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Overview 
In 2007, New York City’s Center for Economic Opportunity launched Opportunity NYC–Family Re-
wards, an experimental, privately funded, conditional cash transfer (CCT) program to help families 
break the cycle of poverty. CCT programs offer cash assistance to reduce immediate hardship, but con-
dition these transfers on families’ efforts to build up their “human capital,” often by developing the 
education and skills that may reduce their poverty over the longer term. Family Rewards is the first 
comprehensive CCT program in a developed country. 
Aimed at low-income families in six of New York City’s highest-poverty communities, Family Re-
wards ties cash rewards to pre-specified activities and outcomes in children’s education, families’ pre-
ventive health care, and parents’ employment. The three-year program is being operated by Seedco — 
a private, nonprofit intermediary organization — in partnership with six community-based organiza-
tions. It is being evaluated by MDRC through a randomized control trial involving approximately 4,800 
families and 11,000 children, half of whom can receive the cash incentives if they meet the required 
conditions, and half who have been assigned to a control group that cannot receive the incentives. This 
report presents initial findings during the program’s early operating period.  
Key Findings 
Despite initial challenges in understanding the program’s large number of incentives and related pay-
ment requirements, nearly all families eventually earned rewards — more than $6,000, on average, over 
the first two years. In addition, effects from Family Rewards varied across a wide range of outcome 
measures — for example, the program:  
 Reduced current poverty and hardship, including hunger and some housing and health care 
hardships 
 Increased savings and the likelihood that parents would have bank accounts, and reduced the use of 
alternative banking institutions (such as check cashers) 
 Did not improve school outcomes overall for elementary or middle school students, but did in-
crease school attendance, course credits, grade advancement, and standardized test results among 
better-prepared high school students 
 Somewhat increased families’ continuous use of health insurance coverage, reduced their reliance 
on hospital emergency rooms for routine care, and increased their receipt of medical care 
 Substantially increased families’ receipt of preventive dental care 
 Increased employment in jobs that are not covered by the unemployment insurance (UI) system but 
reduced employment in UI-covered jobs 
Because only the first 12 to 24 months of the program are covered — including a “start-up” phase dur-
ing which operational “kinks” were being worked out — it is too soon to draw firm conclusions about 
the full potential of Family Rewards. Future reports will present longer-term findings, eventually cov-
ering all three years of program operations plus two additional years after the cash incentives are no 
longer offered. 
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Preface 
Is it inevitable that poverty will be handed down from parent to child? Or is it possible 
to create an opportunity for parents to offer the next generation a better inheritance? In New 
York City, the experimental antipoverty program called Opportunity NYC–Family Rewards is 
trying to answer those questions by helping to reduce families’ poverty and hardship today 
while simultaneously helping them to develop their “human capital” — that is, the skills and 
capacities that will allow parents and their children to escape poverty over the longer term and 
break the cycle of intergenerational poverty. 
Not an easy task — particularly in a city as large and diverse as New York. But efforts 
have been made in that direction elsewhere — perhaps most famously, in Mexico’s highly suc-
cessful Oportunidades program, which is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program and was 
one of the main inspirations for Family Rewards. CCT programs offer cash incentives to help 
families reduce their poverty in the short term if they take certain steps to improve their and 
their children’s futures. Oportunidades provides direct cash payments to very poor families, 
which it initially offered in rural areas and later expanded to urban areas, that are conditioned in 
part on children’s continued school enrollment, families’ use of preventive health care, and 
good child nutrition practices. 
But while CCT programs have shown some promise in Mexico and in other poor and 
middle-income countries, they have not been attempted on a large, broad-ranging scale in any 
developed country. In 2006, mindful of the differences between Mexico’s rural poor (where the 
most evidence had been amassed) and the urban poor in this country, but impressed by the suc-
cess of Oportunidades and other countries’ CCT programs, Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s Center 
for Economic Opportunity (CEO) began to explore whether a CCT program could be adapted 
for use in New York City’s poorest neighborhoods. By 2007, Opportunity NYC–Family Re-
wards had been born. Aware that a CCT program would be controversial, CEO sought and ob-
tained private funding for the initiative in the hope that, if it were successful, the federal gov-
ernment would provide additional support to expand the program to cities nationwide.  
Despite much consternation on both the right and the left about the advisability and fea-
sibility (and even the morality) of using conditional cash transfers, especially for educational 
outcomes, no hard data on the use of a comprehensive CCT program in an American city have 
been available to either refute or substantiate their objections — just theories and beliefs. Now, 
data collection and analysis have begun for Family Rewards, with the goal of hastening the time 
when ideology meets evidence. 
xvi 
It was the vision of CEO and its philanthropic partners for this initiative that Opportu-
nity NYC–Family Rewards had the potential to help low-income New Yorkers while also 
building evidence on a poverty reduction strategy that could have national and international 
importance. It is MDRC’s hope that the findings from this program will inform efforts both 
here and abroad not only to reduce poverty in the short term but to prevent its ongoing recur-
rence in the future. 
Gordon Berlin 
President 
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Executive Summary  
In 2007, New York City launched Opportunity NYC–Family Rewards, an experimen-
tal, privately funded, conditional cash transfer (CCT) program to help families break the cycle 
of intergenerational poverty. CCT programs offer cash assistance to reduce immediate hardship 
and poverty but condition this assistance — or cash transfers — on families’ efforts to improve 
their “human capital” (typically, children’s educational achievement and family health) in the 
hope of reducing their poverty over the longer term. Such programs have grown rapidly across 
lower- and middle-income countries, and evaluations have found some important successes. 
Family Rewards is the first comprehensive CCT program in a developed country.  
Aimed at low-income families in six of New York City’s highest-poverty communities, 
Family Rewards ties cash rewards to a pre-specified set of activities and outcomes in the areas 
of children’s education, family preventive health care, and parents’ employment. The program 
is available to 2,400 families for three years. Inspired by Mexico’s pioneering Oportunidades 
program, Family Rewards’ program effects are being measured via a randomized control trial. 
The Family Rewards demonstration is one of 40 initiatives sponsored by New York 
City’s Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO), a unit within the Office of Mayor Michael R. 
Bloomberg that is responsible for testing innovative strategies to reduce the number of New 
Yorkers who are living in poverty. Two national, New York-based nonprofit organizations — 
MDRC, a nonpartisan social policy research firm, and Seedco, a workforce and economic de-
velopment organization — worked in close partnership with CEO to design the demonstration. 
Seedco, together with a small network of local community-based organizations, is operating 
Family Rewards, and MDRC is conducting the evaluation and managing the overall demonstra-
tion. A consortium of private funders is supporting the project.1
This report presents the initial findings from an ongoing and comprehensive evaluation 
of Family Rewards. It examines the program’s implementation in the field and families’ re-
sponses to it during the first two of its three years of operations. This evaluation period, begin-
ning in September 2007 and ending in August 2009, encompasses a start-up phase as well as a 
stage when the program was beginning to mature. The report also presents early findings on the 
program’s effects, or “impacts,” on a wide range of outcome measures. For some measures, the 
results cover only the first program year, while for others they also cover part or all of the 
second year. No data are available yet on the third year. The evaluation findings are based on 
  
                                                   
1These funders include Bloomberg Philanthropies, The Rockefeller Foundation, The Starr Foundation, the 
Open Society Institute, the Robin Hood Foundation, the Tiger Foundation, The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
American International Group, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and New York Commu-
nity Trust. 
ES-2 
analyses of a wide variety of administrative records data, responses to a survey of parents that 
was administered about 18 months after random assignment, and qualitative in-depth interviews 
with program staff and families.  
Overall, this study shows that, despite an extraordinarily rapid start-up and early chal-
lenges, the program was operating largely as intended by its second year. Although many fami-
lies struggled with the complexity of the program, most were substantially engaged with it and 
received a large amount of money for meeting the conditions it established. During the period 
covered by the report, Family Rewards reduced current poverty (its main short-term goal) and 
produced a range of effects on a variety of outcomes across all three program domains (chil-
dren’s education, family health care, and parents’ work and training).  
The Program Model 
All CCT programs condition immediate poverty relief on families’ investments in hu-
man capital, especially in children. In adopting this core principle, the designers of Family Re-
wards understood that the model and its delivery structure would have to be adapted to suit a 
vastly different social, economic, and policy context. The nature of poverty and its underlying 
causes are not the same in New York City as in Mexico or other middle-income and lower-
income countries. The focus of Family Rewards on parents’ work and children’s academic 
achievement (not just school attendance), its delivery by not-for-profit organizations, and the 
way it complements existing social welfare programs and services are among the features that 
distinguish New York City’s program from many other CCT programs. 
Types of Rewards 
New York City’s program includes an extensive set of rewards with the following 
conditions:  
• Education-focused conditions, which include meeting goals for children’s 
attendance in school, achievement levels on standardized tests, and other 
school progress markers, as well as parents’ engagement with their chil-
dren’s education 
• Health-focused conditions, which include maintaining health insurance 
coverage for parents and their children, as well as obtaining age-appropriate 
preventive medical and dental checkups for each family member 
• Workforce-focused conditions, aimed at parents, which include sustain-
ing full-time work and participation in approved education or job training 
activities 
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The program offered a set of 22 different incentives during its first two years, ranging in 
value from $20 to $600. (See Table ES.1 for a detailed list.) By rewarding a wide range of ac-
tivities, the program gave families many different ways in which to earn money and it was able 
to avoid attaching overly large amounts of money to any one activity or outcome. Based on as-
sessments of the program’s early operational experiences, including the complexity of adminis-
tering so many different rewards, along with preliminary impact evidence, a number of rewards 
were discontinued for the third year. This was done to simplify the program, lower its costs, and 
make it easier to replicate should it prove to be successful.2
The program allows families to receive cash rewards totaling several thousand dollars 
per year over a three-year period. The actual amount that families receive depends on the particu-
lar rewards they earn (some carry higher payments than others) and the number of rewards they 
earn. In addition, larger families can earn higher payments because each child’s actions can earn 
education and health rewards. In general, payments are made directly to the parents. However, 
some education-related payments for high school students are paid directly to the students; de-
pending on the reward, the entire payment is made to the student (for example, for passing a Re-
gents exam) or split with the parents (for example, for meeting the attendance standard).  
  
Like all CCT programs, Family Rewards is based on the assumption that, for a variety 
of reasons, families may underinvest in their own human capital development. That lack of in-
vestment — while certainly not the only reason for their financial hardship — can make it diffi-
cult for parents and their children to escape poverty. The cash payments, in addition to being a 
short-term income supplement to reduce hardship immediately, are intended to function as 
enabling resources and as inducements. As enabling resources, the extra money families earn, 
as it begins to accumulate, may make it more feasible for them to support and promote their 
children’s educational progress, obtain preventive health care, and pursue employment oppor-
tunities; as inducements, the rewards may encourage families to make extra investments of time 
and energy for those purposes. To maximize the potential incentive value of the rewards, the 
program imposes no restrictions on how families can spend the money. 
As noted above, the Family Rewards model differs in important ways from CCT ap-
proaches in other countries. In many countries, CCT programs function as the main govern-
ment-sponsored safety net, or as an important component of it, and they most commonly tie the 
payments only to children’s school enrollment and attendance and to routine health checkups.
                                                   
2The discontinued incentives include the attendance reward for elementary and middle school students, the 
rewards to parents for discussing their children’s annual English language arts (ELA) and math test results with 
teachers, rewards for obtaining library cards, all health insurance rewards, and the rewards for making doctor-
recommended follow-up visits.  
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The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Table ES.1 
Schedule of Rewards 
 
Activity Reward Amount 
 Education incentives 
Elementary and middle school students  
     Attends 95% of scheduled school days (discontinued after Year 2)      $25 per month 
     Scores at proficiency level (or improves) on annual  
     math and English language arts (ELA) tests 
          Elementary school students 
          Middle school students 
 
$300 per math test; $300 per ELA test 
$350 per math test; $350 per ELA test 
     Parent reviews low-stakes interim tests (discontinued after Year 1) $25 for parents to download, print, and review 
results (up to 5 times per year) 
     Parent discusses annual math and ELA test results with 
     teachers (discontinued after Year 2) 
 
$25 (up to 2 tests per year) 
High school students  
     Attends 95% of scheduled school days $50 per month 
     Accumulates 11 course credits per year  $600  
     Passes Regents exams  $600 per exam passed (up to 5 exams)  
     Takes PSAT test  $50 for taking the test (up to 2 times)  
     Graduates from high school  $400 bonus 
All  grades  
     Parent attends parent-teacher conferences $25 per conference (up to 2 times per year) 
     Child obtains library card (discontinued after Year 2) $50 once during program 
 Health incentives 
Maintaining public or private health insurance (discontinued after Year 2) 
     For each parent covered 
     If all children are covered 
 
Per month: $20 (public); $50 (private) 
Per month: $20 (public); $50 (private) 
Annual medical checkup  $200 per family member (once per year) 
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit (discontinued after Year 2) $100 per family member (once per year) 
Early-intervention evaluation for child under 30 months old,  
if advised by pediatrician  
 
$200 per child (once per year) 
Preventive dental care (cleaning/checkup) $100 per family member (once per year for 
children 1-5 years old; twice per year for fami-
ly members 6 years of age or older)  
 Workforce incentives 
Sustained full-time employment $150 per month 
Education and training while employed at least 10 hours per week (em-
ployment requirement discontinued after Year 2) 
Amount varies by length of course, up to a 
maximum of $3,000 over three years 
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Family Rewards includes many more conditions and rewards. In the education domain, it is un-
usual in rewarding children’s school achievement, including test score results, not just school 
enrollment and attendance. Its work-related component for parents is also distinctive. And as a 
short-term intervention layered on top of an already well-developed social safety net, Family 
Rewards serves as a supplemental program rather than as the core welfare system, as in Mexico 
and a number of other countries. It is also unusual in being operated by private, nonprofit agen-
cies rather than by the government.  
The Delivery Structure 
Seedco, the main implementing agency, assembled a network of local organizations in 
the designated community districts to assist in implementing Family Rewards. Called “Neigh-
borhood Partner Organizations” (NPOs), these agencies recruited and enrolled eligible families 
into the research sample and now serve as the face of the program in the communities.3 They 
provide ongoing customer service to participants who request assistance, such as in making 
claims for the rewards or for information about other services in the community. NPOs also 
conduct informational workshops on how to earn and claim rewards in each of the domains in 
which the incentives are offered. Seedco maintains a telephone helpline and Web site to provide 
additional information and assistance to families. 
Once Seedco verifies that families have earned rewards (which it does using a combi-
nation of automated data from city agencies and special “coupon book” forms submitted di-
rectly by participants), it initiates a process of transferring payments electronically into partici-
pants’ newly opened or existing bank accounts or, if they prefer, onto stored value cards 
(prepaid cards, like gift cards or prepaid phone cards, that are not connected to any individual 
account holder). To provide families with a safe banking option, New York City officials 
worked with several banks and credit unions to develop special “Opportunity NYC accounts” 
that carry no fees and come with debit cards that are impossible to overdraw. The reward pay-
ments are made every two months, and families can access the money at any time through any 
automatic teller machine (ATM).  
Envisioned as an “incentives-only” intervention, the program model does not provide 
social services or case management. For example, it makes no provision for staff to work with 
families to develop personalized action plans for pursuing education, health care, or employ-
ment goals, and staff members do not provide ongoing counseling to families to address per-
sonal problems that make it difficult for them to take full advantage of the program. The pro-
                                                   
3These organizations are Urban Health Plan and BronxWorks (formerly Citizens Advice Bureau) in the 
Bronx; Brownsville Multi-Service Center and Groundwork, Inc., in Brooklyn; and Catholic Charities and Un-
ion Settlement Association in Manhattan.  
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gram also does not provide any direct services, such as tutoring, test preparation, job search 
classes, or skills training. However, it does include an information-and-referral component 
wherein the implementing agencies (Seedco and the NPOs) refer families (upon request) to oth-
er agencies in the community that provide relevant services.  
The Study Sample and the Recruitment Process  
Family Rewards is being evaluated through a randomized control trial involving ap-
proximately 4,800 families and 11,000 children who applied to the program. The program could 
not serve all applicants, and the selection of participants was determined on a random basis. 
Through a lottery-like process, half of the applicant families were picked for Family Rewards 
and offered the incentives and half were assigned to a control group that was not offered the 
incentives. Using such a random process to allocate sample members to one group or the other 
helps ensure that the program effects estimated by the evaluation are truly a result of the inter-
vention. 
Family Rewards was targeted toward families who lived in selected community dis-
tricts and who had incomes at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty level. Eligible fami-
lies had to have at least one child in the fourth, seventh, or ninth grade. These grades were se-
lected because they are at or near the start of critical transition points in education. Once a 
family volunteered for the study, all children in the family who were school age or younger 
were eligible for the program. However, the parents as well as the children had to be legal resi-
dents of the United States in order to be eligible.  
Following an initial design and fundraising effort that concluded in the spring of 2007, 
an intensive effort was quickly launched in the summer of 2007 to begin building the program 
infrastructure, recruit families, and implement the random assignment process in time for pro-
gram operations to begin with the start of the new school year in September 2007. To ensure 
that the program reached a broad cross-section of children, not just the most motivated and ac-
tive, potentially eligible families living in the targeted communities were identified from school 
lists maintained by the New York City Department of Education. Seedco and the NPOs then 
attempted to recruit a representative group of those families through mailings, phone calls, and 
home visits, inviting them to apply to be in the study. Those who agreed were randomly as-
signed to the program or control group. Several analyses comparing families who entered the 
sample with those who were not in the study suggest that, despite its voluntary nature, the re-
cruited sample is not a distinctively more advantaged or less advantaged subset of the broader 
target population.  
As it turned out, the challenges of recruiting so many families so quickly — particularly 
in light of the fact that much of the contact information that was available to the recruiters was 
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out of date — meant that it took longer than had been hoped to recruit the full sample, so the 
enrollment period was extended through December 2007. Thus, some families did not enter the 
program until a few months after it began (which is one reason why the first program year is 
considered a start-up phase).  
A majority of the families (81 percent) who enrolled in Family Rewards were one-
parent families at the time of random assignment, but they have a diverse set of background 
characteristics. For example, over half of all families (57 percent) had only one or two children, 
but 43 percent had three or more. About 47 percent of the families were Hispanic/Latino, while 
most others (51 percent) were black, non-Hispanic/Latino. Just over half of the parents (53 per-
cent) were employed, with about 37 percent working full time. About a third (32 percent) had 
only a high school diploma or General Educational Development (GED) certificate, and about 
18 percent had an associate’s or bachelor’s degree, while 50 percent had not completed high 
school and did not have a GED certificate. About 83 percent were U.S. citizens, while the rest 
(17 percent) were legal permanent residents.  
Implementation and Reward Receipt 
As the first comprehensive CCT program in the United States, Family Rewards was 
breaking new ground, and given the model’s many facets and its many operational demands — 
recruiting, informing, verifying, and paying participants on a trial basis — its operational feasi-
bility and success could not be taken for granted. The experience to date indicates that the mod-
el is feasible — though challenging — to operate. 
• The organizations operating Family Rewards succeeded in implement-
ing all the major program systems and procedures that the model re-
quires, although it took until the second year for the program to operate 
as envisioned.  
The rapid launch precluded a pilot phase to work out operational problems. Conse-
quently, the first year of the program was one in which procedures for engaging families, edu-
cating them about the rewards, verifying claims, and making payments were still being refined, 
all while some sample members were still being enrolled into the study. Not surprisingly, some 
aspects of program delivery suffered as a result, especially in initial efforts to orient and explain 
the complex set of rewards to families. However, as the program matured and staff developed 
more experience in operating it, many of these early challenges were overcome, and, by the 
time the 18-month survey was conducted, participants gave high ratings to the assistance they 
received from the program.  
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By the second year of implementation, program operations were much improved and 
the model was being operated in a way that was generally consistent with its designers’ vision. 
Over the first two program years, more than $14 million in rewards had been paid to families. 
Further improvements in operating procedures were being planned as the program entered its 
third and final year. 
• Parents understood the program’s general offer and purposes but many 
were initially confused about some of the details, requiring the providers 
to make ongoing efforts to educate families about the specific rewards 
and how to claim them.  
Survey and in-depth qualitative data reveal that parents possessed a good general 
awareness of the incentives, but their understanding was fuzzy in some places. For example, 
they tended to view more school-related activities and behavior as qualifying for incentives than 
was actually the case. This may indicate that participants believed that positive behavior in gen-
eral would be rewarded. Such a misperception may have positive effects on families, but it 
shows that knowledge of the program offer was imprecise.  
Qualitative data suggest wide variation in the level of understanding that children and 
youth who were enrolled in the program may have had about the rewards. While some parents 
discussed the program in detail with their elementary or middle school-age children and viewed 
the rewards as another tool to motivate their children, others provided only limited information, 
not wanting to emphasize money as a reason for achievement. High school students, who could 
receive some incentives directly, were the target of independent marketing efforts, although 
these efforts were not undertaken until the second year of operations as it became clear that 
many of the participating high school students did not fully understand — or believe — that 
they could earn money for their school attendance and performance.  
• Overall, families were substantially engaged with the program, earning 
reward payments of more than $6,000, on average, in the first two years.  
Nearly all families (98 percent) earned at least some rewards in both program years, and 
65 percent earned payments in every period in which rewards were available. Payments aver-
aged more than $6,000 during the first two program years combined, with 78 percent earning at 
least $3,000, and 37 percent earning $7,000 or more. Families receiving the highest amounts of 
money included parents who, at the time of entering the study, were more educated, more likely 
to be working full time, and more likely to be married or in a legal domestic partnership than 
parents in other families. The higher-reward earners also had more children and were less likely 
to be receiving government safety net benefits. They also had greater levels of contact with the 
NPOs and Seedco and less difficulty keeping track of their claims for rewards.  
ES-9 
Families’ overall reward earnings came largely from meeting conditions in the educa-
tion and health domains: 44 percent for meeting education conditions, 38 percent for meeting 
health-related conditions, and 18 percent for meeting work-related conditions.  
 Parents used the money earned from Family Rewards to provide for  
basic family needs and to celebrate their children’s achievements.  
 Family Rewards imposed no restrictions on families’ access to their reward money or 
how they could spend it, and families used the extra money in a variety of ways. Common uses 
included paying for basic living expenses, paying off bills, paying for school-related supplies or 
activities, saving for the future, buying electronic goods, and covering special recreational out-
ings for the family, sometimes as a reward for school accomplishments. For many families, cel-
ebration of accomplishments took the form of spending time together on leisure activities, like 
eating out, going on a trip, or seeing a movie that would otherwise have been prohibitively ex-
pensive, especially for larger families with limited means. Many parents also used the money 
for children’s allowances.  
Interim Impacts 
Findings on the program’s impacts — that is, the differences in outcomes for the Fami-
ly Rewards program group and the control group — are available on a wide variety of measures 
covering one to two years after each family’s time of entry into the study, depending on the data 
source. Thus, the results reported here provide only an early indication of the program’s effects. 
Given the nature of the model, it is reasonable to expect that, if Family Rewards is successful, 
its effects in the short term will be most evident for measures of poverty and material hardship, 
which can be directly influenced by transferring resources. Its impacts on human capital out-
comes, which require changes in how family members spend their time and energy, and, in 
some cases, necessitate learning new skills, may take longer to emerge.  
 Family Rewards had a wide range of effects across a number of domains 
and outcome measures.  
The overall pattern of impacts is noteworthy for its broad scope: early positive impacts 
on current poverty,4 small or modest impacts on some measures of human capital, and no effect 
on a number of other important outcomes of interest. (See Tables ES.2 and ES.3.) 
                                                   
4In this study, poverty estimates were computed by comparing parents’ cash income (excluding tax cred-
its) and food stamps with the federal poverty levels for families of various sizes.  
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Program Control Difference Change
Outcome Group Group (Impact) (%)
Poverty and hardship (%)
Household income at or below the federal poverty level 58.9 70.0 -11.1 *** -15.8
Household income below 50% of the federal poverty level 16.7 30.0 -13.2 *** -44.1
Family "sometimes" or "often" does not have enough 
food to eat 14.8 22.1 -7.3 *** -32.9
Family usually did not have enough money to make ends 
meet at end of month 34.1 41.8 -7.8 *** -18.5
Banking and savings 
Parent agrees "strongly" or "somewhat" that current 
financial situation is "better than last year" (%) 62.7 44.5 18.3 *** 41.1
Parent currently has bank account (%) 73.3 51.8 21.5 *** 41.4
Parent cashes check at check casher at least 
once a month (%) 29.2 36.5 -7.3 *** -19.9
Family's average savings ($) 575 354 221 ** 62.6
Parent's use of health services and parent's health status (%)
Had a period with no health insurance coverage since 
random assignment 16.1 19.4 -3.3 ** -17.0
Has a personal doctor or health care provider 94.4 93.4 1.0 --
Has a usual source of health care 94.9 91.4 3.5 *** 3.8
Uses hospital emergency room for routine health care 3.3 5.3 -2.0 *** -38.1
Saw a personal doctor in the past 12 months 86.1 82.3 3.8 *** 4.6
Had a health checkup since random assignment 93.2 91.7 1.5 --
Currently being treated for any medical condition 47.2 44.4 2.8 * 6.3
Self-rated health is "excellent" 15.8 13.5 2.3 * 17.3
Had a dental visit since random assignment
At least 1 visit 86.0 83.0 3.0 ** 3.6
At least 2 visits 67.4 57.9 9.5 *** 16.3
(continued) 
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table ES.2
Impacts on Selected Outcomes Measuring Poverty, Hardship, Health, and Work
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Table ES.2 (continued) 
Program Control Difference Change
Outcome Group Group (Impact) (%)
High school student's use of health services (%)
Had health checkup or got shots in past 12 months 96.1 95.8 0.3 --
Has usual source of care when sick 96.1 96.0 0.1 --
Hospital emergency room 9.8 15.9 -6.1 *** -38.4
Other place 86.3 80.1 6.2 ** 7.8
Had a dental visit since random assignment
At least 1 visit 92.7 89.6 3.1 --
At least 2 visits 70.3 57.2 13.1 *** 23.0
Employment
Employment status, UI recordsa
Ever employed, Year 1  (%) 56.2 58.6 -2.4 *** -4.1
Average quarterly employment (%) 48.9 50.3 -1.4 * -2.8
Average earnings, Year 1 ($) 12,091 12,377 -286 --
Employment status, survey (%)
Currently working 59.9 54.3 5.6 *** 10.4
Worked full time (at least 30 hours per week) 48.6 43.0 5.6 *** 12.9
Parent's education and training (%)
Ever participated in an education, training, 
or employment activity 37.3 39.6 -2.3 --
Has any trade license or training certification 54.2 51.2 3.0 * 5.9
Highest degree or diploma
Associate's degree 10.2 7.7 2.5 ** 32.1
Bachelor's degree 8.4 8.3 0.1 --
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey and New York State 
unemployment insurance (UI) wage records.
NOTES: See tables in the complete report for further details on the data in this table.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
aDollar averages include zero values for sample members who were not employed.
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Table ES.3
Impacts on Selected Education Outcomes 
Program Control Difference Change 
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) (%)
4th-grade cohort
Had attendance rate of 95% or higher, Year 2 44.5 41.6 2.9 0.0 --
Proficient on math test, Year 2 80.3 78.6 1.7 0.0 --
Proficient on English language arts (ELA) test, Year 2 67.6 68.1 -0.4 0.0 --
7th-grade cohort 
Had attendance rate of 95% or higher, Year 2 36.6 34.9 1.6 0.0 --
Proficient on math test, Year 2 61.9 63.5 -1.6 0.0 --
Proficient on English language Arts (ELA) test, Year 2 46.5 46.0 0.5 0.0 --
9th-grade cohort 
Had attendance rate of 95% or higher, Year 2 28.8 23.7 5.2 *** 21.8
Remained in 9th grade 16.3 18.0 -1.8 0.0 --
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1-2 38.2 37.6 0.7 0.0 --
Earned 22 or more credits, Years 1-2 41.0 41.1 -0.1 0.0 --
9th-grade cohort, by proficiency level
on 8th-grade standardized math testa
Had attendance rate of 95% or higher, Year 2 †††
More proficient subgroup 51.1 36.2 14.9 *** 41.2
Less proficient subgroup 21.8 19.3 2.5 0.0 --
Remained in 9th grade, Year 2 †
More proficient subgroup 3.0 8.8 -5.8 *** -66.3
Less proficient subgroup 22.1 21.8 0.3 0.0 --
Earned 22 credits, Years 1-2 ††
More proficient subgroup 72.7 64.5 8.1 ** 12.6
Less proficient subgroup 38.1 40.1 -2.0 0.0 --
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1-2 †
More proficient subgroup 77.6 71.7 5.9 * 8.2
Less proficient subgroup 22.9 25.2 -2.3 0.0 --
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SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels are 
indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of family or sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively
aProficiency levels are based on performance on the annual New York State math test administered in the 
eighth grade, prior to the student's entering the Family Rewards sample. In New York State, students who score at 
a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed  "proficient." Similar results were attained when proficiency 
was defined in terms of performance on the annual ELA test. 
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Poverty and Hardship 
• Family Rewards reduced current poverty and economic hardship, in-
cluding reductions in difficulties securing enough food for the family 
and some housing and health care hardships. 
The reduction of current poverty and hardship is a key short-term objective of Family 
Rewards, as it is for all CCT programs. In this area, Family Rewards substantially improved 
families’ economic position in its first two years. Counting the value of the reward payments, it 
boosted average monthly income for the program group by $338, or about 21 percent relative to 
the control group’s income. As shown in Table ES.2, it reduced the proportion of families with 
household income at or below the federal poverty level by 11 percentage points and cut “severe 
poverty” (defined as having income less than 50 percent of the federal poverty level) by nearly 
half, reducing it from 30 percent of the control group to 17 percent among the program group. 
(All impacts discussed in this summary are statistically significant unless otherwise noted, thus 
indicating a high degree of confidence that the observed differences between program and con-
trol groups are most likely a result of the program rather than of chance.) 
The extra income helped families reduce a variety of material hardships. For example, 
the proportion of families who suffered from “food insecurity” (as indicated by parents respond-
ing on the 18-month survey that their families “sometimes” or “often times” did not have 
enough to eat) dropped from 22 percent in the control group to 15 percent in the program group, 
a reduction of 7 percentage points (or 33 percent).5
• Family Rewards increased the likelihood that parents would have bank 
accounts and that they would increase their savings. It also reduced the 
use of alternative banking institutions (such as check cashers).  
 Relative to the control group, program group 
families were also less likely to report that they had to forgo medical care or avoid purchasing 
needed medicines because they could not afford them (not shown in table). They were more 
likely to report that they had enough money to “make ends meet” and that their financial situa-
tion had improved over the prior year. 
The families in Family Rewards were 9 percentage points more likely than those in the 
control group to have any savings (25 percent compared with 16 percent, respectively). Average 
savings for the program group (counting those with no savings) increased by $221 (a gain of 63 
percent against a control group mean of $354). The program also increased the likelihood that 
parents would have bank accounts at the time of the survey by 22 percentage points. At the 
same time, it reduced parents’ reliance on alternative financial institutions, such as neighbor-
hood check-cashing outlets, by 7 percentage points.  
                                                   
5Slight discrepancies in percentages are a result of rounding. 
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Education 
• Family Rewards did not improve school outcomes for elementary or 
middle school students.  
The analysis examined the effects of Family Rewards on school attendance rates and on 
annual standardized test scores in math and English language arts (ELA) during the first two 
years of the program. Among elementary and middle school students, it found few statistically 
significant differences on these measures between students in the program group and those in 
the control group. (For selected measures, see Table ES.3.) The absence of effects on attendance 
measures is not surprising because, although there was still room for improvement, attendance 
rates were fairly high for the control group, averaging about 90 percent. Data from the parent 
survey indicate that Family Rewards increased the likelihood that middle school students were 
more likely than control group members to be involved in school-related activities, such as pro-
grams to help with schoolwork or homework, school clubs, school musical programs, and dance 
or art lessons. However, there is no indication so far that these extra efforts have translated into 
higher academic achievement in school.  
• Family Rewards substantially improved the educational achievement of 
high school students who were better prepared for high school at the 
time they entered the program. 
The program had few effects on school outcomes for high school students overall. 
However, it had impressive effects for a subgroup of high school students who entered high 
school better prepared academically and may have been in a better position to take advantage of 
the incentives offer. For example, among ninth-graders who had scored at or above the basic 
proficiency level on their eighth-grade standardized tests prior to random assignment (a sub-
group that made up about a third of the overall sample of ninth-graders), the program had sub-
stantial positive effects across a range of school outcomes. These include a 6 percentage point 
reduction in the proportion of students who repeated the ninth grade, a 15 percentage point in-
crease in the likelihood of having a 95 percent or better attendance rate (in Year 2), an 8 per-
centage point increase in the likelihood of earning at least 22 credits (11 credits per year are 
needed to remain on track for on-time graduation), and an increase of 6 percentage points in the 
likelihood of passing at least two Regents exams.6
                                                   
6Regents exams are administered to all public high school students in New York State. Students must pass 
at least five tests in specified subject areas in order to graduate with a diploma recognized by the New York 
State Board of Regents, which sets standards and regulations for all public schools. 
 These effects are noteworthy because they 
occurred without any changes in the schools themselves or in teachers’ instructional practices. 
Moreover, they were observed among sample members who attended lower-performing schools 
and those who attended higher-performing schools. No statistically significant effects of these 
ES-15 
kinds were observed for ninth-graders who had scored below the proficiency threshold on the 
eighth-grade standardized exams prior to random assignment, although there was evidence that 
these students were more likely than their control group counterparts to take a Regents exam.  
Given that families were left largely on their own to find ways to earn the incentives in 
Family Rewards, it is understandable that the achievement gains would be larger for the more 
proficient subgroup. These students were staying afloat academically and probably had the per-
sonal and other resources necessary to take advantage of the incentives that were offered. The 
incentives offer may have provided enough inducement for many of them to expend the extra 
effort to meet educational benchmarks. In contrast, the less proficient students may have faced 
too many barriers, both academic and otherwise, and were too distant from educational bench-
marks for the incentives to make a difference. 
Some critics of educational incentives worry that these external rewards will reduce 
children’s intrinsic motivation to learn, especially after the incentives end, thus harming their 
educational outcomes. So far, there is no indication that the Family Rewards incentives have 
caused any such negative effects, but a credible assessment of that risk can only be made after 
the rewards end and once longer-term data are available.  
Health 
• By small to modest amounts, Family Rewards increased families’ consis-
tent maintenance of health insurance coverage, reduced their reliance 
on hospital emergency rooms for routine care, and increased their re-
ceipt of medical care. It produced substantial increases in their receipt of 
preventive dental care.  
The health-related incentives of the Family Rewards program were designed to encour-
age low-income families to adopt better preventive health care practices. It turned out that a 
higher proportion of families than the program’s designers had expected were already receiving 
health insurance coverage and practicing preventive health care. This finding may reflect the 
success of efforts by New York State and New York City to expand access to health coverage 
in recent years. The State’s and City’s success limited the program’s ability to improve some 
health practices and behavior further for this sample.  
Nonetheless, the analysis found that Family Rewards has had a number of promising 
impacts to date on some important health-related indicators. For example, as shown in Table 
ES.2, it reduced the likelihood that parents or their children would experience an interruption in 
health insurance coverage by 3 percentage points, and it increased the likelihood that parents 
and high school students got the recommended two dental checkups/cleanings per year by 10 
percentage points or more. The program also reduced reliance on emergency rooms for care for 
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routine illnesses among parents and high school students by 2 percentage points and 6 percen-
tage points, respectively. It also caused small improvements in parents’ self-ratings of their 
health and their likelihood of currently being treated for any medical condition.  
Employment 
• Family Rewards’ early impacts on employment outcomes are mixed. 
The early findings point to gains in the likelihood of full-time employ-
ment and average earnings but not in jobs covered by the unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) system.  
According to the 18-month survey of parents, the program increased the likelihood of 
working at the time of the interview by 6 percentage points, driven by an increase in full-time 
work (see Table ES.2). However, the program also led to a small reduction in average quarterly 
employment rates (by 1.4 percentage points) in UI-covered jobs over a 12-month follow-up pe-
riod, according to administrative records data. The effect on average annual earnings in UI-
covered jobs (a decline of $286) was not statistically significant.  
It is important to recall that some jobs are not covered by the UI system, such as self-
employment, federal government employment, and domestic work. In addition, the UI system 
also misses informal (casual or irregular) jobs that are never reported to state agencies. It is not 
clear why the effects of the program would vary across types of employment. Perhaps for some 
parents, non-UI jobs were easier to get in today’s economy, particularly those that offered the 
full-time hours necessary to qualify for the program’s work rewards. Such jobs may also have 
been more attractive options if they were more conveniently located, easier to obtain, or offered 
more flexible schedules than UI-covered jobs.  
It is also not clear why the program did not lead to larger increases in all types of em-
ployment (UI-covered and not), a finding that stands in contrast to previous work incentives 
programs. Perhaps during the first year, families were not focused on the work rewards — 
which were not heavily marketed by the program until Year 2. For example, some of the early 
messaging from the community-based organizations that recruited and explained the program to 
participants emphasized completing the paperwork to get rewards for activities in which family 
members were already engaged, rather than stressing the value of new activities, like taking a 
job. In addition, to engage participants and gain their trust, the organizations initially conveyed a 
strong sense that the program was primarily about their children’s education and health. If par-
ticipants concluded that it was their job to make sure their children were attending and doing 
well in school, they may have been less focused on the program’s employment incentives. In 
addition, the added income that families received from the education and health rewards may 
have offset the program’s work incentive for some participants. Longer-term follow up will be 
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important for assessing how the increased marketing of the workforce rewards in Year 2, 
coupled with the worsening of the economy at that time, affect these results. 
Family Composition 
 Family Rewards increased by a small amount the proportion of parents 
who married, as well as the proportion who divorced.  
According to self-reported data from the 18-month survey, the proportion of parents 
who were married and living with their spouses increased by almost 4 percentage points above 
the control group mean of 16 percent. At the same time, the proportion saying that they were 
divorced was 3 percentage points higher than the 12 percent rate among the controls. Although 
the reasons for these effects are not clear, one possibility is that the increased financial stability 
that some parents experienced made them feel better positioned to change their marital status.  
Conclusion 
Evaluations of CCT programs in other countries have convincingly shown that such 
programs can reduce poverty and improve the consumption of goods and services (for example, 
food consumption) among very poor families — their main short-term objective. CCT pro-
grams have also had some positive effects on human capital development outcomes (although 
the evidence here is more mixed). Overall, the initial results from the New York City project 
show that the concept is feasible to implement and can make a difference in the lives of poor 
families in a developed country. More generally, they provide supporting evidence that the CCT 
approach can both reduce immediate poverty and material hardship and promote at least some 
improvements in human capital investment across the domains of children’s education, family 
health care, and parents’ employment. Importantly, these effects on poverty did not lead to ma-
jor unintended consequences. 
Still, the effects that have been observed so far are generally not large, and, so far, the 
program has not improved educational outcomes for elementary and middle school children. 
Given the start-up issues that the program confronted and the fact that the third and final year of 
operation is still under way, it is too soon to draw firm conclusions about the program’s potential. 
The available impact findings largely reflect the effects of the program during its launch year (for 
some outcome measures) or not long afterward (for other measures). Thus, most of the story of 
Family Rewards remains to be written, and it will be important to assess whether the program’s 
effects grow over time as families’ exposure to it increases. Ultimately, the consistency and 
magnitude of the program’s impacts over the longer term will determine the relevance of a com-
prehensive CCT approach for government antipoverty policy in an American context.  
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The third and final year of the Family Rewards program began in September 2009 and 
will end in August 2010. Although the decision to  discontinue some rewards in order to reduce 
the program’s operating complexity and costs will reduce the maximum amount of money 
families can earn, the simplification of the model — combined with ongoing improvements in 
program marketing and delivery — may help families focus on high-priority rewards that have 
a better chance of increasing their human capital. It remains to be seen whether these operation-
al improvements, and the additional time that a third year provides for families to respond to the 
incentives, increase the magnitude of the impacts that have been observed so far.  
Further evaluation reports, to be issued periodically over the next few years, will present 
longer-term findings on the program’s operations, families’ reactions and experiences, the pro-
gram’s impacts, and its economic costs and benefits. The research team will follow program and 
control group families for a total of five years from the time they entered the study, allowing the 
evaluation to show whether any positive effects achieved during the three years in which the 
program operated persist or grow, or perhaps even turn negative for education or other outcomes, 
after the incentives end. The final evaluation report is slated to be completed in 2013.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In 2007, New York City launched a major new antipoverty initiative called Opportunity 
NYC–Family Rewards, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program to help families break the 
cycle of intergenerational poverty. The first of its kind in the United States, the program ties 
cash rewards for very low-income families to a variety of activities and outcomes related to 
children’s educational efforts and achievement, family preventive health care practices, and 
parents’ employment. The intent of the program, which is available to the participating families 
for three years, is to use these rewards to reduce family poverty and hardships in the short term 
while simultaneously supporting and encouraging families to invest in their own health, 
education, and employment potential — or “human capital development” — for their longer-
term economic security. Family Rewards was inspired by similar initiatives in other countries, 
particularly Mexico’s Oportunidades program, and it is being tested in six of New York’s 
highest-poverty communities through a randomized control trial.  
This report presents initial findings from an ongoing and comprehensive evaluation of 
the project. It examines the experiences of implementing Family Rewards and families’ re-
sponses to the program during the first two of its three years of operations. This period encom-
passes a start-up phase as well as a stage when the program was beginning to mature. The report 
also presents interim findings on the program’s effects, or “impacts,” on a wide range of family 
outcomes. For some impact measures, the results are limited to the first program year, while for 
others they cover part or all of the second year.  
Overall, the report shows that, while it was challenging to launch Family Rewards, this 
version of a comprehensive conditional cash transfer program is feasible to operate in a large 
American city, and that its participating families have already received substantial amounts of 
income through the program. Initial impact findings show that the program has begun to 
achieve its primary short-term goal of reducing current poverty and material hardship. The 
program has also generated some encouraging short-term effects on a number of educational, 
health, and employment outcomes, although it has not done so consistently across all outcomes 
in those domains. The report includes no information on the operation or effects of the program 
during its third year, which was just getting under way as this initial analysis was being con-
cluded. Hence, any lessons suggested by this report are necessarily preliminary. Subsequent 
evaluation documents will offer a longer-term and more complete assessment, eventually 
covering the program’s effects on families through five years after Family Rewards began 
(including two years after the incentives offer ends).  
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Family Rewards is one of 40 initiatives sponsored by New York City’s Center for Eco-
nomic Opportunity (CEO). A unit within the Office of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, CEO was 
created to test a wide range of innovative antipoverty strategies that grew out of a special 
“Poverty Commission” appointed by the Mayor in 2006.1
• Work Rewards, a project that offers work and training incentives to low-
income recipients of government rent subsidies from New York City’s Hous-
ing Choice Voucher (Section 8) program
 Family Rewards is one of three 
incentives-based poverty reduction strategies launched by CEO in 2007. The other two are: 
2
• Spark, a school-based education incentives program that was designed to im-
prove the school performance of fourth- and seventh-graders by rewarding 
good performance on a series of standardized tests administered over the 
course of the academic year
 
3
These three projects differ in important ways, but all offer cash rewards to help low-
income families build human capital. Together they make up a set of demonstration projects 
known collectively as Opportunity NYC, and each is being rigorously evaluated through a 
randomized control trial in which study participants are randomly assigned to either a program 
group, which receives the intervention, or a control group, which does not. Considered the “gold 
standard” for evaluating program effects, random assignment helps ensure that any observed 
differences in outcomes between the two groups are truly a result of the program. A consortium 
of private funders is supporting these studies.
 
4
Two national, New York-based nonprofit organizations — MDRC and Seedco — 
worked in close partnership with CEO to design the Family Rewards and Work Rewards 
demonstrations. MDRC is a nonpartisan, social policy research firm with extensive experience 
conducting large-scale demonstration projects using random assignment research designs to 
build rigorous evidence on what works to improve the well-being of low-income families. 
Seedco works with local organizations to create economic opportunities for disadvantaged 
individuals and communities. The design team, made up of staff from CEO, MDRC, and 
  
                                                   
1For more information on CEO and its history and work, see New York City Center for Economic Oppor-
tunity (2009). 
2See Tessler, Verma, and Riccio (2009). 
3Spark is being evaluated by Harvard Education Labs, which developed the project in partnership with the 
New York City Department of Education. See www.edlabs.harvard.edu for more information. 
4The Opportunity NYC demonstration funders include the Bloomberg Philanthropies, The Rockefeller 
Foundation, The Starr Foundation, the Open Society Institute, the Robin Hood Foundation, the Tiger Founda-
tion, The Annie E. Casey Foundation, American International Group, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, New York Community Trust, and (for Spark only) the Broad Foundation. 
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Seedco, also conferred extensively with other New York City agencies and outside experts.5
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the origins of the Family Rewards demonstra-
tion, the program model, and the overall approach for evaluating the intervention. Subsequent 
chapters present findings to date on the program’s implementation experiences and impacts.  
 
Seedco, together with a small network of local, community-based organizations, is operating the 
Family Rewards and Work Rewards programs, and MDRC is conducting the evaluations.  
Origins of the Family Rewards Demonstration 
In 2006, New York City officials began to explore bold new ways of using financial in-
centives to address some of the root causes of poverty. They initiated this effort after learning 
about successful efforts with CCT programs in Latin America and a growing number of lower- 
and middle-income countries throughout the world. Mexico had pioneered this movement, and 
its experience was known best. Its program, originally called Progresa and now known as 
Oportunidades, provides immediate relief to very poor families, mostly in rural areas, through 
direct cash payments that are conditioned in part on children remaining in school. Traditionally, 
many children drop out of school, particularly in the middle school grades, often to work in the 
fields to help their families earn much-needed income. Oportunidades also offers payments to 
families who get preventive health care and adopt certain child nutrition practices.6
Of course, the urban poverty of New York City is vastly different from the largely rural 
poverty of Mexico, and the reasons for children dropping out of school or performing poorly are 
not the same. Moreover, New York City, like the rest of the United States, already has a well-
developed social safety net, including income support systems for poor families. In contrast, 
Mexico had no national income support system, and its CCT program was instituted as the 
country’s main cash welfare system for poor families.
  
7
                                                   
5Staff from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of Education, 
Human Resources Administration, Department of Consumer Affairs, and Department of Small Business 
Services were the main planning partners on Family Rewards, while the Department for Housing Preservation 
and Development and the New York City Housing Authority were the main planning partners for the Work 
Rewards demonstration.  
 A CCT program in New York City 
6For a comprehensive review of the history and evaluation of Oportunidades, see Levy (2006). For a de-
tailed review of CCT programs worldwide and a synthesis of available evaluation findings, see Fiszbein and 
Schady (2009). Summarizing those findings, Fiszbein and Schady state (pp. 3-4): “CCTs have led poor 
households to make more use of health and education services, a key objective for which they were designed. 
Nevertheless, the evidence on improvements in final outcomes in health and education is more mixed.” The 
authors point to the findings such as positive effects on school enrollment but not on learning outcomes as 
measured by achievement tests, and although some CCT programs have produced positive health outcomes, 
such as reduced stunting and improved nutrition, others have not.  
7Oportunidades now serves about five million households, accounting for almost a fifth of the entire Mex-
ican population (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).  
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would thus have to be adapted to very different conditions. Still, the basic principle of CCTs — 
structuring cash transfers in such a way that promotes human capital development while 
simultaneously alleviating immediate poverty and hardship — was compelling. 
Inspired by the Mexican example, New York City officials wondered whether some 
form of a CCT program could work in their own city, and they began to explore the idea of a 
trial project. To support and assist that exploration, CEO entered into a partnership with the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which envisioned that such a project could provide a new opportunity 
to help low-income New Yorkers while also building evidence on a poverty reduction strategy 
that would have national and international importance. With a special grant from the Rockefel-
ler Foundation, CEO asked MDRC to help design the project, including a rigorous evaluation. 
Subsequently, MDRC engaged Seedco in the planning process, and the three organizations 
worked closely together to come up with a plan for a CCT demonstration project. During this 
planning process, they conferred with officials and researchers involved with Mexico’s Oportu-
nidades program, meeting with them in New York City and visiting their program in Mexico. 
The design team also sought guidance and feedback on the idea from the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and experts in universities, foundations, other social policy 
organizations, and various New York City government agencies.  
City officials recognized that a CCT program in New York City would be controversial 
(see below) and that publicly funding this unconventional approach, even on a trial basis, would 
be widely opposed. Consequently, they sought to support the demonstration with private 
resources.8
CEO granted the “go-ahead” for the project in the late spring of 2007. Initial funding 
was secured and agreements were established for Seedco to operate the program and for 
MDRC to evaluate it.
 However, they hoped that, in the future, if the CCT approach proved to be success-
ful, the federal government would invest in such a strategy on a larger scale in New York and 
other cities across the country.  
9
                                                   
8See footnote 4 for the full list of funders.  
 With the end of the mayor’s second term in office a little more than two 
years away, CEO sought to have the project begin operations very quickly, serving families by 
the start of the coming school year in September 2007. Waiting until the subsequent school 
year (beginning in 2008) would have meant, from the City’s perspective, too long a delay 
before any evidence on the program’s effectiveness became available. (See Box 1.1 for the 
demonstration timeline.)  
9For this project, MDRC is a contractor to the Mayor’s Fund for the City of New York, a 501(c)(3) entity 
through which private funds can be donated to the City for specific charitable uses. Seedco is a subcontractor to 
MDRC. The entire demonstration budget, including three years of payments to participants, all costs of operating 
the program, and all evaluation costs covering five years of follow-up, totals approximately $43 million.  
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An intensive effort was thus launched in the summer of 2007 to begin building the pro-
gram infrastructure, recruit families, and implement a random assignment process. Over the 
summer and fall, about 4,800 families were enrolled in the study (with half assigned to the 
control group), with the enrollment period continuing after the start of program operations 
through December 2007.10
Program Overview  
 This extraordinarily rapid start-up of a complex project precluded 
any pilot phase to work out operational problems. Consequently, the first year of program 
operations should be viewed as a start-up phase, and the effects of the program during that 
period do not necessarily reflect the program’s longer-term potential.  
Like other CCT programs in lower- and middle-income countries, Family Rewards is a 
two-generation initiative with both shorter-term and longer-term poverty-reduction goals. It 
includes no new social services or case management. Instead, it attempts to use the offer of a 
new set of cash transfers in strategic ways to lessen immediate income-related hardships for 
poor families while simultaneously helping and encouraging those families to increase — or 
sustain — positive efforts to improve their own futures. The transfers are to function as an 
income supplement to improve families’ economic security in the shorter term, as enabling 
resources to help make short-term human capital investments feasible for them, and as induce-
ments to encourage them to make those investments. Payments, which are available for three 
years, are awarded when households meet specific conditions in three key areas, or “domains”:  
                                                   
10Since random assignment was conducted at MDRC after participants were enrolled into the study at the 
NPOs, some families were allocated to the program or control group in January 2008. 
Box 1.1 
Family Rewards Demonstration Timeline 
• Sample recruited: July 2007 to December 2007 
• First program year: September 2007 to August 2008 
• Second program year: September 2008 to August 2009 
• Third program year: September 2009 to August 2010 
• Evaluation reports: 2010 to 2013 
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• Education-based conditions, which include children’s superior attendance 
in school, meeting certain performance levels on standardized tests and other 
school outcomes, and parents’ engagement with their children’s education 
• Health-based conditions, which include maintaining health coverage for 
parents and their children, as well as age-appropriate preventive medical and 
dental checkups for each family member 
• Workforce-related conditions, aimed at parents, which include sustain-
ing full-time work and participating in approved education or job-training 
activities 
Target Communities and Families  
The model is being tested in a total of six community districts — two each from the 
Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan (see Table 1.1). These six areas were chosen because they are 
among New York’s most persistently disadvantaged communities. Indeed, they have suffered 
from high rates of poverty and unemployment even when economic conditions in the city as a 
whole were good. For example, in 2006, when the Mayor’s Poverty Commission deliberated, 
the official poverty rate in the city was 18 percent. In the six Family Rewards community 
districts, the official poverty rate averaged 35 percent, and it approached or exceeded 40 percent 
(a level of poverty that many experts define as “extreme poverty”) in three of those communi-
ties.11 The unemployment rate across the districts was also disproportionately high, averaging 
19 percent, compared with a 5 percent citywide rate. Considerably higher proportions of 
residents of these communities than the city’s population as a whole relied on public benefits, 
including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, and Medicaid. 
School outcomes were also troubling. The proportion of residents 25 years of age or older 
without high school diplomas averaged 43 percent across the six districts, compared with 28 
percent for the city as a whole.12
While all six areas are high-poverty neighborhoods, these communities are also diverse 
in many ways, allowing the evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the program across a range 
of local contexts. For example, many neighborhoods within the community districts have 
distinct racial and ethnic identities. The Bronx neighborhoods are predominantly Latino, as is 
East Harlem (which also has a large African-American population). However, East Harlem is 
one of the city’s traditional seats of Puerto Rican culture, while Community District 5 in the
  
                                                   
11Levitan (2008). Poverty rates within four of the six districts were somewhat lower but still very high 
according to an alternative poverty measure developed by CEO that was based on recommendations of the 
National Academy of Sciences.  
12These estimates are based on data from the 2000 Census (www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html). 
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The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Table 1.1 
 
Key Neighborhoods in Selected Community Districts 
 
Borough and District Key Neighborhoods  
Bronx  
 Community District 5 Morris Heights, University Heights, Fordham, Mount Hope  
 Community District 6 East Tremont, Bathgate, Belmont, West Farms 
   
Brooklyn  
 Community District 5 East New York, New Lots, Starrett City 
 Community District 16 Brownsville, Ocean Hill 
   
Manhattan  
 Community District 10 Central Harlem 
 Community District 11 East Harlem 
 
 
Bronx has a large Dominican population. Central Harlem (Manhattan) and Ocean Hill-
Brownsville (Brooklyn) are predominantly African-American, while Brooklyn’s Community 
District 5 has a more equal mix of African-American and Latino populations relative to the 
other areas.  
Harder to measure, but potentially relevant to the functioning of the initiative, is the so-
cial service infrastructure of these neighborhoods. While many community and citywide social 
services providers operate in all these districts, the neighborhoods vary in terms of the availa-
bility of social and educational services. At one extreme is Central Harlem, a relatively rich 
service environment, with strong provider organizations such as the Harlem Children’s Zone, 
and with historic ties to African-American political and cultural institutions. East New York 
(Brooklyn) falls at the other extreme, sometimes described as a neighborhood that struggles to 
maintain social services following extreme disinvestment and high crime rates that have taken 
their toll on the area since the 1970s.13
Family Rewards is targeted toward families in these six community districts who had 
incomes at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty level.
   
14
                                                   
13The design paper for the Family Rewards demonstration (MDRC, 2008) includes more detailed infor-
mation on the characteristics of the study neighborhoods.  
 This standard is the same as the 
eligibility standard used for food stamps and a number of other benefit programs that serve very 
14In the continental United States, the 2007 federal poverty level for a family of three was $17,170, and 130 
percent of the poverty level for such a family was $22,321. See http://aspe.hhs.gov/POVERTY/07poverty.html.  
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low-income families, making it a widely accepted benchmark for identifying families in need of 
government cash transfer programs. As a two-generation intervention, the program is intended 
for parents and their school-age children.15 Furthermore, all parents and children must be legal 
residents of the United States.16
Eligible families had to have at least one child in the fourth, seventh, or ninth grade. 
However, once a family enrolled in the program, all school-age or younger children were 
eligible to participate in it.  
  
The demonstration targeted students in the fourth, seventh, and ninth grades because 
these grades are at or near the start of critical educational transition years. For example, by 
fourth grade, children are making a transition from “learning to read” to “reading to learn” — in 
other words, applying their newly developed reading skills to acquire content knowledge. 
Without making that transition smoothly, future school work becomes more difficult, and 
children who fall seriously behind by the third or fourth grade tend to have difficulty catching 
up later.17
While the incentives for the seventh-grade cohort end after ninth grade, rewards for the 
ninth-grade cohort continue through the end of eleventh grade. Many high school students in 
low-income communities struggle in ninth grade. They begin to have more serious attendance 
problems and fall behind in credits, which puts them on a slippery slope toward dropping out of 
school. Students who succeed through the eleventh grade, however, are highly likely to gradu-
ate. Thus, offering students education-focused incentives beginning in the ninth grade — often 
considered a “make-or-break” year — may help boost achievement at this very critical stage; 
continuing incentives for two more years may put them on a solid path toward graduation.  
 The designers of Family Rewards thus hoped that offering three years of education 
incentives for the fourth-grade target group would help them do better in that critical year and 
successfully weather the transition to the first full year of middle school, which typically begins 
in grade 6 in New York City. Similarly, rewards targeted to the cohort of seventh-graders were 
intended to help support and encourage those students to perform well in middle school through 
the end of ninth grade (the first year of high school), another critical transition stage.  
                                                   
15Adults were eligible only if they were the custodial parents or legal guardians of the eligible children, or 
a custodial parent’s cohabiting spouse or legally registered domestic partner.  
16Undocumented residents were not included in the target population because they do not have a legal 
right to work in the United States. That means that they are not be eligible for the program’s full-time work 
bonus. Consequently, including them would have impeded a full test of the two-generation CCT model in 
which workforce incentives for parents are an important program component. 
17For one study showing this pattern, see Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006). 
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Program Delivery Structure 
Seedco assembled a network of six local organizations in the designated community 
districts to assist in implementing Family Rewards.18 Called Neighborhood Partner Organiza-
tions (NPOs), these agencies recruited and enrolled eligible families into the research sample 
and now serve as the face of the program in the communities, providing ongoing customer 
service to participants who request assistance, such as in making claims for the rewards or for 
obtaining information about other services in the community. NPOs also conduct informational 
workshops on how to earn and claim rewards in each of the domains in which the incentives are 
offered. Seedco maintains a telephone helpline and a Web site to provide additional information 
and assistance to families.  
Seedco verifies that families have earned rewards by using a combination of automated 
data from some City agencies and special “coupon book” forms submitted directly by partici-
pants). After verification, it initiates a process of transferring payments electronically into bank 
accounts that participants newly open or into their existing accounts that they attach to the 
program, or, if they prefer, onto stored value cards (which are similar to debit cards but are not 
assigned to an individual account holder, such as prepaid telephone cards). The payments are 
made every two months and families can access the money at any time through any automatic 
teller machine (ATM).  
To provide families with a safe banking option, the New York City officials worked 
with several banks and credit unions to develop special “Opportunity NYC accounts” that carry 
no fees and come with debit cards that carry no overdraft risk.19 (See Chapter 3 for a fuller 
description of the payment process and banking options.) Family Rewards offered participants a 
one-time $50 bonus for opening up an Opportunity NYC account, or for using an existing 
account into which reward payments could be deposited electronically. This bonus was not 
offered to individuals selecting stored value cards as their payment vehicle, which carry extra 
fees for their users. 
By design, Family Rewards includes no case management. This means that it makes no 
provision for staff to develop action plans to address barriers in participants’ lives or to inter-
vene in personal crises that might make it difficult for them to succeed in the program. It also 
makes no provision for staff to follow up with participants about their individual progress in 
meeting their goals or getting the services they need, or to intervene directly with service 
                                                   
18These organizations are Urban Health Plan and BronxWorks (formerly Citizens Advice Bureau) in the 
Bronx; Brownsville Multi-Service Center and Groundwork, Inc., in Brooklyn; and Catholic Charities and 
Union Settlement Association in Manhattan. See Chapter 3 for a description of these agencies and the services 
they normally provide apart from Family Rewards. 
19The City’s Office of Financial Empowerment developed these accounts and negotiated with the banks.  
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providers on behalf of individual families, such as by helping to arrange tutoring for children, 
taking into account their children’s specific learning needs, or arranging child care that is 
appropriate to a family’s particular circumstances. Family Rewards also does not provide any 
direct services, such as tutoring, test preparation, job search classes, basic educational instruc-
tion, or occupational training.  
The program’s designers excluded these forms of assistance and services for four main 
reasons. First, they wanted to test the power of the cash incentive alone. Second, in contrast to 
participants in CCT programs in poorer nations, they expected that many families would have 
access to services through other programs in the community, and that Family Rewards should 
not duplicate those services. Third, they reasoned that if the New York City model could 
succeed without those extra elements, it would be easier and less expensive to scale up as an 
ongoing policy. And fourth, they hoped that the program would be less burdensome to families 
if they were not required to have regular appointments with staff while also trying to balance 
work and family obligations. Thus, just as low-income workers need not take part in services in 
order to benefit from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), it is possible for Family Rewards 
participants to be “fully engaged” with the program without ever meeting with staff from 
Seedco and the NPOs, aside from the sessions in which they pick up their coupon books (which, 
as noted above, contain forms that participants use to verify that they have met specific condi-
tions and to claim their rewards). At the same time, the designers recognized that many families 
would need at least some guidance on where they could find the kinds of services and assistance 
that might enhance their success in the program — for example, where they could find tutoring 
or after-school programs, dental clinics, job search programs, and training programs. For this 
reason, the designers included as part of the model an information-and-referral component 
through which Seedco and the NPOs were expected to help educate families about relevant 
resources that are available in the community, such as by disseminating written resource guides 
listing agencies that might be appropriate for parents to contact, and by reminding families 
about those resources in workshops and in marketing materials.  
Theoretical Framework for Family Rewards 
Family Rewards rests on the premise that financial incentives can influence individuals’ 
short-term choices and actions in ways that will serve their best interests over the longer term. 
Economists, psychologists, and other scholars cite evidence, for example, that people often 
“discount the future,” meaning that they do not attach sufficient value to investments in educa-
tion or health-related practices that can make them more economically secure or healthier 
because they do not fully recognize or appreciate the future payoffs that come from such 
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investments.20
Financial incentives are envisioned as one way to change the equation, at least partially. 
In the face of more immediate and tangible rewards, people may take steps that serve their 
longer-term best interests, and perhaps even develop new habits, regardless of whether they 
fully recognize or believe in the longer-term value of those efforts. Furthermore, if the rewards 
are sizable, the extra resources can help make it more feasible for low-income people to 
undertake certain educational, health care, and work-related efforts in the short term. As 
resources accumulate from some activities, such as school attendance and doctor visits, they 
might help cover the costs of other activities and materials, such as the costs of educational 
materials or tutoring for children, transportation to a free dental clinic, the dental checkup itself 
(if not free or covered by insurance), clothes for a job interview, or tuition payments for a 
training program. In this sense, the conditioned rewards may function not only as financial 
inducements, but also as enabling resources. 
 In addition, for young children in particular, the future is very distant, and long-
term rewards may be too abstract to be significant motivating forces. Community or peer group 
norms, fed by observations of persistent intergenerational poverty, may also reinforce these 
perceptions, especially in high-poverty communities. At the same time, the simple lack of 
resources and other structural constraints among poor families can make it challenging to build 
human capital. For example, poor families may encounter difficulties getting access to good 
schools and enrichment programs for their children; paying for tutoring for children who need 
extra help; affording reliable child care when parents work; getting paid for time off from work 
to take their children to medical or dental checkups; finding dentists who are willing to take 
Medicaid; and even paying for transportation to and from low-wage jobs or job interviews, 
health visits, and school activities — in addition to the many additional impediments with 
which poor families must often contend. 
The following sections more fully describe the logic model on which Family Rewards 
is based, identifying the main processes through which the incentives payments are expected to 
reduce current and future poverty (see Figure 1.1). A number of key assumptions and hypothe-
ses underlying the model are important to highlight. 
Improving Children’s Educational Outcomes 
Longitudinal research that follows children through adolescence and into adulthood 
shows that poor academic achievement and dropping out of school are associated with worse 
future employment outcomes and earnings, contributing to intergenerational poverty. Conse-
quently, succeeding in school is one of the most important ways that children growing up in 
                                                   
20See, for example, Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for a fuller discussion of this issue.  
 The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Figure 1.1
A Logic Model for Family Rewards
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poor families can avoid being poor themselves in the future. For this reason, children’s school 
performance and academic achievement are a central focus of Family Rewards.  
Reflecting the important role that parents can play in their children’s success in school, 
the incentives in this domain are intended to encourage parents to become more fully engaged 
with their children’s education. In this way, Family Rewards differs from school-based incen-
tive programs that only offer rewards directly to students, largely bypassing their parents. In 
Family Rewards, the education incentives for elementary and middle school students are paid 
entirely to the parents, and children learn about the rewards only if their parents choose to tell 
them. In addition, the schools play no direct role in the program, and teachers may not know 
which of their students are in it unless the families inform them.  
At the high school level, the focus shifts somewhat. Although some incentives are still 
paid to the parents, others are partially or completely paid to the students directly. This policy 
was made based on the recognition that high school students increasingly take more responsibil-
ity for their own behavior, and so paying them directly would give them an immediate financial 
stake in their school performance.  
 Beyond whatever direct effects it has on parents’ and children’s school engagement, 
Family Rewards may also boost children’s educational attainment in other, indirect ways. For 
example, its health care rewards may promote early diagnosis and treatment of certain health 
and developmental problems that might otherwise make it difficult for students to sustain 
regular attendance and to perform well in school, or for very young children to enter school 
ready to learn. More generally, an increase in the family’s overall income — from increases in 
parental earnings combined with the direct cash transfers from all CCT payments, regardless of 
domain — might also enhance children’s school performance and other child development 
outcomes. For example, if the increased income helps to reduce family stress, maternal depres-
sion, or housing instability (brought about, for example, by persistent difficulties making rent 
payments) or to increase the purchase of educational materials and experiences for children or 
the nutritional quality of food intake, children’s developmental trajectories may improve.21
                                                   
21Over the last few years, scientific evidence showing that very low-income, material hardship, and finan-
cial strain have causal influences on children’s life trajectories has grown more convincing. Supporting the 
claim of causal influences are findings from longitudinal studies (Dahl and Lochner, 2005; Duncan and 
Brooks-Gunn, 1997; Gershoff, Aber, and Raver, 2003; Mayer, 2002; McLoyd, 1998; Seccombe, 2000) and 
from natural and policy experiments that have effectively raised the income of poor families and evaluated the 
impact of these increases on children (Costello, Compton, Keeler, and Angold, 2003; Miller et al., 2008; 
Morris and Gennetian, 2003). Among the latter studies are evaluations of programs offering earnings supple-
ments and, in the case of the Milwaukee New Hope project (Miller et al., 2008), subsidies for child care and 
health insurance that found improvements in young children’s school performance, social behavior, and other 
developmental outcomes.  
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Improving Family Preventive Health Care Practices  
For a variety of reasons having to do with a lack of resources, knowledge, information, 
or administrative hurdles posed by the health care system, many low- and moderate-income 
families do not get routine preventive health care. To some extent this problem results from 
their lack of health insurance coverage or gaps in that coverage. For example, some families 
who are eligible for public insurance do not realize they are eligible and remain uninsured. 
Others who may believe they are eligible do not follow through with the application process, 
which can be burdensome or confusing, typically requiring that documentation be presented to 
establish eligibility. Similar documentation requirements lead to the termination of public 
insurance for many families when they do not complete the necessary recertification process.22
Families who lack health insurance are understandably less likely to have a regular fam-
ily physician and tend to rely on more costly hospital emergency rooms when they need care.
 
Other low-income individuals who are working and are eligible to participate in employer-
sponsored health insurance plans cannot afford the required copayments.  
23
Not surprisingly, a number of studies have shown that poor children tend to have worse 
health outcomes than their peers who are not poor. These outcomes include higher rates of low 
 
However, even families with health insurance, particularly public health insurance, may neglect 
to maintain good preventive care or to follow up on recommended treatments — a problem that 
cuts across social classes. Low-income families who rely on public insurance can face the added 
challenge of finding doctors who will accept their insurance, sometimes because of low reim-
bursement rates, which may discourage them from getting regular preventive care. Similarly, 
many dentists do not accept Medicaid, so getting preventive dental care may require low-
income families to search for dental clinics that offer free care or charge based on a sliding scale 
according to a family’s income. Furthermore, parents who are working in low-wage jobs that do 
not offer paid personal or sick days may face an added opportunity cost in getting preventive 
care if they lose pay when they miss work for a doctor’s visit.  
                                                   
22A number of states are attempting to develop third-party administrative records data-matching to substi-
tute for applicant-provided documentation as a way to simplify the enrollment and retention of people who are 
eligible for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and thus increase coverage. See 
Edwards et al. (2009).  
23One study summarizing relevant literature on this topic points to the important role of insurance, stating 
that, “There is substantial evidence that people who are insured are more likely than uninsured people to have a 
usual source of care other than the emergency room. Having health insurance and a usual source of care are 
generally among the strongest predictors of health services utilization, and they have been shown consistently 
to enhance timely use of medically necessary health services, increase use of preventive health care, increase 
the continuity of care for chronic conditions, and reduce costly emergency room utilization.” See Polit, 
London, and Martinez (2001).  
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birth weight, infant mortality, diarrhea, asthma, developmental disabilities, and lead poisoning.24 
Some studies suggest that poor children are also twice as likely as other children to experience 
an unmet medical need, are more likely to receive pediatric care from hospital emergency 
rooms rather than pediatric practices, and are less likely to be insured.25 In addition, studies of 
welfare recipients and other low-income populations suggest that health problems are a com-
mon impediment to steady work among the parents in low-income families.26
Anticipating that these broad, nationally observed trends would be significant problems 
in the New York City high-poverty communities that were targeted for Family Rewards, and 
following the practice of international CCT programs, the designers of Family Rewards placed 
a major emphasis on preventive health care. They attached rewards to the maintenance of health 
insurance as well as to getting regular medical and dental checkups. The designers hoped that 
sustained insurance, better preventive care, and quicker responses to emerging health problems 
would help to reduce poverty by removing barriers to steady employment among parents and by 
minimizing school absences and improving school performance among children.  
 
Improving Parents’ Earnings 
Family Rewards may increase family income through the direct cash transfers them-
selves, but only temporarily. Sustained reductions in child and family poverty after the payments 
end require that parents maintain regular employment. The program thus includes a workforce 
component that is designed to promote steady, full-time work and the acquisition of skills to help 
participants qualify for better-paying jobs. A cash transfer program that includes a component 
that explicitly supports and encourages families’ pursuit of self-sufficiency may also have 
broader appeal across the political spectrum than one that does not. This component is the first of 
its kind in a CCT program, and thus holds special interest to the international community. 
Of course, work does not guarantee an escape from poverty, as the growing number of 
“working poor” families attests.27
                                                   
24Aber, Bennett, Conley, and Li (1997). 
 Skills deficits and wage stagnation are important factors 
contributing to this outcome. But it is also true that, for most families, it is impossible to 
improve family income and escape poverty without work. Indeed, data from 2005-2007 show 
that among all New York City families, those without workers had a poverty rate of 47 percent, 
compared with 10 percent of all families who had at least one worker, and 5 percent of all 
25Gershoff, Aber, and Raver (2003).  
26Bloom (1997); Polit, London, and Martinez (2001); Zedlewski and Loprest (2001).  
27In 2005, over 46 percent of poor households in New York City were “working poor” — that is, they had 
incomes below the poverty level despite the fact that the head of household worked at least part of the year. See 
New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (2006). 
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families in which the householder (that is, the person in whose name the house is owned, 
rented, or being purchased) worked full-time, year-round.28
Family Rewards offers incentives to encourage parents to seek and sustain full-time em-
ployment. It offers a second incentive for parents to complete education and training activities. 
Sustained employment is important because studies have suggested that high job turnover 
among less skilled workers may negatively affect skills, wage levels, wage growth, and fringe 
benefits.
  
29
The program’s workforce-related incentives may boost family income in several ways. 
Not only would those rewards increase family income directly, they would also increase that 
income indirectly through higher earnings if they encouraged parents to increase their hours or 
duration of employment, or if the training incentives helped them boost their earnings potential 
by acquiring more skills. Furthermore, the increased earnings could draw additional income 
from the EITC. 
 Moreover, simply acquiring more work experience in the short term may increase the 
likelihood of steady employment in the longer term. There is also a strong body of evidence 
demonstrating that financial work incentives can increase employment stability and earnings. 
The program rewards full-time work rather than part-time work because full-time work is more 
likely to come with higher wages and benefits. In addition, the designers were concerned that 
rewarding part-time work might encourage some participants to reduce their work hours. 
Mutually Reinforcing Effects 
Although each of these components targets specific problems that contribute to long-
term and intergenerational poverty, the Family Rewards model builds on the recognition that 
sustained achievements in any one of these areas may be aided by progress in the others (see 
Figure 1.1). For example, children may make more progress in school if their health care is 
improved and efforts are made to catch and address health problems early. Their health and 
education may benefit if they grow up in a household that has increased economic resources at its 
disposal, for which parents’ sustained employment is critical. Children’s health as adults may 
also be influenced by their education, which can affect their understanding of good health 
practices and healthy lifestyle choices. In sum, the health rewards are not just important to health 
outcomes, the education rewards are not just important to education outcomes, and the workforce 
rewards are not just important to work outcomes. For all these reasons, combining all three 
components into a single, two-generation package may be more powerful than focusing on any 
one or two of these components alone. In addition, as noted previously, the extra income from all 
                                                   
28Based on the “2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates,” American FactFinder Fact 
Sheet (U.S. Census Bureau). See http://factfinder.census.gov. 
29Lane (1999). 
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three components, which serves the program’s immediate poverty reduction goal, may have 
important beneficial effects on child outcomes simply by reducing the hardships of poverty.  
The Family Rewards Incentives: Conditions and Amounts 
Family Rewards offers families an opportunity to receive cash rewards that total several 
thousand dollars per year over a three-year period. The actual payment amount depends on the 
degree to which families meet the qualifying conditions and, importantly, on the number of 
children in the family, each of whom can be a source of substantial rewards.30
Overall Design Considerations 
  
In developing the rewards schedule, the design team (CEO, MDRC, and Seedco) was 
guided by the following key principles:  
1. Incentives should be attached to activities and achievements that represent 
investments in human capital development.  
2. The conditions for incentive payments should be achievable with a reason-
able level of effort.  
3. The incentives should not be tied to activities (such as attendance in early 
Head Start programs) that are not generally available or reasonably access-
ible to participants.  
4. To the extent feasible, more money should be attached to conditions that are 
more challenging to meet (for example, students’ passing standardized tests 
and parents’ sustaining full-time work should earn more than a parent’s at-
tendance at a parent-teacher conference).  
5. The activities and achievements that earn payments should be verifiable in 
ways that are practical, timely, and resistant to fraud. 
6. Incentives for children’s school performance should avoid putting undue 
pressure on students or put them at risk of abuse if their families lose out on 
extra money because of their poor performance.  
                                                   
30The design team had considered capping the total amount of rewards that any given family could earn. 
However, rather than impose arbitrary limits, it chose to use the evaluation to learn how actual reward receipt 
would vary across families in the absence of any restrictions.  
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7. The amounts for any given activity should be substantial enough for fami-
lies to take the offer seriously.  
8. The amounts for any given activity — and overall — must not be so high as 
to appear extremely unreasonable by policymakers and the public, and, 
hence, politically unsustainable.  
9. High compliance with the conditions by all family members across all do-
mains should yield a substantial total cash transfer (in the range of 25 per-
cent of family income in the absence of the program).31
10. A broad range of incentives should be included to give families many dif-
ferent ways to earn rewards — and to earn meaningful amounts of money 
within each of the three domains.  
  
Allowing families many different ways to earn rewards was considered a way to 
achieve the program’s short-term goal of immediate poverty reduction without attaching 
excessive amounts of money to any given reward. However, with 22 different rewards offered 
in the first year, this also made the program more complex than was desirable. That complexity 
meant that more intensive efforts would be needed to educate families about the full incentives 
offer, and that families would undoubtedly take more time to respond to the full range of 
rewards, than would be true in a simpler program.  
The design team faced another important constraint in trying to ensure that rewards 
would be paid close to the time when families met the required conditions. Because of the large 
number and diverse types of rewards, the process of verifying compliance was complicated, and 
for practical reasons it was decided that payments would be made only every two months. There 
was also no way to avoid the long natural lags between activities and payments for certain 
rewards that were based on administrative data for verification. For example, it took time to pay 
out rewards for achievement on tests because the New York City and New York State school 
departments took several months to score the tests and provide that information to the program.  
Table 1.2 summarizes the incentives schedule, showing the specific types of behavior 
and achievements that earn payments and the amounts of those payments. (As discussed 
shortly, this schedule was modified somewhat for the third program year.) In general, the 
payment amounts for the education and health components involve larger sums than has been 
true of most prior tests of incentives strategies in those two fields. In contrast, the full-time work 
bonus is somewhat smaller than similar incentives tried in demonstration projects that have 
tested or are currently testing wage supplementation strategies, but they are still substantial.
                                                   
31This is roughly in line with the standard used in the original design of Mexico’s program (Levy, 2006). 
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The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Table 1.2 
Schedule of Incentive Payments, by Domain 
 
Domain  Schedule of Incentive Payments 
 
 
Children’s educational efforts and achievement 
 
Grades 1-8 (payments made to parents)  
 Attendance $25 per child per month (maximum: $25 per month of school 
year) for superior attendance (95% of scheduled days, with 
provision for extended illness). Discontinued for Year 3. 
   
 Parent-teacher meetings $25 per meeting, twice per year (maximum: $50 per year per 
child) for parent’s attendance at parent-teacher conferences. In 
Year 3, includes other parent-teacher consultations. 
   
 Library card $50 paid once during program per child for having a public 
library card. Discontinued for Year 3. 
   
 Reviewing results of low-stakes interim 
tests 
$25 for parents to acquire and review on their own their 
children’s performance on interim standardized tests intended 
to help teachers diagnose students’ progress (up to 5 times per 
year; maximum: $125 per year per child). Discontinued for 
Year 3. 
   
 Test scores (starting in grade 3)  
  For grades 3-5 $300 per child for scoring at a level 3 (indicating proficiency) 
or above on standardized ELA test, or (starting in grade 4) for 
improving by at least 1 level over prior year’s level; same for 
standardized math test. (Maximum: $600 per year per child.) 
    
  For grades 6-8 $350 per test for meeting the same conditions as above. 
(Maximum: $700 per year per child.) 
   
 Discussing results of annual ELA and 
math tests with school (starting in grade 3) 
$25 per test, once per year (maximum: $50 per year per child) 
for parents to discuss child’s test results with teachers or 
principal. Discontinued for Year 3; incorporated into parent-
teacher meeting reward. 
  
Grades 9-12 (payments split between parents 
and students, as indicated below) 
 
 Attendance $50 per child per school month (maximum: $500 per year) for 
superior attendance (95% of scheduled days, with provision 
for extended illness). (50% paid to student, 50% paid to 
parent.) 
   
 Parent-teacher meetings $25 per meeting, twice per year (maximum: $50 per year per 
child), for parent’s attendance at parent-teacher conferences. 
(100% paid to parent.) Modified for Year 3 to include other 
parent-teacher consultations.   
   
(continued) 
 20 
Table 1.2 (continued) 
Domain  Schedule of Incentive Payments 
Grades  9-12 (continued)  
 Library card $50 paid once during program per child for having a public 
library card. (100% paid to student.) Discontinued for Year 3. 
   
 Test scores $600 per child for passing (scoring 65 or above on) each of 5 
Regents tests (maximum: $3,000 during program). (100% paid 
to student.) 
   
 Credit accumulation $600 per year per child for accumulating 11 credits during a 
school year. (50% paid to student, 50% paid to parent.)  
   
 PSAT $50 for taking PSAT test up to 2 times (maximum: $100 during 
program). (100% paid to student.) 
   
 Graduation $400 payment for graduating from high school. (50% paid to 
student, 50% paid to parent.) 
  
 Family preventive health care practices 
  
Maintaining health insurance $20 per month (maximum: $240 per year) for each parent for 
maintaining public health insurance (including Medicaid and 
Family Health Plus coverage) for each parent.  Discontinued for 
Year 3. 
 
$20 per month (maximum: $240 per year) for maintaining 
Medicaid or CHIP coverage for all children (together). (Not for 
TANF recipients due to near-automatic Medicaid enrollment.) 
Discontinued for Year 3. 
 
$50 per month (maximum: $600 per year) for each parent for 
maintaining private/employer health insurance for each parent. 
$50 per month (maximum: $600 per year) for maintaining 
private/employer insurance for all children (together). Discon-
tinued for Year 3. 
  
Nonemergency health screenings and early 
intervention 
$200 per family member per year for completing an annual 
nonemergency medical checkup. Physician must fill out 
“preventive health care form” indicating that a minimum set of 
age-appropriate screenings and assessments was conducted and 
that other health information was reviewed with the patient 
and/or parent. 
$100 per family member per year for completing a physician-
advised follow-up visit within a specified time frame. Discon-
tinued for Year 3. 
For young infants and toddlers (children under 30 months of 
age): $200 per child for completing a pediatrician-advised 
early-intervention evaluation. 
Dental care: $100 per family member for cleaning and checkup; 
once per year for ages 1-5 and twice per year for ages 6 and older. 
  
(continued) 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
Domain  Schedule of Incentives Payments 
  
 Adult workforce efforts 
  
Sustained full-time employment $300 for working full time (an average of 30 hours per week 
for 6 or more weeks in each 2-month payment period — that 
is, approximately 75% of the time) (maximum: $1,800 per 
year at $150 per month). 
  
Education and training while employed Payments for completing an approved education or training 
course while holding a job. Must work at least 10 hours per 
week while attending course. (Discontinued for Year 3.) $200 
per each course lasting 35-70 hours; $400 per each course 
lasting 71-140 hours; $600 for each 141-hour increment of a 
course lasting at least 141 hours (maximum: $3,000 per adult 
during program). (Training may include ESL, basic skills, and 
GED courses.) 
  
  
When combined, the full set of transfers represents a potentially very significant in-
crease in the incomes of the very poor families, allowing them to receive several thousands of 
dollars in extra income per year. The cash transfers do not affect eligibility or payment amounts 
for most existing government transfer benefits, including TANF, food stamps,32 Medicaid, 
CHIP, housing assistance, or the EITC.33
Education Rewards  
 This strategy avoided undercutting the value of the 
incentives offer and greatly simplified the implementation of the program.  
The first panel of Table 1.2 presents the schedule of payments pertaining to children’s 
education. For all students, rewards during the first two program years were attached to 
superior school attendance, obtaining a library card, and parents’ participation in parent-
teacher conferences.  
For students in elementary and middle school (starting with children in grade 3), addi-
tional rewards were offered for scoring at or above a threshold level on annual standardized 
                                                   
32The federal Food Stamp program was renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 
beginning on October 1, 2008. However, this report refers to the program as the Food Stamp program, because 
that is the name by which it is more commonly known at this time.  
33However, the CCT payments may affect the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments of partici-
pating families who were contending with physical or mental health disabilities and receiving such benefits. A 
waiver had been sought from the Social Security Administration but the request was not approved.  
 22 
tests in English language arts (ELA) and math.34 Payments were made if a student achieved a 
score that fell within the “proficient” range (a level 3 or 4 on a four-level proficiency scale) or 
improved his or her score in a given year over the prior year by at least one full level on that 
four-level scale.35 The expectation was that these rewards may encourage parents to engage 
more deeply with their children on activities that, in general, might help improve their perfor-
mance in school in ways that would eventually be reflected in their standardized test scores, 
such as by monitoring their homework more closely, talking with them more about how they 
can perform better in school, taking advantage of other programs and school resources in the 
community that might support their performance, and talking more with their teachers. As a 
more direct incentive for increased interaction with the schools, the program offered an addi-
tional reward for parents to discuss the results of the annual tests with their children’s teachers 
or school principals.36
For high school students, Regents exams are the relevant tests. These exams are admin-
istered statewide each year by the New York State Board of Regents, an entity that sets stan-
dards and regulations that apply to all public schools and universities in the state. In order to 
graduate from high school with a diploma that is recognized by the Board of Regents, students 
must pass at least five tests in the following subject areas at some point during their high school 
career: English, mathematics, global history and geography, U.S. history and government, and 
science. Family Rewards offers students a separate payment for passing each of these five main 
content-area exams (that is, obtaining a score of at least 65).
 (It is noteworthy that most other countries’ CCT programs do not attach 
rewards to achievement outcomes.) 
37
                                                   
34Recognizing that standardized tests are given only once a year, the design team considered trying to at-
tach incentives to certain types of effort that could be assessed more regularly, such as satisfactory completion 
of homework (as indicated on elementary school report cards) and improvement in grades. However, some 
administrators in the New York City Department of Education strongly advised against these options, primarily 
because of inconsistencies in teachers’ homework and grading standards, and because of a concern that the 
incentives might generate conflict between families and teachers, with some parents and students pressuring 
teachers to change grades and assessments so they could earn rewards.  
 High school students can also 
earn a small additional payment for taking up to two Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Tests 
(PSATs), which they can do without charge in New York City. (These tests are designed to help 
students prepare for the Scholastic Aptitude Tests, or SATs, that many colleges and universities 
35Because standardized testing begins in grade 3, the opportunity to earn a reward through improvement 
from the prior year does not apply. It also does not apply to students who are new to New York City schools 
and have no prior-year standardized test score.  
36Originally, rewards were also offered for parents to obtain and review their children’s scores on interim 
diagnostic tests that are administered over the course of the school year. However, parents did not understand 
these tests very well (see Chapter 4), and the reward was discontinued in Year 2 after the Department of 
Education explained that not all schools were offering these exams.  
37Special education students with individualized education plans (IEPs) need to pass the Regents Compe-
tency Test, a simpler version of the Regents exam.  
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require for admission.) Additional payments are attached to earning a minimally acceptable 
number of credits in a given academic year (11 each year toward a total of 44 credits needed to 
graduate). This reward was created to encourage students to pass all their courses each academ-
ic year (taking advantage of summer school opportunities if necessary) so that they would 
remain on track to graduate in four years.38
Preventive Health Care Rewards 
 An additional reward is available for graduating.  
The second panel of Table 1.2 (“Family preventive health care practices”) shows the 
preventive health care rewards. These rewards cover activities that pertain to health insurance, 
preventive health care checkups, and dental care.  
Many families who enrolled in the study were eligible for publicly provided health in-
surance through Medicaid, or in some cases through the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) or Family Health Plus (FHP) in New York State.39 However, families must comply with 
annual recertification requirements for these programs, and many eligible families fail to 
complete the process. Consequently, “churning” on the rolls can be significant, with many 
otherwise eligible families losing their coverage.40
                                                   
38A study of high school students in Chicago public schools found that attendance, course grades, and 
credit accumulation in ninth grade are correlated with the likelihood of graduating from high school (Allens-
worth and Easton, 2007). Moreover, a New York City study of high school students highlights the problem of 
students quickly falling behind in their accumulated credits: “Overage and under-credited students fall behind 
early, and once they become off-track, they leave the system rapidly. Eighty-four percent of students who are 
16 years old with fewer than eight credits end up leaving the system.” See Cahill, Hamilton, and Lynch (2006).  
 Family Rewards incentive payments for 
maintaining health insurance were offered to address this problem, encouraging families to keep 
their coverage in place. The program also offered payments to families in which the parent was 
not eligible for public health insurance but had access to private, employer-sponsored health 
insurance. Some families may forgo that insurance because of copayment costs for premiums or 
services; in these cases, the rewards, which were set at a higher amount than for maintaining 
public insurance, were intended to encourage families to make those copayments and get the 
insurance. Participants who were receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistance (SNA) benefits 
39Medicaid is available to pregnant women and children under age 6 whose family income is at or below 
133 percent of the federal poverty level, for children ages 6 to 19 with family income up to 100 percent of the 
federal poverty level, and for families receiving government income support through the federal TANF 
program or New York State’s Safety Net Assistance program. CHIP is a federal public health insurance 
program, administered by states, for families with children who have incomes that are too high to qualify for 
Medicaid but are within 200 percent of the federal poverty level. FHP is a New York State public health 
insurance program for adults who are age 19 to 64 and who have income or resources too high to qualify for 
Medicaid; those with children can qualify with family incomes up to 150 percent of the federal poverty level. 
40One unofficial estimate that the New York City Human Resources Administration provided during the 
Family Rewards design phase suggested that 31 percent of Medicaid cases did not complete a recertification 
annually and were closed, although 27 percent of those closed cases were reopened within nine months.  
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were not eligible for the program’s health insurance rewards.41
The second set of health care incentives was designed to encourage families to get 
comprehensive, nonemergency physical examinations — the cornerstone of good preventive 
health care practice. The main objective was to ensure that family members got comprehensive 
medical assessments that could lead to the early diagnosis and treatment of health problems that 
might become more serious over time, and that could also alert them to or reinforce the impor-
tance of healthy lifestyle choices (for example, healthful eating, exercise, and protection against 
sexually transmitted diseases). At the same time, it was hoped that by promoting preventive 
health care visits, families would be more likely to establish a “medical home” — that is, a 
relationship with a regular doctor (or health care institution) who would maintain their medical 
records and understand their medical history, and to whom they could turn when problems 
arose, rather than resorting first to hospital emergency rooms.  
 This was because families who 
were receiving those benefits were routinely enrolled in Medicaid at the time of application and 
did not have to reestablish their eligibility as long as they remained on TANF or SNA. 
To encourage thorough exams during these visits, the program designers, in consulta-
tion with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, created a special 
“preventive care checklist form” that identifies a set of common health conditions that doctors 
are expected to explore or screen for in any thorough annual physical examination. This form, 
which has to be signed by the participant’s doctor, is tailored to the different needs of adults, 
teenagers, and younger children. For infants and toddlers, the form includes a standard set of 
questions to encourage the doctor to screen for developmental problems and to make an 
appropriate referral for a fuller early intervention evaluation when warranted. An additional 
payment is offered to parents to encourage them to follow through with such a comprehensive 
evaluation (which is free in New York City) if they are advised to do so by their pediatricians.  
The design team sought to create incentives for getting follow-up care that would make 
it practical for those who needed such care to get it, but without encouraging those who do not 
need care to try to get it just to earn the extra rewards, which would waste medical resources 
and program dollars. The decision was made to attach an incentive payment for one follow-up 
visit per family member per year in cases where the doctor indicated the need for it on the initial 
health care checklist (and specified the purpose and time frame for making the follow-up visit 
on a subsequent form). The payment amount for the second visit was set at half that of the first 
visit, to help temper the incentive to seek unneeded medical care. 
                                                   
41Safety Net Assistance is a New York State welfare program for various in-need populations. For in-
come-eligible families with dependent children, it allows those who have exhausted their five-year eligibility 
for cash assistance under TANF to continue receiving cash assistance on similar terms and conditions that 
applied under TANF, but paid out of non-federal funds.  
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Finally, the health component includes incentives for preventive dental care (regular 
cleanings and checkups). Although many dentists do not accept Medicaid, a number of dental 
clinics around the city offer free or reduced-cost dental care. Identifying them, getting to them, 
and paying them (if they charge a fee) were expected to be significant burdens for low-income 
families. The incentives payments were intended to help compensate for those extra burdens 
and costs.  
Workforce Rewards 
The third panel of Table 1.2 (“Adult workforce efforts”) presents the workforce com-
ponent, which is aimed at the parents and has two main features. The first is a payment for 
sustained full-time employment. Operationally, this means that a participating parent must work 
at least 30 hours per week for six out of every eight weeks. Allowing for some “downtime” is a 
way of recognizing that, for many low-wage workers, job turnover is common, sometimes 
because the job itself ends. Those who are in this situation or who leave work for other reasons 
would have a strong incentive to seek another full-time job quickly.42
The workforce incentives also incorporated payments for completing approved educa-
tion and training activities that can help build parents’ human capital so that they can qualify for 
higher-skilled and better-paying jobs. The courses may be shorter term or longer term, and the 
incentive payments were tailored with that in mind, providing a higher payment for a longer-
term course. Instruction can include not only specific occupational skills training, but also 
instruction in English as a Second Language (ESL), adult basic education (ABE), and General 
Educational Development (GED) preparation.
  
43
Year 3 Modifications  
 To discourage participants from dropping out 
of the labor force in order to undergo training, which would be inconsistent with New York 
City’s welfare-to-work policies, the program’s designers further required that the training 
reward be available only to parents who were working at least 10 hours per week.  
The program’s designers recognized early on that the incentives described above might 
need to be modified as the program unfolded. They knew before the program was rolled out that 
their estimates of how many families would earn rewards, and, hence, the cost of those incen-
                                                   
42This reward is modeled after a bonus that is being tested in an employment retention and advancement 
demonstration project in the United Kingdom; see Riccio et al. (2008). 
43In order to earn the payments for these activities, participants in ABE, GED preparation, or ESL classes, 
for which standards of completion are often ambiguous and compliance hard to measure, must provide 
documented evidence from their providers indicating that they have made satisfactory progress in their classes 
and that they have participated for the required number of hours established by Family Rewards for a given 
level of payment.  
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tives, were largely guesses. Furthermore, in the absence of a pre-study operational pilot, they 
could not fully anticipate all the practical difficulties that would be involved in marketing, 
verifying, and processing the long list of incentives to be offered. However, a better understand-
ing began to emerge as operational experience grew and some preliminary impact findings 
became available. In the summer of 2009, as the end of the second program year was approach-
ing, CEO, Seedco, and MDRC agreed on a set of modifications to the incentives schedule for 
the program’s third and final year that would simplify the program and reduce its overall costs, 
both of which would make the program more feasible to replicate if successful. These modifica-
tions include the following:  
• Children’s education. First, the attendance reward was discontinued for 
elementary and middle school students because average attendance rates 
proved to be very high already for these grade levels, as evidenced by the 
control group’s patterns, and it appeared that the program was producing lit-
tle further gain (see Chapter 6). Second, the reward for parents to discuss 
their children’s annual ELA and math test results with teachers was discon-
tinued as a separate reward, and the parent-teacher conference rewards were 
no longer limited to attendance at the official semi-annual parent-teacher 
nights sponsored by the schools. Instead, a single, consolidated reward for 
parent-teacher exchanges was created and offered to parents twice a year 
(once during the first half of the year and once during the second half), to en-
courage them to talk with teachers about test scores and any other issues con-
cerning their children’s school performance, and at times of the parents’ 
choosing.44
• Family health care. First, all health insurance rewards, a costly component, 
were discontinued for Year 3. This was done partly because preliminary data 
from the evaluation suggested that insurance coverage rates were already 
very high for adults and children in the study. Second, rewards for doctor-
recommended follow-up visits were discontinued because of the complexity 
of distinguishing visits that were truly separate follow-up visits. 
 Third, payments for library cards were discontinued because 
most children who were likely to get them were believed to have done so 
within the first two years. 
                                                   
44Over the first two years of the program, it appeared that many parents were claiming parent-teacher con-
ference rewards for meetings they had with teachers at times other than the official parent-teacher nights, 
perhaps even when discussing the standardized test results. The design team believed that consolidating these 
rewards into one would promote parent-teacher interactions in ways that might be more meaningful to the 
parents, while also helping to simplify the incentives schedule by eliminating a reward.  
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• Parent’s work and training. The requirement that parents must be working 
at least 10 hours per week while in education or training programs in order to 
earn that workforce reward was eliminated. As later chapters show, very few 
adults received that reward during the first two years, a problem that may 
have been exacerbated by the poor economy, which made it more difficult to 
find work. Future analyses will examine whether dropping the work re-
quirement helped to boost the receipt rate of the training incentives. 
Because all these changes apply to the program’s third year, which is not covered by this report, 
later reports will assess their implications for program operations and impacts.  
Family Rewards Compared with Other CCT Programs 
Family Rewards shares important principles with CCT programs in other countries, par-
ticularly its dual emphasis on immediate hardship reduction and human capital development. 
However, CCT programs in most other countries are at the heart of their social protection 
systems and are the main or only source of government cash assistance. In contrast, Family 
Rewards is layered on top of an already well-developed safety net in New York City. It offers 
families a chance to secure extra income. Indeed, as Chapter 2 shows, many of the families in 
the program receive food assistance, public health insurance, cash welfare, and/or rent subsi-
dies. New York also includes a broad network of social services programs. Thus, Family 
Rewards had to be adapted to a context in which the underlying social protection system is very 
different.  
Family Rewards shares with other CCT programs a central focus on children’s educa-
tion and family preventive health care. However, the reasons children may not remain in and 
progress in school or get the preventive care they need are also different from those found in 
Mexico and elsewhere, and the reward structure reflects these differences. More generally, New 
York’s program is distinguished by the sheer number of rewards it offers (22 separate ones 
initially). It is also unusual in including rewards for educational achievement, not just atten-
dance, and for work and training. In further contrast to most other CCT programs, Family 
Rewards is a short-term, time-limited intervention and is being delivered entirely by private, 
nonprofit organizations rather than by government institutions. As an entirely urban program, it 
operates in a very different social and economic environment than the more heavily rural CCT 
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programs in the rest of the world. And, of course, as a start-up project, it is operating on a much 
smaller scale than most other CCTs.45
Expected Effects of Family Rewards  
 
The idea of making income transfers conditional, or of trying to influence educational, 
health, or employment behaviors with financial incentives, is certainly not new in the United 
States, and past experience offers some guidance on what effects might be expected from 
Family Rewards. This section presents some of those past lessons and highlights a number of 
criticisms that have been lodged against the program, often from different ideological stand-
points and pointing to possible consequences beyond the experiences of the families who are 
involved in the program.  
Evidence on Other Incentive-Based Policies and Programs  
In contrast to Family Rewards, most conditional cash transfer programs in this country 
have focused on work-related activities. The EITC is the best example of a work-conditioned 
cash transfer program. It offers payments (in the form of a refundable tax credit) only to low-
income adults who are working. The TANF program, the main cash welfare system for families 
with children, requires parents to seek or prepare for employment or face the possibility of a 
financial penalty — namely, a reduction in or termination of the family’s welfare grant.46 Most 
states also use earnings disregards to encourage work among TANF recipients. These policies 
disregard a portion of earned income in calculating the welfare grant, allowing some working 
recipients to retain a portion of the grant as an earnings supplement. Finally, a number of special 
demonstration projects have tested work incentives that are delivered as special wage supple-
ments or as bonuses for sustained employment. Overall, findings from evaluations of welfare-
to-work and other employment programs that have featured work incentives and/or work 
requirements have generally found them to have positive effects on employment and earnings.47
                                                   
45It is possible that, if operating on a larger scale, Family Rewards might affect community norms in a way 
that it cannot as a small-scale initiative. Any such potential, of course, cannot be measured in the current 
evaluation. 
  
46For its part, the government offers some services to aid in that search, making the principle of “mutual 
obligation” (akin to the “coresponsibility” principle of Oportunidades and other CCT programs) a central tenet 
of the policy.  
47For information about the effects of the EITC, see Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Holt (2006). For 
findings from evaluations of welfare-to-work and other employment programs that included financial incen-
tives alone or combined with work mandates and employment-focused case management, see Michalopoulos 
(2005); Bloom, Riccio, and Verma (2005); Riccio et al. (2008); and Martinson and Hendra (2006).  
 29 
Incentive-based policies have also been growing in the education and health fields. 
Prominent examples from a number of cities that have been the subject of careful evaluations 
include programs that paid for performing well on Advanced Placement tests for high school 
students, for exceeding certain levels of performance on standardized English and math exams 
or meeting other performance measures, and (in Israel) for passing a series of national high 
school exams that are required by universities and some jobs. In addition, some community 
colleges are experimenting with “performance-based scholarships,” which tie tuition and other 
financial support to school performance in an effort to increase persistence and rates of degree 
completion. In all these examples, the school offers the education incentives directly to the 
students. Alternative approaches include “learnfare” programs for teenage parents on welfare, 
which are operated through the welfare system. These programs have attached financial rewards 
and penalties to performance on outcomes such as attendance, GED certificate receipt, and high 
school graduation. Some evaluations of education-focused incentive programs have found small 
to modest positive effects on certain education outcomes. This finding suggests that such 
incentives can work in some contexts, although in a number of cases they had no effects.48
In the health field, evidence is accumulating on the effectiveness of financial incentives 
for important health-related behavior such as losing weight, refraining from smoking, and 
complying with treatment regimes. A number of mostly small-scale clinical trials have found 
some positive short-term effects on the desired outcomes, but information on the longer-term 
effects of such interventions remains very limited.
  
49
As these examples illustrate, a growing body of experimental literature suggests that, 
under certain circumstances, financial incentives in each of the areas targeted by Family 
Rewards can generate small to moderate improvements in education, health care, and workforce 
outcomes. This evidence, along with the results from evaluations of CCT programs in other 
countries, offers some empirical justification for predicting that Family Rewards, too, can have 
 
                                                   
48See, for example, Angrist and Lavy (2002) for information on the Israeli experiment; Jackson ( 2010) for 
information on the evaluation of the Advanced Placement test incentives program in Texas; Harvard Education 
Labs (www.edlabs.harvard.edu) for overviews of incentives experiments that are under way in schools in New 
York City (Spark), Washington, D.C. (Capital Gains), and Chicago (The Paper Project). Other relevant studies 
include experiments involving a large Canadian university (Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos, 2007), elementary 
schools in a poor Appalachian community in Ohio (Bettinger, 2008), and primary schools in Kenya (Kremer, 
Miguel, and Thornton, 2007). See Bos and Fellerath (1997) and Mauldon et al. (2000) regarding learnfare 
experiments; Battistin et al. (2004) on the UK Educational Maintenance Allowance regarding a policy that 
offered financial incentives for teenagers to remain in school past the age of 16; and Brock and Richburg-
Hayes (2006) on a test of performance-based scholarships in a community college.  
49For a review of 47 studies that tested the use of financial incentives to promote preventive health care 
activities, see Kane, Johnson, Town, and Butler (2004). For an earlier meta-analysis reviewing 11 randomized 
trials that used financial incentives to enhance patient compliance with medication regimens and medical 
appointments, see Giuffrida and Torgerson (1997). For more recent evidence on a weight loss incentives trial, 
see Volpp et al. (2008), and on smoking cessation, see Volpp et al. (2006).  
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positive effects, and possibly larger and a broader range of effects, given its unusually compre-
hensive nature.50
Controversies 
 At the same time, the fact that some studies of incentives have found no or 
small effects underscores the importance of testing the Family Rewards model carefully for 
proof that it can succeed. 
From the time of its announcement, the idea of a CCT program for New York City has 
been controversial. Critics point to possible negative effects that could arise from this type of 
intervention, including ramifications that extend beyond the program’s effects on the participat-
ing families. 
Some critics on the political right have argued vociferously that “paying” people to be 
“good parents” and to “behave responsibly” is morally wrong and may weaken norms that 
signal and guide socially appropriate behavior for parents and children. While believing that 
poor families’ own motivational problems or bad choices contribute to their lower incomes, 
lower educational attainment, and, in some cases, health problems, such critics contend that 
incentives are not the right way to try to change that behavior. Some have also expressed a fear 
that, if offered on a larger scale, this approach will feed expectations among low-income 
families — and perhaps others — that they should be paid for fulfilling their “moral obligation” 
as parents and citizens.51
Some scholars have strongly opposed attaching financial rewards to education, arguing 
that such an approach will harm children’s educational achievement over time. Drawing largely 
on psychological theory and laboratory-like experiments, these scholars contend that extrinsic 
rewards can undermine an intrinsic motivation to achieve particular goals — including the 
motivation to learn — and that persistence in pursuing those goals may weaken once the 
rewards are terminated. For example, the desire to learn for its own sake may be diluted when 
students are rewarded with money or prizes to engage in learning activities.
  
52
                                                   
50In the United States, at least two very small-scale initiatives — the Family Independence Initiative, orig-
inating in Oakland, California, and Pathways to Rewards, operated by Chicago’s Project Match for public 
housing residents — similarly offer rewards across a broad range of activities. The programs have not been 
rigorously evaluated. See www.fiinet.org and www.pmatch.org for further information. 
 Some critics also 
fear that participants who have difficulty earning rewards may become discouraged and be 
more likely give up trying to achieve certain outcomes as a result. But other scholars challenge 
51One critic, Heather MacDonald of the Manhattan Institute, is quoted in the New York Times Magazine as 
saying: “If Opportunity NYC goes large scale, it will further break down the moral obligation to care for one’s 
child and adopt the repertoire of parenting behaviors the middle class takes for granted. It will replace that with 
the expectation that I’m only going to do it if you pay me.” See Rosenberg (2008).  
52See, for example, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999). 
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the claim that external rewards undermine intrinsic motivation, countering with other evidence 
and on theoretical and empirical grounds.53
Some commentators, especially from the political left, have objected that the program 
distracts attention from what they deem to be the main causes of poverty, which are more 
structural in nature — for example, poor schools, poor services, and a lack of good jobs. They 
are thus skeptical that the program can make a substantial difference. Some also view it as 
paternalistic and “insulting” to poor parents to assume that they need to be paid to do what is 
right for their families.
  
54
City officials have a different view. They have argued that they want to test new strate-
gies to tackle persistent, entrenched poverty where other approaches have failed, and that, given 
the positive results that other CCT programs and incentive-based strategies have sometimes 
achieved, this approach is worth testing in New York City. The evidence will show, for exam-
ple, whether students’ achievement is helped (or harmed), whether family poverty is reduced or 
left unchanged, and whether preventive health care practices and parents’ employment pros-
pects are improved. Thus, they have urged that final judgments about the merits of Family 
Rewards and whether it has any place in public policy should wait until the results of the 
evaluation are available.  
  
They have also challenged the moral arguments against incentives, stressing that incen-
tives are already used widely throughout society to influence the choices and activities of 
middle-class and wealthy people, including tax deductions designed to encourage home 
purchases and tax breaks to steer a multitude of business investment decisions in particular 
directions.55
Finally, City officials asserted that they are not ignoring infrastructure conditions, but 
that they are responding to those conditions through their broader policy agenda, not Family 
Rewards. For example, they have pointed out that, through other CEO initiatives and those of 
other agencies, they have made important investments in the public schools, community 
colleges, health and food policies, child tax credits, low-income housing, and other institutions 
 Furthermore, the program offers a substantial amount of extra resources to poor 
families, adding to — not competing with — other benefits that are already available to them.  
                                                   
53See, for example, Cameron and Pierce (2002).  
54For an example of contrasting views, see The Becker-Posner Blog, www.becker-posner-blog.com.  
55In a speech at a conference on CCT programs hosted by the Organization for American States in Sep-
tember 2009, Mayor Bloomberg said: “Financial incentives have already proved to be a powerful tool in so 
many areas. The federal government puts them in our tax code, through policies such as the mortgage interest 
tax deduction for homeowners. And the private sector uses them too, in the form of compensation packages. So 
why shouldn't local governments also harness the power of incentives?”  
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and policies that address a variety of structural causes of poverty and quality-of-life issues in 
low-income communities.56
Evaluation Overview and Data Sources 
  
The Family Rewards evaluation will show whether the program has the positive effects 
its designers hope for, or the negative effects that some critics fear. This report is the first major 
installment in that evaluation, which is assessing the program’s implementation, impacts on 
families, and economic costs and benefits. The follow-up period for the impact analysis will 
eventually cover five years from the time of each family’s date of random assignment. This 
time period will make it possible to assess the program’s effects during the three years in which 
the incentives are offered to families, as well as during two additional years after the program 
and the incentives end. The post-program period will be especially important for determining 
whether any positive impacts that are achieved while the incentives are available will be 
sustained or will grow, or whether negative effects on education or other outcomes emerge after 
the incentives are no longer offered.  
The evaluation is using an extensive set of quantitative and qualitative data. This infor-
mation includes administrative records on school outcomes, employment, earnings, public 
health insurance, welfare and food stamp payments, and housing subsidies obtained from 
various New York City and New York State agencies; three waves of a survey in which a 
subset of parents in the program and control groups are interviewed (only the first wave — the 
18-month survey — is covered in this report); program-related data on reward payments 
obtained from Seedco; and qualitative data obtained through in-depth, qualitative interviews 
with a sample of program participants and through observations of staff carrying out program 
activities at Seedco and the NPOs.  
For this initial report, the follow-up periods vary in length for different parts of the 
analysis that use different data sources (see Table 1.3). For example, the impact estimates for 
education outcomes that are based on school administrative records cover two complete school 
years for all sample members. In contrast, impact estimates for employment and earnings based 
on New York State unemployment insurance wage records primarily cover only the first 
program year, while impact estimates based on the Family Rewards 18-month survey of parents 
cover the period through about midway into the second program year, on average. The exact
                                                   
56See, for example, New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (2009). 
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Months for Which Length of Follow-Up Period End of Follow-Up Period Relative 
Data Source Data Were Collected for Quantitative Measures to Program Years 1 and 2
Unemployment insurance wage 
recordsa
July 2007 - March 2009 12 months from each family's random 
assignment date
Near beginning of second program year for most 
sample members  
Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families/Safety Net records
July 2007 - March 2009 12 months from each family's random 
assignment date
Near beginning of second program year for most 
sample members  
Food stamp records  July 2007 - March 2009 12 months from each family's random 
assignment date
Near beginning of second program year for most 
sample members  
Medicaid recordsb July 2007 - April 2009 18 months from each family's random 
assignment date
Near beginning of second program year for most 
sample members  
Children's Health Insurance 
Program recordsc
October 2007 - February 2009 15 months from each family's random 
assignment date
Near end of first program year for most sample 
members  
School records September 2007 - August 2009 2 complete program years End of second program year for all sample 
members  
Family Rewards data from Seedcod September 2007 - August 2009 2 complete program years End of second program year for all sample 
members
Parent survey  November 2008 - July 2009 18 months (average) Middle of  second program year for most sample 
members  
Program observations and                       
in-depth interviews
July 2007 - August 2009 NA NA
Table 1.3
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Data Sources and Coverage Periods for This Report
NOTES: NA = not applicable.
aUnemployment insurance wage records are provided in calendar quarters (Quarter 3, 2007, through Quarter 1, 2009).
bMedicaid receipt was measured by collecting snapshots of the sample's Medicaid status during the first day of each calendar quarter.
cData for the Children's Health Insurance Program were measured by collecting snapshots of the children's status three times a year, in February, June, 
and October.
dThis refers to the data that Seedco collects on the rewards that program participants earned. These data do not include information on payments made to 
participants.    
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calendar months covered by the survey vary according to family members’ random assignment 
dates and when they were reached for interviews. The survey had an overall response rate of 82 
percent, with similar results for the program and control groups.57
Structure of This Report 
  
This report covers the implementation and impacts of Family Rewards through the first 
year of program operations, which should be viewed largely as a “start-up” phase, and to some 
extent into the second year (depending on the data source). It thus offers a preliminary assess-
ment of the program’s operations and effectiveness. Future reports will assess program results 
covering longer periods of time.  
Chapter 2 begins the analysis by describing the process for recruiting and enrolling fam-
ilies into the study and the characteristics of the families. Chapter 3 examines the operation of 
the program by Seedco and the NPOs, explaining how those operations have evolved over time 
as the agencies have gained more experience. Chapter 4 focuses on families’ understanding of 
the incentives offer, the number and amounts of rewards they earned, and their reactions to the 
program. Chapter 5 reports on the initial impacts of Family Rewards on a variety of outcomes 
that are most closely associated with the program’s short-term poverty-reduction goals. It is 
reasonable to expect that effects on such outcomes might be larger in the short term than the 
effects on human capital development, which may emerge more slowly. In addition to measur-
ing impacts on income and poverty, that chapter also examines the program’s effects on 
commonly used indicators of material hardship, economic well-being, financial and banking 
behaviors, and asset building. Chapters 6 through 8 take a closer look, by domain, at the extent 
to which program participants earned particular types of rewards, and at the program’s early 
impacts on children’s education, family health care outcomes, and parents’ workforce out-
comes. Chapter 9 offers concluding thoughts and highlights topics that will be addressed in 
future reports as the evaluation continues to unfold.  
                                                   
57See Appendix D for further details on the survey and response bias analysis. The next two waves of the 
survey, in which the same sample members will be contacted for interviews, will be conducted at approximate-
ly three and five years after random assignment. 
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Chapter 2 
Recruitment and Characteristics of Participating Families 
In the summer of 2007, an intensive effort was launched to begin building the Family 
Rewards infrastructure, recruit families, and implement the random assignment process in time 
for program operations to begin with the start of the new school year in September. The 
Neighborhood Partner Organizations (NPOs) were charged with rapidly recruiting 5,100 
eligible low-income families for the Family Rewards demonstration, beginning in July. They 
had to contact and enroll families who were identified through lists of students compiled from 
New York City Department of Education (DOE) data. Ideally, the NPOs would have completed 
the process by the time the program officially began in September 2007, but they encountered a 
number of challenges that required extending the recruitment period until the end of 2007. The 
NPOs succeeded in enrolling a final sample of approximately 4,800 volunteer families within 
six months, or about 94 percent of the original target.  
This chapter describes the recruitment and enrollment strategies that were devised for 
the project and how they were executed in the field. It explains the procedures for contacting 
families, marketing the study to them, administering the intake process, obtaining the parents’ 
informed consent to take part in the research, and conducting random assignment. The chapter 
also describes the characteristics of the study sample. In addition, with the goal of assessing 
whether the results of the evaluation can be generalized beyond the study sample, the chapter 
compares the sample’s characteristics with the characteristics of families in the larger eligible 
population who were not enrolled. Data for the analyses that are presented here come from 
program documents, observations of the outreach and enrollment process, in-depth interviews 
with parents and program staff, responses on a Background Information Form that parents 
completed just prior to random assignment, school records from the DOE, and special tabula-
tions using data from the American Community Survey.  
As the chapter shows, the NPO staff quickly discovered that, for many families, the tel-
ephone numbers and home addresses on the DOE’s list of potentially eligible families were out-
of-date. This situation required the NPOs (together with Seedco and MDRC) to search for 
alternative contact information, slowing the recruitment process. Adding to that difficulty was 
the fact that many families, upon hearing of the offer of “substantial cash payments,” were 
skeptical and questioned the program’s legitimacy. The NPOs’ marketing job was made even 
tougher by the nature of the random assignment research design, which cannot guarantee that 
families who agree to participate in a study will get a slot in the program being evaluated; thus, 
the NPOs could only offer families a chance to enter the program through a lottery-like process.  
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As with any voluntary study, the risk that those who enroll might not broadly represent 
the kinds of families for whom the program was intended was an important concern. In an 
attempt to minimize that risk, MDRC and Seedco formulated a recruitment strategy aimed at 
reaching more than just the families who were the “most motivated,” easiest to contact, or 
most willing to “join programs.” This step added yet another level of complexity to the 
recruitment task.  
Despite numerous hurdles, the NPOs were able to find and enroll a sample that appears 
to be fairly similar to the intended target population on many dimensions. However, the re-
cruitment struggles resulted in some delays in building the sample, with the consequence that 
half of enrolled families entered the study after the program had already begun. This delay 
means that the first year in the program was truncated for some participants, and, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, it complicated program operations during the initial months by requiring that NPO 
staff split their attention between completing recruitment and working with the families who 
were already enrolled.  
Identifying the Target Population  
The initial timeline for Family Rewards included a short enrollment period over the 
summer of 2007 in anticipation of the program beginning at the start of the school year in 
September. The NPOs recruited families from lists provided by MDRC and Seedco of poten-
tially eligible students who were selected from an initial list prepared by the DOE, according to 
the criteria described in Box 2.1. Working with predefined and prescreened lists, the NPOs 
knew exactly which families they were charged with recruiting, rather than having to launch a 
general advertising campaign in the communities to find eligible families. The lists contained 
the names and contact information of the students and parents, including phone numbers and 
addresses. All students on the list lived within zip codes associated with the targeted community 
districts, were enrolled in the National School Lunch Program (a federally funded program that 
provides free lunches for children in families with incomes at or below 130 percent of the 
federal poverty level),1
                                                   
1For more information on the National School Lunch Program, see www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/ 
Lunch/AboutLunch/NSLPFactSheet.pdf. 
 and were slated to enter the fourth, seventh, or ninth grade in the fall. 
Enrollment in the National School Lunch Program was a proxy for determining a family’s 
income eligibility for the program, which avoided the need for a new and burdensome means-
testing process. Some schools are also designated as “universal feeding schools,” where all 
students are eligible for the free lunch program regardless of family income. These schools are
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Box 2.1 
Eligibility for Family Rewards 
As described in Chapter 1, program designers created the Family Rewards program to ad-
dress intergenerational poverty among specific types of low-income families. The pro-
gram’s designers set eligibility criteria in the following categories: family income, entering 
grade of child in September 2007, home location, and citizenship status. 
Family income: The program designers defined “low income” using the federal poverty 
guideline. In order to qualify for the study, enrollees had to have family income at or below 
130 percent of the federal poverty level, the income eligibility requirement for the Food 
Stamp program.   
Entering grade of child: The program targeted families with children in grades 4, 7, and 9, 
each of which is considered to be the start of a critical transition period in education. Fami-
lies had to have at least one child in one of those grades in order to be eligible for the study. 
This requirement ensured that samples would be large enough so that the program’s educa-
tional effects could be analyzed separately for cohorts of students in each of these critical 
transition periods.  
Home location: Enrollees had to be living in the targeted areas, which consisted of six of 
the highest-poverty areas in New York City located in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhat-
tan. These areas include Community Districts 5 and 6 in the northwest Bronx, 5 and 16 in 
northeast Brooklyn, and 10 and 11 in northeast Manhattan.  (See Chapter 1 for the included 
neighborhoods.) 
Citizenship status: Eligibility requirements restricted enrollment by citizenship status 
because of the two-generation intervention design targeting both children and parents. Par-
ents enrolling in the program had to be either U.S. citizens, by birth or naturalization, or 
legal permanent residents. This ensured that all enrolling parents had the legal right to work 
and would not experience legal barriers preventing the take-up of work-focused incentive 
payments. 
■ 
The following eligibility requirements were also in place: Both parents in a married couple 
or legal domestic partnership and all children in their legal custody under the age of 18 could 
enroll in the Family Rewards program, provided that they met the documentation require-
ments (described in Box 2.3). In order for an eligible couple to sign up, both parents were 
required to be present at the time of enrollment. While there are not many married parents or 
partners in the sample, this rule led some parents to enroll without their spouse or partner 
because of scheduling conflicts. Any children and parents for whom documentation was not 
provided at the time of enrollment were not eligible for the program, including spouses and 
partners who did not attend enrollment. Only new additions to a family were eligible for 
incentive payments, which were limited to the addition of a child through birth or adoption 
and the addition of a spouse through marriage or the addition of a partner through a legal 
domestic partnership. Data about these additional family members are not included in the 
information presented in this report. Since it is not possible to identify similar family addi-
tions for the control group, those individuals were not added to the research sample. 
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located in low-income neighborhoods where most families would qualify for free lunch, and a 
number of such schools were in the neighborhoods that were targeted for Family Rewards.2
In June 2007, the DOE compiled a list of 37,000 potentially eligible students and sent it 
to MDRC, where staff pared this initial recruitment list down to about 22,000. This process 
involved removing cases that had been deemed ineligible according to additional criteria.
  
3 With 
the final target population defined, MDRC split the larger recruitment list of approximately 
22,000 families into random batches of smaller groups of families.4
NPOs were required to call each family in a given batch six to eight times and conduct 
several home visits before MDRC issued a new batch. In the case that a family was harder to 
reach because of a bad, disconnected, or out-of-service phone number, the program’s outreach 
protocols required home visits in an attempt to ensure that even those families would be invited 
to sign up. However, home visits were not always possible because of incorrect or changed 
addresses. Home visits were also deployed to increase the chances of enrolling families who 
initially ignored attempted contacts because they were skeptical about the program. The NPOs 
eventually exhausted all batches because of the large quantity of bad contact information. To 
help them meet their recruitment goals, the program’s designers expanded the geographical 
target areas somewhat, adding approximately 5,000 more families to the list of potentially 
eligible families.
 MDRC then distributed 
these smaller lists to the NPOs one batch at a time. The NPOs were required to do as much as 
they could to contact all families in a given batch before requesting the next batch from MDRC. 
This approach was put in place to ensure that the recruiters did not “give up” too quickly on 
harder-to-find cases, who might have been systematically different types of people (for exam-
ple, perhaps more disadvantaged) than the easier-to-find cases. The exclusion of these families 
could have resulted in a study sample that misrepresented the larger target group of interest.  
5
                                                   
2See http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/governance/prov-1-2-3/prov2guidance.pdf. 
  
3These cases included families who were receiving reduced price lunches, which has a higher family in-
come cut-off, or who were not participating at all in the National School Lunch Program; families living in 
parts of zip code areas that were outside the designated community district boundaries; and families who were 
among the target populations for Work Rewards and Spark, the two other Opportunity NYC evaluations (see 
Chapter 1). Any substantial overlap of samples across the three incentives-based Opportunity NYC studies 
would threaten the integrity and clarity of the findings for all three evaluations, since control group members in 
one study could become program group members in either of the other studies, and vice-versa. 
4Dividing the batches randomly ensured that all batches would include similar types of families, including 
those who were easier to recruit as well as those who were harder to recruit. 
5These additional families lived in bordering community districts in zip code areas that overlapped with 
the target areas. 
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Strategic Outreach  
The original recruitment goal of enrolling 5,100 families before the beginning of the 
school year was extremely ambitious, considering that enrollment did not start until July.6 
Eventually, this deadline was extended to December 31, 2007.7 Over the course of the six-
month enrollment period, targeted families received several forms of program advertising. As 
shown in Figure 2.1, Seedco first sent them a postcard that described Family Rewards and its 
eligibility guidelines and included information on how to sign up or learn more about the 
program. The NPOs then followed up with phone calls and home visits.8
To help the NPOs meet their recruitment goals, the program designers allowed them to 
enroll up to 85 families (10 percent of their total enrollees) who were not on the recruitment 
list but expressed interest in joining the study and met all other eligibility requirements.
 Often, the NPOs sent 
letters reminding families of the opportunity to enroll or inviting them to recruitment events to 
learn more about the program and enjoy free food and entertainment. These events included 
end-of-summer and back-to-school parties. For some families, particularly those who were 
skeptical, these invitations were an effective inducement to get them to consider the opportunity 
to sign up for the study. The NPOs also advertised a $20 MetroCard as a “thank you” sign-up 
gift for all families who enrolled in the program.  
9 These 
families included those who had recently moved to the neighborhood, had not applied for the 
free school lunch program (but met the income standard), had children who were held back to 
a target grade for the 2007 fall semester, or had a change in family income that made them 
eligible. Outreach workers posted flyers around the neighborhood in select locations, passed 
out flyers as they made home visits, and provided information at events to recruit these 
additional families.10
                                                   
6Seedco created weekly recruitment targets for each NPO, which required enrolling over 100 families each 
week in order to meet the September deadline.  
  
7Since random assignment was conducted at MDRC after participants were enrolled into the study at the 
NPOs, some families were allocated to the program or control group in January 2008. 
8Since language was a potential problem during the initial outreach phone call, some NPO staff and man-
agers developed creative ways to address these potential barriers to recruitment before contacting a family. For 
example, instead of calling an individual, finding that the individual spoke only Spanish, and then giving the 
contact information to a Spanish-speaking outreach worker, staff at some NPOs divided batch lists by last 
name, giving families with Spanish-sounding surnames to bilingual outreach staff, and others to monolingual 
staff.  
9MDRC monitored the number enrolled for each site through data submitted during enrollment. 
10Almost every NPO reported encountering some families who spoke languages other than English and 
Spanish. For example, some could only communicate in Bengali, Chinese, or French, making it difficult for 
such families to enroll. In some cases, outreach workers were able to communicate through family members or 
friends who acted as translators, but some families may not have enrolled because of the language barrier. 
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Identification of Target Sample 
 - MDRC obtained list of potentially eligible students and contact information from 
New York City Department of Education.
 - MDRC created final recruitment list. 
Recruitment 
 - Seedco mailed postcards about the program to targeted families. 
 - Neighborhood Partner Organizations (NPOs) called and/or visited targeted 
families. 
Enrollment 
 - Families proved eligibility with documentation.
 - Parents signed informed consent form.
 - Parents viewed a video explaining random assignment. 
 - Parents provided baseline information. 
Random Assignment
Families were notified of their research 
group assignment by mail. 
Program Group
 - NPOs contact families for orientation session to 
explain program and incentives system.
 - Seedco and NPOs provide ongoing information 
about incentives offer.  
Control Group
 - Control group members have no ongoing contact 
with the program.   
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Figure 2.1
Recruitment and the Random Assignment Process
41 
 
In addition to planning different types of outreach strategies, some NPOs used incen-
tives to keep staff engaged and motivated throughout the recruitment period.11
Contending with Obsolete Contact Information  
 These included 
incentives for the staff member with the highest number of enrollments each week, paying 
staff a bonus for each enrollment, and rewarding the whole recruitment team for meeting 
weekly targets. 
Although the recruitment list provided phone numbers and addresses for potentially eli-
gible families, NPO staff estimated that 30 percent to 50 percent of these phone numbers were 
out of service or had been disconnected since parents had given them to their children’s schools. 
In these cases, NPOs often sent follow-up letters or tried calling numbers at different times of 
the month to determine whether out-of-service numbers might be reinstated after bills were 
paid. As a result of obsolete numbers, NPOs had to spend a good deal of time conducting home 
visits. This process was much less efficient than phone-based outreach. Outreach workers were 
able to contact between two and three homes an hour, depending on the accuracy of addresses, 
whether public housing development security prevented staff from entering, and how long 
travel time was between the targeted homes. In contrast, a worker might be able to reach 12 to 
18 families an hour by phone.12
Avoiding the Appearance of a “Scam” 
 
Before the start of recruitment, Seedco and MDRC developed a marketing pitch that 
stressed how much money families might be able to receive in reward payments if they were 
selected for the program. For example, a script prepared for outreach workers stated: “I’m 
[INSERT NAME] calling with good news from the City of New York! Your family may be 
eligible to earn up to $4,000 or more in cash every year as part of a new program sponsored by 
the City.” However, outreach workers quickly encountered skeptical responses from many 
participants, who doubted the offer was real or feared that the caller was involved in a “scam.” 
These experiences were shared in weekly meetings between Seedco and the NPOs, and the 
organizations adopted a more flexible marketing approach.  
Some outreach workers found it effective to stress the program’s link to Mayor Bloom-
berg to give the program credibility; others spoke about cash rewards only at the end of the 
conversation, focusing instead on how the program helped children. (An example of this 
                                                   
11Each NPO had six to nine outreach staff. 
12In another effort to help the NPOs reach targeted families with bad contact information, CEO solicited 
selected city agencies to try to obtain contact information on families in the sample who were enrolled in other 
city programs. MDRC and Seedco then distributed the relevant information to the NPOs. Overall, outreach 
staff reported small returns on these efforts.  
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approach can be found in the outreach case study in Box 2.2.) Outreach workers sometimes 
varied their messages according to the race, ethnicity, or national origin of the person to whom 
they were speaking. In some cases, messages incorporated a cultural reference. For instance, to 
legitimize the program with Spanish-speaking families, some workers referenced the connec-
tion to the Mexican program Oportunidades, which received some press coverage during the 
recruitment period. Other NPOs emphasized how the program could contribute to improve-
ments in the families’ neighborhoods. 
In order to keep recruitment efforts focused on families who were on the recruitment 
list, to avoid encouraging other interested but ineligible families to try to apply, and to maintain 
more control over the messages about the study that reached families who would eventually be 
assigned to the control group, the guidelines for the recruitment process precluded buying air 
time on a local radio or public broadcasting station or conducting outreach at schools or through 
teachers or parent associations. This absence of broad-based publicity may have added to the 
challenges of establishing the legitimacy of the program. However, as recruitment continued, 
NPOs reported that news coverage of the program had increased community awareness about 
it.13
Marketing a “Chance” to Be in the Program 
 Official program postcards, distributed after the initial phone calls began, also helped the 
program establish credibility, as did information shared increasingly via word-of-mouth by 
families who had enrolled. 
Although the messages could vary, all staff were required to explain clearly that selec-
tion for the program was random. For example, the script that staff were expected use in recruit-
ing families stated, “There are a limited number of spaces available in the program. So, to be fair, 
we’re using a process that’s completely random to decide who will be eligible for the payments. 
It’s like flipping a coin: you’ll have a 50 percent chance of becoming eligible for payments.” 
Outreach workers stressed the 50/50 chance of getting into the program group and often added a 
reference to the lottery, reminding families that they had less chance of winning the New York 
Mega Millions than of getting into Family Rewards. While the chance to be part of a program 
like Family Rewards was often enough for a family to sign up, some families may have opted 
out since there was no guarantee of getting into the program even if they were eligible. 
                                                   
13Between July and September alone, articles about the program were published in the New York Times, 
USA Today, Newsweek, Gotham Gazette, Daily News, New York Post, and New York Sun, and it received 
television coverage on the local station NY1. 
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Box 2.2 
Outreach Case Study: Appealing to the Target Community 
The case study below highlights an example of a home visit that MDRC researchers ob-
served. This example demonstrates how staff changed the message to appeal to their target 
community. 
Sharon and Ted (not their real names), two NPO staff members, started their day by spend-
ing about a half an hour in the office sorting contact sheets by street and address, and 
putting them in the order in which each home would be visited. The families who were 
included on these contact sheets were those whom staff had not been able to contact by 
telephone, and who were getting their first home visit.   
At the home visit, Sharon and Ted introduced themselves by stating their names and ex-
plaining that they were associated with Opportunity NYC and Union Settlement Associa-
tion. They then explained quickly that Opportunity NYC is a program for children, using 
the name of the target child in grade 4, 7, or 9; a variation on this approach was to say “I’d 
like to talk to you about your son/daughter.” They led with the child’s name quickly, in the 
first sentence or two, to pique the parent’s curiosity. This approach also gave them an air of 
legitimacy or authority, although it may also have made the parent temporarily nervous if 
he or she thought that Sharon and Ted were conducting a home visit from the Administra-
tion for Children’s Services or from the child’s school. After this introduction, they asked to 
talk to the parent about the program. In every case that MDRC researchers observed, the 
potential enrollees invited staff into their homes. 
When they got into the apartment, Sharon and Ted reintroduced themselves and the pro-
gram, and asked whether the child whom they’d mentioned was entering one of the target 
grades. Then they explained that Opportunity NYC is a program that is designed to keep 
children in school and “doing the right thing.” Ted made the point that it “pays you for 
being a parent.” They talked about rewards for parent-teacher visits, library cards, test 
score rewards, and, last, employment. The amount of potential earnings was not mentioned 
until the end, at which point they also explained that there was “no fee to join this pro-
gram” and that it didn’t cost anything or interfere with the receipt of public benefits. Then, 
they scheduled an appointment with the parent to go to Union Settlement for enrollment. 
Finally, before they left, they mentioned that families would receive a gift of a $20 Metro-
Card for signing up.  
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Parents’ Reasons for Joining the Study 
MDRC researchers conducted in-depth interviews with parents in the program group to 
learn about their initial perceptions of the program and their interest in joining it. They gave a 
variety of positive reasons for signing up. Some saw Family Rewards as an opportunity to 
encourage their children to do better in school and finish high school. As one parent said, 
“There wasn’t really anything really motivating me ’cause I still have to take them to the doctor 
regardless. So [I signed up to] try to let them push them to do better in school.” Others thought 
Family Rewards was worthwhile because it encouraged parents in the community to support 
their children, even though they did not think of themselves as needing this type of encourage-
ment. One parent commented:  
I really do think it’s a great idea…like taking the kids for physicals and tak-
ing kids for the dentist and stuff like that. Not every parent does it. And espe-
cially there’s a lot of young girls nowadays giving birth, something that you 
used to not see before. So I think it’s real good that they really, you know,  
really want the parents to be on time for their kids’ stuff. 
Some of these parents thought Family Rewards would help other parents become more 
engaged in their children’s schooling. While most of these parents did not describe themselves 
as needing this type of guidance, the program was appealing because of its potential to improve 
the habits of parents for the greater good.  
Some of these parents also wanted to be part of finding a solution to long-standing 
community problems. As one said:  
When they approached me with it I said, “Well, it’s an opportunity. Even if 
they don’t put me as part of the program where I get paid, I’ll still partici-
pate” because it’s a pilot program and it’s something that’s gonna help the 
community, for parents to be more responsible and accountable for what 
they’re supposed to be doing. So either way, I was gonna participate. 
For some other participants, the program spoke directly to their pressing financial 
needs. These participants saw the program’s potential for help with household expenses after a 
recent job loss, or as a way to buy clothes for their children, save money, and become financial-
ly independent from other family members. 
Finally, friends, family, or community members who had enrolled encouraged some 
families to sign up. These participants often first ignored outreach and then reached out to the 
NPOs in response to this encouragement. 
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While most participants who were interviewed described the goals of the program in 
positive terms, some were initially skeptical about Family Rewards. To these individuals, it 
seemed farfetched that they would be paid to take their child to the doctor or to school. As one 
parent put it, “Now, let’s be for real. In this day and age, who’s gonna give away free money?” 
Some of this skepticism stemmed from a fear of fraud or identity theft, since Social Security 
numbers were required for enrollment. However, contact with the program made them more 
comfortable, especially repeated contact by outreach staff and visits to an NPO. Other parents 
sought out additional information to confirm the program’s legitimacy through researching 
media coverage or calling 311, the New York City government telephone number through 
which callers can be connected to nonemergency government services or agencies. One parent 
described her experience of verifying the program’s existence: 
They called me, and, you know, they left a message on my phone, on the 
answering machine. And I said to myself, you know, telemarketer. I’m not 
gonna deal with that. So they called again. And I happened to answer the 
phone. So the lady was saying, you know, you can get rewards. I said, “Lis-
ten, I don't know who’s playing games.” She said, “Listen now, if it was me 
and somebody’s offering me free money, are you gonna turn it down?... I’m 
telling you, I’m for real.”…She said, “I’m gonna prove it to you, just come in 
and — you know, you can think I’m crazy.” She said, “But if you don’t be-
lieve me, go, you know, online and find out about Groundwork.” So you 
know what happened, I called 311…The lady was cracking up. She said, 
“You know, you’re like the tenth person who called.” I said, “Well, you 
know, I mean come on, this sounds crazy.” She said, “Ma’am, I’m not — 
this is not a joke.” She said, “I know it sounds crazy, ’cause if I was you I 
would be the same way.” 
A number of the interviewees who were initially skeptical also spoke about the stigma 
of being part of a program for low-income people that pays parents for doing what they are 
“supposed to do.” As one parent said, “I was first appalled at the fact that somebody — things 
were so bad where you had to be paid to do things that you should normally do for your 
children anyway. So I just — I tore the paper up and put it in the garbage later.” In these types 
of statements, interviewees sometimes noted that the program was for “poor” or “low-income” 
families and made clear distinctions between themselves and that target group.  
Despite their skepticism, these interviewees signed up for Family Rewards. As one par-
ent described, it was worth taking a chance: “Sometimes opportunities do arise, and you should 
take advantage of them and see what happens with the outcome…what harm could come from 
it, or what good can come from it. Sometimes you have to go out and test the waters.” After 
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deciding to “take the plunge,” these participants went to an NPO to enroll through the process 
described in the following section.  
The Enrollment and Random Assignment Process 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the enrollment process at the NPO required parents to provide 
eligibility documentation, view a video that explained random assignment, sign an “agreement 
to participate” (or “informed consent”) form, and provide background information. The pro-
gram required that families have at least one child in fourth, seventh, or ninth grade in order to 
be eligible for Family Rewards. As long as one child met that criterion, with proper documenta-
tion the whole family could enroll in the program, including siblings under the age of 18 and 
both parents, if they were married or in a legal domestic partnership.  
While the data provided by the DOE proved income and location eligibility, the pro-
gram required that all parents prove age, identity, and citizenship; marital status; and custody of 
enrolling children. In addition, enrolling families who were not on the recruitment list had to 
provide proof of address and income. Documentation requirements are described in Box 2.3.  
Once NPO staff approved the documentation, parents viewed a short video describing 
the program, read the “agreement to participate” form, and then participated in a question-and-
answer session. Each parent who chose to enroll in the program was required to sign the 
“agreement to participate” form. Enrollment workers then collected background information 
about the family and each family member for whom the parent(s) provided documentation.  
The random assignment process itself happened after the family left the NPO, off-site 
at MDRC.14
                                                   
14The NPOs submitted background information electronically to MDRC through a secure, Web-based 
system, which MDRC staff then reviewed to make sure it was complete. If all key indicators were provided, 
MDRC staff compared the enrolling parents and children with the parents and children who had previously 
been randomly assigned, using name, Social Security number, and date of birth (to preclude duplicate random 
assignments), and then completed the random assignment.  
 MDRC used batch random assignment for this process, which ensures that 
program and control group status is assigned randomly within the group of processed enrol-
lees. As shown in Figure 2.1, families were selected by random assignment for either the 
program group, which is eligible for reward payments, or the control group, which does not 
have any contact with the Family Rewards program. About half of the families were assigned 
to the program group and the other half to the control group. Seedco notified families who
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were assigned to the program group, and MDRC notified families who were assigned to the 
control group, both via mail.15
                                                   
15Although random assignment could have been completed at the NPO and families notified immediately, 
using batch random assignment ensured that there were no attempts to “game the system” by looking for a 
pattern in the random assignment and trying to circumvent it. With such a large amount of money at stake, the 
program designers were concerned that NPO staff and enrolling families might be tempted to try to get certain 
families assigned to the program group, thus undermining the randomness of the allocation process. Physically 
removing random assignment from the location of enrollment allowed enrollment to take place in a neutral 
  
(continued) 
Box 2.3 
Documentation Requirements 
To prove eligibility for the program, families were asked to bring documentation when 
enrolling. This included documentation to prove age, identity, and citizenship; marital 
status; and custody of enrolling children. Any families who were not on the recruitment 
list were also asked to provide proof of income and address. 
• Age, identity, and citizenship: Adults were asked their age and citizenship status 
during outreach telephone calls and were told what kind of documentation they 
would need to prove that. All adults enrolling in Family Rewards had to be 18 years 
of age or older and U.S. citizens by birth or naturalization or legal permanent resi-
dents. To prove this, adults were asked to provide a U.S. birth certificate, U.S. pass-
port, or legal permanent resident or green card. Adults who presented a U.S. birth 
certificate to prove citizenship were also required to provide a photo identification 
card to prove their identity, which did not have to be government-issued. 
• Marital status: Both parents in a family could sign up for the program if they were 
legally married or were in a legal domestic partnership. To prove this, adults were 
asked to provide a marriage license or a certificate of domestic partnership registra-
tion.  
• Custody of enrolling children: Parents were asked to provide proof that the child-
ren who were enrolling were legally in their custody, which was usually done with a 
birth certificate. Parents who had adopted children were asked to provide their adop-
tion records. Foster children were not eligible to be enrolled in the program since 
their legal guardian is the State of New York. 
Income and proof of address: Families who were not on the recruitment list were asked 
to bring documentation to prove their income and address. Most families provided proof 
of receipt of food stamps or public health insurance like Medicaid to prove income at or 
below 130 percent of the federal poverty level. They also had to submit a bill or a piece of 
mail to prove that they lived in one of the target community districts.  
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Sample Build-Up 
As shown in Table 2.1, the NPOs enrolled and randomly assigned nearly 51 percent of 
the total sample in the first two months of outreach before the program began, another 36 
percent in September and October 2007, and the remaining 14 percent after October. Enroll-
ment was finally closed on December 31, 2007, with a sample of 4,803 families.16 (The actual 
random assignment process was completed for the last few families after December.) Although 
recruiting such a large sample over six months is an impressive accomplishment,17
Characteristics of the Study Sample  
 the fact that 
recruitment continued past the start of the program in September had important implications 
for program operations, placing strains on the NPOs as well as on Seedco. The NPOs had to 
begin conducting Family Rewards orientation sessions with program group families, teaching 
them about the rewards that are available, the rules and regulations of the program, and how to 
apply for payments, while Seedco had to begin implementing the verification and payment 
processes. At the same time, the NPOs and Seedco needed to continue to strive to reach the 
sample recruitment goals, so that neither goal could receive the organizations’ full attention as 
the program got under way, making the first few months in the life of the new program 
especially challenging.  
During the intake process and prior to random assignment, NPO staff collected back-
ground information on the families. Tables 2.2 through 2.5 show the background characteristics 
of all families, parents, and children in the entire study sample, combining program and control 
group members from all the NPOs. Appendix A includes supplementary tables that compare the 
characteristics of the program and control groups. There are no statistically significant differ-
ences between the two groups in the measured background characteristics, providing assurance 
that the random assignment process worked well. Appendix A also includes tables that compare 
the characteristics of families across each of the NPOs.  
                                                   
environment. The remote random assignment also provided distance and time between the NPO staff and 
families who may have been upset about their random assignment to the control group. 
16This number includes families that have since withdrawn from the program or were excluded from this 
analysis. 
17Some other random assignment studies with a voluntary study sample have taken closer to two years to 
reach targets of 2,000 or fewer. For example, one site in MDRC’s Work Advancement and Support Center 
demonstration, a voluntary program focused on retention and advancement in work, took about two years to 
recruit about 1,200 people (Miller, Tessler, and Van Dok, 2009). 
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Family and Parent Characteristics 
As shown in Table 2.2, most parents who enrolled in Family Rewards were unmarried 
(81 percent) and spoke English at home (77 percent).18 Fifty-three percent were receiving 
housing assistance in the form of either public housing (30 percent) or Section 8 vouchers (23 
percent). While the target family income was 130 percent of the federal poverty level or below, 
15 percent of the families had earnings above that level. Since parents completed the free lunch 
application that provided data for the Family Rewards recruitment one to three years prior to 
enrollment, families’ incomes may have changed between the time they first became eligible for 
free school lunch and when they enrolled. Sample members with income higher than the 
targeted level may also have been included because children attending universal feeding schools 
are all eligible for free lunch regardless of family income.19
                                                   
18“Unmarried” includes both one- and two-parent families. That is, the unmarried category includes those 
who responded “single, but living with boy/girlfriend,” which is shown as “one-parent family” in Table 2.2. 
 Such higher-income families may  
19Families with children in universal feeding schools are only required to complete free lunch applications 
every four years. 
Number Cumulative
Month of Random Assignment Enrolled Percentage Number Percentage
July 2007 869 18.3 869 18.3
August 2007 1,530 32.2 2,399 50.5
September 2007 961 20.2 3,360 70.7
October 2007 733 15.4 4,093 86.2
November 2007 369 7.8 4,462 93.9
December 2007 259 5.5 4,721 99.4
January 2008 28 0.6 4,749 100.0
March 2008a 1 0.0 4,750 100.0
Enrollment of Sample Members, by Month of Random Assignment 
Table 2.1
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Background Information Forms. 
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
aRandom assignment officially ended in January 2008, but one family was added to the 
sample in March due to a communication error during the enrollment process.
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Table 2.2
Characteristics of Families at the Time of Random Assignment
Characteristic Total
One-parent familya (%) 80.9
Two-parent family with both parents enrolled in Family Rewardsb (%) 5.7
Average number of children in household 2.5
Number of children in household (%)
1 child 22.8
2 children 34.3
3 children 25.1
4 children or more 17.8
Primary language spoken at home is English (%) 76.9
Housing status (%)
Own home or apartment 5.9
Rent apartment or home 87.1
Other housing arrangement 7.1
Living in public housing (%) 30.4
Receiving Section 8 rental assistance (%) 23.0
Receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistancec (%) 24.0
Receiving food stamps (%) 59.4
Not receiving any public benefits or housing assistance (%) 13.1
At least one adult covered by public health insurance (%) 70.9
Earnings above 130% of federal poverty leveld (%) 14.9
Sample size 4,750
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums.
Public health insurance measures in this table exclude child information. 
aThis measure includes families with parents who reported their marital status as single, single but 
living with a boyfriend or girlfriend, separated, divorced, or widowed. 
bThis measure refers to sample members who enrolled in Family Rewards with their spouse or legal 
domestic partner.
cThis measure includes families with child-only cases.
dIncome information is not available.
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also have been included in the sample as a result of the free lunch program application process, 
which relies on families’ self-attestation of income without any required proof of income.  
Table 2.3 shows the background characteristics of the parents in the study sample. On 
average, parents were 40 years old. Nearly all were either black, non-Hispanic/Latino (51 
percent) or Hispanic/Latino (47 percent). Educationally, they were a diverse group. While 50 
percent did not have a GED certificate or a high school diploma, 18 percent had either an 
associate’s or bachelor’s degree. Their attachment to the labor force also varied widely, with 
slightly more than half (53 percent) holding a job. Overall, 37 percent of parents were work-
ing full time (at least 30 hours per week), and 16 percent were working part time (not shown 
in Table 2.3).  
In deciding on the target population for the demonstration, the program’s designers 
sought to include low-income families who were not attached to the public benefits system, as 
well as those who were receiving some existing form of assistance. They hypothesized that 
families who were not receiving public benefits may have been more disadvantaged than those 
who were receiving benefits, speculating that they would be people who “fell through the 
cracks” in the safety net system or faced obstacles applying for assistance. As shown in Table 
2.2, 13 percent of parents enrolled in Family Rewards reported at the time of random assign-
ment that they were not receiving any public benefits or housing assistance. As it turned out, 
these families were generally less, not more, disadvantaged than those receiving benefits. Table 
2.4 illustrates this by comparing parents’ employment and educational status across the two 
categories of families. It shows, for example, that parents without benefits were much more 
likely to be working (87 percent versus 48 percent), and more likely to be working full time (72 
percent versus 32 percent). They were also more likely to have earned at least a high school 
diploma or received a GED certificate (83 percent versus 56 percent) and more likely to have an 
associate’s or bachelor’s degree (30 percent versus 12 percent).  
Children’s Characteristics  
Table 2.5 shows that 94 percent of enrolled children were born in the United States. The 
vast majority of children were attending public schools (98 percent), with 52 percent entering 
the targeted grades (17 percent were entering fourth grade, 16 percent were entering seventh 
grade, and 19 percent were entering ninth grade). Only 1 percent of the children were not 
enrolled in school.20
                                                   
20This category captures both children under 18 years of age who were no longer attending school, as well 
as those who graduated before they reached their eighteenth birthday. 
 In the previous school year, 15 percent had been enrolled in special
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Table 2.3
Characteristics of Parents at the Time of Random Assignment
Characteristic Total
Female (%) 94.3
Age (%)
18-24 years 0.3
25-34 years 28.9
35-44 years 45.1
45-59 years 22.8
60 years or more 2.9
Average age (years) 39.9
U.S. citizena (%) 83.1
By birth 67.4
By naturalization 15.7
Legal Permanent Resident 16.9
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 46.7
White, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.7
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 51.2
Other 1.4
Education (highest degree or diploma earned) (%)
GED certificate 11.1
High school diploma 21.3
Associate's degree/2-year college 8.9
4-year college or beyond 8.7
None of the above 50.1
Marital status (%)
Single 62.4
Cohabitating 2.3
Separated, widowed, or divorced 16.1
Married or in a legal domestic partnership 19.1
Has an account at bank or credit union (%) 47.0
Employment measures
Currently working (%) 53.1
Working full timeb (%) 37.1
Average weekly earnings, among those currently working 393
During past year, average number of months worked (%) 10
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
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Table 2.3 (continued)
Characteristic Total
Health measures (%)
Health insurance coverage 
Public health insurance 70.5
Employer health insurance 20.6
Other health insurance 3.0
Not covered 6.0
Had annual medical checkup when not sick
Within the past year 82.1
1-2 years ago 14.3
More than 2 years ago 3.4
Never 0.2
Last medical checkup was at own (regular) doctor's 
office or clinic 93.5
Had preventive dental checkup 
Within the past year 64.9
1-2 years ago 23.5
More than 2 years ago 10.9
Never 0.7
Self-rated health
Excellent or very good 43.0
Good 36.9
Fair or poor 20.1
Over the past 2 weeks, had little or no interest
in doing things 22.4
Over the past 2 weeks, had been feeling down, 
depressed, or hopeless 21.9
Sample size 4,750
#N/A
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
This table excludes information for enrolled second parents in two-parent households (N = 247).
aThis measure refers to U.S. citizens both by birth and by naturalization.
bThis measure refers to 30 hours a week or more. 
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education and 13 percent in the English Language Learner (ELL) program. The children were 
spread across 407 elementary schools, 358 middle schools, and 390 high schools throughout the 
city (not shown). 
Most of the children’s parents reported attending a parent-teacher conference in the last 
year. Only 5 percent of children had a parent who reported never attending a parent-teacher 
conference. An additional 35 percent of children had a parent who reported attending one or 
two parent-teacher conferences, the minimum parents are usually asked to attend over the 
course of the school year. Because Family Rewards includes payments for attending parent-
teacher conferences, these high rates at random assignment suggested that many families might 
be eligible for the payment. 
 
Characteristic (%) Receiving Benefitsa Not Receiving Benefits
Working 47.6 86.6
Working full time 31.8 71.5
Earning more than $400 per week 11.3 59.5
Education (highest grade completed or degree or 
diploma obtained)
Grade 9 or less 11.9 4.0
Grade 10 or 11 22.6 7.9
Completed grade 12 with no diploma or GED certificate 9.2 5.4
GED certificate 9.2 6.7
High school diploma 16.9 18.5
Some college 18.5 27.2
Associate's degree or 2-year degree 6.4 12.6
4-year college degree or higher 5.2 17.6
Sample size (total = 4,688) 4,073 615
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 2.4
Selected Baseline Characteristics of Parents in Families Receiving 
and in Families Not Receiving Government Transfer Benefits 
at the Time of Random Assignment
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums.
aBenefit receipt includes receipt of food stamps, public health insurance, and housing assistance.
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Table 2.5
Characteristic Total
Gender (%)
Female 50.0
Male 50.0
Age (%)
0-5 years 13.7
6-10 years 30.6
11-13 years 26.2
14 years or older 29.5
Average age (years) 11
Born in the United States (%) 93.5
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 47.0
White, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.4
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 50.4
Other 2.2
Type of school child attended in the past year (%)
Public or charter school 97.5
Private or parochial school 2.5
Gradea (%)
Not yet in pre-K or kindergarten 7.1
Pre-K 2.4
Kindergarten 2.8
1st grade 3.5
2nd grade 4.2
3rd grade 3.8
4th grade 16.7
5th grade 3.9
6th grade 4.3
7th grade 16.1
8th grade 3.9
9th grade 18.6
10th grade 4.1
11th grade 3.6
12th grade 3.0
Collegeb 1.2
Not enrolledc 0.9
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Characteristics of All Children at the Time of Random Assignment 
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Characteristic Total
Education measures (%)
Child's parent attended parent-teacher conference 
during past year
Never 5.0
1-2 times 35.3
3-4 times 35.0
5-6 times 11.8
More than 6 times 12.9
Child's parent spoke with teacher about
grades, tests, or homework during past year
Not at all 2.9
A little 8.2
Some 20.0
A lot 34.5
A great deal 34.5
Enrolled in special education in the past school year 14.9
Enrolled as an English Language Learner (ELL)
in the past school year 12.9
Child health outcomes (%)
Health insurance coverage
Public health insurance 81.1
Employer health insurance 14.5
Other health insurance 1.7
Not covered 2.7
Parent's rating of child's health
Excellent 43.5
Very good 31.1
Good 21.8
Fair 3.1
Poor 0.4
Had annual medical checkup when not sick
Within the past year 90.7
1-2 years ago 8.4
More than 2 years ago 0.8
Never 0.2
Last annual checkup was at own (regular) doctor's office or clinic 97.7
Had preventive dental checkup
Within the past year 74.6
1-2 years ago 17.2
More than 2 years ago 3.1
Never 5.1
(continued)
Table 2.5 (continued)
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Health Characteristics 
The responses to health-related questions were similar for parents and children (see 
Tables 2.3 and 2.5). Both children and parents had high rates of health insurance coverage and 
annual medical exams, as discussed further in Chapter 7. Only 6 percent of parents and 3 
percent of children had no health insurance coverage. Public health insurance was the most 
common form of coverage, with 71 percent of parents and 81 percent of children having such 
insurance. The rates of self-reported medical checkups were high. For example, 82 percent of 
parents reported having an annual medical exam within the past year, and this was also the case 
for 91 percent of the children in the sample. As might be expected, fewer participants reported 
having an annual dental checkup at the time of random assignment, with 65 percent of parents 
reporting a dental checkup in the last year, along with 75 percent of children. Responses to these 
health-related questions at the time of random assignment also suggest that there will be high 
receipt of Family Rewards health-related payments.  
How Well Does the Study Sample Reflect the Target Population? 
As described above, the NPOs used specific outreach strategies to increase the like-
lihood that families who were enrolled in the study would reflect the kinds of low-income 
families in the larger target population from which the sample was recruited. The use of home 
visits, persistent outreach to targeted families, and limitations on the number of families who 
were not on the recruitment list but who could enroll ensured that the NPOs engaged more than 
just the easiest-to-reach families, who were potentially less disadvantaged. To assess whether 
Characteristic Total
Has a physical problem that limits activities 9.5
Has an emotional or mental health problem 
that limits activities 6.3
Sample size 11,331
Table 2.5 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
aGrades 4, 7, and 9 were "target grades" for the Family Rewards program. Therefore, all enrolled 
families had to have a child in grade 4, 7, or 9.
bCollege students who were under the age of 18 were enrolled in Family Rewards.They were not 
eligible for any reward payments.
cThe "not enrolled" category includes school-age children who are no longer attending or have 
graduated before the age of 18.
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the families in the study are generally similar to the broader target population, two types of 
comparisons were conducted.  
First, test scores from annual standardized tests in English language arts (ELA) and 
math exams from 2007 were used to determine whether children who were enrolled in the study 
had pre-program academic performance levels that were similar to the achievement levels of 
children on the larger recruitment list who were not in the study sample. Table 2.6 presents the 
results for fourth-, seventh-, and ninth-grade students, showing the percentage of students who 
scored at proficiency levels. The test scores are almost the same for both groups. The only 
differences that are statistically significant are those for fourth-graders, but the size of the 
differences is very small (2.3 percentage points on the ELA test and 2.2 percentage points on 
the math test). For seventh-graders and ninth-graders, the exam results are nearly identical. 
These findings suggest that the children in the study sample represent well those children who 
were eligible for the program but are not in the sample. 
A second comparison uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) to con-
struct a benchmark sample for parents. (The DOE data contain little to no information about the 
parents’ demographics.) Although it was not possible to identify parents in the ACS sample 
who would meet all the eligibility criteria for Family Rewards, it was possible to identify those 
who at least lived in the targeted community districts, had income at or below 130 percent of the 
federal poverty level, and had at least one school-age child. Table 2.7 presents the results. 
Because of the small size of the ACS sample in the targeted community districts, the table 
shows estimates from the ACS not only for the designated families who were living in the 
targeted community districts, but also for those who were living anywhere in the boroughs of 
New York City that include those districts (the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan). The compari-
son below focuses on the community districts themselves, which is the most relevant compari-
son, but the data from the larger boroughs do not paint a very different picture.  
As Table 2.7 shows, parents in the study are more likely than those in the ACS survey 
to be female (94 percent versus 79 percent) and single heads-of-household. As might be 
expected because of the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the program, the Family 
Rewards sample includes a somewhat higher proportion of U.S. citizens (83 percent versus 75 
percent) than does the ACS sample. Perhaps also linked to this requirement are the differences 
in race and ethnicity: the Family Rewards sample has a higher proportion of black, non-
Hispanic/Latino parents and fewer Hispanic/Latino parents than the ACS sample. The sample 
has a similar percentage of parents with college degrees, but also a somewhat higher percentage 
of parents with no high school diploma or GED certificate (50 percent versus 44 percent). It 
also has a somewhat higher proportion of sample members who were employed (53
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percent versus 44 percent), though it has a similar proportion working full time (37 percent 
versus 34 percent).  
Although the ACS sample is not a perfect comparison for the parents in the Family 
Rewards sample, comparing the two samples does suggest that, despite the voluntary nature of 
the program, the Family Rewards sample does not include parents who, on the whole, are 
distinctively more advantaged than those in the larger target population. In fact, on many 
indicators, the study sample appears to be somewhat more disadvantaged.  
Non-Family Rewards Family Rewards Difference
Grade Level and Outcome (%) Samplea Sample (Impact) P-Value
4th-graders at random assignment
Proficient on ELA test 44.1 46.4 -2.3 * 0.095
Proficient on math test 75.1 77.4 -2.2 * 0.055
Sample size (total = 9,295) 7,569 1,726
7th-graders at random assignment
Proficient on ELA test 37.2 37.7 -0.6 0.681
Proficient on math test 53.5 52.9 0.5 0.694
Sample size (total = 8,761) 7,090 1,671
9th-graders at random assignment
Proficient on ELA test 30.3 31.0 -0.7 0.568
Proficient on math test 32.5 33.8 -1.4 0.275
Sample size (total = 10,095) 8,116 1,979
Percentage of Students Scoring at Proficiency Levels on Prior Year (2007)
English Language Arts (ELA) and Math Tests, by Grade Level
Table 2.6
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: aThe non-Family Rewards sample members are students from the recruitment list whose families did 
not enroll in the program. Recruitment data provided by the Department of Education indicate that these 
students were in the third, sixth, and eighth grades when ELA and math tests were taken in the year prior to 
random assignment. However, grade levels at the time of random assignment are not known for this sample.
In New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed "proficient."
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
Differences across groups were assessed using chi-square tests.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
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the American Community Survey 
Family Rewards Targeted Targeted
Characteristic Adult Samplea Community Districts Boroughs
Female (%) 94.3 78.9 72.6
U.S. citizenc (%) 83.1 75.3 66.9
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 46.7 56.6 48.0
White, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.7 1.4 12.1
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 51.2 38.0 26.6
Other 1.4 4.0 13.4
Education (highest degree or diploma earned) (%)
High school diploma or GED certificate 32.4 43.9 45.7
Associate's degree/2-year college 8.9 6.0 5.5
4-year college or beyond 8.7 5.7 7.6
None of the above 50.1 44.3 41.1
Marital status (%)
Single, never married 62.4 35.0 25.3
Cohabitating 2.3 8.3 7.4
Separated, widowed, or divorced 16.1 29.1 23.8
Married or in a legal domestic partnershipd 19.1 27.6 43.4
Currently working (%) 53.1 43.5 47.1
Working full timee (%) 37.1 33.6 34.1
One-parent family (%) 80.9 69.6 53.6
Average number of children in household 2.5 1.9 1.9
Primary language spoken at home is English (%) 76.9 38.3 31.0
Housing status (%)
Own home or apartment 5.9 3.2 9.2
Rent apartment or home 87.1 96.8 90.8
Family is receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistancef (%) 24.0 30.3 21.5
Family is receiving food stamps (%) 59.4 56.8 48.6
Sample size (total = 8,920) 4,750 765 3,405
(continued)
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American Community Survey Sampleb
Table 2.7
Characteristics of Parents in Family Rewards and Similar Parents in 
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Conclusion 
Despite the many hurdles they faced, and the fact that the sample enrollment had to 
continue past the program’s start date, the NPOs largely met the recruitment goals for the study 
within an extremely tight time frame. Moreover, the characteristics of the families who enrolled 
in the study appear to mirror the characteristics of the intended target population reasonably 
well. The evidence presented in this chapter thus suggests that the sample that is enrolled in the 
study is a good one for evaluation purposes, allowing the findings from the impact analysis, 
discussed later in this report, to be generalized beyond those of the immediate sample with a 
reasonable degree of confidence.  
Table 2.7 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms and the 2007 American 
Community Survey (ACS) data.
NOTES:The Family Rewards housing categories do not add up to 100 percent because the “other housing 
arrangements” category is not shown. 
ACS data were obtained from New York City's Human Resources Administration.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums.
aThis table excludes information for second parents in two-parent households (N = 247).
bThe ACS data were selected for individuals with a family income of 130 percent of the federal poverty 
level, with at least one child between the ages of 5 and 17, and who lived in the target community districts in the 
Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan in 2007. 
cThis measure includes U.S. citizens both by birth and by naturalization.
dACS data do not measure legal domestic partnerships.
eThis measure refers to 30 hours a week or more. 
fThis measure includes families with child-only cases.
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Chapter 3 
Operating Family Rewards 
As a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, Family Rewards needed systems and 
procedures to market, document, verify, and pay rewards to low-income families. The program’s 
implementing agencies had to teach families about the rewards being offered and how to claim 
them, pay rewards accurately and efficiently, provide “customer service” to resolve payment 
questions and disputes, and offer guidance on where to find other services in the community that 
could help them succeed in the program. This chapter — the first of two focused on implementa-
tion — describes the agencies’ efforts to accomplish these operational goals and the challenges 
they encountered along the way. Three critical implications of these operations — participants’ 
understanding of incentives, their receipt of rewards, and their confidence in receiving payments 
that they earned over time — are introduced here but are covered in much more detail in Chapter 
4. This chapter focuses on the evolution of operational experiences through the first two years of 
the program, drawing on the perspective of practitioners and participants. The analysis is based 
primarily on qualitative data obtained from program observations and in-depth interviews with 
families and program staff, on reviews of program documents, and on quantitative data collected 
from the 18-month Family Rewards parent survey.1
The chapter shows that Family Rewards agencies implemented all the major program 
systems and procedures required by the model. The extraordinarily rapid launch of the program, 
which, as indicated in Chapter 1, had to begin without the benefit of a pilot phase, meant that 
the early months of the program were difficult ones. Some aspects of program delivery suffered 
as a result, especially in initial efforts to orient families to the program. In addition, although 
payments were made successfully during every payment period, unanticipated problems 
delivering cash to families’ bank accounts generated some strain in the program and distress 
 
                                                   
1The Family Rewards implementation research used data from a variety of sources. Structured observa-
tions (that is, observations based on predefined points for recording information) by MDRC staff provided 
information on outreach and orientation activities at each of the six Neighborhood Partner Organizations 
(NPOs), payment processing and helpline operations within Seedco, and NPO workshops for program 
participants. “In-depth” interviews with participants refer to qualitative interviews lasting 45 minutes to an hour 
and a half with 75 heads-of-household, drawn from a randomly selected list of participants that was stratified 
by the grade level of the “index” or focal child, focusing on those entering the fourth, seventh, or ninth grades. 
The interviews occurred between spring of 2008 and summer of 2009 and were conducted mostly in the homes 
of participants. These interviews were coded in NVivo 7 by three coders, using a predefined codebook and 
employing initial and periodic inter-rater reliability checks, which showed that differences between coders 
were minimal. Additional data sources include program documents, correspondence, Seedco’s management 
information system, and a special module on participants’ experiences that was part of the 18-month Family 
Rewards parent survey described in Chapter 1.  
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among families. As the program matured and staff developed more experience in operating it, 
many of these early difficulties were overcome, and, overall, participants rated the services they 
received from the program very highly. By the second year of implementation, program 
operations were much improved and the model was being operated in a way that was generally 
consistent with its designers’ vision. By the end of the second year, nearly $14.7 million in 
rewards had been paid to families. Further improvements in operating procedures were being 
planned as the program entered its third and final year.  
The Organizational Structure of Family Rewards 
Two major groups were responsible for implementing Family Rewards: Seedco, which 
manages the initiative and provides payments to families, and community organizations known 
as Neighborhood Partner Organizations, or NPOs, which play a variety of face-to-face roles 
with participants, from orientation to marketing and customer service. Seedco is a national 
nonprofit organization with program areas that include workforce development, asset building, 
business assistance, and community finance. In New York City and elsewhere, Seedco is 
known for designing, launching, and operating model programs in partnership with networks of 
community organizations and serving as an intermediary that provides funding, management 
support, fiscal management, performance analysis, and technical assistance to community 
partners, who in turn provide direct services to clients. 
For Family Rewards, as shown in Figure 3.1, Seedco was responsible for operationaliz-
ing cash transfers, which includes developing the payment system, establishing payment 
policies, creating materials for submitting reward claims, verifying eligibility for payments, 
authorizing payments to participants, interacting with banks, and providing customer service 
through its telephone helpline. Seedco also provided support and technical assistance to NPOs 
and ensured fidelity to the program model, defined in concert with New York City’s Center for 
Economic Opportunity (CEO) and MDRC, while also managing and monitoring NPO perfor-
mance and accountability. Although Seedco is known as a national intermediary for community 
organizations, and although it has in the past managed complex performance contracting and 
verification systems, it had to create a new set of procedures to handle processes for verifying 
payment eligibility and authorizing payments required by Family Rewards. For these tasks, 
Seedco assigned approximately five managerial staff, four helpline operators, and 20 back-
office staff, in addition to information technology (IT) and marketing subcontractors.  
NPOs were envisioned as the “front line” of Family Rewards and participants’ initial 
point of contact with the program. Each NPO devoted approximately two full-time staff 
positions for these functions. During the first year, these staff members were heavily involved in 
the program’s start-up activities, including recruiting participants, orienting families, and 
helping parents and teens establish new bank accounts or provide other account information in
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Figure 3.1
Family Rewards: Operational Structure and Major Points of Interaction
Seedco (manages implementation and payments)
Operationalizing cash transfers
- Developing the payment system 
- Establishing payment policies
- Creating materials for claiming rewards
- Verifying eligibility for payments 
- Authorizing payments to participants 
- Interacting with banks 
- Providing customers service through helpline
- Providing support and technical assistance 
- Ensuring fidelity to program model 
- Monitoring NPO performance
Neighborhood Partner Organizations 
(NPOs) (face-to-face contact with 
participants)
Start-up activities 
- Recruiting participants
- Orienting families, establishing bank
     accounts
- Distributing coupon books
Customer service and marketing to 
families 
- Help with coupon submission
- Information and referral to participants
     upon request
- Marketing of incentives and creating
     sense of “community”
Manages 
NPOs
Submit documentation 
and contact helpline 
staff if needed 
Pays participants, sends 
earnings statements, and 
markets materials
Participants
- Learn about numerous, varied
     conditions
- Decide whether or not to attempt them
     or document them
- Decide how to communicate to their
     children about them 
- Work to fulfill conditions
Orient families, 
conduct targeted 
marketing calls
Contact for 
documentation 
help or referral 
needs, attend 
voluntary 
workshops and 
social events
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order to receive their incentive payments. They also distributed annual “coupon books” to 
families  personalized binders containing coupons and other forms that families must submit 
every two months to verify and claim rewards  during sessions that reacquainted participants 
with payment conditions, while reminding them of important activities or other services they 
might wish to pursue in order to be eligible for rewards. On an ongoing basis, NPOs were 
deeply involved in customer service and marketing activities, which meant reminding families 
of the incentives that were available, helping them with coupon submission when they re-
quested assistance, and providing them with information on and referrals to other services. 
Working with Seedco, the NPO staff created special workshops for families as another vehicle 
for educating them on how the program could help them and how they could earn and claim 
rewards in each of the domains. Finally, the NPOs strived to develop a sense of “community” 
among the families by hosting social events, such as summer barbecues and holiday parties.  
To select the NPOs, Seedco released a Request for Qualifications (RFQ). A committee 
headed by Seedco and including representatives from MDRC, CEO, and City agencies then 
reviewed proposals from these organizations, conducted site visits, and approved the selection 
of the six NPOs listed in Table 3.1. These NPOs represent an array of community-based, not-
for-profit organizations. Two groups — the Brownsville Multi-Service Family Health Center 
(BMS) in Brooklyn and Urban Health Plan (UHP) in the Bronx — are health organizations 
embedded in their communities, although both have experience conducting outreach and 
education programs. BronxWorks (known as Citizens Advice Bureau when the program began) 
is a community-based organization with services including early childhood programs, services 
geared toward school-age children, and family and senior citizen programs. The two Manhattan 
NPOs are also located within larger social service agencies: Catholic Charities Community 
Services is located within the Diocesan network of social services, while the Union Settlement 
Association is part of a settlement house established in 1895. Finally, Groundwork, Inc., is a 
recently founded youth development organization in East New York, which provides after-
school programs, college preparation and counseling, and individual services to families.  
Figure 3.1 displays the often varied capacities required of Family Rewards practitioners. 
As an incentives program without case management or direct services, the onus of carrying out 
program activities falls upon the family, as parents and children attempt to fulfill activity 
requirements, document them for Seedco, and claim and receive payments. However, for the 
implementing agencies, the tasks involved in operating a payment system, interacting with 
banks, and encouraging participants to take part in the program required many different types of 
skills. For example, Seedco needed to act both as an intermediary to build the capacity of 
community organizations around a new type of intervention for the United States — one that, as 
shown below, contained many subtleties of practice — while also functioning in some ways 
like an income support bureaucracy and insurance claims department. And the NPOs needed to 
practice successful door-to-door outreach, orient participants to the program, explain complex
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Regular Services Provided
Borough Name of NPO Type of Community Organization (Excluding Family Rewards)
Bronx Urban Health 
Plan (UHP)
Health center Primarily health services and public 
health outreach; serving Community 
District 6
Bronx BronxWorks Settlement house Early childhood education, summer 
camp, eviction prevention, transitional 
housing, English as a Second 
Language/citizenship classes, senior 
and legal services; serving Community 
District 5
Brooklyn Brownsville 
Multi-Service 
Center (BMC), 
part of the 
Brownsville 
Community 
Development 
Corporation 
Health center Primarily health services and public 
health outreach; serving Community 
District 6
Brooklyn Groundwork, Inc. 
(GW)
Youth development and education Test preparation and mentoring for 
high school students, elementary 
literacy education, legal services and 
One-Stop benefits for adults; serving 
Community District 5
Manhattan Catholic 
Charities (CC) 
Community 
Services, Joseph 
P. Kennedy 
Center 
Diocesan social service 
organization
Case management, crisis intervention, 
youth and recreational activities; 
serving Community District 10
Manhattan Union Settlement 
Association (US)
Settlement house Daycare and Head Start, senior citizen 
and after-school programs, home 
health services, community 
development and credit union; serving 
Community District 11
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 3.1
Neighborhood Partner Organizations (NPOs)
SOURCE: MDRC field research.
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rules to them, troubleshoot participants’ documentation problems, and conduct uplifting and 
motivating workshop sessions and social events. As this chapter shows, Seedco and the NPOs 
developed their capacity to perform these varied tasks over time.  
MDRC had no direct operational role in the project. However, as overall manager of the 
demonstration and the program’s evaluator, its staff observed program practices at Seedco and 
the NPOs, and offered formative feedback to these organizations based on those observations. 
MDRC staff also explored ideas together with Seedco and NPO staff as they considered ways to 
continue improving their operation of the program. In addition, MDRC staff were involved 
continuously with CEO and Seedco staff in making strategy and policy decisions that affect the 
program, which ultimately had some bearing on what would be learned from the evaluation. 
These decisions ranged from levels of documentation that were acceptable to verify activities, to 
jointly developing a broad marketing and engagement strategy, to advising whether NPO 
practice was consistent with the “no case management” model envisioned by the program’s 
designers and discussed in Chapter 1. 
Orienting Participants 
Orientation was the first in a series of Family Rewards activities that participants expe-
rienced after random assignment, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Orientation sessions were critical 
to participation in the program. Conducted by the NPOs, they offered families their “first” view 
of Family Rewards after they were selected for the program. Because participants cannot strive 
to undertake activities they do not fully understand, and because the “framing” or explanation of 
rewards has been shown to matter for outcomes in a number of studies on motivation,2
In these sessions, NPO staff explained the conditions of reward receipt and the schedule 
of payments, and what families had to do to verify their claims for payment. Also during 
orientations, staff guided participants on setting up a bank account or stored value card to ensure 
reward deposits. Seedco only paid Family Rewards payments electronically, through direct 
deposits to bank accounts or stored value cards. This was considered a more efficient way of 
getting money to families than issuing paper checks, and helped to “legitimize” the program. It 
was also viewed as a way of encouraging participation in mainstream banking.  
 the 
quality of these orientations is important to consider in assessing the strength of the program’s 
implementation.  
To prepare for their presentations at the orientations, NPO staff were trained by Seedco 
and viewed detailed PowerPoint presentations to ensure consistency of messaging across sites. 
(NPO staff did not always follow these presentations exactly, sometimes adapting them to
                                                   
2Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999). 
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1.  Orientation
- Participant learns about 
  conditions, payment cycle, and 
  program rules.
- Participant receives coupons and
  forms.
- Participant establishes or links
  bank account/stored value card
  for direct deposit of incentives.
- Participant picks up new coupon   
 book at beginning of second and 
 third years.
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Figure 3.2
Family Rewards: Overview of Program and Procedures
Ongoing Marketing
- Reminder flyers, earnings statements, and targeted campaigns
- Topical workshops and social events (optional)
- Family Rewards Web site
2.  Activities and Documentation
 - Family members complete 
   activities.
- Families submit coupons every
  other month in preaddressed,
  stamped envelope.
- Families do not need to submit 
  coupons for “autoverified”
  rewards (such as tests,
  attendance).
Ongoing Customer Service
- Participant may call helpline for payment information or to ask
  questions.
- Participant may call or visit NPOs for help with payments or
  documentation or for referrals.
3.  Verification and Payment
- Seedco receives
  documentation and verifies it.
- The Department of Education
   and other agencies
   periodically share data with
   Seedco, which cleans data and
   processes payment.
- Seedco makes payment 1
  month after submission
  deadline.
Cycle repeats 
every 2 months.
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accommodate concerns about length or a belief that messages would be stronger if framed 
differently.) Seedco also supplied the NPOs with large posters, to be displayed at the sessions, 
describing the payment cycle (see Figure 3.3) and forms for collecting bank account informa-
tion. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, participants needed to send in coupons every two months in 
order to claim rewards, and then had to wait to receive their payments the following month. In 
some cases, bank representatives were on site to help participants open accounts, even though 
staff did not endorse any particular bank.  
Orientation sessions usually began with an overview of program rules and responsibili-
ties, including an explanation that families would be terminated from the program if they 
submitted fraudulent claims for rewards. The sessions continued with a description of the 
qualifying conditions for the rewards, which were listed on an Activity List that was included in 
program folders given to all participants. NPO staff explained the use of the coupon book for 
claiming rewards, and described which activities required coupon submission and documenta-
tion, such as visits to doctors and dentists and full-time work, and which activities were “auto-
matically verified” — meaning that the participant did not need to submit any documentation — 
such as children meeting the 95 percent school attendance standard and families maintaining 
public health insurance. High school students were a special target of these sessions, as they 
received rewards that went straight into their own bank accounts. However, not every eligible 
teenager attended these sessions, and Seedco and NPO staff had to develop special outreach 
efforts to inform and educate teens about the program and get their bank account information. 
The sessions usually concluded with the distribution of interim coupons. (The full coupon 
books were not yet ready during many orientations, as described below.)  
Banking 
The other critical function of orientations was to set up bank accounts or obtain existing 
account information. When bank representatives attended the orientation sessions, participants 
could open up new accounts right away. If bank representatives were not available, participants 
could open their accounts at a branch office of the participating banks, which sometimes 
required follow-up by NPOs in the event that tellers or other bank staff were unaware of the 
program. The new accounts, called “Opportunity NYC accounts,” which were negotiated with 
several banks by the City’s Office of Financial Empowerment, were considered “safe ac-
counts”; that is, they were savings accounts that came with debit cards that were impossible to 
overdraw, to help participants avoid incurring penalties and slipping into debt. These accounts 
also had no minimum-balance requirements or fees and were meant to connect participants with 
mainstream banking services. The Office of Financial Empowerment within the Department of 
Consumer Affairs negotiated with a number of banks and credit unions to establish these 
accounts for the Family Rewards program. Seven agreed to do so: Bethex Federal Credit Union, 
Brooklyn Cooperative Federal Credit Union, Carver Federal Savings Bank, Lower East
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Figure 3.3 
Family Rewards Payment Cycle Timeline 
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Side Peoples Federal Credit Union, M&T Bank, North Fork Bank, and Union Settlement 
Federal Credit Union. Those who signed up for these new accounts or linked their existing 
accounts to the program received a one-time $50 bonus payment. According to responses on the 
Family Rewards 18-month parent survey, 55 percent of parents reported opening one of the new 
accounts. No bonus was offered for accepting payment through stored value cards, which the 
program sought to discourage because of the extra fees those cards carry.  
Racing to Orient Participants to the Program 
Most participating families were oriented during the fall of 2007 as a result of intense ef-
forts on the part of the NPOs, with assistance from Seedco, to bring participants back into their 
offices. The NPOs provided orientation sessions during normal business hours, evenings, and on 
weekends. In addition, they conducted many small, individualized orientations when a sufficient 
number of participants did not appear for scheduled orientations or when participants came 
during off-hours. However, orientation also overlapped with the end of enrollment and random 
assignment, and with the NPOs’ extensive recruitment efforts (described in Chapter 2), to reach 
potential participants in their homes. One of the consequences of the overlap between outreach 
and orientation — and, in general, of the overall rush to get the new program up and running — 
was that Seedco and the NPOs were not able to give orientations the type of attention and 
practice they had hoped devote to them. As one practitioner described the dynamic that fall:  
I think it was just hard because we didn’t have the programs set up. And we 
were running and marking performance by the number of families you 
brought in. So we were kind of stuck in a mode where we were just working 
on enrollment, which meant that all the programmatic issues were kind of 
getting pushed back  
Another factor complicating first-year orientations was that the final version of profes-
sionally printed coupon books was not available until later in the fall. Seedco had intended to 
supply each family with pre-printed coupons that had the names of family members on them 
and rewards appropriate to their age, to clarify which rewards each family member was eligible 
for. The delay in providing these coupon books occurred because certain program rules and 
conditions for receiving rewards had not been fully established until late in the summer of 2007, 
and because no system had yet been developed to “personalize” coupons and forms to families 
in an efficient way. As a result, staff needed to create individualized books manually on the 
computer, based on the unique family composition of nearly 2,400 households. As it turned out, 
the absence of coupon books provided a challenge to initial orientations, but also a later oppor-
tunity to reorient participants who came back in to pick up their new books. This additional 
reorientation opportunity, while off-putting to some participants, proved to be fortuitous in 
many cases, allowing staff another chance to explain the program and engage participants.  
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Early Challenges in Conducting Orientations 
Initial orientations varied in quality. Some NPO staff who proved to be effective re-
cruiters for the program sometimes had difficulties presenting and explaining the program’s 
detailed documentation requirements. During orientations, NPOs were sometimes challenged to 
explain detailed rules for the program’s different activities while also delivering welcoming and 
motivating messages to participants. As suggested by the extensive list of incentives (see 
Chapter 1, Table 1.2), merely describing all the potential conditions — even without explaining 
all the details of documentation required for them — could take a good amount of time. NPOs 
expressed anxiety that lengthy presentations would exhaust the attention of their audience. Still, 
four of the six NPOs were able to deliver information in a manner that was clear and concise. 
These four sites enlisted interactive techniques in their presentations, asking questions of 
participants in an attempt to engage families and maintain their interest and attention. Presenters 
utilized probes such as, “How many of you have a middle-schooler?” or “How many of you 
have a job?” One of these more successful orientations is described in Box 3.1.  
 
 
 
Box 3.1 
Introducing Family Rewards to Participants:  
An Example of a Successful Orientation 
The orientation sessions that were presented early in the program tended to vary in quali-
ty. Orientations that made an attempt to actively engage the participants, such as the one 
described in this box, were generally more successful than others. The presenter used 
PowerPoint to lead the discussion. Her coverage of the Activity List was the most inter-
active section of the presentation. When she explained the payments for attendance, one 
participant exclaimed, “I’m going to send my child to school!” The presenter helped 
participants understand the difference between activities for which they would need cou-
pons and those that would be verified automatically. She did this in an interactive fashion 
as well, asking the participants to point out things in one or the other category. She also 
explained complicated rules about rewarding either improvement or achievement in the 
English language arts exam. Finally, her presentation style was engaging and she encour-
aged everyone to take part: “I need participation from you guys so I know you get the 
program. Everybody understands that this is for each child, right?” There was a good deal 
of back-and-forth, with parents giving examples from their own lives and sharing advice 
about how to navigate schools.  
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Nonetheless, even the most accomplished of sites did not initially have a way of assess-
ing whether participants understood documentation rules, and attempts to assess knowledge in a 
large group were sometimes limited to pauses when presenters asked, “Does anyone have any 
questions?” This lack of an assessment mechanism, and the variety of literacy levels and 
learning styles among participants, sometimes made it difficult to gauge their comprehension. 
Those who may feel uncertain in their understanding are sometimes embarrassed about it; as 
one participant who was interviewed later about her orientation described the experience: “Yes, 
not all of it I understand. Sometimes you don’t feel like asking questions in a group of people, 
that kind of a thing.” Seedco, NPOs, and interviewers observed confusion early in the process 
about documentation requirements and the full extent of conditions for receiving payments. 
(Participant knowledge and understanding of the rules governing Family Rewards is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 4.)  
However, two of the six NPOs were less adept than the others at communicating detailed 
program information. At these two NPOs, on multiple occasions, Seedco and MDRC observed 
challenges in communicating rules about conditions. One of these challenging orientations is 
summarized in Box 3.2. In both NPOs, staff were observed more than once to be disorganized in 
presentation and sometimes confused about the rules that they were trying to explain.  
A participant described her experience at one of these orientations, bringing to mind 
how another function of orientation sessions was to establish credibility for a program that 
many participants initially thought was “too good to be true”:  
When I went down to their orientation, the people weren’t trained that well to 
tell us what really the program consisted about, so I was kind of skeptical. 
When I went…[the NPO staff member] wasn’t really sure about his words. I 
was really skeptical about that because, “I’m giving you my son’s birth cer-
tificate and Social Security number.” At first, I thought identity theft, you 
know? I was really concerned, and I told him. He was like, “Oh, well you 
shouldn’t feel like that.” I’m like, “Well, mister, you’re not making me feel 
sure about this,” you know? I had left; I was furious. I had left because I was 
like, “You don’t know [what] you’re talking about.” 
A second type of early orientation challenge occurred because very few NPOs initially 
encouraged participants to “stretch” to take advantage of incentives for activities they did not 
already fulfill, such as combining part-time work with training. Rather, presentations often 
directed participants to take advantage of rewards for activities they had already achieved or 
would be likely to achieve, such as taking their children to the doctor. This messaging strategy 
was consistent with what NPOs had learned about successful outreach, which avoided offend-
ing parents with the message that they needed an incentive to take care of their children. It also 
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reflected a strategy to have participants focus, initially at least, on more manageable rewards 
that would increase their comfort level in learning to use the program (such as obtaining a 
library card), before moving on to more difficult activities. These “easy wins” might lead to 
greater gains down the road. However, as an early orientation strategy, it may have also con-
tributed to perceptions among many participants that Family Rewards is more like an income 
support program than an incentives program. (Participants’ views on receiving rewards, many 
of which are informed by the potential stigma of reward receipt, are described in Chapter 4.) In 
contrast, one session where motivation was prominent in messaging is described in Box 3.3.  
To an important extent, these difficulties were part of the “growing pains” of a new and 
ambitious program. By Year 2, the processes of distributing coupon books and conducting the 
orientations were substantially more accomplished. Coupon books for Year 2 were distributed 
in the fall of 2008, which served as a refresher and reorientation,  giving participants a chance to 
ask additional questions about the program rules. (A sample coupon for full-time work rewards, 
personalized for a fictional participant, is shown in Figure 3.4.) By that point, the NPOs were 
much more practiced in describing conditions and framing incentives. Distribution sessions
Box 3.2 
Example of an Unsuccessful Family Rewards Orientation Session 
Orientations that were unorganized, rushed, or negative in tone, or for which the presen-
ters were unprepared or seemingly indifferent or frustrated, were generally unsuccessful. 
In the example that follows, although the orientation was scheduled for 10:00 a.m., it 
began at 10:20 in a large space that was ill-suited for the presentation and in which gar-
bage cans rolled back and forth loudly throughout. The speakers said they needed to rush 
right into the presentation because the space would not be available after 11:00 a.m. 
There was no effort to assess how well people spoke English or to welcome participants; 
instead, staff read through one of the benefits information sheets very quickly, without 
stopping to ask if anyone had any questions until the end of the presentation. At that 
point, it was clear that a participant did not understand where he was supposed to send in 
coupons; he also appeared to believe he needed to send in all documentation for every 
condition within the first two months. One of the participants, who had a baby with her, 
asked no questions and was understandably distracted. During the presentation, staff 
repeatedly emphasized the restrictive aspects of the rules in a specifically negative way, 
making statements like “You can only get paid twice for parent-teacher visits” and “You 
will only receive $50 once for the library card, so please do not photocopy them over and 
over again.” They also noted aspects of the program that appeared to frustrate them — 
for example, that some of the coupons were not ready. 
 
76 
 
worked much more smoothly, and there was much less variation between NPOs in the way they 
practiced. Some of these learning experiences are described in the following section.  
Engaging Families by Marketing the Incentives 
Initial orientations with the program were not designed to be the only mechanism of 
contact with participants. As Figure 3.2 also shows (under “Ongoing Marketing”), Family 
Rewards used two main, ongoing strategies to proactively engage families. The first involved 
workshops, and the second involved the development of marketing materials and communica-
tion strategies to encourage families to take advantage of the incentives. As the program 
evolved, Family Rewards placed greater emphasis on the proactive marketing of incentives, a 
departure from its earlier focus on explaining payment rules and documentation requirements to 
families, as described above. Developing workshops was initially challenging for Seedco and 
the NPOs, especially while they were simultaneously trying to finish recruiting and enrolling 
families for the study through the end of 2007. However, over time these events were well 
received by participants, helping them form a connection with the program, even if not all 
Family Rewards families participated in the events.  
Creating Workshops 
Family Rewards, as an incentives program without a service component, was designed 
so as not to require participants to interact with the NPO, outside of picking up coupon books.
Box 3.3 
Motivational Messaging in the Family Rewards Orientations 
One site explicitly encouraged participants to take on activities that they hadn’t taken on 
before, to “stretch.” These messages started with the description of the reward for opening 
a bank account: “We want to encourage you to build on what you have.” It continued with 
a description of how to encourage children to take the PSATs: “Nobody’s going to tell 
your child to sign up for the PSATs. We’re telling you to tell your child to take the 
PSATs.… [Tell them to] go to the library to study for [the test].… You want them to go to 
college, right?” With regard to the work and training activities, presenters said, “So if you 
are teeter-tottering, this should encourage you to go in that direction [that is, training]. If 
you don’t build on your skill set, you can’t grow.” For working toward the deadlines, they 
emphasized, “Write it down on your calendar in red! If you don’t, you’ll miss out on [get-
ting rewards for] everything you’ve done.” 
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Figure 3.4 
Family Rewards Sample Coupon for Full-Time Work 
(continued) 
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Figure 3.4 (continued) 
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However, program designers believed that the need for periodic reeducation and engagement 
on the conditions for earning rewards might require topical workshops covering work, high 
school rewards, or other process-related issues such as coupon submission. These sessions 
were not mandatory, and in fact, relatively few participants attended these workshops over 
time. Forty-three percent of 18-month parent survey respondents said that they had attended a 
workshop at some point. 
Because workshops did not offer services directly, Seedco and the NPOs had to ap-
proach them differently from the way they had approached other workshops in service-oriented 
programs, which they were more accustomed to operating. One NPO staff member reflected on 
the difference and how participants sometimes responded:  
I think our work-and-training workshop was a keen example of that. The 
workshop itself was geared toward teaching individuals how to earn the work-
and-training and work awards. It was geared toward giving them resources for 
the areas of work and training. But I think they were somewhat disappointed, 
a lot of them, when they came in and realized that I wasn’t gonna hand them 
out a job, or that I wasn’t sitting with them as a job developer. 
Workshops were initially planned entirely by Seedco in order to minimize the burden on 
NPO staff, who were still working on enrollment and orientation. This strategy of central 
planning was also seen as a way to create uniformity in “treatment” across sites, with the 
assumption that NPOs would play a more active role over time, after their staff gained more 
practice in workshop delivery. However, NPO staff and other observers viewed some of these 
early workshop sessions as somewhat impersonal and unresponsive to individual participants’ 
circumstances, which made it difficult to help participants with specific problems they were 
having — such as gathering required documentation — or to offer referrals to appropriate 
services in the community. As a result, staff at the NPOs developed the strong conviction that 
workshops and information sessions must be tailored more closely to families’ personal circum-
stances, and that this was key both to motivating participants and to resolving their documenta-
tion problems. Staff also placed greater emphasis within the workshops on interaction among 
participants and creating a more comfortable environment for them to come together to discuss 
the program. Seedco emphasized this approach in later workshops, which were planned more 
closely with the NPOs. As shown in Box 3.4, practitioners developed engaging ways to educate 
the participants about the reward conditions and simultaneously to create opportunities for 
families to have fun while spending time together under the program’s auspices.  
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Realizing the Need for Additional Marketing 
As described above, participants’ early encounters with the program emphasized the 
explanation of payment rules. However, several factors helped contribute to a sense among 
Seedco, MDRC, and CEO staff that better marketing of the incentives was necessary. First, 
problems with the documentation that participants submitted suggested that not every partici-
pant understood the required conditions for all activities. Second, early implementation research 
suggested that many participants felt disconnected from the program and wanted more contact 
Box 3.4 
Evolution of the Family Rewards Workshops 
Spring 2008: One work-and-training workshop started with seven adults and three child-
ren in attendance. All the adult attendees described themselves as employed and seeking 
a promotion or a better job, but their specific circumstances varied. One woman wanted 
to learn how to submit coupons for work and training. The other two wanted to upgrade 
to different jobs and were also interested in the coupon submission process. One woman 
had an associate’s degree and wanted to get a master’s degree to become a librarian. De-
spite these different circumstances, the presenter simply read posters in a perfunctory 
manner, and was not very easy to listen to or follow. In response to questions, staff were 
adamant about defining boundaries. One answered several questions by starting out, “We 
are not here to get you a job” or “We are not doing job placement,” and then gave a gen-
eral explanation of the services that were available at various agencies. Staff were not 
able to provide detailed or specific information about the range of available services or to 
direct individuals to the most appropriate services.  
Fall 2008: Twenty adults and 30 children attended the evening event, which started with 
a dinner of pasta and salad. Two staff members were present, so that one could supervise 
children younger than age 6 in an adjacent room, where there was a television set. Staff 
were well prepared and upbeat as they went through different game-like activities. For 
the first, a version of the “Newlywed Game,” adults and children sat on opposite sides of 
the room and answered questions such as, “What does your child want to be when she/he 
grows up?” and “What is one thing your child needs to do better in school?” Children 
then stated their answers and saw how they corresponded with their parents’ answers. 
The second game involved answering — for the chance to win a prize — multiple-choice 
questions about the conditions attached to earning particular rewards, such as the defini-
tion of “ELA” and what a child had to do to earn the rewards that were attached to this 
test. Participants also had the opportunity to ask questions about what happens when 
coupons are submitted late, and rules for resubmission. 
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with NPO staff and a greater sense of “community” within the program. Finally, lower-than-
expected receipt of certain rewards, such as those for full-time work and the combination of 
work and an approved training program, suggested a need for greater emphasis on certain 
activities, such as employment, training, and improvement on standardized tests. A Seedco staff 
person reflected on this evolving perspective on marketing:  
We didn’t really prioritize what are the rewards that we care about more than 
others. It was really [at first] an approach that all of the rewards are created equal. 
…. In the second year I think what we did was we said no, they’re not all created 
equal. We care much more about certain things. And that’s what drove us to our 
marketing efforts really targeting certain rewards. To say these are the ones that 
we think matter the most.  
Marketing of incentives took several forms over time. In Year 1, workshops were pub-
licized by mail and through outreach calls to participants, and through the production of 
customized earnings statements (see Appendix H for a sample earnings statement). In Year 2, in 
addition to continuing to offer workshops, Seedco and the NPOs launched targeted campaigns 
through which the staff sought to contact participants who had not earned certain rewards, 
reminding them about the opportunities to earn those rewards and how the NPOs could help 
them. The campaigns emphasized standardized tests (that is, the ELA and math tests for 
younger students and Regents exams for high school students) and the full-time work and  
training and education rewards for parents. As part of the new outreach efforts, the NPOs began 
calling selected lists of participants with scripted messages about the rewards. To aid with this 
work, DCF Advertising, a professional advertising agency, was hired to design new marketing 
materials and to create a Family Rewards Web site. One of the postcards that the agency 
generated is shown in Figure 3.5. Staff at Seedco believed that these revamped materials were 
more appealing and engaging to families.  
Building the Cash Transfer System  
By the end of the second year of Family Rewards, Seedco had transferred approximate-
ly $14.7 million to participating families. The capacity to deliver these payments depended on 
the creation of a verification and cash transfer system that involved manual as well as automated 
processes and that could accommodate 22 different rewards and the particular conditions and 
verification requirements that were attached to each of them. In some respects, this system is the 
core of Family Rewards. As a CCT program, paying for performance is fundamental to the 
model’s theory of change.  
Creating the verification and payment system was an extensive and complicated task; 
details about it are presented in Appendix B. Seedco first needed to establish (with input from
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MDRC and CEO) detailed rules for each activity, including what kind of documentation would 
be required for each of the 22 different rewards to verify that participants had met the conditions 
that enabled them to earn payments. Seedco then needed to create a system for receiving, on 
average, about 6,200 coupons and forms every two months, using approximately 20 workers to 
check and review the accompanying documentation. Seedco has worked hard to conduct what it 
calls “verification with a heart,” meaning that staff attempt to find missing documentation for 
participants whenever possible — for example, by calling community colleges whose tran-
scripts do not indicate the number of hours associated with each completed course. For automat-
ically verified activities, Seedco created a data exchange with public agencies to gather informa-
tion about school attendance, tests, and public health insurance, and, as part of this process, 
needs to clean very large data files, which sometimes contain errors.  
After verification, Seedco authorizes GrantsPlus, a payment management service that is 
a division of the Research Foundation of the City University of New York (CUNY), to process 
payments directly into participants’ bank accounts or stored value cards. However, payment to 
participants is sometimes problematic. Seedco initially believed that a direct deposit system for 
rewards would be most efficient, but, unexpectedly, this system made it nearly impossible to 
give money to the many participants whose accounts had closed or changed, or when the 
participant had provided incomplete information or had not opened an account in the first place 
(as was often the case for eighth-graders in Year 1 who became high school students in Year 2). 
According to analyses of Seedco’s Family Rewards payment data, about 93 percent of the 
dollars earned by participants in Years 1 and 2 were paid into their accounts. However, there 
was a particular problem in paying high school students: by the end of Year 2, about 16 percent 
of high school students who had earned high school rewards could not be paid, mostly because 
of bank account problems. In fact, about 43 percent of all cases where payments could not be 
made were accounted for by teenagers who had not opened their own bank account. In the 18-
month survey, 14 percent of participants reported that they were unable to receive a payment at 
some point because of an issue with their bank accounts. A Seedco staff person reflected on the 
challenges for both Seedco and the participant in this type of situation:  
They just don’t go through. There’s either an error in the account [or] the ac-
count’s been closed, the account’s been changed…. I think we initially viewed 
[getting account information] as a static activity…. And that’s not how it hap-
pens usually. [The participant] doesn’t pay child support. It gets shut down. 
[The participant] forgets to tell us. We put money in the account, it gets frozen. 
To address these banking issues, Seedco developed extensive “account management” 
procedures. For example, Seedco attempts to alert the participant as well as the NPO when it 
has incomplete account information, and holds conference calls with banks to attempt to open 
closed accounts or to reactivate stored value cards when needed. However, it sometimes takes 
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several months to get the proper account information and documentation that are necessary for a 
payment to be made.  
During the in-depth interviews, almost all participants reported feeling that they were 
not paid for an activity for which they thought they had earned a reward, even if the case was 
later rectified or the participant recognized that he or she was in error. The lack of payment was 
often related to providing insufficient documentation or to bank account issues. While these 
problems are understandable given the complexity of the program’s verification and payment 
operations, they underscored the importance of good customer service, so that participants did 
not become discouraged and fail to engage with the program. (Chapter 4 provides some 
examples of the relationship between the extent of rewards received and participants’ frustra-
tions with the program.) These customer service efforts, which are described in the next section, 
represented some of the most successful aspects of Family Rewards implementation and an area 
characterized by both organizational learning and service improvement over time.  
Providing Customer Service and Support 
Family Rewards had, by design, two major mechanisms for customer service and gen-
eral support: participants could call the helpline or they could call or visit the NPOs (see Figure 
3.2). These program components both encourage participants to take advantage of the opportun-
ities to earn rewards and help them claim the rewards they have earned. The first of these 
mechanisms, the helpline, provides bilingual support to Family Rewards participants, primarily 
to answer questions about payment. As such, the helpline plays a particularly critical role within 
Family Rewards. However, because of technological limitations, helpline staff were the only 
practitioners in the program who had access to payment information and details about why 
some claims were rejected, which was potentially problematic when disputes or confusion 
arose. Consequently, when a participant with a payment question arrived at an NPO, the NPO 
staff needed to contact the helpline in order to understand and try to resolve the problem.  
The second mechanism for customer service and general support involved the NPOs di-
rectly, each of which, as described above, had at most two staff members assigned to the task. 
Support from the NPOs included not just customer service to address payment questions, but 
help in submitting coupons, information and referral activities upon request, and the creation of 
social events and celebrations for families. Because Family Rewards was designed as a program 
without case management or services, the NPOs’ roles needed to be defined over time, some-
times in ways that were new for staff whose experiences were in more traditional service roles. 
However, despite these role questions and some initial challenges involving orientation, NPOs 
were viewed over time in extremely positive terms by participants, many of whom also reported 
that NPOs contributed to their ability to take advantage of the program.  
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The Family Rewards Helpline 
Seedco’s Family Rewards helpline provides real-time customer service to participants 
during day and early evening hours. In any shift, three or four bilingual staff members are on 
duty at a time. It is used primarily for participants’ questions about payments, although staff 
also field other types of calls. Very early in the program, Seedco had only a single staff person 
assigned to the helpline, which was first called a “hotline.” Seedco realized early on that 
additional, dedicated staff were required. For example, starting in January 2008, it answered an 
average of over 500 calls every month. Seedco also realized that it needed to reframe partici-
pants’ expectations about the service, especially when immediate support was not available 
because of heavy call volume or other issues. Over time, the helpline was staffed by former 
workers from the payment processing division, which meant that they had firsthand experience 
in coupon submission procedures and documentation requirements. Upon provision of a family 
ID, staff have access to payment histories and specific reasons for the rejection of claims, as 
noted above; for example, a medical coupon might be rejected for missing a license number 
from the physician. Staff also have access to the “nonpaid clients list,” which includes partici-
pants who do not receive some payments because of problems with their bank accounts or 
stored value cards.  
Most participants viewed the helpline positively (see Table 3.2). Among respondents to 
the 18-month survey, 68 percent reported calling the helpline at least once, and among those 
callers, 69 percent said they were “very” or “extremely” satisfied with the assistance they 
received. In-depth interviews indicated that “positive” experiences with the helpline were not 
necessarily linked with receiving the payments they initially expected, but instead linked with 
receiving satisfactory explanations for their problems from helpline staff. Participants who had 
positive interactions with the helpline found that the staff were helpful, kind, knowledgeable, 
and/or patient. Some participants felt that helpline staff assisted them in understanding the 
program, especially during the initial months. The helpline often performs these tasks under 
challenging circumstances. As one participant admitted, staff often face angry callers and yet 
responded in her case with patience: “The hotline, they are so patient. They speak to you in a 
form like, you know, they try to really work with you, but by the time you get to the hotline, 
you’re just so mad. You know, because I’ve done threatened, ‘I’m gonna sue you. I’m gonna 
drop out of the program.’” The helpline was often described as professional and encouraging, as 
illustrated in the following statements from a participant who described what “keeps her coming 
back” to the program:  
Participant: Well…that’s what’s keeping us more coming back…  
Interviewer: So, for you, it’s been [helpline staff]?  
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Program
Outcome (%) Group
Turned to staff from the following agencies with questions about Family Rewardsa
Neighborhood Partner Organization (NPO) only 56.2
Family Rewards helpline only 13.1
Both NPO and Family Rewards helpline 20.0
Either NPO or Family Rewards helpline 69.3
Called Family Rewards helpline to get information or help, or to ask about payments 68.1
Number of times called Family Rewards helpline in past year
0 32.1
1-2 36.6
3 or more 31.4
Very or extremely satisfied with Family Rewards helpline staffb 69.0
Number of times called NPO staff for information about Family Rewards
0 14.8
1-2 37.4
3 or more 47.8
Said that NPO staff were extremely or very helpfulc 85.9
NPO staff helped find
Health care provider or dentist 19.0
Education or training program 25.1
Program to help find a job 23.6
Tutors, after-school activities, or programs to help children with school 28.0
Attended any Family Rewards workshop 43.4
For high school studentsd 31.8
On work and employment training 19.0
On financial literacy 16.7
On elementary and middle school studentse 28.7
Attended other Family Rewards eventsf 52.4
Visited the Family Rewards Web site for information 25.5
Opened a new Opportunity NYC savings account when enrolled in Family Rewards 55.4
Unable at least once since the beginning of the program to receive a payment because 
of bank account problem 13.7
Sample size 1,037
(continued)
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Participant: Yeah, she’s never raised her voice to pitch level…. She didn’t 
never seem like she was frustrated with me asking a question. And she al-
ways said, “Anytime, just call me. You need help.” That’s the main thing 
you can have. That friendly person on the other end telling you, “Anytime.” 
However, for other participants, using the helpline proved more difficult, as NPOs and 
participants initially reported frustration with staff’s ability to respond to questions and resolve 
problems. As described above, NPOs do not have access to participant payment and rejection 
information, and they, too, have often needed to call the helpline to answer participants’ 
questions. This technological limitation placed considerable strains on the helpline and the 
NPOs, and sometimes resulted in conflicts between them, although procedures such as instal-
ling a separate NPO call-line were later put into place to mitigate the potential for such conflicts. 
During the early months of the program and before the development of a call-management 
system, several participants reported leaving messages and never receiving a return call. At 
times, the helpline was observed to have more than 45 voice-mail messages from participants, 
and staff reported that even more messages were left at other times. Some participants described 
frustration with Family Rewards in general as a result of these interactions. For example, one 
participant said that she expended considerable effort trying to track down a coupon packet she 
had mailed that was never received; a second had trouble getting through to the helpline and 
gave up; and a third experienced a great deal of back-and-forth with program staff after she 
received payment for attendance by only one of her two elementary school children, even 
though both children always attended together. These participants called the program “a joke” 
and “a headache” and said that the staff was “incompetent” and “not knowledgeable.”  
Those impressions notwithstanding, 69 percent of parent survey respondents described 
themselves as “satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” with the helpline. Given the fact that the 
helpline is the flashpoint for often-contentious interactions around money, it is not surprising 
Table 3.2 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table excludes control group members because it pertains only to the Family Rewards 
program. A randomly selected subsample of program group members was asked these questions. 
Sample sizes vary across measures because of missing values. 
aPercentages do not add to 100 percent becasue some respondents did not think the Family Rewards 
program had staff available to help with questions or problems with the program and because other 
respondents usually turned to other program participants or a Web site for help or tried to figure out the 
problem on their own.
bThis excludes respondents who did not call the Family Rewards helpline.
cThis excludes respondents who did not contact NPO staff.
dThis excludes respondents without a high school-age child in the household.
eThis excludes respondents without an elementary or middle school-age child in the household.
fEvents may include picnics, barbecues, or informational sessions.
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that participants who believed they were owed payments might become frustrated. Another 
factor that might influence customer perceptions about the helpline is that, even though staff can 
explain why payments have been denied, they may not always be able to assist immediately — 
when, for example, the caller disputes the reason for payment denial, when documentation is 
ambiguous, or when additional policy decisions are required. Helpline staff reported that callers 
may expect a different and more immediate form of customer service, such as the type they 
experience with private companies, where workers with whom participants interact may be 
empowered to authorize payments. Finally, similar frustrations are often reported in welfare 
programs. However, given the nature of Family Rewards as an incentives program, negative 
encounters related to payments have potentially important implications for the program’s ability 
to influence families in the ways it intends, as discussed below. 
Limits on Case Management and Direct Service  
As described in Chapter 1, Family Rewards was designed to test a model that avoids 
case management or intensive service provision, focusing instead on directing incentives toward 
participants. This model was seen as potentially easier and less costly to operate on a larger 
scale (if successful) than one that had to involve additional resources for case management 
support, in a similar way that the Earned Income Tax Credit operates without case management 
or direct services. Also by design, with only two staff assigned to the program from each NPO 
— or one per approximately every 350 families — NPOs would not have been able to provide 
ongoing, personalized case planning and assistance to all families. However, delineating what 
constituted impermissible “case management and services,” as distinct from permissible 
marketing and motivating efforts, was a conceptual challenge for the design team (CEO, 
MDRC, and Seedco) and, operationally, a learning process for Seedco and the NPOs, especially 
during the first year of the program. Program designers recognized that given the extensive 
incentives schedule and often complex documentation requirements, many participants were 
likely to benefit from face-to-face customer service to help them fully understand the program 
and claim their rewards. The designers also recognized that participants should not be without 
guidance about how to achieve the conditions that would qualify them for rewards. Thus, the 
NPOs were charged not only with explaining the incentives and assisting with claims-related 
issues, but also with providing information about services in the community that might be 
helpful to participants. In addition, they were expected to offer participants referrals to reputable 
organizations in the community. In some cases, NPOs without these broad referral networks 
were asked to identify appropriate local organizations that might be of assistance to families. 
However, personalized, proactive case management in the normal sense of that term, and the 
direct provision of services, were not permitted by the program. Moreover, it would not have 
been feasible for the NPOs to offer such services to all families on an extensive basis given their 
limited staffing for Family Rewards.  
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The prohibition on services was easier to define. For example, it was acceptable for the 
NPOs to provide guidance on where to get job search assistance or homework help, but not to 
provide it directly. However, reaching agreement about what constituted case management was 
a more extensive process, in part because the term “case management” can be defined various-
ly. In practice, it also proved complicated to draw the line between permissible marketing 
activities and impermissible case management activities. For example, NPOs were encouraged 
to make targeted calls to participants to call their attention to rewards that they had not received, 
but they were discouraged from helping families develop personalized action plans for earning 
those rewards.  
During the first year of the program, Seedco’s efforts to ensure fidelity to the “no case 
management” rule was interpreted by some NPOs to mean that they should not probe or ask 
questions of individual participants about their circumstances during one-on-one sessions. Even 
if the purpose was to engage participants around potential activities or help them with documen-
tation troubles, these NPOs believed that they were prohibited from probing into those issues. 
Staff at NPOs reacted against these perceived limitations, finding it excessively restrictive and 
making individualized, personalized contact more difficult. (In doing so, a few staff members 
also provided limited services to participants, such as help writing résumés.)  
Most NPOs believed that the complexity of documentation requirements necessitated 
face-to-face contact and probing about participants’ family situations. For some, literacy and 
comprehension challenges made it especially important to establish in-person connections. 
Other practitioners came to believe that incentives alone were not enough to change partici-
pants’ behavior, and that families needed encouragement to pursue new activities. As one 
program staff member said, “I don’t think just the money — well, we see that the money is not 
doing it. Right? We see that.” These staff believed that the program’s model was new to 
participants because it made them responsible for carrying out activities on their own. As a 
result, the NPOs felt that they needed more contact with the families to help familiarize them 
with this new mindset of participating in a program that does not offer any tangible services. As 
one practitioner put it:  
You’re really changing a state of mind, a state of being that you really can’t 
change simply by rewards. The reason I say it’s a state of mind is because 
you kind of have to change people’s thinking from the social service hand-
holding that they’re used to.… All other programs hand-hold. This program 
is not hand-holding and the only way that I find that we can do that is contin-
ue to say and show them that we’re here [for them]. 
NPO staff also believe that to promote participants’ engagement with Family Rewards, 
it is important to mitigate any potential stigma associated with participation in the program. 
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They are aware that participants are sensitive to the implications of being in a program that 
rewards what they consider to be ordinary parenting tasks. As a result, NPO staff developed 
strategies to help families feel more comfortable. For example, one staff member described an 
attempt at a workshop that involved interacting with the participants briefly on a more personal 
level — by, for instance, having participants talk about their summer and sharing information 
about their children — before moving on to discuss activities and incentives.  
Starting in Year 2 and over the course of that year, Seedco, MDRC, and NPO staff 
agreed on guidelines for interaction with participants, presenting illustrations of what is per-
missible and what is not, as shown in Table 3.3. For example, NPO staff were expected to ask 
participants about goals in an encouraging way, but not to keep a case file on them or track their 
progress. Staff were directed to introduce participants to local resources in an active way — and 
not merely provide referral sheets — but not to coordinate the provision of additional services, 
such as scheduling appointments for them.  
Participants’ Reactions to NPOs 
The results of these efforts to define roles were very positive: the vast majority of par-
ticipants viewed NPO staff very well. Among respondents to the Family Rewards parent 
survey, 76 percent said that they had turned to the NPOs with questions about the program and, 
of those respondents, 86 percent said that NPO staff were “very” or “extremely” helpful. Many 
participants during in-depth interviews described NPOs as integral to Family Rewards, not only 
helping with coupon submission and payment problems, but also generally facilitating their 
engagement with the program. According to these participants, NPOs were often the first source 
for help or answers to questions and provided instrumental support with coupons and documen-
tation. This was borne out in the 18-month parent survey: 56 percent of participants reported 
using only the NPOs, and not the helpline, as a source of information about the program, while 
20 percent reported speaking to both NPOs and the helpline. More than just the “face” of the 
program, the NPOs expended a great deal of effort working with individual participants to 
ensure that they submitted coupons correctly and on time in order to redeem rewards, which 
participants said they appreciated. Participants also appreciated the quality of interactions with 
NPO staff, generally viewing them as personable, accessible, and patient. As one Spanish-
speaking participant described her experience: 
I really like that when I go . . . to the office, they treat me well. For example, 
if anything happens, they call me. They’re always attentive, . . . they sit me 
down, they speak to me in Spanish, in English, and if I don’t understand 
something, they explain it again, it doesn’t matter. The person interviewing 
me doesn’t get annoyed, upset, or anything.  
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Many participants took advantage of this personal attention and accessibility, and they 
described getting help from these in-person sessions in different ways: for example, fixing 
errors resulting from an incorrect zip code, straightening out a situation where two brothers had 
the same name, enrolling a new baby, and enrolling a woman who was raising her deceased 
sister’s daughter. Many participants appreciated the fact that NPO staff were willing to call the 
helpline, rather than asking participants to call on their own. Other practical support that NPOs 
provide includes sending reminders about deadlines, calling and sending flyers about work-
shops, and making strategic suggestions like putting notes in one’s purse the night before 
appointments.  
As has been described throughout this report, one important aspect of participants’ ex-
perience in the program is the potential for a stigma being associated with getting paid for what 
is often considered normal parenting activities. NPOs helped many participants feel comfortable 
with this aspect of the program as well. As one mother said, “I was really contemplating 
whether I should be in this program or not because I thought it was like labeling people. So I 
was like, you know — I didn’t really understand. But then she was explaining to me what it 
Type of Assistance NPO Staff Should: NPO Staff Should Not:
Coupon/payment 
troubleshooting and 
assistance
Answer participants' questions 
about coupon submission and ask 
whether issues previously discussed 
have been resolved; help facilitate 
the coupon submission process.
Take responsibility for completing participants' 
forms or sending coupon submissions on their 
behalf.
Goal setting Ask participants about the goals 
they have set for themselves and 
their children and motivate and 
direct them to find the services and 
assistance they need to achieve 
these goals.
Keep a record or case file on the goals set by a 
participant nor proactively follow up on progress 
toward achieving these goals.
Workshops Provide information and resources 
related to rewards.
Provide direct services to participants (such as 
giving tips for résumé writing).
Field trips Take a small group of participants 
to the local library, for example, to 
introduce them to resources and 
services.
Collaborate with outside organizations to jointly 
provide direct services (such as working with the 
library to provide study sessions for 
participants). 
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 3.3
Customer Service Guidelines for Neighborhood Partner Organizations (NPOs)
SOURCE: MDRC field research.
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does and how it helps people out a lot.” In a similar vein, many participants saw the NPO’s role 
as supporting and validating their own parenting efforts. For example, one staff member talked 
about the need for responsibility to children who came to NPO social events in a way that 
echoed the language parents used themselves with their children about responsibility.  
Not only did NPO activities appear to alleviate the potential for stigma, but the NPO 
staff also helped create a sense of positive community around the program. One way they did 
this was by sponsoring social events — especially barbecues during the summer and holiday 
parties in December. Participants’ responses to social events appear to have been very positive, 
and these events attracted somewhat more participants than the workshops had. Among respon-
dents to the 18-month parent survey, 43 percent said that they had attended a workshop, while 
52 percent said that they had attended events other than workshops. Parents who were inter-
viewed appeared to value these occasions to come together, and sometimes saw them as ways 
to engage their children in the program as a whole. Speaking of her child’s awareness of the 
program, one mother commented, “They have this little Christmas play…Halloween parties, all 
kind of holidays…and I think that’s really good for the children.”  
Nonetheless, these positive experiences were not universal. A downside to the impor-
tance of NPOs within Family Rewards is that negative experiences with NPOs can be asso-
ciated with disengagement from the program. Despite the generally positive experiences, some 
participants said in interviews that they had had early experiences with their NPOs that raised 
their doubts about Family Rewards, noting, for example, that the NPO office was too crowded 
or too deserted, or that the staff were unprepared or brusque. At the same time, it is important to 
note that participants did not appear to make use of the full panoply of resources that the NPOs 
offered. In addition to low workshop attendance, described above, not many participants 
reported using NPOs for referrals. As Table 3.2 shows, roughly one-fourth or less of respon-
dents to the parent survey indicated that they had received help from NPO staff finding a 
particular service, such as a health care provider or dentist, programs for help finding a job, or 
tutoring or after-school programs. This low usage may reflect participants’ views of NPOs 
primarily as sources of help with coupon submission and to answer questions about payments.  
Potential Implications of Operational Challenges and Successes  
This chapter has described implementation accomplishments and challenges, as well as 
implementation improvements as the initiative matured. Although the association among 
challenges, successes, and program outcomes is not clear, several aspects of participants’ 
experiences in Family Rewards may be important, according to the literature about incentives 
and motivation. First, a basic tenet of learning theory emphasizes the need for rewards to be 
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closely linked to behavior in time.3
Second, psychological studies on behavior associated with earning rewards suggest that 
it is important that incentives be understood and translatable into specific action by the potential 
reward recipients.
 Despite Seedco’s successful efforts to create a system for 
cash transfers, there were inevitable delays between successfully meeting certain conditions and 
reward receipt, even beyond the regular two-month program payment cycle modeled on 
Oportunidades. For example, as noted in Chapter 1, the results of the annual standardized ELA 
and math tests were not available until months after the tests were taken because of the time 
required by New York State to grade the exams and for New York City to process the results 
and feed them back to Seedco. Delays such as these may make it more difficult for families to 
feel a connection between performance on the tests and the rewards offered by the program.  
4 On a basic level, if participants misunderstand the terms and conditions of 
reward receipt, they will be hindered from earning it. As described above, there is some evi-
dence of early confusion about the full spectrum of program rules and documentation require-
ments (see Chapter 4 for a full examination of this issue). In addition, the fact that the program 
staff did not initially push parents to attempt more challenging activities, but, instead, to 
concentrate on obtaining rewards for the things they were already doing, may have influenced 
some parents to avoid focusing — at least earlier in the program — on certain activities, such as 
work and test-taking, which they may have felt were out of their control.5
Third, trust between the reward giver and the reward seeker has been identified as a po-
tential factor influencing motivation. As described in Chapter 1, a major theme in social 
psychology around incentives is the potential that they can reduce intrinsic motivation after the 
incentive is no longer associated with the activity. These potential effects are seen to be exacer-
bated when the person receiving the reward does not trust the actor who provides it. That is, 
resentment about reward receipt may reduce participants’ inner drive, whereas trusting the actor 
who gives the reward is associated with greater internal motivation.
  
6
                                                   
3Skinner (1974). 
 This factor makes partici-
pants’ experience of payments potentially important. Although the types of frustrations expe-
rienced by some Family Rewards participants are not unusual for cash transfer programs, 
according to the literature this frustration may diminish participants’ internal drive to achieve 
difficult goals, despite the promised reward. On the other hand, NPOs and the helpline appear to 
have created a good degree of trust for the program — through dedicated customer service, 
community-building social events, clear explanations of rules for payment and their legitimacy, 
and effective ways of understanding participation in a potentially stigmatizing program. For 
4Eisinberger, Pierce, and Cameron (1999). 
5This may also be significant, as autonomy and competence are seen to be critical factors that influence the 
way in which rewards affect motivation. See, for example, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999). 
6Benabou and Tirole (2003). 
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example, one participant contrasted the experience of participating in Family Rewards with 
other types of income support programs:  
Participant: Because they don’t treat people — like for example, we both 
worked and then my husband got sick, we didn’t have money to pay rent and 
I had to go get help and they treat you like if you were asking them — they 
talk in a bad way and you have to put up with all that because you need.  
Interviewer: And this program has not made you feel bad. 
Participant: No. This program makes you feel useful. 
Conclusion 
This chapter described the operational challenges and accomplishments of Family Re-
wards in its first two years. Because Year 1 involved both intense enrollment efforts and the 
creation of payment systems, customer service guidelines, and marketing strategies, the early 
operation of the program was problematic in many ways. Operations were much improved in 
Year 2 as staff resolved many initial problems, refined their practices, and gained experience. 
Reflecting these improvements, participants generally held positive views of Family Rewards, 
and the program was able to deliver on its promise of payments. At the same time, early expe-
riences may have implications for the timing and intensity of program impacts, as many partici-
pants did not begin to feel able to use the program as a tool within their families until Year 2. By 
that point, they may have already been oriented toward the incentives. For many participants, this 
orientation meant focusing on activities that were the easiest to undertake and document.  
This chapter also notes some variation in practice among the NPOs. Some NPOs were 
more skilled at communicating payment rules, marketing incentives, and conducting more 
positive workshops and social events than others, especially at the beginning of the program. 
However, because participants’ very positive views of NPOs over time were shared across sites, 
and because payment systems for participants were centralized with Seedco, the similarities of 
implementation experiences across sites were far greater than the differences. Consequently, 
later chapters in this report focus primarily on outcomes for the entire study population. Perhaps 
even more important, the focus on pooled results is appropriate because Family Rewards, as a 
directly marketed incentives program, does not primarily involve site-based service delivery. 
Instead, it requires that participants understand incentives, engage their households in attempt-
ing to achieve the goals needed to earn them, and document activities in order to be paid — the 
subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Families’ Receipt and Use of Program Rewards 
For any incentives program to be effective, its participants must be aware of and under-
stand the rewards it offers and how to earn and claim them. This is a particular challenge for 
Family Rewards as a two-generation, comprehensive conditional cash transfer (CCT) program 
with 22 different rewards and a number of complex rules. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
program’s designers recognized that creating many different opportunities for the families to 
earn rewards and obtain large total cash transfers came at the price of simplicity. Consequently, 
it could not be taken for granted that families would truly understand what they were being 
offered and would earn substantial amounts of money in reward payments.  
Chapter 3 described the efforts of the organizations that were operating Family Re-
wards to market the program to participating families and the procedures for verifying claims 
and making payments. This chapter focuses more closely on the families themselves, exploring 
how much money they actually earned in reward payments during the first two years of the 
program, and why some families earned more than others. The analysis devotes particular 
attention to the crucial issue of participants’ understanding of both the incentives themselves 
and the process for claiming rewards.  
Of course, even if families understand the program, obtaining the rewards requires that 
they also meet the qualifying conditions, submit coupons for the incentives that are not automat-
ically verified, and maintain working bank accounts (or arrange for payment through stored 
value cards) for the duration of the program. This chapter thus examines how these and other 
factors, along with certain characteristics of families, were related to the amount that families 
earned and for which categories of activities (education, health care, and workforce) they earned 
rewards. As part of that analysis, the chapter explores the way families interpreted the purpose 
of the program and their personal goals in relation to that purpose. These experiences and 
perspectives provide important insights into the feasibility and challenges of operating a CCT 
program in a way that deeply engages families and becomes meaningful in their lives. 
In the last section, this chapter looks at how the families used the extra resources they 
obtained through the cash transfers. An important part of that discussion is how parents allo-
cated money to their children — that is, for what purposes and according to what preconditions.  
The findings are based on both quantitative and qualitative data sources. These include 
data from Seedco’s Family Rewards payment system, which tracks reward earnings and actual 
payments. The analysis also uses data from the Background Information Forms completed by 
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all families and the Family Rewards 18-month parent survey and in-depth interviews from two 
smaller subsamples.1
In brief, nearly all families earned rewards, with payments per family averaging about 
$3,100 per year and more than $6,200 for the first two program years combined. In each year, 
most families earned rewards in the range of $1,000 to $5,000, which suggests a fairly high 
level of engagement with the program across the board, although a small group of families was 
very difficult to engage. Most rewards were earned in the education and health domains, with 
less than half of families earning any workforce rewards. Most families earned rewards during 
both program years and consistently across activity periods. Patterns in reward receipt differed 
little across the six community districts in the study. Families who earned the most rewards 
tended to be larger and were more likely to have high school students, and they were more 
advantaged at the time of enrollment than were those with lower program earnings. High-
earning families submitted far more coupons per person than did lower-earning families, and 
had a better overall understanding of program components. The families used the extra money 
they received through the program in a variety of ways. Common uses included paying for basic 
living expenses, school-related supplies or activities, and electronic goods and special recrea-
tional outings for the family, sometimes as a reward for school accomplishments.  
  
The Amount of Reward Money That Families Earned 
Families were very engaged with the program, as measured by the amount of money 
they earned and the consistency of those earnings over time.2
                                                   
1See Chapter 3, especially footnote 1, for further information on data for the evaluation’s implementation 
research.  
 Table 4.1 shows that 99.6 percent 
of families earned at least one reward during the program’s first two years. For most, this 
included a combination of coupon and automatically verified rewards, with only 12 percent of 
families relying exclusively on automatically verified rewards. Submitting coupons is an 
indicator of families’ attention to the program and incorporation of the program into their daily
2Most of the analysis in this section focuses on rewards earned rather than paid because of complications 
in making payments into bank accounts. As described in Chapter 3, sometimes families were not paid for what 
they earned, largely because their bank account information was incorrect or their account had been closed. 
Appendix Table C.2 shows, however, that most families who had earnings were eventually paid.  
Also, the average amount of rewards earned that is reported in this section is an aggregate across all fami-
lies. It does not take into account differences in family structure and personal circumstances that affect reward 
earning potential (for example, number of children, or having a physical disability that limits work) because it 
was methodologically unfeasible to create such a metric given the many factors that would have to be 
considered for each household. However, later analyses do demonstrate the differential impact of family size, 
number of high school students, and work status on reward receipt.  
97 
Years 1 and 2
Outcome Year 1 Year 2 Combined
Family earned at least one reward (%) 99.5 98.0 99.6
Only automatically verified rewards 16.5 18.4 11.7
Any automatically verified rewards 98.7 96.7 99.0
Only coupon book rewards 0.8 1.3 0.6
Any coupon book rewards 83.1 79.6 87.9
Automatically verified and coupon book rewards 82.2 78.3 87.3
Average number of automatically verified rewards earned 14.0 12.9 26.9
Distribution of number of rewards earned (%)
0 1.4 3.3 1.0
1-10 32.7 35.3 10.3
11-20 47.2 47.2 23.3
21 or more 18.7 14.2 65.5
Average number of coupon book rewards earned 13.6 11.7 25.3
Distribution of number of rewards earned (%)
0 17.0 20.4 12.1
1-10 27.2 31.1 15.5
11-20 31.4 27.8 19.4
21 or more 24.5 20.7 53.0
Family earned at least one reward (%)
Education reward 96.4 91.4 97.5
Health reward 95.2 94.1 97.6
Workforce reward 42.2 41.1 48.3
Among families who earned a reward in a specified period, 
average reward amount earned ($) 3,154 3,108 6,209
Average reward amount earned, by domaina ($)
Education 1,451 1,447 2,791
Health 1,224 1,230 2,379
Workforce 1,359 1,372 2,356
Average number of activity periods during which rewards were earned 5.6 5.5 11.0
Distribution of average reward amount earnedb (%)
$1 - $99 0.6 0.6 0.2
$100 - $499 4.7 5.3 1.3
$500 - $999 7.9 7.5 2.9
$1,000 - $2,999 39.5 39.2 18.2
$3,000  -$4,999 29.7 31.2 21.5
$5,000 - $6,999 12.1 12.2 19.1
$7,000 or more 5.4 3.9 36.9
Sample size 2,377
(continued)
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lives. On average, families earned about the same number of coupon-based rewards (25) and 
automatically verified rewards (27).  
The amount earned by families during the first two years of the program averaged 
$6,209, which includes $3,154 from Year 1 and $3,108 from Year 2. Table 4.1 shows that Year 
1 reward earnings were normally distributed (meaning they fell along a “bell curve”). Approx-
imately 70 percent of families received between $1,000 and $5,000 from Family Rewards per 
year. This percentage represents a significant boost in income for families in the program, all of 
whom were low-income. By way of illustration, a mother with two children who had an income 
at the 2009 federal poverty level ($18,310 for a family of three), and received the average Year 
1 payment of $3,154, experienced a 17 percent increase in income.3
Rewards Earned in the Education, Health Care, and Workforce Domains 
  
Most rewards were earned in the education domain. Figure 4.1 shows that 44 percent of 
the $14.7 million that families received through the program were earned for education rewards, 
38 percent were earned for health rewards, and 18 percent were earned for workforce rewards. 
Almost all families earned at least one reward for education or health, while less than half ever 
earned a reward for work or work and training. The average amounts earned in education, 
health, and work for families who earned at least one reward in one of those domains were 
$1,451, $1,224, and $1,359, respectively, in Year 1 (and similar amounts in Year 2). These 
figures demonstrate that, while fewer families collected workforce rewards than education or 
health rewards, the workforce rewards provided a comparatively high level of return for those 
who did earn them.  
Parents expressed a particular set of beliefs about the purpose of the program that 
shaped their understanding and contributed to the pattern of engagement across the three 
domains. When parents were asked about the purpose of the program during interviews, most 
said it was, first and foremost, “for the kids,” meaning that it was supposed to help motivate
                                                   
3See Chapter 5 for an analysis of the program’s impacts on family income and poverty. 
Table 4.1 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008, and the second program 
year covers September 2008 through August 2009.
aReward amounts are calculated among families who earned rewards for each domain during the 
specified period.
bThe maximum amount earned in Year 1 was $13,235; in Year 2, it was $12,150.
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them in school and to ensure that they are healthy. Second, they described it as a way to reward 
or provide a bonus for responsibilities that they were already fulfilling. Parents saw themselves 
as responsible and attentive to the activities that the program rewarded, but they commented 
that many irresponsible parents lived in their neighborhoods — for example, the parents of their 
children’s friends — who might need the cash incentive to undertake these responsibilities 
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Figure 4.1
Total Amount of Reward Money Earned by Families in Program 
Years 1 and 2 Combined, by Domain
Workforce 
$2,706,600
(18%)
Health
$5,521,760
(38%)
Education
$6,468,950
(44%)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTE: The first year covers activities that occurred from September 2007 through August 
2008, and the second year covers activities that occurred from September 2008 through August 
2009. 
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consistently. The “us versus them” dichotomy was a strong theme in the interviews, as illu-
strated by the following example:  
I haven’t really done anything out of the ordinary myself, but I know that 
there’s people who don’t go through what they’re supposed to with their 
children.… And being that they’re getting paid here, and it’s not a lot of 
money but it does help, I’m sure it’s an incentive. Even just taking your 
kid to school on a daily basis, it’s not something people always do in this 
community.  
Parents described the purpose of the program in ways that corresponded with the 
NPOs’ recruitment messages, which were intended to neutralize the stigma they may have felt 
about joining a program that offers cash for activities that most would consider their natural 
duties. Chapters 2 and 3 have described how children were presented as the focus of the 
program from recruitment through orientation. 
 It is not surprising, then, that many parents who participated in the in-depth interviews 
disregarded aspects of the program that would require “going out of their way” or disrupting 
preexisting priorities, such as the decision to stay at home with a young child. One mother who 
was deeply engaged with the educational component of the program threw out the workforce 
coupons at the start, explaining, “I don’t work.” These parents simply did not see the program 
as an intervention that was designed to make significant changes in their lives.  
This does not mean that parents were completely unwilling to “stretch” as part of the 
program. “Stretching” tended to mean going a step further in relation to practices they had 
already adopted. For instance, some parents appreciated the program as a “reminder” to sche-
dule health appointments for their children. Some parents discussed ways to benefit from the 
program by working more hours, going to the doctor more consistently, or asking better 
questions during parent-teacher conferences. A parent who was working said that thinking 
about the incentives stopped her from taking unnecessary days off. “You want to go to work 
everyday instead of calling [in sick] like some people may do more often than they should. 
When this opportunity came to me, I’m [thinking I’m] going to work everyday just so I can pull 
these hours off.”  
Continuity of Reward Receipt 
Reward receipt followed similar patterns in Years 1 and 2. Ninety-eight percent of 
families earned rewards in both program years (Table 4.2), and they continued to earn about 
even numbers of coupon and automatically verified rewards (see the distribution of number of 
rewards by verification method in Table 4.1). Families earned rewards in an average of 5.5 out 
of 6 activity periods per year, with 65 percent of families earning at least one reward every
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activity period (Table 4.2). Only a small number of families who participated in Year 1 did not 
earn any rewards in Year 2 (1.6 percent). Given that 99.5 percent of families earned at least one 
reward in Year 1 (Table 4.1), there was not much room for growth, and only two families began 
earning rewards for the first time in Year 2.  
While these trends suggest generally strong and stable participation over time, accounts 
shared during the in-depth interviews reveal that the connection to the program fluctuated with 
program and life events. Parents reported that high school students became much more interest-
ed in the program after they claimed the first large payments for Regents exams and other 
academic outcomes at the end of the summer of 2008, after a full year into the program. 
Changes in the other direction occurred as well. A number of parents described experiencing 
personal and family shocks, such as deaths; struggles with their own mental health and sub-
stance abuse problems; and a child’s illness, injury, or rebellious behavior that caused them to 
take a break from the program. A single mother of two young children described how her 
recurrent, untreated depression affected her participation in the program: 
I didn’t get my things together. Well, I was depressed for a couple of months. 
And what happens to me, when I get depressed, I basically shut down. So I 
lost about five months of getting things together. I’ve just been back on track. 
I sent my papers out this month and I’m doing it again before the fifteenth. 
So for the first, like, five or six months, I didn’t do anything, and when I rea-
Years 1 and 2
Outcome Combined
Average number of activity periods in which rewards were earneda 11.0
Family earned rewards ina (%)
Every activity period 65.3
Year 1 but not Year 2 1.6
Year 2 but not Year 1 0.1
Year 1 and Year 2 98.3
Sample size 2,367
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 4.2
The Continuity with Which Families Earned Rewards 
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008, and the second program 
year covers September 2008 through August 2009. 
"Sample size" refers to the number of families who earned rewards.
aCalculations are based on families who earned any rewards.
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lized how much money I was losing, it was, like, “Oh, God, we got to get 
this together.” But when I get depressed, I basically just shut down. And 
that’s what happened. 
These kinds of interruptions may not be reflected in the above discussion of earnings 
continuity because families may still be receiving automatically verified rewards, but they are 
meaningful because during these periods families effectively stop thinking about and pursuing 
the incentives, which may limit their ability to renew participation and complete more challeng-
ing activities later. This issue points to the difficulty of keeping up with the demands of the 
program for families who face multiple personal challenges, often with only one parent in the 
home to manage these trials. A mother who was a victim of domestic violence after starting the 
program, and then stopped participating, found herself wishing the program offered more 
individual support to people like her: “It’s like nobody didn’t care what problems I was really 
having as person, that I was going through physically. So, if I’m not together physically and I’m 
the breadwinner of this house, my kids are not gonna get nothing.” 
Variation in Reward Receipt by Community District 
It might have been expected that earnings would vary systematically by community dis-
trict because the types of families that enrolled at different NPO sites differed substantially in 
terms of characteristics such as ethnicity, full-time working status, benefits receipt, and primary 
language spoken in the home (see Appendix Table A.5). There were also differences in the 
service environments and other community assets by location, which may have made it more 
difficult for some families to earn rewards. Finally, it was reported in Chapter 3 that some sites 
were less successful than others in delivering information and motivational messages during 
orientation. This might also have had an effect on participants’ understanding of and interest in 
the program. 
As it turns out, there was very little difference in the amounts, types, and continuity of 
rewards by community district, with each location looking very similar to the sample as a whole 
(Appendix Table C.1). The largest difference in average program earnings was between 
Brooklyn Community District 5 (served by Groundwork), at $7,027, and Manhattan Communi-
ty District 11 (served by Union Settlement Association), at $5,662. This difference appears to 
have been driven by the higher proportion of the Brooklyn district’s participants who collected 
workforce rewards (54.6 percent compared with 45 percent). However, the disparity in work-
force participation between these two locations was also evident at enrollment. None of the 
findings suggests a meaningful difference in the performance of NPOs, although Groundwork 
and Catholic Charities had somewhat greater success retaining families across both years, which 
may reflect the quality of customer service or other factors.  
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Parents’ Understanding of the Incentives Offer 
The scope, accuracy, and durability of parents’ understanding of the incentives offer are 
important prerequisites for participation in the program and the achievement of its intended 
outcomes. If parents are focused only on one part of the offer, unclear about what would 
constitute achievement, or forget about rewards over time, they may not reap the full benefits of 
the program for themselves or their families. Since parents play an important role in Family 
Rewards as the primary communicators of the program to children, their knowledge of the 
program structure influences the whole family’s engagement in the program.  
Understanding the Offer 
The 18-month survey contained a series of questions that asked parents to distinguish 
between activities and achievements that actually qualified for rewards and others that did not. 
This was done as part of the evaluation’s effort to assess parents’ awareness of the rewards in 
the three domains. The pattern of responses to these questions across all domains, shown in 
Table 4.3, reveals that parents possessed good knowledge of the incentives in general, but their 
understanding was overgeneralized and fuzzy in places. Parents did best at perceiving the real 
incentives, correctly identifying them 87 percent of the time. However, they had trouble 
distinguishing activities that did not qualify for reward payments, correctly identifying those 
activities only 39 percent of the time. This confusion may indicate that participants internalized 
a belief that positive behavior in general would be rewarded. Such a misperception may have 
positive effects on families, but it shows that knowledge of the program offer was imprecise. 
The survey found, for example, that although 93 percent of parents knew that the program 
rewarded children’s good attendance in school, only 27 percent of parents knew that the highly 
advertised reward for attendance required that children be present for 95 percent of school days.  
It is highly likely that the children and youth who were enrolled in the program had a 
poorer understanding of the specifics of the offer than their parents did. Very few young people 
actually attended orientations, so they heard about the program from their guardian. During in-
depth interviews, parents were asked to describe the conversation they had introducing their 
children to Family Rewards. One parent used the following language to explain the program: 
“Mommy has participated in a program…. it’s called Opportunity NYC, and what they do is 
that they reward you for going to school, for Mommy taking you to appointments, and those 
sort of . . . things.” Though each parent used her own words, this kind of explanation was fairly 
common in that it focused the child’s attention on the positive values the program promotes 
without going into great detail about the specifics. Some parents gradually incorporated their 
children more into the program by showing them the coupon book and periodically discussing 
the rewarded activities or payments. But some parents withheld all information about the 
program from their elementary and middle school-age children. This range of communication
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Program
Outcome (%) Group
Understanding across all domainsa
Average proportion of rewarded activities that respondents
correctly identified as eligible for rewardsb,c 86.6
Average proportion of unrewarded activities that respondents
correctly identified as not eligible for rewardsd 39.0
Educationa,e
Knew that the program rewarded the following activities
Children's good attendance in school 93.2
Children's attending 95 percent of school days 27.4
Parents' attending a parent-teacher conference 95.6
Children's good performance on standardized English or math tests or Regents exams 89.3
Children's taking the PSAT exam 82.3
Children's getting enough credits each school year in high school 77.2
Children's completing 11 course creditsf 15.4
Children's graduating from high school 80.2
Knew that the program did not  reward the following activities
Children's good behavior in school 29.6
Children's going to an after-school program 37.3
Average proportion of rewarded education activities that respondents
correctly identified as eligible for rewardsg,b 86.3
Average proportion of unrewarded activities that respondents
correctly identified as not eligible for rewardsh 33.4
Health caree
Knew that the program rewarded the following activities
Having health insurance 93.1
Getting medical checkups when not sick 83.1
Going to the dentist for cleaning and checkups 96.9
Knew that the program did not  reward the following activities
Going to the hospital for emergency care 50.0
Having child visit school nurse 64.1
Average proportion of rewarded health care activities that respondents
correctly identified as eligible for rewardsb,i 91.1
Average proportion of unrewarded health care activities that respondents
correctly identified as not eligible for rewardsj 56.9
(continued)
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Table 4.3
Parents’ Understanding of the Family Rewards Incentives and Procedures
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strategies for younger children may be a response to the challenge that many parents described 
of trying to maintain the delicate balancing act of leveraging the motivational aspects of the 
program while avoiding the negative effects of having children become overly focused on the 
money as the reason for achievement.  
High school students had more direct exposure to the program because they had their 
own bank accounts or stored value cards. However, these students needed a good initial 
Program
Outcome (%) Group
Work and traininga
Knew that the program rewarded the following activities
Keeping a full-time job 87.1
Completing training or education while working full time 73.0
Knew that the program did not  reward the following activity
Going to school full time while not working 13.8
Average proportion of rewarded work and training activities that respondents
correctly identified as eligible for rewardsb,k 80.1
85.6
93.3
89.2
62.8
Sample size 1,032
I have no trouble keeping track of all the coupons
Table 4.3 (continued)
I know what I need to do to submit coupons for Opportunity NYC activities I have completed
Payment process
Submitted a coupon
Agree or strongly agree with the following statements
I find the coupon book easy to understand
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table excludes control group members because it pertains only to the Family Rewards 
program. A randomly selected subsample of program group members was asked these questions. 
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values. 
aResponses of "Don't know" are considered a wrong answer.
bThis measure refers to the average number of correctly identfied items divided by the total number of  
items and multiplied by100.
cThere are 11 rewarded activities that respondents could identify as eligible.
dThere are 5 unrewarded activities that respondents could idenitfy as not eligible.
eThis measure excludes repondents who had no children at the time of the interview.
fOnly sample members with a sample member in high school were asked this question.
gThere are 6 rewarded education activities that respondents could identify as eligible.
hThere are 2 unrewarded education activities that respondents could identify as not eligible.
iThere are 3 rewarded health activities that respondents could identify as eligible.
jThere are 2 unrewarded health activities that respondents could identify as not eligible.
kThere are 2 rewarded work and training activities that respondents could identify as eligible.
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introduction to the program to be able to connect deposits into those accounts with prior 
educational achievement. In other words, at some point they had to establish a clear understand-
ing of what specific types and levels of performance would be rewarded. There is reason to 
doubt that high school students as a group achieved this level of understanding of rewarded 
activities at the orientation stage or even later. Widespread efforts to market the program 
directly to high school students did not start until several months into the program, and the large 
number of youth who did not have bank accounts in the first two program years suggests that a 
lot of high school students may have been unaware of reward payments they were owed.4
These knowledge gaps point to the difficulty of shoring up participants’ understanding of 
the details of a program with many incentives and few points of contact with central staff. As 
described in Chapter 3, Seedco and the NPOs exerted a massive amount of effort trying to 
reinforce participants’ understanding of the incentives. Various materials were developed over 
the course of the first two program years. In roughly chronological order, these included a glossy 
Activity List distributed at orientation that listed all the incentives and verification methods in 
one place (see Figure 4.2), a coupon book for each family member, bimonthly earnings state-
ments, and regular mailings from the NPO, including a monthly calendar with deadlines and 
helpful hints. (A sample earnings statement for a fictional participant appears in Appendix H.) At 
the Year 2 orientation, NPO staff distributed a Guide to Automatically Verified Activities, and 
during that year, they implemented marketing campaigns in which they informed families of 
upcoming events, such as standardized tests, through postcards and phone calls.  
  
Remembering Specific Rewards 
Because of its comprehensiveness, the Activity List was probably the most useful tool 
for recalling all the incentives. Program designers may have expected parents to affix this list 
prominently on the kitchen refrigerator or some other central location in the home, but this 
advice was never given during orientations. Months later, during in-depth interviews, most 
families had not retained or used the Activity List, relying instead on the coupon book and their 
memory of the rewards discussed at orientation for an awareness of program activities. (See the 
description of orientation topics in Chapter 3.) Parents described pulling out the coupon book at 
the beginning of a payment cycle and flipping through it to plan out activities. One parent 
pasted folders for each child on her wall and inserted the relevant coupons in them so she would 
be reminded of what each child needed to do. 
                                                   
4As noted in Chapter 3, 16 percent of high school students had earned rewards but were not paid by the 
end of Year 2, and about 43 percent of all cases where payments could not be made were accounted for by 
teenagers who had not opened their own bank account. The findings in Appendix Table C.2, which presents 
information on program overpayments and underpayments, indicates that about 10 percent of families were 
underpaid by at least $500, which is probably largely accounted for by problems paying high school students.  
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The reliance on the coupon book and memory contributed to the knowledge gaps al-
ready noted and to the more serious problem of participants completely forgetting about 
automatically verified rewards. As an illustration of this, only 15 percent of the parents of high 
school students knew about the automatically verified reward for completing 11 credits. Many 
of the education rewards were automatically verified. This may be why 70 percent of parents 
believed (incorrectly) there was a reward for good behavior in school, and 63 percent of parents 
believed there was a reward for going to an after-school program — very high rates of error 
considering that parents identified most strongly with the education domain of rewards.  
In the first year of the program, parents also had some difficulty understanding the 
meaning of a coupon that rewarded them for reviewing their children’s results on up to five 
New York City Department of Education (DOE) Periodic Assessments per year.5
Parents’ Efforts to Claim Rewards 
 Many parents 
simply ignored the coupon because they did not understand it. A mother who had succeeded in 
submitting the coupon for one activity period described, during an interview, taking it to the 
school secretary, who did not know what a Periodic Assessment was. She eventually brought 
the coupon to her child’s teacher and received the print-out of her child’s results after a delay of 
two weeks. This reward was discontinued for Year 2 because the incentive was not well 
understood and because Periodic Assessments were not available at every school, as originally 
intended by the Department of Education.  
Knowing about and understanding the incentives is not enough to actually receive re-
wards in this program. Families must possess the competence to satisfy the conditions for a 
reward and properly document their fulfillment of those conditions, when necessary. The NPOs 
and helpline staff played crucial roles in supporting participants as they worked their way 
toward reward receipt. Acting within the constraints of the “no case management” approach, 
program staff served as a resource to families, navigating their involvement with the program 
and, in some cases, their interactions with outside institutions like schools, health clinics, and 
banks. Chapter 3 has already outlined the customer service functions in detail and the generally 
positive reviews they received from survey respondents. This section focuses on participants’ 
efforts to claim rewards by using the coupon book and accessing resources that would enable 
them to qualify for reward payments.  
                                                   
5The DOE’s Periodic Assessments provide teachers with feedback on “students’ strengths and weaknesses 
to help guide instruction and increase student achievement. They also provide an early indicator of student 
performance on State tests and measure student progress toward success in high school and beyond.” See 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/ResourcesforEducators/PeriodicAssessments/default.htm. 
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Submitting Coupons 
As noted in Chapter 3, most participants contacted the NPOs or helpline at some point 
in the first two program years. Parents explained their rationale for using these resources during 
in-depth interviews. They relied heavily on NPO staff at the beginning of Year 1 because many 
left the initial orientation doubting their comprehension of program requirements, especially 
since official coupon books were frequently not available at that time. Participants described 
calling and visiting their local NPO during the first couple of activity periods, with documents 
and coupons in hand, to ensure they were filled out correctly. Once families started to expe-
rience coupon rejections, they called the helpline for assistance with resubmission and to have 
program policies explained. It took several months for parents to feel a sense of competence 
about managing the verification requirements on their own. However, by the time of the Family 
Rewards 18-month parent survey, the overwhelming majority of respondents (93 percent) 
affirmed that they knew what they needed to do to submit coupons for completed activities, and 
a similar percentage found the coupon book easy to understand (Table 4.2). This suggests that 
participants received effective help and training on this aspect of the program from NPO and 
helpline staff.  
Accessing Resources to Qualify for Rewards 
It was expected that families who were not already engaged in rewarded activities 
would need some additional guidance to satisfy the conditions for receiving rewards. NPOs 
offered workshops on topics related to the three domains of activities as part of their efforts to 
educate families on what they had to do to earn and claim rewards within each domain and to 
offer advice on other social services in the community that could help families who were 
struggling with unemployment, mental or physical health problems, and poor school perfor-
mance meet the conditions for claiming rewards. These workshops were completely voluntary, 
but they were strongly promoted by NPO staff. About 43 percent of parents responding to the 
18-month survey said that they had attended at least one workshop, but NPO staff have noted 
that attendance at any given workshop was generally fairly low. In addition, only about one-
fourth of families sought a referral from the NPOs (either at workshops or through other 
contacts) for workforce development or educational services, and even fewer for health care. 
This low rate of utilization may reflect a number of situations: participants could have been 
unaware that the NPOs were offering this type of assistance, they might have been unable to 
take advantage of it because of time and child care constraints, they may have lacked the 
motivation to seek it because of their orientation to the program, or the offerings did not seem 
adequate to meet their needs.  
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Why Some Families Earned More Rewards Than Others 
As described above, families earned an average of about $3,000 per year from Family 
Rewards, and most families had reward earnings within $2,000 of that amount each year. 
Although high overall, the amounts varied widely. This section explores why some families 
earned more money or less money than others. It begins by taking a closer look at the small 
proportion of families who seemed generally disengaged from the program based on their low 
levels of reward receipt overall.  
Disengaged Families 
Families whose reward earnings were in the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of 
reward earnings were defined as disengaged for the purposes of this analysis. Given the struc-
ture of Family Rewards, in which every family member is enrolled individually and is eligible 
for rewards with different dollar values, reward receipt was partially determined by the inde-
pendent factors of family size and composition, especially the number of high school students. 
Although family characteristics play a role in explaining below-average earnings, disengaged 
families are characterized this way because they used the program very infrequently. About 60 
percent of disengaged families never submitted a coupon in the first two program years (Table 
4.4). Also, these families earned an average of two coupon rewards each, compared with 24 for 
families in the middle of the distribution of reward earnings, and 59 for families who earned the 
most rewards. These low numbers are not surprising because additional analyses (not shown) 
indicate that 39 percent of disengaged families did not pick up a coupon book in Year 1. A 
greater proportion — 55 percent — did not pick up the Year 2 coupon book, and only a third of 
those families picked up a coupon book in both program years. 
Table 4.4 paints a broad picture of disengaged families and shows that relative disad-
vantage, family size, and experiences with the program contributed to overall low program 
earnings. It shows that, as a group, families in the bottom 10 percent of reward earners were 
more disadvantaged at the start of the program. In particular, the parents had generally lower 
levels of education and were less likely to be employed full time.  
Consistent with their low rates of reward earnings, the head of the household of a dis-
engaged family was the least knowledgeable about which activities were eligible for rewards 
and which were ineligible. They did not seek much help from the customer service agents 
within the program, contacting the NPO and helpline less often than more highly engaged 
adults, and were less likely to attend workshops. They were also much less likely to report that 
they had “no trouble keeping track of coupons.” 
In-depth interviews suggest some potential reasons these parents were disconnected 
from the program. Some parents tried to participate in the program but were turned off when 
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Top 10 Percent Middle 80 Percent Bottom 10 Percent 
Characteristic $11,521 - $24,880 $1,741 - $11,520 $0 - $1,740
Characteristics of families at
random assignment
Average number in household 5 3 3
Average number of children
in household 3 2 2
Average number of high school  
students in household 1 1 0
Primary language spoken at home
is Spanish (%) 22.5 21.7 23.3
Family was receiving no government
transfer benefits (%) 44.4 19.1 18.0
Characteristics of parents at
random assignmenta 
Age (%)
 18-24 0.0 0.3 0.4
 25-34 22.0 30.0 27.1
 35-44 60.2 43.3 39.4
 45-59 17.8 23.2 28.4
 60 or older 0.0 3.3 4.7
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 41.3 47.8 48.3
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 56.6 50.4 50.9
No high school diploma or GED
certificate (%) 27.2 41.3 59.7
Foreign-born (%) 40.7 31.4 27.5
Married or in a legal domestic 
partnership (%) 41.5 17.2 16.1
Working full time (%) 62.3 35.9 27.1
Average weekly earnings, among those 
currently working ($) 495 383 319
Physical or mental health problem (%) 9.2 25.2 27.9
(continued)
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Table 4.4
Comparison of Families Who Earned Reward Amounts in the Top, Middle, or Bottom
Range of Earnings During Years 1 and 2 Combined
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Top 10 Percent Middle 80 Percent Bottom 10 Percent
Characteristic $11,521 - $24,880 $1,741 - $11,520 $0 - $1,740
Pattern of reward receipt and 
submissionsb 
Average number of automatically 
verified rewards earned 41 27 13
Average number of coupon book 
rewards earned 59 24 2
Never submitted a coupon (%) 0.0 7.3 59.8
Average number of activity periods 
family earned rewards 12 11 8
Sample size (total = 2,378) 236 1,905 236
Parents’ understanding of incentives  
and experiences with programc (%)
Average proportion of reward activities 
correctly identified as eligible 
for rewardsd,e 93.5 86.0 81.1
Average proportion of unrewarded activities 
that respondents correctly identified as
not eligible for rewardsf 45.6 38.6 32.2
Knew how to submit coupons 96.6 93.8 81.8
Had no trouble keeping track of coupons 75.0 63.3 35.8
Number of times family contacted Neighborhood 
Partner Organization
1-2 times 29.1 38.4 39.1
3 or more times 64.1 46.8 33.3
Number of times family contacted helpline 
1-2 times 38.6 37.4 23.2
3 or more times 43.9 30.9 15.9
Ever attended any workshop 64.6 41.8 28.4
Ever received referral for services from 
Neighborhood Partner Organization 52.2 57.1 51.6
Sample size (total = 1,037) 117 849 71
(continued)
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they had bad customer service experiences or were not paid because of banking problems in the 
early part of the program. Negative interactions with customer service and nonpayment rein-
forced these participants’ early skepticism about the program. Some families were deterred by 
the deadlines for mailing in coupons. They saw these deadlines as rigid, sometimes because of 
misinformation from NPO staff, and got discouraged when they could not seem to send cou-
pons in on time.  
Parents with very different levels of personal competence cited disorganization or hectic 
schedules as reasons for low levels of involvement. A single mother with three children who 
had not turned in any coupons at the time of her interview and faced multiple personal chal-
lenges explained, “My brain be somewhere else. … ’cause I just took my kids to the doctor last 
month, but me rushing to get them to the doctor, I forgot to bring those coupons. So half the 
time I be forgetting to bring it. It’s not that I don’t want to bring it; I be forgetting ’cause I be 
busy.” By contrast, a single mother who was employed and pursuing an additional certification 
also described being too busy to attend to the program, given the time it takes to document 
activities. She said: 
What was a difficulty for me is making time ’cause I have such a busy sche-
dule. I have to manage those four lives plus my own. So I have five sche-
dules to manage every day and basically keeping my head. So it was just the 
time management and choosing what I wanted to do.…What happened with 
me is I don’t have time to go back to the doctor and go to the doctor, fill out 
this, fill out four forms and wait for everyone, then come back next week. Do 
you know — ’cause now, you don’t have a private doctor. You have a clinic. 
That’s crazy. 
This parent essentially conducted a cost-benefit analysis that indicated that involvement in the 
program was not worth it.  
Table 4.4 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey, Seedco's Family 
Rewards program data, and Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: The first program year covers activities that occurred from September 2007 through August 2008, 
and the second program year covers activities that occurred from September 2008 through August 2009.
aThis section excludes information for enrolled second parents in two-parent households.       
bCalculations are based on Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
cData derive from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
dThere are 11 rewarded activities that respondents could identify as eligible.
eThis measure refers to the average number of correctly identified items divided by the total number of 
items and mulitplied by 100.
fThere are 5 unrewarded activities that respondents could identify as not eligible.
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A final factor that contributed to low engagement was low expectations for earnings 
from the program. Some parents were content to earn the occasional reward to pay a bill or 
cover a cost that had been a burden. This could be achieved without investing a lot of time in 
submitting coupons. 
Factors Related to the Overall Variation in Earnings 
The discussion of disengaged families should not obscure the achievement of the vast 
majority of families who participated at a level that enabled them to obtain significant 
additional resources from Family Rewards. Several factors account for the variation seen 
among these families.  
Family size and composition were clearly important factors contributing to reward re-
ceipt. Table 4.5 shows how the average amount of rewards that families earned increased with 
each additional child in a household. Families with two children earned an average of $5,760 
compared with three-children families, who earned an average of $7,357. The number of high 
school students in a family was also correlated with the overall amount of reward earnings. 
Families with no high school students had overall reward earnings, on average, of $1,989 less 
than families with at least one high school student. Having two adults enrolled in the program 
was another important factor, but few families overall had two adults.6
Table 4.4 illustrates the relationship between household size and the total amount of 
rewards earned. The top 10 percent of families were generally larger than other families, with 
more elementary, middle, and high school students. These families averaged five members, 
with three children in elementary or middle school and one child in high school. In comparison, 
families in the middle of the distribution averaged three members, with two elementary or 
middle school-age children and one high school student.  
 
Other factors that were related to reward earnings concerned what families were able to 
do and the ways they engaged with program components. Families who earned more rewards 
were less disadvantaged at the time of enrollment than families who earned fewer rewards. 
Sometimes the differences were marginal, but the trend was consistent. Table 4.4 shows that the 
top 10 percent of earners had, on average, higher levels of education, employment, earnings 
from employment, marriage, and self-reported mental and physical health than did other 
families. They were also less likely to be receiving other public benefits.  
                                                   
6Additional analyses showed that families with two adults who were enrolled in Family Rewards earned 
an average of $333 more than families with one enrolled adult. Families with two adults who were enrolled in 
the program constituted 6 percent of families at the time of enrollment (shown in Table 2.2). 
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Language and nationality did not affect earnings; in fact, most foreign-born families 
were in the top half of earners. Families who spoke Spanish were no less likely to be top earners 
than were English speakers. There was also little difference in earnings patterns between black 
and Hispanic families. 
Table 4.4 shows that of the parents who responded to the survey, top earners had the 
best knowledge of actual rewards and were able to distinguish them from unrewarded activities 
with the greatest accuracy. They also had the most contact with customer service. Sixty-four 
percent of them contacted the NPO three or more times, and 44 percent contacted the helpline 
three or more times. They attended the greatest number of workshops, and slightly more than 
half received referrals.  
This pattern of results from the first two years indicates that, among low-income fami-
lies who were enrolled in the program, those with relatively better circumstances and who were 
most determined were best able to take advantage of what the program had to offer.  
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 4.5
 Variation in Average Amount of Reward Money Earned, 
Outcome ($) and Family Compositiona
Years 1 and 2 
Combined
Average earnings among familes with
1 child 4,284
2 children 5,760
3 children 7,357
4 children or more 7,893
Average earnings among families with no high school students 5,206
Average earnings among families with at least 1 high school student 7,195
Sample size 2,367
by Family Size and Composition
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008, and the second 
program year covers September 2008 through August 2009. 
"Sample size" refers to the number of families who earned rewards.
aCalculations are based on families who earned any rewards.
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How Families Spent Their Reward Payments 
Families could spend their reward money any way they wished. As one participant put it, 
the program “put the money directly in your pocket and don’t ask no questions,” in contrast with 
her experience in other low-income programs that provide in-kind support (for example, food 
stamps). The program’s designers believed that the appeal and incentive value of the program 
would be greater without any restrictions on how the money could be spent. They hoped that 
families would use the extra money in ways that align with program goals, such as reducing 
immediate material hardship or investing in family members’ human capital development 
through services that enhance children’s academic performance or parents’ workforce skills. In 
addition, the designers anticipated that parents would administer the program in the home in a 
way that mirrored the incentives structure of Family Rewards as a whole, meaning that younger 
children’s access to rewards would be tied to achievement, to the extent appropriate.  
The two most common uses of the extra money, cited by about 70 percent of survey 
respondents (Table 4.6), were regular expenses (such as rent, food, and utilities) and consumer 
goods or special treats for the family (like eating out). This pattern speaks to the internalization 
by parents of the language of “reward” that pervades the program. Parents tried to balance their 
responsibility to provide for the basic needs of their family with a desire to celebrate their 
achievements. For many families, celebration took the form of doing things together like going 
on a trip or to a movie that would otherwise be prohibitively expensive, especially for a large 
family with limited means. Parents also used the money for allowances, which tended to be 
higher in the program group. A little extra pocket money was certainly another way parents 
combined provision and celebration.  
Specific transfers of program money from parent to child occur for complicated reasons 
that involve the parents’ own feelings about being able to provide for their children and the 
general style of rule-setting and child management in the home. Some parents who were 
included in the in-depth interviews expressed a great deal of relief that the first program pay-
ment was received right before Christmas because they might not have been able to give gifts to 
their children otherwise. In general, it seemed to enhance parents’ self-esteem to be able to 
provide their children with visible signs of stability, like a stocked food pantry, and extras, like a 
nice pair of shoes, since they often have to go without such items. Some parents did not tell 
younger children that they were in the program, so that the extra money would seem to come 
from the parent; other parents combined their earnings with their children’s whenever large 
purchases needed to be made to, again, enhance parental responsibility for the gift.  
A few parents expressed a belief that expenditures on clothing or grooming for children 
were related to educational goals, because children feel more confident at school and experience 
less harassment when they look good. But many parents did not create clear and consistent 
expectations in this respect, satisfying children’s requests for various items or money without 
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meaningful behavioral preconditions. One mother whose high school-age son had shown no 
interest in the program, and whose grades and attendance were slipping, described his liberal 
access to “rewards” nonetheless from her program earnings and other sources: 
No, he don’t have a job. He don’t get allowance. I do for him. His sister do 
for him. His godfather do for him. His cousins do for him. His family do for 
him. All he does is pick up the phone and say, “I want such and such and 
such,” and it’ll come through out of the Amazon.com, come to the house. 
The reward money does not serve as a targeted incentive for the child’s investments in academ-
ic achievement in this context.  
One-third of parents who responded to the 18-month survey reported that they had used 
reward money to pay off debt or for education-related services, like tutoring (Table 4.6). The 
following passage describes a negotiation between a mother and child over investing his reward 
earnings in private tutoring:  
He was upset at first. But we made an agreement. He was getting $100 for 
dentist, $200 for doctor. So he saved up over, I think, $1,000. So the agree-
ment was if I let him take guitar lessons and buy a guitar, I could place him 
in a program at Sylvan Learning for tutoring. Because he wanted one-on-one. 
He don’t want any of those free tutoring programs. Because it’s in a group, 
and he didn’t want to be embarrassed. He’s already a teenager. So I said, 
“Okay. We’re gonna put you in one of the best tutoring programs. It’s one-
on-one. It’s called Sylvan Learning. Because I did my research. But you have 
to pay like $62 an hour a teacher.” So he came on, and he agreed. I said, 
“Okay. I’ll give you — after that, you get guitar lessons. And I’ll buy you a 
guitar. This is your money. But you also have to pay for your reading pro-
gram.” So it helped.  
Her son’s reading level went up as a result of the tutoring, and she congratulated him: 
“This is what you should be proud of, and this is what your money helped us do!” There did not 
appear to be widespread investments in tutoring services with Family Rewards earnings, 
according to the survey and interview data. This family interaction exemplifies the kind of 
skillful bargaining that might have been necessary to get children’s buy-in for using program 
money for educational services.  
About half of those surveyed indicated that they were saving the extra money for a fu-
ture need. Some parents expressed a shift in goals as they headed into the last year of the 
program, intending to save more money or to make investments in workforce training in order 
to maintain the family’s standard of living once the program ends. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter explored patterns in families’ receipt of rewards during the first two years 
of the Family Rewards program. It showed that the overwhelming majority of families collected 
rewards consistently, no doubt helped by the marketing efforts and customer service of Seedco 
and the NPO staff, which, as explained in Chapter 3, improved considerably over time. Al-
though families received a substantial amount of cash transfers, the amount of money they 
earned varied widely, in part because of variation in family size and composition of the families 
but also according to factors such as parents’ level of disadvantage at the time they entered the 
program, their understanding of the program’s rewards, and persistence in claiming rewards. At 
the same time, there was little difference in reward receipt across the six community districts, 
between black and Hispanic families, and between families that varied in their facility with the 
English language. The next chapter examines how the extra resources from Family Rewards 
affected families’ overall levels of poverty and material hardship relative to families in the 
control group.  
Program
Outcome (%) Group
Use Family Rewards payments to
Help pay for regular expenses, such as rent, utilities, or food 69.9
Pay off bills, such as credit cards or medical bills 32.4
Make a major purchase, such as a house, major appliance, or car 11.6
Save for some future need, such as college tuition or retirement 46.0
Pay for health or dental care or health insurance 15.2
Pay for things to help children in school, such as special lessons or private schools 34.6
Pay for a few luxuries, such as eating out, going to a movie, buying electronics or clothes 72.3
Help other family members or friends with expenses 11.7
Other 18.7
Sample size 1,032
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 4.6
Parents’ Reports on Family’s Use of Rewards Received 
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table excludes control group members because it pertains only to the Family Rewards 
program. A randomly selected subsample of program group members was asked these questions. 
Sample sizes vary across measures because of missing values. 
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Chapter 5 
Income and Material Well-Being 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the long-term goal of Family Rewards is to reduce poverty 
by promoting human capital development among low-income children and their parents. But 
the program also aims to reduce current poverty and material hardship through its direct cash 
reward payments — or conditional cash transfers (CCTs)  and through any immediate 
increases it can generate in parents’ earnings from employment, which can also boost Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) payments.  
Overall, as already shown, nearly all of the families participating in Family Rewards 
earned at least one reward payment during the observation period for this report. In each of the 
first two years, most families earned rewards in the range of $1,000 to $5,000, averaging 
approximately $3,100 per year. Family Rewards did not limit the ways in which families could 
spend their reward payments, and there is some evidence that a large proportion of program 
participants used the extra money to meet regular expenses such as rent, utilities, and food. With 
these cash payments serving as substantial income supplements, an important question is how 
much they, along with any program effects on income from other sources, have begun to affect 
families’ overall household income, poverty, and hardship.  
This chapter examines the program’s effects on those outcomes, incorporating informa-
tion about the reward payments, impacts on earnings from work, and impacts on other cash 
transfers, including cash aid from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and food 
stamp payments. In addition, it explores changes in families’ overall material well-being and 
perceptions of their financial security, such as whether they are able to “make ends meet.”  
The analyses draw heavily on the Family Rewards 18-month parent survey, as well as 
administrative records data on TANF and food stamp receipt provided by the New York City 
Human Resources Administration (HRA). The 18-month survey was administered to a random 
subset of the full study sample, and provides extensive information on household income and 
material well-being.1 Most of these survey interviews were conducted by phone, between 
December 2008 and July 2009, part of the way through the second year of the program.2
                                                   
1The Family Rewards 18-Month Survey provides information about Family Rewards sample members on 
a broad set of topics such as participation in employment and education activities, health care, employment and 
job characteristics, household composition, and child outcomes. Overall, 3,082 sample members completed the 
survey interview, resulting in a response rate of 82.2 percent. Appendix D provides additional details on the 
survey effort and analyzes response patterns.  
  
2About 92 percent of these interviews were completed between 15 and 20 months after random assignment. 
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Box 5.1 explains how to interpret the tables that show estimated program impacts that 
are presented throughout the remainder of this report. These tables cover a large number of 
impact estimates that are relevant to family poverty, hardship, and economic security and in the 
three domains in which rewards are provided: children’s education, health care, and parent’s 
work and training. The estimates of program impacts were calculated controlling for a range of 
pre-random assignment background characteristics, such as the parent’s race/ethnicity, educa-
tion level, marital status, and employment status. As the number of outcomes that are examined 
increases, the probability of finding “false positives,” or differences that are statistically signifi-
cant simply by chance, also increases.3
Overall, the results presented here suggest that the program achieved some of its short-
term goals: it reduced the proportion of families who were living in poverty (and in severe 
poverty), reduced some material hardships, increased family savings, and improved parents’ 
sense of their family’s financial well-being. It also reduced their reliance on alternative financial 
institutions, such as neighborhood check-cashing outlets. In addition, some evidence suggests 
that Family Rewards may have had small effects on marital status, increasing to a small degree 
the likelihood of both marriage and divorce.  
 Although the impact analysis does not formally account 
for “multiple hypothesis testing,” caution is used when interpreting impacts that do not appear 
to be part of a larger pattern of impacts within a given set of measures.  
Income and Poverty 
Survey respondents were asked to list their income sources and total household income 
for the calendar month prior to the month in which their survey interview took place.4
                                                   
3Statistical significance indicates the extent to which the difference between the program and control 
group outcomes — or the “impact” of the program — is likely to have been a true result of the program. 
 Using 
this monthly snapshot, one estimate of average total household income was calculated exclud-
ing any cash reward payments that program participants earned. A second measure of family 
income counting those rewards (for the program group) was also constructed and is presented 
separately. As Table 5.1 shows, the estimated average monthly household income at the time of 
the interviews was $1,658 for the program group (excluding Family Rewards payments) and 
4Respondents were instructed to exclude tax refunds, EITC payments, and program cash rewards, and to 
include income from all other sources such as their job(s), jobs of other household members, food stamps, child 
support, TANF, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and unemployment insurance, among other sources, for 
everyone living together in the household. This estimate of income is used to calculate household poverty and 
income relative to the federal poverty threshold, using the 2008 and 2009 poverty guidelines, depending on 
when a respondent was interviewed. (In 2009, the federal poverty level for a family of three was $18,310.) 
Because of its particular definition, readers should be cautious comparing the poverty estimates presented in 
this report with estimates from other published sources.  
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Box 5.1 
How to Read Impact Tables in this Report 
In the context of this evaluation, an “impact” is a measure of how much Family Rewards changed 
outcomes for program participants. All the tables in this report that show impacts use a similar format, 
illustrated in the table excerpt below, which presents data on two material hardship and well-being 
outcomes that were obtained from parents’ reports on the Family Rewards 18-month survey. The top 
row, for example, shows that 39 percent of respondents in the program group had not paid their rent in 
full or made a full mortgage payment in the 12 months prior to the time of the survey interview, com-
pared with 41.5 percent of control group respondents.  
Because families were assigned randomly either to the program group or to the control group, the 
effects of the program can be estimated by the difference in outcomes between the two groups. The 
“Difference” column in the table shows the differences between the two research groups’ outcomes 
— that is, the program’s estimated impacts on the outcomes. For example, the estimated program 
impact on paying full rent or mortgage can be calculated by subtracting 39 percent from 41.5 percent, 
yielding a reduction, or estimated impact, of −2.5 percentage points. 
The p-value shows the probability that this difference, or impact, arose by chance. In the table below, 
the difference between the program and control groups in paying the full rent or mortgage has a 24 
percent probability of arising as a result of chance rather than as a result of the Family Rewards pro-
gram. In contrast, the difference on the measure of financial well-being (bottom row) has less than a 1 
percent probability of having arisen by chance. For this evaluation, only differences that have a 10 
percent probability or less of arising by chance are considered “statistically significant” and therefore 
represent true program effects. The number of asterisks indicates whether the impact is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), or 10 percent (*) level.  
The final column shows the effect size, which is presented for selected impacts. The effect size is the 
difference between the program and control group outcomes divided by the “standard deviation” of 
the outcome (a measure of its variability). Expressing an impact in standard deviation units helps to 
interpret its size, particularly when the outcome is in nonstandard units, such as scale scores, as in the 
second row. In contrast, effect sizes are not shown for impacts that are easier to interpret, such as im-
pacts on dollar amounts or percentages.  
Impacts on Two Material Hardship and Well-being Outcomes, from the 18-Month Survey 
  
Outcome 
Program 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Difference 
(Impact) 
 
P-Value 
Effect 
Size  
Did not pay full rent or  
mortgage 39.0 41.5         -2.5 
 
0.245  
       
 
Financial well-being scale  
(4 = low; 16 = high)     9.2 8.7 0.5 *** 
 
 
 0.000 0.199 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Income
Average total household income in prior month
excluding Family Rewards paymentsa ($) 1,658 1,573 85 * 0.086
Average monthly Family Rewards incentive payments 
received during Year 2 b ($) 287 0 -- --
Average total household income in prior month
including Family Rewards paymentsb,c ($) 1,940 1,573 366 *** 0.000
Percentage of families with household income at or below
the federal poverty levelb,c 58.9 70.0 -11.1 *** 0.000
Total household income in prior year as a percentage of the
federal poverty levelb,c 
Less than 50% 16.7 30.0 -13.2 *** 0.000
50% - 100% 42.2 40.1 2.2 0.358
101% -129% 14.5 11.7 2.8 * 0.079
130% or more 26.6 18.3 8.3 *** 0.000
Income sources
Household income source in prior monthd (%)
Respondent's earnings 63.4 57.7 5.7 *** 0.001
Other household members' earnings 23.5 20.7 2.9 0.104
Food stamps 62.4 62.3 0.2 0.934
Child support 18.1 18.9 -0.8 0.639
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or other 
cash assistance 13.1 14.6 -1.5 0.289
Supplemental Security Income or Disability 27.5 29.1 -1.6 0.381
Unemployment insurance (UI) 6.8 6.6 0.2 0.864
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, 
and Children (WIC) 14.4 14.2 0.1 0.928
Heating or cooling assistance 7.7 5.6 2.1 * 0.052
Free or reduced-price school lunch 71.6 66.5 5.1 ** 0.012
Other 6.7 5.8 0.9 0.397
Taxes
Heard of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 74.2 72.8 1.4 0.442
Filed taxes in prior year and applied for EITC 44.1 41.6 2.5 0.226
Filed taxes in prior year and used tax
preparation servicee 65.3 62.0 3.3 * 0.089
(continued)
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Table 5.1
Impacts on Income and Income Sources
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$1,573 for the control group, representing a statistically significant gain of $85 per month (or 
about a 5 percent increase relative to the control group’s income). On average, families who are 
participating in the program earned an additional $287 each month in reward payments during 
the period covered by the survey.5
                                                   
5Year 2 payment data, which cover August 2008 to September 2009 and overlap with the survey period, 
are used to estimate the average monthly incentive payment during this period. 
 Including those rewards in the measure of family income 
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Filed taxes in prior year and received a refund-
anticipation loan 15.3 16.3 -0.9 0.565
Employed at time of random assignment (%)
Heard of EITC 79.8 76.7 -- --
Filed taxes in prior year and applied for EITC 53.9 52.3 -- --
Filed taxes in prior year and used tax
preparation service e 77.3 75.1 -- --
Filed taxes in prior year and received a refund-  
anticipation loan 19.1 20.8 -- --
Sample size (total = 2,060) 1,051 1,009
Table 5.1 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: The items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,060) of the 
survey respondents.
Italic type indicates comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
aAbout 15 percent of the sample are excluded from this calculation because they either did not respond to 
the income question or reported a monthly amount of $10,000 or higher.
bFamily Rewards payments are based on Seedco's Family Rewards data from program Year 2, which 
include activities completed in September 2008 through August 2009. The monthly Family Rewards payment 
amount is calculated by dividing the annual reward amount by 12. The payment data do not include bonus 
payments that some families received for opening new bank accounts.
cAnnual household income is calculated by multiplying by 12 the respondent's income in the month prior to 
the survey interview. For program group members, it includes Family Rewards payments earned during 
program Year 1; see the preceding note. The federal poverty level was created based on annual income  
(monthly income multiplied by 12) and the household size at the time of the survey. The poverty threshold was 
measured according to the 2008 or 2009 poverty guidelines, depending on when a respondent was interviewed.
dPercentages may add up to more than 100 percent because respondents may have multiple income 
sources.
eThis includes free tax preparation services and paid tax preparers.
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shows that the estimated average monthly household income at the time of the interviews was 
$1,940 for the program group (including Family Rewards payments) and $1,573 for the control 
group, representing a statistically significant gain of $366 per month (or about a 23 percent 
increase relative to the control group’s income). 
Next, poverty rates were calculated by estimating annual family income relative to the 
federal poverty level pertaining to each family’s size, with reward payments added in for the 
program group.6
Respondents to the 18-month survey were also asked whether they had received income 
or benefits in the prior month from a wide variety of sources. Table 5.1 shows that Family 
Rewards neither increased nor decreased the likelihood of receiving income from most of these 
sources. However, it did appear to have positive effects on reported earnings from employment 
(which are discussed more fully in Chapter 8), and small positive effects on the likelihood of 
receiving heating or cooling assistance (for example, help paying for air conditioning) or free or 
reduced-price school lunch assistance.  
 Table 5.1 presents the distribution of this measure of poverty across four 
levels, including “severe poverty,” which is defined as income below 50 percent of the poverty 
level. It shows that Family Rewards substantially altered the distribution of families across 
different levels of poverty, especially by reducing the proportion of households in severe 
poverty and increasing the proportion with income at or above 130 percent of the federal 
poverty level. For example, while 30 percent of the control group had income falling into the 
severe poverty category, the rate for the program group was 16.7 percent, representing a 
statistically significant drop of 13.2 percentage points. Similarly, 26.6 percent of the program 
group had income at or above 130 percent of the federal poverty level compared with 18.3 
percent of the control group, a statistically significant gain of 8.3 percentage points.  
Administrative records data were used to estimate the program’s effects on cash aid from 
the TANF and Safety Net Assistance (SNA) programs and food stamp benefits.7
                                                   
6Annual household income is estimated based on the one-month household income snapshot gathered at 
the time of the survey interview.  
 The available 
data covered four quarters of follow-up after the quarter of random assignment. Overall, the 
results, presented in Table 5.2, show that Family Rewards had no clear effect on benefits receipt 
— either the likelihood of receiving payments or the average dollar amount received. 
7The SNA program provides assistance to individuals and families in New York State who do not qualify 
for the time-limited federal TANF program. SNA payments may take the form of direct cash aid to beneficia-
ries or vendor payments (for example, to landlords) made on their behalf.  
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Ever received TANF/SNA (%)
Quarter of random assignment 33.1 32.4 0.7 0.373
Quarter 2 32.4 32.4 -0.1 0.942
Quarter 3 32.4 31.6 0.7 0.410
Quarter 4 31.4 30.7 0.7 0.434
Quarter 5 30.2 29.7 0.5 0.605
Quarters 2-5 35.9 36.6 -0.7 0.439
Amount of TANF/SNA received ($)
Quarter of random assignment 564 522 42.0 * 0.050
Quarter 2 547 528 18.7 0.396
Quarter 3 561 514 46.6 ** 0.039
Quarter 4 550 514 35.9 0.125
Quarter 5 513 481 32.5 0.156
Quarters 2-5 2,170 2,036 133.7 0.106
Ever received food stamps (%)
Quarter of random assignment 61.7 61.4 0.2 0.838
Quarter 2 61.2 61.2 0.0 0.990
Quarter 3 59.6 60.1 -0.4 0.701
Quarter 4 58.9 59.9 -1.1 0.353
Quarter 5 60.1 60.5 -0.4 0.741
Quarters 2-5 65.5 65.8 -0.3 0.796
Amount of food stamps received ($)
Quarter of random assignment 600 595 5.3 0.720
Quarter 2 620 620 0.0 0.999
Quarter 3 600 600 -0.2 0.989
Quarter 4 579 588 -8.7 0.585
Quarter 5 618 622 -3.5 0.831
Quarters 2-5 2,417 2,430 -12.4 0.836
Sample size (total = 4,966) 2,498 2,468
(continued)
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Table 5.2
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Banking and Financial Services 
As described previously, Family Rewards made payments electronically to families 
who earned rewards, depositing the money into bank accounts or onto stored value cards. The 
program strongly urged all families to set up bank accounts if they did not already have one, or 
to link their existing accounts to the program’s payment system. In addition, it provided all 
parents and high school students with a chance to use savings accounts that, with the coopera-
tion of several banks and credit unions, were designed especially for the program. These 
“Opportunity NYC accounts” did not carry fees or minimum balances and could not be over-
drawn.8
In addition to providing the program with an efficient mechanism for paying out cash 
rewards to qualifying participants, the use of bank accounts served as a way to encourage low-
income families to increase their connections to mainstream financial institutions. The designers 
of Family Rewards had hoped that, with these accounts and the extra money they earned from 
 Recognizing that families might also benefit from some guidance on how to manage 
the money they earned from the program, Seedco and the participating Neighborhood Partner 
Organizations (NPOs) provided them with some information (including a special workshop) on 
the basics of budgeting, money management, debt management, and asset building.  
                                                   
8See Chapter 3 for additional information on these accounts and the requirements or features associated 
with them.  
Table 5.2 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using administrative records data from the New York State 
Human Resources Administration.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 
percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-
random assignment characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were 
adjusted to account for multiple observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and 
control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control 
groups arose by chance.
Dollar averages include zero values for sample members who were not receiving TANF 
or food stamps.
TANF or SNA and food stamp receipt and payment data are available for four quarters of  
follow-up after the quarter of random assignment. Thus, this table presents impacts for the 
first year of program participation.
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the program, families would be more likely to save money and build their assets and less likely 
to rely on alternative financial institutions. Most often located in low-income neighborhoods, 
alternative financial institutions tend to offer such services as check cashing, bill payment, and 
short-term loans (or “payday loans”),9
Local and national studies show that low-income populations are less likely to hold 
bank accounts and more likely to face high costs for basic financial transactions through 
alternative or non-mainstream financial services providers.
 often at very high prices and in ways that many experts 
contend mislead and exploit the poor. Payday loans are illegal in New York, but are available 
through the Internet.  
10 According to some scholars, these 
circumstances can make it more difficult for families to escape or stay out of poverty, and they 
can undermine the accomplishments of welfare-to-work programs and “make-work-pay” 
policies.11 According to one study, nearly 25 percent of low-income families (defined as those 
with earnings under $18,900) in the United States are “unbanked”; that is, they have neither a 
checking nor a savings account.12 Among the Family Rewards sample, the proportion unbanked 
was more than double that rate when they entered the study: about 53 percent of that sample did 
not have a bank account at the time of random assignment (shown earlier in Table 2.3).13
Family Rewards changed this pattern. It increased program participants’ connection to 
mainstream financial institutions and reduced their reliance on alternative institutions. For 
example, 73.3 percent of program group respondents to the 18-month survey reported having a 
bank account at the time of the interview, compared with 51.8 percent of the control group 
respondents, a statistically significant difference of 21.5 percentage points (see Table 5.3).
 
14
                                                   
9A payday loan is a loan from a check-cashing outlet or other lending institution that must be repaid by the 
next payday. 
 The
10Barr (2004).  
11Barr and Blank (2009).  
12Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore (2006). 
13The Neighborhood Financial Services Study conducted by the New York City Department of Consumer 
Affairs’ Office of Financial Empowerment (OFE) provides a useful context for interpreting findings in this 
domain (banking, savings, and debt, for example). The OFE study explored the availability and use of financial 
services in two New York communities: Jamaica (Queens) and Melrose (the Bronx). It found that about 31 
percent of respondents with low income were unbanked. Respondents gave several reasons for being un-
banked, including prohibitively high bank fees, discomfort interacting with financial institutions, the need to 
maintain a minimum balance, and hours and location, among others. See New York City Department of 
Consumer Affairs (2008).  
14The estimate for the program group, based on survey data, is lower than what might be expected given 
the fact that program operations data show that close to 83 percent of adults had a checking or savings account 
linked to the program for payment purposes (with an additional 10 percent using stored value cards). Program 
operators note that a number of families had bank accounts that closed from time to time, or were in the 
process of changing accounts, so at any given moment a substantial proportion of participants had no function-
al bank account.  
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Use of banking/financial services (%)
Currently has bank account 73.3 51.8 21.5 *** 0.000
Currently has checking account 57.8 46.7 11.1 *** 0.000
Had bank account closed since random assignment 14.3 15.4 -1.1 0.504
Financial transactions at least once a month
Cash check at check casher 29.2 36.5 -7.3 *** 0.000
Pay bill at check casher 38.3 42.9 -4.6 ** 0.032
Use ATM card to access cash 60.7 55.0 5.7 *** 0.008
Take cash advance on credit card 3.6 3.0 0.7 0.413
Bounce check or overdraw checking account 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.989
Get payday loan 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.239
Family savings and debt
Average savingsa ($) 575 354 221 ** 0.015
$0 (%) 74.3 83.7 -9.4 *** 0.000
$1 - $250 (%) 7.1 4.2 2.9 *** 0.006
$251 - $500 (%) 4.5 4.1 0.4 0.660
More than $500 (%) 14.1 8.0 6.0 *** 0.000
Average debtb ($) 7,062 6,399 663 0.191
$0 (%) 16.2 19.2 -3.1 * 0.079
$1 - $1,000 (%) 19.2 18.8 0.3 0.858
$1,001 - $5,000 (%) 32.8 32.1 0.7 0.757
$5,001 - $15,000 (%) 19.8 18.6 1.3 0.485
More than $15,000 (%) 12.1 11.3 0.8 0.589
Currently repaying (%)
Any loan 22.8 19.8 3.0 * 0.095
Car loan 4.0 2.7 1.4 * 0.087
Home loan 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.150
Student loans 12.0 11.0 0.9 0.500
Hospital or medical bill 5.2 4.1 1.1 0.244
Credit card or store bill 16.2 12.1 4.1 *** 0.007
Other 4.1 2.8 1.4 * 0.094
Sample size (total = 2,060) 1,051 1,009
(continued)
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program group was also more likely (by 11.1 percentage points) to report having a checking 
account. Although similar proportions of the program and control groups were likely to close a 
bank account at some point following random assignment (14.3 percent and 15.4 percent, 
respectively), the program clearly generated a net increase in the establishment of bank accounts.  
Program group members were less likely to report on the 18-month survey that they had 
used alternative financial services since the time of random assignment. The survey asked 
whether they had used these fringe financial services several times a month, about once a 
month, every few months, a few times during the year, or never. Table 5.3 presents the 
proportion of sample members reporting use of such services at least once a month. Family 
Rewards decreased regular use of alternative financial services: it reduced the use of check-
cashing services by a statistically significant 7.3 percentage points and reduced the use of these 
services for the payment of regular bills by 4.6 percentage points. As expected, it increased the 
use of ATMs for cash withdrawal, a benefit made possible by having formal banking accounts. 
Very few sample members reported getting a payday loan.15
Overall, program participants were more likely to be using banks or credit unions for 
their financial transactions. For some, this came with a lot of pride:  
  
Now with this program, I can afford [a savings account]. I even feel more 
important because I have a card; I have two bank cards. And I go, I have my 
money there. I withdraw it. I manage it. My girls, it’s very nice when they 
                                                   
15In comparison, the OFE survey suggests that 9 percent of the families surveyed in two New York com-
munities (Jamaica, in Queens, and Melrose, in the Bronx) used short-term loans. However, 75 percent had used 
fringe financial services, such as check cashers. Moreover, 65 percent of respondents with checking accounts 
also reported that they used check cashers.  
Table 5.3 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: The items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,060) of the 
survey respondents.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differnces.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
aA total of  7 percent of the sample are excluded from this analysis due to missing data.
bDebt amounts equal to or greater than $100,000 were excluded from these calculations. The survey 
questions on savings and debt are largely framed around family finances; thus, it is most likely that participants 
are reporting debt accumulated by the family. A total of 9 percent of the sample are excluded from this analysis 
because of missing or out-of-range values.
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say “Mommy, go to the bank and get me some money to buy this,” and eve-
rything. It’s been a great blessing.  
Savings and Debt 
Low-income families typically have few assets and low savings, making it difficult to 
build financial security for the future.16
Family Rewards places no restrictions on how families can use the cash transfers they 
receive. This feature was included because the program designers believe that imposing 
restrictions (such as for education, training, or home ownership, as some asset-building pro-
grams do, or for any particular purpose) can reduce the incentive value of the rewards that are 
offered. At the same time, it is important to understand whether the additional income that 
families receive through the program has begun to help them improve their financial security. 
The results presented in Table 5.3 suggest that it has. Family Rewards increased the program 
group’s average savings by $221, a gain of 38 percent over the control group mean of $354.
 By living off limited resources, they are especially 
vulnerable to medical or other financial emergencies, and their lack of savings affects their 
ability to respond to crises.  
17 
Roughly 25 percent of the program group reported having some family savings at the time of 
the 18-month interview, compared with 16 percent of the control group.18
These results are consistent with reports from the in-depth interviews that engaged par-
ticipants in discussions about their savings strategies. While several families were unable to 
save for a variety of reasons, others tried to “save for a rainy day.” Talking about how Family 
Rewards “taught” her to save and manage her finances, one participant said:  
 Family Rewards 
reduced the proportion of program group families with no savings by 9.4 percentage points, and 
it increased the proportion with greater than $500 in savings by 6 percentage points.  
Yeah, I still save like $200, $300. I leave it in the bank. The rest I pay my 
rent and my bills, and [take care of] five children  their clothing and the 
basic necessities that we need to survive throughout the day and night. Yeah, 
so it’s good for me. 
                                                   
16Barr and Blank (2009). 
17The survey respondents were asked to report how much they (and their spouse or partner) had in sav-
ings. The reported savings could include any money or savings kept at home or elsewhere, such as money in a 
savings account, money market fund, credit union, pension fund, stocks or bonds, or certificates of deposit. The 
calculation shown in the table includes those with zero savings, so for those with any savings, the amount could 
be substantially higher. 
18At enrollment, a majority of the participants (80.9 percent) were in one-parent families.  
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. . . I didn’t know how to save money like — because I needed it, because I 
was only getting a little bit a month, and now my whole family is incorpo-
rated into the program, so it’s like helping me out more so I’m able to leave it 
and not touch the money, and I’m able to still take care of daily things, like 
some of the stuff that I get — the finances. 
 The same respondent also reflected on the way these savings eased her financial strain:  
As far as mentally, like I feel more secure knowing that if an emergency 
happens I’m able to do something because I know I have the funds to do it. 
So it’s given me some self-esteem on that part.  
Findings related to debt are also presented in Table 5.3. At the start of the program, it 
was unclear whether Family Rewards would encourage participating families to manage their 
finances better — and to clear their debt, for example — or whether it would encourage them to 
incur additional debt. To explore this potential effect, survey respondents were asked to report 
whether they had accumulated any debt and, if they had, the amount they owed.19
Table 5.3 also presents estimates of the program’s impacts on the extent to which fami-
lies were repaying different types of debt. As discussed in Chapter 4, the in-depth interviews 
with program participants revealed that some were able to use their cash rewards for such 
purposes. Respondents to the 18-month survey were asked whether they were currently paying 
back any loans and, if so, which types of loans they were paying. The most noteworthy effects 
pertain to credit card or store bills: 16.2 percent of the program group members said they were 
 As shown, 
16.2 percent of the program group families reported having no debt at the time of the survey 
interview, compared with 19.2 percent of the control group, a statistically significant 3.1 
percentage point reduction in the proportion reporting no debt. In terms of the average amount 
of debt, both groups reported relatively high amounts of family debt, but the difference is not 
statistically significant ($7,062 for the program group versus $6,399 for the control group). This 
calculation of average debt excludes extremely high levels of debt (over $100,000) that some 
respondents reported. The survey did not ask respondents to break down their overall debt 
amount by broad categories (for example, student loans, medical bills, and credit card bills), so 
it is unclear from these data what might be driving these relatively high levels of debt among 
Family Rewards sample members. However, looking at the types of loans being repaid (also 
discussed below), it appears that those who were reporting higher levels of debt (over $5,000) 
were repaying multiple types of loans or bills, including credit card payments, student loans, or 
medical bills.  
                                                   
19The survey questions on savings and debt are largely framed around family finances, and it is most likely 
that participants are reporting debt that was accumulated by the family rather than simply the respondents’ 
personal debt. 
134 
paying off such bills, compared with 12.1 percent of the control group, a statistically significant 
increase of 4.1 percentage points. 
Material Hardship 
Many welfare-to-work and other types of employment programs for low-income popula-
tions have been premised on the expectation that work will increase families’ income over the 
longer term and, ultimately, reduce their material hardship. However, many rigorous evaluations 
of programs that have had positive effects on work and earnings have not found them to have 
much effect on commonly used hardship indicators. In mandatory welfare-to-work programs 
tested in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, earnings gains were substantially offset by losses in 
other transfer benefits, such as welfare, with little effect on poverty or, consequently, material 
hardship. However, most programs that have included special financial work incentives that did 
reduce poverty have been found to show some short-term effects on various dimensions of 
material hardship.20
Researchers use various indicators to measure material hardship.
 This section examines whether there is any evidence that the Family Re-
wards program, in the short run, is beginning to affect families’ overall material well-being.  
21 Unfortunately, a 
common definition of this concept does not exist, nor is there a standard approach to its mea-
surement.22
                                                   
20The studies referenced here do not always use the same items to measure material hardship, making 
comparisons somewhat complicated. However, relying on the measures used, these studies suggest somewhat 
mixed effects in this domain, with some demonstrating positive impacts for selected samples and others 
demonstrating short-term reductions that were not sustained beyond the program. For example, the Minnesota 
Family Investment Program (MFIP), which aimed at encouraging work and reducing poverty by allowing 
parents to keep more of their public assistance benefits, increased income, reduced poverty, and reduced 
financial strain and material hardship for single-parent applicants, but showed few similar effects for two-
parent applicant families (see Miller et al., 2000). In New Hope, a demonstration project in Milwaukee that 
provided full-time workers with an earnings supplement to raise their income above the poverty threshold, 
program group members were less stressed, reported fewer worries, and experienced less material hardship 
(particularly that associated with lack of health insurance and unmet medical or dental needs). These short-term 
effects did not last beyond the three years that New Hope operated (see Bos et al., 1999, and Huston et al., 
2003). The Self-Sufficiency Project, which tested the effectiveness of making work pay for Canada’s Income 
Assistance recipients, helped working-poor families meet their basic needs. At the 18-month point, it increased 
income and increased spending on three basic necessities: food, children’s clothing, and housing. The percen-
tage of families using food banks was also reduced. Families also appeared to be saving some of their addition-
al income. By 36 months, members of the program group were spending $49 more per month than were 
members of the control group on food, clothing, rent, and child care. See Lin et al. (1998) and Michalopoulos 
et al. (2000). 
 Some people experience primarily one kind of hardship, but others may experience 
multiple and varied kinds of hardships. As a result, most efforts to measure material hardships 
21Material hardship scales were pioneered by Mayer and Jencks (1989). 
22Ouellette, Burstein, Long, and Beecroft (2004).  
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include measures that capture dimensions of need across domains such as food adequacy, 
shelter, financial strain, and the like.  
The present study includes the following measures:  
1. A multi-item material hardship index, based on responses to five commonly 
asked questions that assess whether families have experienced the following 
difficulties with housing or utilities in the past 12 months: not paid full rent or 
made a full mortgage payment, evicted for not paying rent or mortgage, unable 
to pay full utility bill, been without utilities, or had phone service disconnected.  
2. A mean score on a financial strain scale, ranging from 4 to 16, with a lower 
score indicating greater perceptions of financial strain. The scale includes 
such items as “My financial situation is better than it’s been in a long time” 
and “I worry about having enough money in the future.” 
3. An overall financial well-being measure that is assessed by asking respon-
dents how their family finances usually work out at the end of the month, 
whether they have some money left over, just enough to make ends meet, or 
not enough money to make ends meet. 
4. A common self-reported measure of food insufficiency to assess the adequa-
cy of food for the family.23
5. Measures of whether families ever had to forgo medical care or medicine be-
cause of costs.  
 
The findings under the first panel of Table 5.4 show that on the housing-and-utilities 
hardship indicator, Family Rewards had little effect on the summary measure (“Any hous-
ing/utilities material hardship in the past 12 months”). However, it did cause small but statisti-
cally significant reductions in particular types of hardships in this domain, such as being 
evicted for not paying rent or making mortgage payments or having utilities turned off or 
phone service disconnected.  
Results for an indicator of financial strain also reveal positive effects. For example, the 
program group was more likely to be able to “make ends meet” with the resources they had 
available (third panel in Table 5.4). Roughly 34 percent of the program group reported that 
they did not have enough to make ends meet at the end of the month, compared with 41.8
                                                   
23The food sufficiency question has been used in United States Department of Agriculture surveys since 
the mid-1970s to measure food deprivation, and has been validated against other measures of hunger and 
nutritional adequacy (Rose and Oliveira, 1997). 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Any housing/utilities material hardship in the 
past 12 months (%) 55.1 57.3 -2.2 0.316
Did not pay full rent or mortgage 39.0 41.5 -2.5 0.245
Was evicted from home for not paying rent or mortgage 2.7 4.3 -1.6 ** 0.043
Did not pay full utility billa 29.3 28.2 1.1 0.571
Utility was turned off a 5.6 8.7 -3.1 *** 0.007
Phone service was disconnectedb 20.0 25.4 -5.4 *** 0.003
Financial well-beingc (4 = low; 16 = high) 9.2 8.7 0.5 *** 0.000
Strongly or somewhat agree with the following (%)
Financial situation is better than last year 62.7 44.5 18.3 *** 0.000
Don't worry about having enough money in future 19.0 20.3 -1.4 0.443
Can generally afford to buy needed things 69.7 63.7 6.0 *** 0.004
Sometimes have enough money to buy something or go 
somewhere just for fun 29.2 27.3 1.9 0.353
Family finances usually work out to have the following at end  
of month (%)
Some money left over 12.3 12.2 0.1 0.941
Just enough to make ends meet 53.7 46.0 7.6 *** 0.001
Not enough to make ends meet 34.1 41.8 -7.8 *** 0.000
Food securityd (1 = low; 4 = high) 3.4 3.2 0.2 *** 0.000
Insufficient foode (%) 14.8 22.1 -7.3 *** 0.000
Did not get needed medical care because of cost in
past 12 monthsf (%) 6.5 10.4 -3.9 *** 0.000
Did not fill prescription because of cost in past 12 months (%) 13.6 15.8 -2.1 * 0.096
Sample size (total = 2,060) 1,051 1,009
(continued)
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Table 5.4
Impacts on Material Hardship and Financial Strain
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: The items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,060) of the 
survey respondents.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differnces.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
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percent of the control group, a statistically significant reduction of 7.8 percentage points on this 
measure of hardship.  
The program also reduced food insufficiency, which is measured with a question that 
asks respondents to describe the food they and their families have eaten in the prior month: (1) 
often not enough to eat, (2) sometimes not enough to eat, (3) enough to eat, but not always the 
kinds of food desired, and (4) enough to eat of the kinds of food desired. Overall scores close to 
1 indicate families often do not have enough to eat. Values close to 4 indicate families have 
enough of the kinds of food desired. Households reporting that they sometimes or often do not 
get enough to eat are termed “food-insufficient.” The average food sufficiency score for the 
program group was 3.4, compared with 3.2 for the control group, a 0.2 percentage point 
difference (or a gain of 6 percent) that is statistically significant. Program group members were 
less likely than the control group members to report food insufficiency — in other words, report 
that they sometimes or often did not get enough to eat (14.8 percent versus 22.1 percent, 
respectively, a statistically significant drop of 7.3 percentage points).  
Also reflecting hardship, the survey asked respondents whether they were unable to get 
needed medical care because of costs in the prior year, and whether they were unable to fill 
prescriptions for the same reason. Although only 10 percent to 16 percent of control group 
members indicated that they had incurred these hardships, the rates for the program group were 
even lower as a result of Family Rewards.  
Assessing respondents’ circumstances more broadly, the survey contained questions 
that asked them to compare their current financial situation with what it had been a year before, 
and the impact of Family Rewards on this measure was large. Close to 63 percent of the 
program group reported that their current financial situation was better than it had been the year 
before, compared with 44.5 percent of the control group, a statistically significant increase of 
18.3 percentage points. Observations from the in-depth qualitative interviews with parents 
support this finding. For example, many participants in those interviews said that they used 
some or all of the rewards to meet immediate needs, such as paying for groceries, rent, and 
utilities. As one participant noted: 
Table 5.4 (continued)
aUtilities include gas, oil, and electricity.
bThis includes cellular or land service.
cComponents of the financial well-being scale have been coded such that a lower score implies being 
worse-off and a higher score implies being better-off. The scale is calculated by summing responses to the 
four component questions. Thus, the financial well-being scale presented here ranges from 4 to 16 points.
dThe food security question describes food eaten by the family in the prior month: 1 = Often not enough 
to eat; 2 = Sometimes not enough to eat; 3 = Enough to eat but not always the kinds of food desired; 4 = 
Enough to eat of the kinds of food desired.
eInsufficient food is defined as "sometimes" or "often times" not having enough food to eat.
fThis excludes prescriptions.
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That little $40 put my lights back on. The payments that I get, I’m com-
fortable [with], ’cause it helps me put food on my table instead of me 
pawning my jewelry every month —’cause I do that.  
Overall, the pattern of findings across the range of measures in this section provides 
strong evidence that Family Rewards has, during its initial period of operations, begun to 
improve families’ financial security and material well-being.  
Housing Stability 
Some participants in the in-depth interviews discussed the strides they made in improv-
ing their housing circumstances. One participant used the payments to move to a bigger apart-
ment, and another was able to pay off debt that was preventing her from getting credit to 
purchase a house. The 18-month survey provides broader evidence on the topic of housing, 
focusing particularly on housing status and residential stability (that is, whether people stay in or 
move from their neighborhood of origin). The Family Rewards sample members, who live in 
high-poverty neighborhoods, may be vulnerable to housing instability and residential turmoil, 
which, in turn, may have consequences for child and family well-being. Some studies report an 
association between high mobility and poor school outcomes for children in low-income 
families.24
Respondents were asked to report on their housing status — whether they owned a 
home or rented, or received some form of housing assistance (Section 8, public housing, or 
other form of housing subsidy). They were also asked whether they had moved since random 
assignment and, if they had, to describe the reasons they moved. Residential mobility is high 
among low-income populations, and families move for a variety of reasons, including a desire 
for safety, a better neighborhood, a bigger place, and proximity to good schools and jobs, or 
because they are unable to pay the rent at their current residence.  
  
Table 5.5 shows that program group respondents were less likely to report that they had 
moved during the 18 months since random assignment. Although this is not a long period over 
which to be assessing residential stability, it is noteworthy that the proportion of program group 
members who moved (10.7 percent) was about 4 percentage points lower than the mobility rate 
for the control group (14.9 percent). More analysis is necessary to understand how Family 
Rewards affects housing stability and the reasons families moved during the study period. This 
issue will be addressed in future reports.  
                                                   
24Simpson and Fowler (1994); Crowley (2003); Burkam, Lee, and Dwyer (2009). 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Housing statusa
Current housing arrangement
Owns home or apartment 4.3 4.8 -0.5 0.557
Rents home or apartment 90.1 89.0 1.0 0.432
Lives with family or friends and contributes to rent 3.2 3.0 0.2 0.787
Lives with family or friends and does not contribute to rent 1.3 1.4 -0.1 0.806
Other 1.1 1.7 -0.6 0.239
Currently lives in public or subsidized housing 69.8 72.6 -2.7 0.142
Currently lives in New York City 99.3 98.7 0.6 0.187
Moved since time of random assignment 10.7 14.9 -4.3 *** 0.004
Family composition
Current marital status
Single, never married 45.5 50.1 -4.6 *** 0.004
Married and living with spouse 19.0 15.6 3.5 *** 0.000
Separated or living apart from spouse 16.6 17.9 -1.3 0.353
Divorced 15.2 12.3 2.9 ** 0.017
Widowed 3.7 4.2 -0.6 0.409
Living with partner 10.6 9.2 1.5 0.175
Number of childrenb
0 2.7 3.7 -1.0 0.108
1 24.5 25.2 -0.7 0.649
2 32.4 33.5 -1.1 0.537
3 or more 40.4 37.7 2.8 0.105
Had or fathered a child since random assignment 6.9 6.2 0.7 0.448
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 5.5
Impacts on Housing and Family Composition
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups 
arose by chance.
aThe items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,060) of the 
survey respondents.
bThis measure only includes children 18 years of age or younger.
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Marriage and Family Composition 
The data in Table 5.5 suggest that Family Rewards may have had small effects on fami-
ly composition, including marital status. According to the 18-month survey, 19 percent of the 
program group was married at the time of the interview, compared with 15.6 percent of the 
control group, a statistically significant increase of 3.5 percentage points. Yet, program group 
members were also more likely to report that they were divorced (15.2 percent versus 12.3 
percent, a statistically significant increase of 2.9 percentage points). What might explain these 
program effects?  
A few insights are suggested by data from interviews with some NPO staff. They com-
mented that some participants were making a rational economic choice to marry people whom 
they had already been living with or coparenting with, given the financial advantages of having 
two adults enrolled in the program.25
It is also possible (although only speculative) that the increased financial stability that 
some participants experienced (as reflected in self-reported savings, income, and earnings) led 
them to feel better positioned to divorce. It should be underscored that the overall effects on 
marriage and divorce are small, and the mechanisms through which this program might have 
influenced those results are not understood. The evaluation’s longer-term data will show 
whether these effects are sustained over time and, if possible, what factors may be contribut-
ing to them.
 One NPO staff person said she had explained how to 
formalize a domestic partnership to a number of participants who asked about it. This suggests 
that at least for some participants, Family Rewards was a factor of consideration as they thought 
about their marital status. The same staff member said that she had also attended one partici-
pant’s wedding and that the participant was getting married in part because she was trying to 
protect the financial stability she had achieved over the prior two years, to which the program 
had contributed. Perhaps the extra resources that were earned through the program gave them a 
sense of greater financial stability that might have influenced their decision to marry. 
26
                                                   
25The second adult could enroll only if he or she were married to or in a legal domestic partnership with 
the main program applicant. However, the second adult is not included in the research sample if enrolled after 
random assignment.  
  
26Other studies have explored the relationship between marital status and programs that offer income sup-
ports. Michalopoulos et al. (2000) report that Canada’s Self-Sufficiency Project, which offered an income 
supplement, had no effect on marriage in the three years of follow-up. Investigating the effects of the Minneso-
ta Family Investment Program on marriage and divorce among the program’s nearly 2,500 welfare recipients 
and applicants who were married or cohabiting at study entry, Gennetian (2003) reports that for two-parent 
recipient families who were married at study entry, MFIP increased marital stability by decreasing divorce. 
Among cohabiting couples, the cumulative rate of ever marrying during the seven-year follow-up period was 
similar for the MFIP and control groups. MFIP had no cumulative effect on divorce during the follow-up 
(continued) 
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Table 5.5 also shows that Family Rewards did not have effects on other measured as-
pects of family composition. For example, there were no effects on cohabitation or childbearing.  
Effects for Key Subgroups 
Because overall impacts can mask program effects for some groups of study partic-
ipants, the income and material well-being impacts of Family Rewards are analyzed for two 
subgroups defined by baseline measures of education and employment. These two sub-
groups were pre-selected, based on the literature demonstrating that quality-of-life and 
indicators of well-being vary greatly across groups defined by socioeconomic characteris-
tics.27
To examine program impacts for these subgroups, the effects of Family Rewards 
were analyzed separately for parents who had less than a high school diploma or GED 
certificate at the time of random assignment, and for those with at least a high school 
diploma or GED certificate. Similarly, program impacts were examined separately for 
parents who were employed at the time of random assignment and for those who were not 
employed. In general, impacts are expected to vary to some extent across subgroups, simply 
as a result of natural variation around the average impact for the full sample. This section 
examines whether that variation in impacts across subgroups is statistically significant, or 
 In addition, it might be expected that the more “advantaged” participants — those 
who are employed or those with higher levels of education at study entry — may be more 
likely to respond to the Family Rewards incentives and thus experience greater short-term 
improvements in income, poverty, and material hardship. Descriptive analysis of the top 
and bottom 10 percent of reward earners (shown earlier in Table 4.4) also reveals signifi-
cant variations across these groups in terms of their baseline education and employment 
characteristics. Among other distinguishing characteristics, the top-earning families were 
more likely to have been employed at baseline and to earn a high school diploma or a 
General Educational Development (GED) certificate.  
                                                   
period among two-parent families who were new welfare applicants, but it did somewhat increase the 
incidence of divorce late in the follow-up period. This and other research will be considered to better under-
stand the impact of Family Rewards on marriage. 
27In addition to education and employment, variation in impacts was examined across a range of dimen-
sions including race/ethnicity, housing status, and poverty status at random assignment. These explorations 
suggest no noteworthy effects.  
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beyond what would be expected to occur naturally. For this reason, the focus is not on 
whether a given impact for the less educated subgroup is statistically significant, for 
example, but whether the difference between that impact and the impact for the more 
educated subgroup is statistically significant (which is indicated by daggers in the rightmost 
column of the tables). If the difference between these two impacts is not statistically 
significant, the results suggest that the effects observed for the full sample generally hold 
across both more and less educated individuals.  
Table 5.6 presents the results for subgroups defined by parent’s educational status at 
random assignment. It shows that the program’s positive impacts on income and financial 
well-being were largely comparable for both subgroups. On most measures, the small 
differences in impacts across the subgroups were not statistically significant. Although there 
are some exceptions to this pattern on the housing-and-utilities hardship measures, the 
overall pattern points to no meaningful variation in effects in this domain by parent’s 
education level.  
A similar analysis was conducted comparing subgroups defined by parent’s em-
ployment status at the time of random assignment. The results shown in Appendix Table 
E.1 suggest the same conclusion: Family Rewards had similar effects on the income and 
financial well-being measures whether or not the parent was working upon entry into the 
study. 
Next, the analysis examines the variation of program impacts on marital status and 
housing status across subgroups. The data in Table 5.7 (see page 146) reveal that the 
positive estimated effects of Family Rewards on marital status are concentrated primarily 
among parents who have more education (those who have at least a high school diploma or 
GED certificate). The reduction in residential mobility caused by the program is also 
similarly concentrated in that better-educated subgroup. In contrast, there are no noteworthy 
differences in these measures by the parent’s employment status at the time of random 
assignment (see Appendix Table E.2).  
Finally, program impacts on TANF and food stamp receipt for both the parent’s 
employment subgroup and the parent’s education subgroup were also considered. As shown 
in Appendix Table E.3, the results indicate that Family Rewards had virtually no impact on 
these outcomes, regardless of a parent’s education or employment status.  
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value   Sig.
High school diploma/GED certificate at random assignment
Income
Average total household income in prior month
excluding Family Rewards paymentsa ($) 1,824 1,795 29 0.673  
Average total household income in prior month
including Family Rewards paymentsb,c ($) 2,122 1,799 323 *** 0.000  
Percentage of families with household income at or below
the federal poverty levelb,c 50.5 60.2 -9.7 *** 0.001  
Total household income in prior year as a percentage
of the federal poverty levelb,c (%)
Less than 50% 10.3 22.6 -12.3 *** 0.000  
50% - 100% 40.3 37.6 2.7 0.371  
101% - 129% 15.1 14.1 1.1 0.628  
130% or more 34.3 25.8 8.6 *** 0.001  
Family savings and debt ($)
Average savingsd 720 470 249 * 0.060  
Average debte 8,964 7,764 1,201 0.112  
Material hardship and financial strain 
Any housing/utilities material hardship in past 12 months (%) 53.6 59.3 -5.7 ** 0.045 ††
Did not pay full rent or mortgage 39.1 44.2 -5.1 * 0.075  
Evicted from home for not paying rent or mortgage 1.7 2.8 -1.2 0.183  
Did not pay full utility billf 28.7 32.6 -4.0 0.137 †††
Utility was turned offf 4.3 7.3 -3.0 ** 0.026  
Phone service was disconnectedg 21.8 25.6 -3.8 0.127  
Financial well-beingh (4 = low; 16 = high) 9.2 8.6 0.6 *** 0.000  
Strongly or somewhat agree with the following (%)
Financial situation is better than last year 63.4 46.1 17.3 *** 0.000  
Don't worry about having enough money in future 18.3 19.2 -0.9 0.700  
Can generally afford to buy needed things 70.0 64.4 5.6 ** 0.038  
Sometimes have enough money to buy something or go 
somewhere just for fun 28.7 26.6 2.1 0.422  
Family finances usually work out to have the following  
at end of month (%)
Some money left over 14.0 12.0 2.1 0.294  
Just enough to make ends meet 55.7 50.1 5.7 ** 0.050  
Not enough to make ends meet 30.2 38.0 -7.8 *** 0.004  
Food securityi (1 = low; 4 = high) 3.4 3.3 0.1 ** 0.011  
Insufficient foodj (%) 12.6 19.9 -7.3 *** 0.001  
Sample size (total = 1,820) 922 898
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 5.6
at the Time of Random Assignment
Impacts on Income and Material Well-Being, by Parent’s Education Level
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value   Sig.
No high school diploma/GED certificate at random assignment
Income
Average total household income in prior month
excluding Family Rewards paymentsa ($) 1,353 1,272 81 0.230  
Average total household income in prior month
including Family Rewards paymentsb,c ($) 1,614 1,270 344 *** 0.000  
Percentage of families with household income at or below
the federal poverty levelb,c 72.3 83.6 -11.3 *** 0.000  
Total household income in prior year as a percentage
of the federal poverty levelb,c (%)
Less than 50% 26.3 39.6 -13.3 *** 0.000  
50% - 100% 46.1 44.0 2.1 0.597  
101% - 129% 13.5 8.5 5.0 ** 0.040  
130% or more 14.2 7.9 6.3 *** 0.007  
Family savings and debt 9$)
Average savingsd 299 201 98 0.336  
Average debte 4,293 4,692 -399 0.534  
Material hardship and financial strain
Any housing/utilities material hardship in past 12 months (%) 57.7 54.5 3.2 0.356 ††
Did not pay full rent or mortgage 39.3 38.5 0.7 0.836  
Evicted from home for not paying rent or mortgage 3.8 6.6 -2.8 * 0.071  
Did not pay full utility billf 31.2 21.6 9.6 *** 0.002 †††
Utility was turned offf 7.6 9.9 -2.3 0.245  
Phone service was disconnectedg 17.2 26.2 -9.0 *** 0.002  
Financial well-beingh (4 = low; 16 = high) 9.2 8.8 0.3 ** 0.021  
Strongly or somewhat agree with the following (%)
Financial situation is better than last year 62.2 40.3 21.9 *** 0.000  
Don't worry about having enough money in future 19.1 22.8 -3.7 0.190  
Can generally afford to buy needed things 69.9 62.0 7.9 ** 0.020  
Sometimes enough money to buy something or go 
somewhere just for fun 28.4 28.4 0.0 1.000  
Family finances usually work out to have the following  
at end of month (%)
Some money left over 9.8 12.4 -2.6 0.250  
Just enough to make ends meet 50.9 40.3 10.6 *** 0.002  
Not enough to make ends meet 39.3 47.3 -8.0 ** 0.020  
Food securityi (1 = low; 4 = high) 3.4 3.2 0.2 *** 0.001  
Insufficient foodj (%) 17.7 24.7 -7.0 ** 0.016  
Sample size (total = 1,186) 610 576
(continued)
Table 5.6 (continued)
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Conclusion  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Family Rewards was launched as a bold new intervention to 
address the short-term and long-term poverty goals of low-income families. Achieving those 
goals meant that families had to take the necessary steps to earn rewards that are conditioned on 
a variety of activities designed to improve their human capital and overall well-being.  
The results presented in this chapter provide substantial evidence supporting the pro-
gram’s effectiveness in reducing short-term poverty and income-related hardships. In the short 
run, across a broad set of measures of income and hardship, Family Rewards produced signifi-
cant gains for participating households. It reduced the proportion of families who were living in 
Table 5.6 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: The items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,060) of the 
survey respondents.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences in impacts across subgroups were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
aMonthly household income amounts equal to or greater than $10,000 were excluded from this 
calculation.
bFamily Rewards payments are based on Seedco's Family Rewards data from program Year 2, which 
include activities completed in September 2008 through August 2009. The monthly Family Rewards payment 
amount is calculated by dividing the annual reward amount by 12. The payment data do not include bonus 
payments that some families received for opening new bank accounts.
cAnnual household income is calculated by multiplying by 12 income in the month prior to the survey 
interview. For program group members, it includes Family Rewards payments received during Year 1. The 
federal poverty level was created based on annual income (monthly income multiplied by 12) and the houshold 
size at the time of the survey.The poverty threshold was measured according to the 2008 or 2009 poverty 
guidelines, depending on when a respondent was interviewed.
dA total of 7 percent of the sample are excluded from this analysis due to missing data.
eDebt amounts equal to or greater than $100,000 were excluded from this calculation. The survey 
questions on savings and debt are largely framed around family finances; thus, it is most likely that participants 
are reporting debt accumulated by the family. A total of 9 percent of the sample are excluded from this analysis 
because of missing or out-of-range values.
fUtilities include gas, oil, and electricity.
gThis includes cellular or land service.
hComponents of the financial well-being scale have been coded such that a lower score implies being 
worse-off and a higher score implies being better-off. The scale is calculated by summing responses to the four 
component questions. Thus, the financial well-being scale presented here ranges from 4 to 16 points.
iThe food security question describes food eaten by the family in the prior month: 1 = Often not enough to 
eat; 2 = Sometimes not enough to eat; 3 = Enough to eat but not always the kinds of food desired; 4 = Enough 
to eat of the kinds of food desired.
jInsufficient food is defined as "sometimes" or "often times" not having enough food to eat.
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Subgroup
Program Control Difference Difference
Subgroup and Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value (Sig.)
High school diploma/GED certificate
at random assignment
Family composition
Current marital status
Single, never married 42.5 50.1 -7.6 *** 0.000 †
Married and living with spouse 21.2 16.9 4.3 *** 0.001  
Separated or living apart from spouse 16.0 17.8 -1.8 0.299  
Divorced 17.2 11.6 5.6 *** 0.001 ††
Widowed 3.1 3.6 -0.5 0.565  
Housing statusa
Currently lives in public or subsidized housing 65.6 68.8 -3.2 0.204  
Moved since time of random assignment 9.6 16.1 -6.5 *** 0.001 ††
Sample size (total = 1,820) 922 898
No high school diploma/GED certificate 
at random assignment
Family composition
Current marital status
Single, never married 49.7 51.1 -1.3 0.593 †
Married and living with spouse 15.7 13.2 2.5 * 0.091  
Separated or living apart from spouse 17.9 17.7 0.2 0.929  
Divorced 12.3 13.1 -0.8 0.674 ††
Widowed 4.4 5.0 -0.6 0.625  
Housing statusa
Currently lives in public or subsidized housing 76.3 77.8 -1.5 0.604  
Moved since time of random assignment 12.7 13.1 -0.4 0.874 ††
Sample size (total = 1,186) 610 576
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 5.7
Impacts on Family Composition and Housing Status, by Parent’s Education Level 
at the Time of Random Assignment
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Differences in impacts across subgroups were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
aThe items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,060) of survey 
respondents.
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poverty, including severe poverty. It increased the proportion of individuals with bank accounts 
and families’ average savings. It reduced the proportion of families who were suffering from 
food insufficiency or financial strain, or reporting different types of housing-related material 
hardships. And it produced small reductions in residential mobility and small increases in 
marriage as well as divorce.  
The next three chapters in this report examine the short-term effects of Family Re-
wards on program participants’ human capital development. Chapter 6 focuses on Family 
Rewards’ effects on children’s education; Chapter 7 examines the program’s impacts on 
family health care outcomes; and Chapter 8 explores the program’s effects on parents’ 
employment and training.  
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Chapter 6 
Education Rewards and Impacts 
The achievement gap between poor children and higher-income children has been well 
documented. As early as kindergarten, poor children score lower than other children on a range 
of achievement and school-readiness measures.1 These early disparities grow over time.2 By 
high school, for example, low-income students are nearly three times more likely than high-
income students to have repeated a grade and nearly six times more likely to drop out.3
Other countries’ conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs primarily offer rewards for 
school enrollment and attendance, and evaluations have documented positive effects on 
enrollment fairly consistently.
 In its 
effort to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty, Family Rewards seeks to increase chil-
dren’s school performance. This chapter presents initial evidence of the program’s effects on a 
range of schooling outcomes.  
4
Studies show that other CCT programs have not increased achievement, at least as 
measured by standardized tests, but neither do those programs offer rewards for it. A central 
question for the Family Rewards evaluation is whether incentives for achievement can, in fact, 
contribute to improved school performance. Of course, any effects on performance cannot be 
attributed definitively or solely to the education incentives, since the additional income that the 
program provides to families may influence children’s educational outcomes.
 Family Rewards has a much broader range of incentives tied to 
school-related behavior, including, in addition to attendance incentives, rewards for certain 
types of parental engagement, student performance on tests and other indicators of achieve-
ment, and even for getting a library card. The large rewards that are tied to achievement are 
particularly noteworthy.  
5
An equally important question is whether it is reasonable to expect effects on student 
performance within two years, the length of this report’s follow-up period for outcomes based 
 Any differences 
in performance must be attributed to the program as a whole — the extra income overall plus 
education-specific incentives. Nonetheless, the patterns of results may offer some insight into 
the possible influence of the education rewards. 
                                                   
1Lee and Burkham (2002). 
2Carneiro and Heckman (2003). 
3U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (2004). 
4Fiszbein and Schady (2009). 
5Dahl and Lochner (2008); Morris and Gennetian (2003). In addition, positive effects in the other do-
mains, such as improved health, can also lead to better school outcomes (Romero and Lee, 2008). See, also, the 
Family Rewards logic model in Chapter 1, Figure 1.1. 
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on school records. Effects on intermediate outcomes, such as parental engagement and chil-
dren’s school attendance, should be observable within the first two years, even with the pro-
gram’s rough start (see Chapter 3). But it may take more time for changes in student perfor-
mance and test scores to emerge, particularly since many families struggled to understand the 
program in the first year and did not fully engage with it until the second year. 
The findings indicate that Family Rewards led to small increases in elementary and 
middle school students’ participation in extracurricular activities and in the extent to which their 
parents were engaged with their schooling, but it had few effects on attendance or test scores. 
Among the older students, the program led to large and consistent gains in school progress for a 
subgroup of more academically prepared ninth-graders. For students in that subgroup, who may 
have been in a better position to take advantage of the incentives, the program increased 
attendance and school progression, namely promotion to the tenth grade and number of credits 
earned. These effects are encouraging and on a par with those found from other, more intensive, 
school-based interventions. Longer-term follow-up data, to be examined in future reports, will 
show whether positive effects for the younger students emerge over time, and whether the 
positive effects that were observed for the more proficient ninth-graders are sustained or grow 
even larger. 
The Education Rewards Offer 
The Family Rewards education incentives are intended to encourage both achievement 
and the effort that supports achievement. As such, the program rewards a variety of behaviors. 
The full list of education rewards is presented in Table 6.1 and is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 1. Although the program’s designers (Center for Economic Opportunity, MDRC, and 
Seedco) had little research evidence to guide them on the size of the reward necessary to change 
behavior in a given area, they followed at least three key principles in setting reward amounts. 
First, outcomes that are more difficult to achieve should receive greater rewards. Second, the 
rewards should be set large enough to appeal to families and encourage them to take steps to 
obtain them. For example, the rewards for achievement on tests are considerably larger than 
those for obtaining a library card or for high attendance in a given month. Third, the rewards for 
test scores should not be so large as to put undue pressure on children.  
Key differences between the rewards by age are that high school students can earn con-
siderably more than can younger students, and that some or all of the rewards that high school 
students earn are paid directly to them, rather than to their parents. These differences reflect the 
fact that attendance and performance problems tend to get worse as students age and that high 
school students have more control over their educational effort than do younger students.  
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Table 6.1 
Education Rewards 
School Activity Payment 
Attendance is 95% or higher 
  
 
$25 per month for elementary/middle school 
     students  
$50 for high school studentsa 
 
Scoring at proficiency level or improving 1 
level on ELA and math tests 
 
$300 for each test for elementary students  
$350 for each test for middle school students 
Passing Regents exams 
 
$600 for each test for high school students, up to 5 
testsb 
Earning 11 or more credits per year $600 for high school students per yeara 
Taking the  PSAT 
 
$50 per test, for taking the test up to 2 times 
(maximum of $100 per student)b 
Graduating from high school  $400 oncea 
Having a library card $50 once during the program (all grades)b 
Attending parent-teacher conferences  $25 per conference, twice per year 
Parent’s attending meetings with teachers to 
discuss annual ELA and math test results 
$25 once per year for elementary/middle school  
Students 
 
NOTES: aThe student directly receives 50 percent of this payment. 
bThe student directly receives 100 percent of this payment. 
 
By rewarding a variety of activities, the incentives schedule ensures that most families 
will receive at least some payments, even if they are not able to meet every benchmark. At the 
same time, the program can achieve its goal of immediate poverty reduction by transferring 
significant resources to low-income families. For example, a single parent with one middle 
school student and one high school student could earn more than $3,000 per year through the 
education rewards alone if she and her children met all or most of the benchmarks.  
 Data and Samples 
This chapter uses data from several sources. First, administrative payment data from the 
program provide information on the receipt of rewards during the first two years of program 
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operation. These records provide data on the number and type of rewards earned, as well as the 
total amount earned by families and students. 
Data on key education outcomes are obtained from administrative records provided by 
the New York City Department of Education (DOE). These data are available for all students in 
the study for one year prior to study entry, or school year 2006-2007, and for two years after 
study entry, or school years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009. School outcomes that are available from 
the DOE records include attendance rates, scores on annual math and English language arts 
(ELA) tests, performance on Regents exams, course credits earned, and school enrollment 
status. These data are available for the full sample of students. Although these data do not 
provide information for students attending parochial schools, private schools, or schools outside 
of New York City, survey data shown later indicate that few students in the sample attended 
these other types of schools.  
The various DOE data sources for students are linked together by a student ID, which is 
unique to each student within the New York City public school system. This ID was used to 
match the relevant DOE data to the Family Rewards students in the target grades. Because these 
students were identified and recruited using DOE data, their student IDs were known at study 
entry. However, parents were not required to provide a student ID when enrolling a child into 
the study, since few would have known it. For this reason, student IDs for siblings of the target 
children were obtained by matching their names, dates of birth, and other information to similar 
information on DOE records. Using this matching process, MDRC was able to obtain student 
IDs for more than 90 percent of students in the Family Rewards study. 
Finally, a survey was administered approximately 18 months after study entry to a ran-
dom subset of parents with children in the target grades, or grades four, seven, and nine.6
The analysis of education outcomes is conducted for three groups of students, based on 
the grade at which they entered the study: elementary school (kindergarten through fifth grade), 
middle school (sixth through eighth grades), and high school (ninth through twelfth grades). 
 The 
survey provides information on what might be thought of as the more intermediate outcomes, 
such as parental effort (parents’ interaction with their children and their children’s teachers), 
children’s engagement in extracurricular activities, and parents’ ratings of their children’s 
school performance. The survey data are an important complement to the records data, offering 
a look into whether and how the incentives may have changed parents’ and children’s behavior, 
the key input into better school outcomes. One caveat to the survey is that all outcomes are 
reported by the parents. (A small survey of older students is scheduled for 2010.) 
                                                   
6Although the majority of respondents were interviewed between 17 and 19 months after random assign-
ment, some were interviewed as early as month 16 or as late as month 24. 
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There are several reasons to expect that the program might have distinct effects across groups. 
First, the groups are very different developmentally, suggesting that their ability to respond to 
the offer, as well as the processes by which they respond may be different. Second, among low-
income and disadvantaged students, school performance, in terms of attendance and test scores, 
tends to fall as students age, suggesting on the one hand that high school students have more 
room for improvement in outcomes than do younger students, but on the other hand that 
changes might be harder to achieve among high school students. Finally, and partly in response 
to these patterns in performance, the three groups faced a different incentives structure, in which 
high school students were eligible for much larger rewards and directly received at least part of 
any rewards earned.  
The students in the study are spread throughout the grade distribution, from kindergar-
ten through twelfth grade. However, as shown in Table 6.2, the sample is heavily weighted 
toward the three target grades. For example, seventh-graders make up 65 percent of the middle 
school group. For this reason, and because the target grades represent key transition periods for 
children and adolescents, effects are also presented for target grades separately.7
All impacts are estimated controlling for a range of background characteristics, such as 
the student’s race/ethnicity, school district, sex, and prior year test scores, and parents’ educa-
tion level, marital status, and employment status.
  
8
A Brief Portrait of the Students and Their Schools  
 Finally, as noted in earlier chapters, impacts 
are examined for multiple outcomes within each area — parental engagement, student atten-
dance, student performance, and so on. Given that the likelihood of finding “false positives” 
increases as the number of outcomes increases, caution should be used when interpreting 
impacts that do not appear to be part of a larger pattern of impacts within a given area. 
Students in the Family Rewards sample are spread across 900 schools in New York 
City. To help provide a context for the impact analysis in this chapter, Table 6.3 presents 
selected characteristics of these schools and the more than 1,600 schools citywide for the 2006-
2007 school year. Data are available for 818 of the schools attended by students in the Family 
Rewards study: 341 elementary schools, 189 middle schools, and 288 high schools.9
                                                   
7Fourth-graders, for example, are beginning to apply their newly developed reading skills to acquire con-
tent knowledge. Without making that leap well, future schoolwork becomes more difficult. Children who fall 
seriously behind in educational performance by the third or fourth grade tend to have difficulty catching up 
later (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, 2006). 
 The first 
8An ordinary least squares regression model was used to control for these characteristics. Standard errors 
take into account clustering at the family level. 
9School characteristics data are not available for Opportunity NYC schools in District 75 (schools serving 
students with disabilities), District 79 (transfer/alternative schools), and District 84 (charter schools).  
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three columns present data for the schools after they were ranked according to measures of 
student performance — proficiency rates in ELA and math for elementary and middle schools 
and pass rates for the English and math Regents exams for high schools. The final two columns 
present averages for the schools attended by students in the study and all city schools. 
On average, the schools attended by the Family Rewards sample are somewhat lower 
performing than schools citywide, particularly for elementary and middle schools. For example, 
only 49.1 percent of elementary school students in the schools attended by the study sample 
were proficient in ELA, compared with 56.9 percent citywide. Despite these lower test scores, 
however, the study schools receive fairly similar progress report scores.10
                                                   
10The DOE calculates these scores based on ratings in three areas: school environment, student perfor-
mance, and student progress. The overall scores are then used to assign a letter grade to each school. Elementa-
ry and middle schools with scores of 68 or higher, for example, receive a letter grade of A. 
 The schools attended 
by high school students in the sample, in contrast, are fairly similar to schools citywide.  
Grade Number Percentage
Elementary school
Kindergarten 270 7.3
1 364 9.9
2 446 12.1
3 427 11.6
4 (target grade) 1,726 46.7
5 459 12.4
Total 3,692 100
Middle school
6 474 18.4
7 (target grade) 1,671 64.7
8 436 16.9
Total 2,581 100
High school
9 (target grade) 1,979 64.3
10 537 17.5
11 297 9.7
12 264 8.6
Total 3,077 100
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 6.2
Students in the Sample, by Grade Level
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Bottom Middle Top
School Level and Outcome Third Third Third All
Elementary schools (N = 341)
Percentage of students proficient on ELA test 35.4 45.1 66.1 49.1 56.9
Percentage of students proficient on math test 55.1 68.4 83.5 69.1 75.6
School attendance rate (%) 90.1 91.1 93.0 91.4 92.5
Total number of students enrolled 562 615 618 591 566
Overall score on school progress report (0 to 100 scale) 45 53 57 52 53
Middle schools (N = 189)
Percentage of students proficient on ELA test 22.7 35.6 60.9 39.9 43.8
Percentage of students proficient on math test 28.8 45.3 70.3 48.3 53.1
School attendance rate (%) 87.9 90.3 93.3 90.5 91.4
Total number of students enrolled 521 511 591 541 586
Overall score on school progress report (0 to 100 scale) 49 56 59 55 55
High schools (N = 288)
Graduation rate 52.8 59.0 74.5 61.4 59.1
Percentage of students who passed English Regents exams 65.9 80.0 93.3 79.7 79.8
Percentage of students who passed math Regents exams 66.8 77.0 89.7 77.9 78.5
School attendance rate (%) 79.9 83.4 88.6 84.2 84.8
Total number of students enrolled 805 788 1,072 829 796
Overall score on school progress report (0 to 100 scale) 42 54 62 53 54
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 6.3
Selected Characteristics of Schools Attended by Study Sample and of 
All New York City Public Schools
Schools Attended by Study Samplea All NYC 
Public 
Schools
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Report Card Database and New York 
City School Progress Reports from the 2006-2007 school year.
NOTES: Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
In New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed "proficient."
aSample sizes vary due to missing data on certain outcomes. Two measures that are missing for relatively 
large number of schools are the graduation rate and the progress report score; both are missing for 30 percent 
of the high schools. The schools are divided into thirds based on the average percentage scoring at a level of 3 
or higher on a 4-point scale on ELA and math for elementary and middle schools and on the average 
percentage who passed English and math Regents exams for high schools. 
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The first three columns illustrate that, although the schools attended by the Family Re-
wards sample are similar to or a bit lower performing, on average, than all schools, there is 
considerable diversity around these averages. In the bottom third of elementary schools attended 
by sample members, for example, only 55 percent of students scored at the proficient level or 
higher on the math test, compared with 84 percent of students in the top third of schools. The 
higher performing schools also tend to be a bit larger, and there is only a small difference in 
attendance rates. Differences in attendance rates across schools become more pronounced for 
older students. At the high school level, for example, the bottom third of high schools attended 
by sample members have an average attendance rate of 79.9 percent, compared with 88.6 
percent for schools in the top third.  
The data show that a fair number of students in the Family Rewards sample attend quite 
low-performing schools, where most students either do not achieve proficiency on standardized 
tests or do not graduate. At the same time, a fair number of students attend schools with high-
performing peers. This difference in context is important to keep in mind and may influence the 
way in which the Family Rewards program affects students. A later section addresses this issue 
by examining effects for subgroups of students.  
To help illustrate the benchmarks against which the effectiveness of Family Rewards 
will be assessed, Figure 6.1 presents data on average attendance and test scores (performance) 
for the students in the Family Rewards control group, regardless of the schools they attend. The 
top bar chart shows attendance data for students in the three target grades who were in the 
control group. Their attendance rates during the first year after random assignment represent the 
counterfactual, or what would have happened to the program students in the absence of Family 
Rewards. The data show the familiar pattern found for low-income students of declining 
attendance rates as students age. For example, more than 40 percent of fourth-graders and 
seventh-graders had attendance rates of 95 percent or higher, and another 27 percent or so had 
attendance rates of 90 percent to 94 percent. Average attendance rates for these two groups are 
about 91 percent. In contrast, only about 32 percent of ninth-graders had high attendance, and a 
very large fraction of those students (about 27 percent) attended for less than 80 percent of the 
time. Overall, the data show that there is ample room for improvement in attendance rates, 
particularly among high school students. There is also some, although less, room for improve-
ment among the younger students.11
                                                   
11Partly because of the fairly high average attendance rates for elementary and middle school students, 
rewards for attendance were dropped for these age groups for the third year of the program.  
 Approximately 30 percent of elementary and middle school
  
  
   
  
 
 
First-Year School Attendance Levels and Proficiency Rates for Students in the  
Control Group, by Grade Level
Figure 6.1
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students and almost half of high school students attended for less than 90 percent of the time, 
which some have defined as chronic absence.12
The bottom bar chart in Figure 6.1 shows the percent of fourth- and seventh-grade stu-
dents in the study who scored at the proficient level or higher on the ELA and math tests and, 
for ninth-graders, the percent who passed at least one Regents exam. As noted in Chapter 1, 
students in New York State must pass Regents exams in five core subjects as a requirement for 
graduation. As with the attendance data, the figure shows declining performance with grade 
level. For example, just over 70 percent of entering fourth-graders were deemed proficient in 
math in Year 1, compared with 60 percent of seventh-graders. Although students can take 
Regents exams at any point during high school, most students typically take at least one during 
their ninth-grade year. The figure shows that only about a third of ninth-graders in the control 
group passed at least one Regents exam during Year 1. Just over 60 percent of those students 
attempted at least one exam during the year, indicating a 55 percent pass rate (not shown). As 
with attendance, the ELA and math test scores and the Regents exam data show that there is 
substantial room for improvement, particularly for older students.  
 
Receipt of Education Rewards 
As shown in Chapter 5, nearly all families received at least one reward payment, and 
the average family received a substantial amount of money per year. Table 6.4 presents the 
receipt of the education rewards in more detail, for all students in the study. The first two panels 
focus on elementary and middle school students. Over 95 percent of these students earned at 
least one reward during Year 1, and the receipt of rewards was spread fairly widely across the 
various activities. Although the most common award received among elementary school 
students was for attendance (86 percent), nearly three-fourths (74 percent) also received a 
reward for achieving proficiency on at least one test. Similarly, the majority of students earned 
rewards for having a library card (65 percent) and having a parent attend a parent-teacher 
conference (67 percent).  
In terms of continued engagement, most students received attendance rewards fairly 
regularly. Among middle school students, for example, 57 percent of those who received an 
attendance reward did so in at least four activity periods (that is, 84.3 percent earned at least one 
attendance reward, and 47.7 percent of those students earned a reward in at least four activity 
periods). Comparing data for Year 1 and Year 2 also shows a pattern of continued engagement. 
Although fewer students received at least one education reward during Year 2, the total amount
                                                   
12Chang and Romero (2008). 
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Years 1 and 2 
School Level and Outcome Year 1 Year 2 Combined 
Elementary school students 
Student earned any education reward (%) 96.5 92.3 98.2
Total amount earneda ($) 494 553 1,005
Student earned at least 1 attendance reward (%) 86.1 76.9 91.2
Student earned an attendance reward ina (%)
1 activity period only 16.0 22.2
2-3 activity periods only 37.5 40.8
4-5 activity periods 46.5 37.0
Student earned reward forb (%)
English Language Arts (ELA) test 50.3 65.0 75.7
Math test 68.2 74.4 84.0
ELA or math test 73.8 81.8 90.6
Student earned reward for obtaining a library card (%) 64.9 8.2 73.0
Students whose parents earned a reward 
for attending a parent-teacher conference (%) 67.3 64.5 78.5
Sample size 1,889
Middle school students 
Student earned any education reward (%) 96.8 89.3 98.9
Total amount earneda ($) 614 688 1,222
Student earned at least 1 attendance reward (%) 84.3 71.0 88.8
Student earned an attendance reward ina (%)
1 activity period only 16.0 23.4
2-3 activity periods only 36.4 42.7
4-5 activity periods 47.7 33.9
Student earned reward forb (%)
English Language Arts (ELA) test 45.5 41.5 58.7
Math test 60.6 53.3 73.8
ELA or math test 69.7 59.2 81.7
Student earned reward for obtaining a library card (%) 63.8 8.4 72.2
Students whose parents earned a reward 
for attending a parent-teacher conference (%) 60.7 55.3 72.0
Sample size 1,264
(continued)
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Table 6.4
Education Rewards Earned, by School Level at the Time of Random Assignment
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Years 1 and 2  
School Level and Outcome Year 1 Year 2 Combined
High school studentsc 
Student earned any education reward (%) 87.8 75.0 90.4
Total amount earneda ($) 1,167 1,227 2,073
Student earned at least 1 attendance reward (%) 67.5 52.2 72.0
Student earned an attendance reward ina (%)
1 activity period only 22.0 26.7
2-3 activity periods only 35.2 38.2
4-5 activity periods 42.9 35.1
Students earned at least one reward for
Any Regents exam 40.6 48.6 60.0
Regents exam - Math A 22.6 18.4 39.4
Regents exam - Global History and Geography 7.2 23.2 28.3
Regents exam - U.S. History and Government 9.6 8.0 17.2
Regents exam - Comprehensive English 8.1 14.9 21.9
Regents exam - Science 24.5 15.2 38.2
For earning 11 or more credits (%) 51.0 41.3 56.2
For graduationd (%) 75.0 60.3 74.3
For obtaining a library card (%) 57.6 6.0 63.1
For taking the PSATe (%) 15.3 10.2 12.8
Students whose parents earned a reward 
for attending a parent-teacher conference (%) 48.4 40.0 56.4
Sample size 1,538
Table 6.4 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008, and the second program 
year covers September 2008 through August 2009.
aThis is calculated only for students who earned any attendance rewards. 
bReceipt of test score rewards in a given year is calculated only for students who are in grades that 
take the tests (grades 3 to 5 among elementary school students and grades 6 to 8 among middle school 
students). 
cUnless otherwise indicated, Year 2 reward outcomes for high school students are calculated only for 
students who entered the study in grade 9, 10, or 11.
dThe receipt of graduation rewards for Year 1 is calculated for students who entered the study in 
grade 12. The rate for Year 2 is calculated for students who entered the study in grade 11. The 
combined-year rate is calculated for students who entered the study in grade 11 or 12.
eThe receipt of PSAT rewards for Year 1 is calculated for students who entered the study in grade 10 
or 11. The rate for Year 2 is calculated for students who entered the study in grade 9 or 10. The 
combined-year rate is calculated for students who entered the study in grade 9, 10, or 11.
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of money earned in that year is somewhat higher. The differences between Year 1 and Year 2 
are not large.  
The final panel presents data for high school students. In order to present an accurate 
measure of program engagement, receipt rates for Year 2 were calculated only for students who 
entered the study as ninth-, tenth-, or eleventh-graders. Overall, the third panel shows that high 
school students were somewhat less likely than their younger counterparts to earn rewards, but 
they tended to earn substantially more money, about $1,200 on average during each year. 
Receipt rates were fairly high across most activities. About 41 percent of high school students 
earned a reward for passing a Regents exam in Year 1, for example, and 60 percent earned such 
a reward over Years 1 and 2 combined. Just over half of the students earned rewards for earning 
11 or more credits, and 75 percent of students who entered the study as twelfth-graders received 
a reward for graduating in Year 1. The receipt of rewards for taking the PSAT, in contrast, was 
fairly low, at 15 percent in Year 1 and 10 percent in Year 2.  
Impacts on School Activities and Outcomes 
This section presents the effects of the Family Rewards program on a variety of school-
ing outcomes. Many of the measures that are examined are determinants of school achievement, 
such as parental engagement with teachers and children, students’ use of tutoring, or students’ 
participation in extracurricular activities. The model underlying the Family Rewards program 
assumes that any effects on ultimate school outcomes will occur largely through changes in 
these factors, which are measured using parents’ responses to the 18-month survey. Measures of 
school performance are obtained largely from DOE records and include attendance rates, test 
scores, credits earned, and grade progression.  
Elementary School Students  
Table 6.5 presents self-reported data from the survey on parental engagement. The data 
for parents in the control group indicate a high level of engagement. For example, over 97 
percent of parents in the control group reported attending a parent-teacher conference since 
study entry. Overall, the program had few effects on parental engagement with teachers among 
parents of fourth-graders.  
The second panel presents various measures of parents’ engagement with their children, 
ranging from talking to children generally about school to helping them prepare for tests. The 
measures range from 1 (indicating that the parent never took part in this activity in the past 
month) to 4 (meaning that the parent undertook this activity several times per week). Although
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Parent-teacher interactions since
random assignment (%)
Respondent attended parent-teacher conference 98.1 97.3 0.8 0.441
Respondent talked with teacher about grades, tests, or 
homeworka 95.0 93.8 1.3 0.419
School contacted respondent because of a problem 37.5 39.5 -2.0 0.541
Parent-child interactions in past month
Respondent has done the following
(1 = never; 4 = several times per week)
Talked with child about school 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.211 0.084
Helped child with homework 3.6 3.6 0.1 0.341 0.064
Checked to see child's homework was complete 3.9 3.9 0.0 * 0.098 0.112
Helped child prepare for test 3.3 3.1 0.2 *** 0.001 0.230
Allowance payments
Child receives an allowance (%) 64.6 57.4 7.1 ** 0.022
Child does something to earn the allowance (%) 50.2 45.5 4.7 0.148
Average weekly allowance amount ($) 6.57 5.58 1.00 * 0.059
Among those who received allowance,
average weekly amount ($) 10.40 9.74 -- --
Sample size (total = 911) 468 443
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
and on Allowance Payments:
Impacts on Parents’ Engagement in Focal Child’s Schooling
Elementary School Students
Table 6.5
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table presents outocmes only for focal children who were living in the household and were in 
elementary school at the time of the interview and at random assignment. Nearly all were in the fourth-grade 
target group.
Italic type indicates comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepencies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of 
the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined. 
aThis excludes discussions at formal parent-teacher conferences.
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the responses indicate a fairly high level of parental involvement, the program did increase self-
reported involvement in two areas — checking on children’s homework (a modest impact, 
which shows up as zero in the table because of rounding) and helping children prepare for tests. 
Program group parents of elementary school children were also more likely to report 
providing an allowance to their children, from 57.4 percent for the control group to 64.6 percent 
for the program group, for a statistically significant difference of 7.1 percentage points. On 
average, the children in the control group received $5.58 per week, although this average 
includes zeroes for children who did not receive any allowance. Among those who received an 
allowance, the average payment was about $10 per week. Children in the program group 
received more, on average ($6.57), than did children in the control group, partly because they 
were more likely to get any allowance and partly because those who did get an allowance 
received slightly higher amounts. See Box 6.1 for a discussion of the ways in which parents 
shared the reward money with their children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6 presents data from the survey on parents’ reports of their children’s school 
performance and activities. Parents in the study report that their children are doing fairly well in 
school. Over 65 percent of parents in the control group, for example, report that their children 
are doing well or very well in school. The program had no effect on parents’ ratings of their 
children’s performance.  
Box 6.1 
Sharing Reward Money with Children 
The in-depth interviews that were conducted for the evaluation revealed that parents who 
were enrolled in Family Rewards used different strategies for giving their children access 
to money, and they may have considered many of these strategies to be types of allow-
ances when responding to the 18-month survey. At one end of the spectrum, some parents 
did not let their younger children know they were part of Family Rewards, fearing it 
would put too much pressure on them, but gave them money for special occasions. Others 
tied cash specifically to the children’s achievement; for example, one mother took her son 
and daughter to Busch Gardens as a reward for doing well on tests. Finally, some parents 
used the extra income coming from the program to provide a more regular “allowance,” 
independent of rewards. As one parent explained, “So when that money did come in, I 
was like, ‘Okay, you got the money  some money from the program, you know. We 
can go  if you wanna go shopping, get some sneakers or whatever, whatever,’ and they 
get their money also to do whatever they have to do. You know…to buy little things that 
they [want]….” 
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
School status
Child currently attends school (%) 100.0 100.0 0.0 1.000
NYC public school 97.1 96.5 0.7 0.574
Parochial or other private school in NYC 2.3 2.1 0.2 0.860
Public or private school outside NYC 0.4 1.4 -0.9 0.136
Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.650
Child's school performance (1 = not well at all; 5 = very well) 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.967 -0.003
Very well (%) 41.1 42.7 -1.6 0.594
Well (%) 25.0 24.2 0.8 0.784
Average (%) 25.3 23.0 2.3 0.407
Below average (%) 6.5 7.2 -0.7 0.658
Not well at all (%) 2.2 2.9 -0.8 0.477
Child has done the following since random assignment (%)
Received an academic award 69.5 68.9 0.6 0.846
Participated in educational programs, 
such as extra classes or tutoring 77.8 73.5 4.3 0.137
Received special education 25.7 25.2 0.5 0.824
Internet/library use (%)
Child has access to Internet from home 79.7 78.4 1.3 0.624
Child has public library card 97.5 89.1 8.3 *** 0.000
Number of times child went to public library in past 6 months
0 7.9 15.0 -7.2 *** 0.001
1-2 23.2 19.8 3.5 0.216
3-5 31.0 27.6 3.4 0.267
6 or more 37.9 37.6 0.3 0.938
Activities since random assignment (%)
Child participated in any extracurricular activity 94.1 91.7 2.4 0.154
Before- or after-school program 36.3 32.3 4.0 0.208
Program to help with schoolwork or homework 51.9 46.2 5.7 * 0.086
School clubs or organizations 19.3 16.2 3.1 0.234
Sports 54.6 52.5 2.0 0.535
Band, choir, orchestra, or chorus 27.5 26.7 0.8 0.790
Lessons such as dance, music, or arts and craftsa 64.1 61.0 3.1 0.341
Club or youth group 30.1 30.5 -0.4 0.891
Recreation or community center activities 26.0 29.2 -3.3 0.275
Sample size (total = 911) 468 443
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In terms of children’s activities, the program increased the number of children with a 
public library card and their use of the library. Fewer parents in the program group reported that 
their children had never been to the public library in the past six months. Although the program 
had no effect on Internet access, almost 80 percent of parents reported that their children have 
access to the Internet from home. The final set of rows (“Activities since random assignment”) 
presents data on extracurricular activities. Almost all children in the control group participated 
in at least some type of activity, with the most common activities being lessons and sports. The 
program did not increase the overall rate of participation. The statistically significant impact on 
participation in programs to help with schoolwork should be interpreted with some caution, 
given that it is only one statistically significant effect among the many outcomes that were 
examined. 
Table 6.7 presents effects on enrollment status, attendance, and test scores based on 
DOE administrative records. The top panel includes only entering fourth-graders, and the 
bottom panel includes all entering elementary school students (kindergarten through fifth 
grade). More than 90 percent of students who entered the study as fourth-graders were enrolled 
in the fifth grade during their second year in the program. Most of the remaining students 
transferred out of the school system, and few students were retained in the fourth grade. The 
program had no effects on enrollment status.  
Attendance rates for fourth-graders are fairly high, at 91 percent on average for control 
group students. However, as shown earlier, there is room for improvement in terms of achieving 
very high attendance — only 43.3 percent of control group students attended for 95 percent or
Table 6.6 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table presents outcomes only for focal children who were living in the household and were in 
elementary school at the time of the interview and at random assignment. Nearly all were in the fourth-grade 
target group.
Sample sizes vary because of missing values.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of 
the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
aThis measure includes all lessons except those that involve sports.
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Program Control Difference Effect
Grade Level and Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
4th-graders at random assignment
Enrollment status, Year 2 (%)
Enrolled in 5th grade 91.9 93.2 -1.3 0.300
Remained in 4th grade 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.173
Not enrolled in NYC public schoolsa 6.4 5.7 0.7 0.547
Attendance
Attendance rate, Year 1 91.5 91.0 0.5 0.414 0.040
Attendance rate, Year 2 87.9 88.3 -0.4 0.689 -0.019
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 1 43.2 43.3 -0.1 0.973
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 2 44.5 41.6 2.9 0.225
Test scores
English Language Arts (ELA) scale score, Year 1 646.9 647.0 -0.1 0.914 -0.004
ELA scale score, Year 2 661.5 661.4 0.1 0.943 0.003
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 50.7 51.1 -0.4 0.859
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 67.6 68.1 -0.4 0.828
Math scale score, Year 1 669.4 668.9 0.5 0.672 0.014
Math scale score, Year 2 674.0 673.5 0.5 0.683 0.015
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 73.4 71.2 2.1 0.238
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 80.3 78.6 1.7 0.345
Among students enrolled
Attendance rate, Year 1 92.4 92.3
Attendance rate, Year 2 92.4 92.4
Sample size (total = 1,726) 862 864
Kindergarten to 5th-graders at random assignment
Attendance 
Attendance rate, Year 1 91.5 91.0 0.5 0.173 0.049
Attendance rate, Year 2 88.8 88.7 0.2 0.823 0.008
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 1 43.7 41.1 2.7 0.142
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 2 42.6 39.4 3.2 * 0.076
Test scoresb
ELA scale score, Year 1 647.5 646.6 0.9 0.383 0.026
ELA scale score, Year 2 658.1 657.4 0.8 0.412 0.027
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 49.5 49.9 -0.5 0.790
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 63.1 61.9 1.2 0.461
(continued)
Elementary School Students
Table 6.7
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Impacts on Attendance and Test Scores:
167 
 
more of the time during Year 1. Attendance rates fall somewhat from Year 1 to Year 2, al-
though this is largely because of the inclusion of nonenrolled students in the attendance meas-
ures.13
In contrast to the attendance measures, only students who took the ELA and math tests 
were used as the denominator when calculating average test scores and proficiency rates in 
each year. Few students were missing test score data in either year and there were no differ-
ences between the program and control groups in the percentage who were missing data. In 
Year 1, about half of the control group students scored at the proficient level or higher on the 
ELA test and 71 percent were proficient in math. Proficiency rates, particularly for math, 
 The bottom rows present attendance for enrolled students and show similar rates for both 
years. The program had no effects on attendance.  
                                                   
13In order to keep the analysis experimental, attendance impacts are calculated using the full program 
group and the full control group, even though some fraction of these students was no longer enrolled in New 
York City public schools during the second year.  
Program Control Difference Effect
Grade Level and Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Math scale score, Year 1 668.4 667.6 0.9 0.399 0.025
Math scale score, Year 2 673.5 672.9 0.6 0.568 0.018
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 73.0 71.3 1.7 0.270
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 79.0 76.2 2.9 ** 0.039
Sample size (total = 3,692) 1,889 1,803
Table 6.7 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple observations 
per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
Italic type indicates comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of 
the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined. 
In  New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed  "proficient." 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
aNonenrolled students may be attending private schools in New York City or any schools outside New York 
City or may have dropped out of school.
bYear 1 test scores and proficiency are shown for grades 3 through 5 at random assignment. Year 2 test 
scores are shown for grades 2 through 5 at random assignment.
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increased from the first to the second year. The program had no effect on average test scores or 
proficiency rates.14
Results for the full group of elementary school students, shown in the bottom panel of 
Table 6.7, are similar to those shown in the top panel, in part because entering fourth-graders 
account for a large fraction of the sample.
  
15
Middle School Students 
 However, for this larger sample the data show small 
but statistically significant increases in high attendance and math proficiency in Year 2. These 
increases should be viewed with some caution, however, given that one or two significant 
effects are likely to emerge by chance when examining a large number of outcomes. 
Table 6.8 presents measures of parental engagement for parents of entering seventh-
graders. Looking first at outcomes for the control group, parental engagement is still quite high, 
although somewhat lower than for the parents of younger children. On most measures of parent-
child interactions, for example, parents of seventh-graders reported less frequent interaction 
than did parents of fourth-graders. The program led to a small increase in reported attendance at 
parent-teacher conferences (3.3 percentage points) and to a moderate increase in the frequency 
with which parents helped their children with homework.  
As for the younger children, the most notable effects in this area were on allowance. 
Parents in the program group were more likely to report giving their children an allowance 
than were parents in the control group (73.3 percent versus 65.2 percent), and they were more 
likely to report that this allowance was conditional upon certain behaviors or activities. 
Children in the program group received a larger allowance on average than did their control 
group counterparts, but largely because they were more likely to receive any allowance. 
Among children in both research groups who received an allowance, the average amount 
received was about $16 per week. 
Table 6.9 presents data on school performance and activities among middle school 
students (mostly seventh-graders). The most notable difference in these measures between 
this group of students and the elementary school students (mostly fourth-graders) shown in 
Table 6.6 is parents’ reports of their children’s school performance. The average scale rating
                                                   
14Comparing the proficiency rates for the program group with the receipt of education rewards (Table 6.4) 
suggests that nearly all the students who scored at the proficient level or higher on these tests received a test 
score reward. For example, 73.0 percent of program group elementary school students were proficient in math 
during Year 1 (Table 6.7), and 68.2 percent received the math test reward (Table 6.4). 
15The sample changes from Year 1 to Year 2 for the test score outcomes. In Year 1, the group of test takers 
includes entering third- through fifth-graders. In Year 2, the group includes this sample plus students who 
entered the study as second-graders.  
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Parent-teacher interactions since
random assignment (%)
Respondent attended parent-teacher conference 96.9 93.6 3.3 ** 0.019
Respondent talked with teacher about grades, tests, or 
homeworka 94.6 93.0 1.6 0.329
School contacted respondent because of a problem 47.5 48.2 -0.7 0.840
Parent-child interactions in past month
Respondent has done the following
(1 = never; 4 = several times per week)
Talked with child about school 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.738 0.022
Helped child with homework 3.1 2.9 0.2 ** 0.034 0.141
Checked to see child's homework was complete 3.7 3.7 0.0 0.767 0.020
Helped child prepare for test 2.8 2.7 0.1 0.199 0.087
Allowance payments
Child receives an allowance (%) 73.3 65.2 8.1 *** 0.008
Child does something to earn the allowance (%) 60.1 52.3 7.9 ** 0.017
Average weekly allowance amount ($) 11.74 10.36 1.38 * 0.092
Among those who received allowance,
average weekly amount ($) 16.42 16.06 -- --
Sample size (total = 911) 485 426
 
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Impacts on Parents’ Engagement in Focal Child’s Schooling 
Middle School Students
Table 6.8
and on Allowance Payments:
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table presents outcomes only for focal children who were living in the household and were in 
middle school at the time of the interview and at random assignment. Nearly all were in the seventh-grade 
target group.
Italic type indicates comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Sample sizes vary because of missing values.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of 
the standared deviation of the outcomes for both groups combined.
aThis excludes discussions at formal parent-teacher conferences.
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
School status
Child currently attends school (%) 99.6 99.8 -0.3 0.495
NYC public school 95.7 97.0 -1.3 0.310
Parochial or other private school in NYC 1.8 1.7 0.1 0.934
Public or private school outside NYC 1.6 0.7 0.9 0.208
Other 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.935
Child's school performance (1 = not well at all; 5 = very well) 3.7 3.7 0.0 0.757 0.020
Very well (%) 34.8 36.8 -2.0 0.514
Well (%) 20.1 21.0 -0.9 0.748
Average (%) 32.4 25.0 7.4 ** 0.014
Below average (%) 9.8 11.8 -2.0 0.327
Not well at all (%) 2.9 5.5 -2.6 * 0.053
Child has done the following since random assignment (%)
Received an academic award 61.1 61.4 -0.3 0.921
Participated in educational programs, 
such as extra classes or tutoring 75.9 68.7 7.2 ** 0.017
Received special education 21.8 20.0 1.9 0.323
Internet/library use (%)
Child has access to Internet from home 84.2 81.5 2.7 0.283
Child has public library card 96.7 92.0 4.6 *** 0.002
Number of times child went to public library in
past 6 months
0 11.2 15.9 -4.7 ** 0.042
1-2 19.5 25.1 -5.5 * 0.053
3-5 25.4 24.7 0.8 0.800
6 or more 43.8 34.3 9.5 *** 0.004
Activities since random assignment (%)
Child participated in any extracurricular activity 91.1 89.7 1.4 0.475
Before- or after-school program 19.9 16.7 3.2 0.219
Program to help with schoolwork or homework 48.6 42.7 5.9 * 0.076
School clubs or organizations 31.3 25.3 6.0 ** 0.043
Sports 56.0 55.4 0.6 0.847
Band, choir, orchestra, or chorus 28.6 22.5 6.0 ** 0.041
Lessons such as dance, music, or arts and craftsa 56.2 48.9 7.3 ** 0.029
Club or youth group 36.3 29.9 6.5 ** 0.041
Recreation or community center activities 32.8 30.0 2.8 0.363
Sample size (total = 911) 485 426
(continued)
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is lower for seventh-graders (3.7) than for fourth-graders (4.0), and fewer parents of seventh-
graders report that their children are performing “very well” in school. This change in par-
ents’ perceptions matches a real decline in performance. As shown in an earlier section, 
seventh-graders do perform at somewhat lower levels than do fourth-graders, at least on 
standardized math tests. Overall, the program did not increase parents’ rating of their chil-
dren’s school performance, although it did increase the proportion of parents who described 
their children’s performance as “average.” 
The primary effect of the program for middle school students was on their participation 
in school-related activities. For example, 75.9 percent of program group parents reported that 
their children had participated in education programs, such as tutoring or extra classes, since 
study entry, compared with 68.7 percent of control group parents. The program also increased 
participation in a range of extracurricular activities, including lessons (such as dance or music 
lessons), band or orchestra, and youth groups. Note, however, that there is no increase in the 
rate of students who participated in “any extracurricular activity.” This pattern of effects 
suggests that the program encouraged students who would have already participated in at least 
one activity to take up additional ones. Although student participation in extracurricular activi-
ties is not a rewarded activity, parents may have used the additional income provided by the 
program to cover the cost of these types of activities for their children.16
                                                   
16The Milwaukee New Hope program also led to an increase in children’s participation in after-school, 
structured activities, and it is hypothesized that this effect was in part a result of increased family income (Bos 
et al., 1999).  
  
Table 6.9 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table presents outcomes only for focal children who were living in the household and were in 
middle school at the time of the interview and at random assignment. Nearly all were in the seventh-grade target 
group.
Sample sizes vary because of missing values.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculationg sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between program and control groups arose by 
chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of 
the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
aThis measure includes all lessons except those that involve sports.
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Table 6.10 presents effects on enrollment, attendance, and test scores based on DOE 
administrative records. The first item in the top panel shows that more than 90 percent of 
entering seventh-graders were enrolled as eighth-graders in Year 2. Attendance rates for 
seventh-graders in the control group are on a par with those for fourth-graders during Year 1. 
The program had no effect on attendance rates in either year. Similarly, the program had no 
effect on test scores.17
High School Students 
 Results were similar when estimated using the full sample of entering 
middle school students.  
Table 6.11 (page 175) presents measures of parental engagement for parents of entering 
ninth-graders. Comparing this table with the tables for the younger students shows that parental 
engagement, at least as measured by the survey data, continues to fall as children age. Control 
group parents of ninth-graders were less likely than parents of younger children to report having 
attended a parent-teacher conference since study entry, and they scored lower on all the meas-
ures of parent-child interaction. The program had no effects on these measures of parent 
engagement. Parents in the program group did tend to give their children more in allowance, 
about $2 more per week compared with control group parents. Children in the program group 
who received allowance received, on average, $23 per week.  
Table 6.12 (page 176) presents measures of ninth-graders’ school performance and ac-
tivities. Overall, there were few program effects on these outcomes. One exception is a large 
increase in students’ use of the public library — only 14.9 percent of program group students 
had never been to the library in the six months preceding the survey, compared with 27.8 
percent of control group students, for an impact of 12.8 percentage points. Unlike the impact for 
the younger children, this impact on library use was not accompanied by an increase in the 
percentage of students who had a library card. In addition, the program led to a small increase in 
participation in extracurricular activities.  
Table 6.13 (page 178) presents effects on enrollment, attendance, and credits earned 
based on DOE administrative records. The top panel, for entering ninth-graders, illustrates the 
increasing problems with attendance and progression for older students. Only about 70 percent of 
entering ninth-graders were enrolled in tenth grade in Year 2, with most of the remaining 
students retained in ninth grade. The program had no effect on enrollment status but did increase 
the likelihood of very high attendance in Year 2. About 29 percent of program group students
                                                   
17There was a small but statistically significant difference between the program and control groups in the 
percentage of students missing a Year 2 ELA test score. Because this difference was small, at 2 percentage 
points, students with no test data were still excluded from the test score comparisons.  
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Program Control Difference Effect
Grade Level and Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
7th-graders at random assignment
Enrollment status, Year 2 (%)
Enrolled in 8th grade 92.9 94.2 -1.3 0.308
Remained in 7th grade 1.3 1.4 -0.1 0.866
Not enrolled in NYC public schoolsa 5.6 4.0 1.6 0.137
Attendance
Attendance rate, Year 1 91.1 90.8 0.3 0.551 0.029
Attendance rate, Year 2 86.4 87.6 -1.2 0.182 -0.065
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 1 43.5 43.1 0.4 0.876
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 2 36.6 34.9 1.6 0.472
Test scores
English Language Arts (ELA) scale score, Year 1 648.7 649.2 -0.5 0.618 -0.017
ELA scale score, Year 2 646.6 646.5 0.1 0.920 0.003
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 50.6 50.6 0.0 0.983
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 46.5 46.0 0.5 0.824
Math scale score, Year 1 653.7 654.4 -0.6 0.548 -0.019
Math scale score, Year 2 658.0 659.8 -1.9 * 0.081 -0.060
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 60.4 59.6 0.8 0.690
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 61.9 63.5 -1.6 0.414
Among students enrolled:
Attendance rate, Year 1 91.7 91.2
Attendance rate, Year 2 89.9 89.6
Sample size (total = 1,671) 823 848
6th- to 8th-graders at random assignment
Attendance (%)
Attendance rate, Year 1 90.8 90.1 0.7 0.126 0.062
Attendance rate, Year 2 86.0 86.3 -0.3 0.743 -0.013
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 1 42.0 39.8 2.1 0.281
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 2 36.0 32.3 3.7 * 0.052
Test scoresb
ELA scale score, Year 1 644.9 646.0 -1.1 0.162 -0.039
ELA scale score, Year 2 647.6 648.0 -0.3 0.693 -0.013
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 44.6 43.9 0.7 0.677
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 50.5 49.0 1.4 0.432
(continued)
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attended at least 95 percent of the time, compared with only 23.7 percent of control group 
students, for a statistically significant difference of 5.2 percentage points.  
Students in the program group were also more likely to have attempted at least 11 cred-
its during their ninth-grade year, the minimum number considered necessary to make progress 
toward graduating in four years. However, they were not more likely to have earned 11 or more 
credits in either year. A good measure of progress over the two-year period is the percentage of 
students who had earned at least 22 credits. Only about 45 percent of the students had met this 
benchmark, and the program had no effect on this outcome. The bottom panel of Table 6.13 
presents data for all high school students, showing roughly similar effects, with the exception of 
an increase in high attendance during Year 1 as well as during Year 2.  
Program Control Difference Effect
Grade Level and Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Math scale score, Year 1 653.1 653.2 -0.1 0.914 -0.003
Math scale score, Year 2 659.1 660.6 -1.5 0.111 -0.050
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 58.8 56.8 1.9 0.225
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 64.3 65.6 -1.2 0.491
Sample size (total = 2,581) 1,264 1,317
Table 6.10 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Italic type indicates comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion 
of the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
In  New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed  
"proficient." 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
aNonenrolled students may be attending private schools in New York City or any school outside New 
York City or may have dropped out of school.
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Parent-teacher interactions since
random assignment (%)
Respondent attended parent-teacher conference 90.3 87.7 2.6 0.231
Respondent talked with teacher about grades, tests, or 
homeworka 92.8 92.6 0.2 0.918
School contacted respondent because of a problem 47.8 44.5 3.3 0.328
Parent-child interactions in past month
Respondent has done the following
(1 = never; 4 = several times per week)
Talked with child about school 3.8 3.8 0.0 0.470 0.049
Helped child with homework 2.6 2.5 0.0 0.875 0.011
Checked to see child's homework was complete 3.6 3.5 0.0 0.520 0.044
Helped child prepare for test 2.5 2.4 0.1 0.416 0.056
Allowance payments
Child receives an allowance (%) 70.6 66.6 3.9 0.212
Child does something to earn the allowance (%) 55.8 52.1 3.7 0.278
Average weekly allowance amount ($) 16.18 14.19 2.0 * 0.073
Among those who received allowance,
average weekly amount ($) 23.09 22.00 -- --
Sample size (total = 870) 469 401
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 6.11
Impacts on Parents’ Engagement in Focal Child’s Schooling
High School Students
and on Allowance Payments:
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table presents outcomes only for focal children who were living in the household and were in 
high school at the time of the interview and at random assignment. Nearly all were in the ninth-grade target 
group.
Italic type indicates comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Sample sizes vary because of missing values.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of families or sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between the program and control groups arose 
by chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a 
proportion of the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
aThis excludes discussions at formal parent-teacher conferences.
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
School status
Child currently attends school (%) 98.2 96.9 1.3 0.204
NYC public school 94.5 92.1 2.4 0.160
Parochial or other private school in NYC 1.6 2.4 -0.7 0.440
Public or private school outside NYC 0.6 1.3 -0.7 0.269
Other 1.5 1.1 0.4 0.610
Child's school performance (1 = not well at all; 5 = very well) 3.4 3.4 0.0 0.779 -0.018
Very well (%) 24.9 27.2 -2.2 0.446
Well (%) 22.8 19.2 3.6 0.190
Average (%) 30.1 31.1 -1.0 0.752
Below average (%) 11.6 13.8 -2.2 0.331
Not well at all (%) 10.6 8.8 1.8 0.372
Child has done the following since random assignment (%)
Received an academic award 44.2 45.9 -1.7 0.605
Participated in educational programs, 
such as extra classes or tutoring 68.0 63.4 4.6 0.160
Enrolled in college exam preparation program 39.0 32.3 6.7 0.563
Received special education 18.1 22.1 -3.9 * 0.053
Internet/library use (%)
Child has access to Internet from home 83.8 84.5 -0.7 0.783
Child has public library card 93.4 91.9 1.5 0.401
Number of times child went to public library in
past 6 months
0 14.9 27.8 -12.8 *** 0.000
1-2 23.6 21.0 2.5 0.384
3-5 27.7 18.0 9.7 *** 0.001
6 or more 33.8 33.3 0.6 0.868
Activities since random assignment (%)
Child participated in any extracurricular activity 87.8 83.5 4.3 * 0.077
Before- or after-school program 8.0 9.2 -1.2 0.545
Program to help with schoolwork or homework 43.3 40.0 3.3 0.332
School clubs or organizations 17.2 15.9 1.4 0.592
Sports 51.8 49.1 2.7 0.429
Band, choir, orchestra, or chorus 16.1 17.6 -1.5 0.554
Lessons such as dance, music, or arts and craftsa 39.9 38.7 1.3 0.707
Club or youth group 27.4 28.6 -1.2 0.700
Recreation or community center activities 30.5 31.4 -0.9 0.783
Sample size (total = 870) 469 401
(continued)
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Tables 6.14 (page 180) and 6.15 (page 182) present data on another measure of high 
school progress, the taking and passing of Regents exams. For entering ninth-graders (Table 
6.14), the effects are consistent with the effects on credits in that they show an increase in effort 
but not necessarily in achievement. More students in the program group attempted at least one 
Regents exam during their ninth-grade year, although they were not more likely to have passed 
at least one exam. There were no effects on the cumulative outcome over Years 1 and 2, 
suggesting that the program induced some ninth-graders to take Regents exams earlier than they 
would have otherwise.18
Finally, although eleventh and twelfth grades were not target grades, a key question for 
the first two years of follow-up is whether the program encouraged students to complete high 
school. Table 6.16 (page 184) presents data on graduation rates. For students in the control group 
who entered the study as twelfth-graders, only about 71 percent graduated during Year 1, and 
another 11 percent graduated during Year 2. The program had no effect on this group’s gradua-
tion rates. Similarly, the program did not have a statistically significant effect on graduation for
 Results for all high school students (Table 6.15) show a similar pattern, 
although there is a small positive impact on the rate of passing Regents exams during Year 1. 
Over the two-year period, the primary effect of the program was to increase the number of 
students who took Regents exams. 
                                                   
18For outcomes expressed as percentages, the effects for Years 1 and 2 combined will not necessarily 
equal the sum of effects in Year 1 and Year 2. As an extreme example, suppose that 50 percent of program 
group students and 25 percent of control group students take at least one exam in Year 1. During Year 2, those 
same 50 percent of program group students and a different 25 percent of control group students take at least 
one exam. Effects for Years 1 and 2 combined will be zero, since 50 percent of both the program and control 
group students will have taken at least one exam over the two-year period. 
Table 6.12 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table presents outcomes only for focal children who were living in the household and were in 
high school at the time of the interview and at random assignment. Nearly all were in the ninth-grade target 
group.
Sample sizes vary because of missing values.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion 
of the standard deviation of the outcomes for both groups. 
aThis measure includes all lessons except those that involve sports.
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Program Control Difference Effect
Grade Level and Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value Size
9th-graders at random assignment
Enrollment status, Year 2 (%)
Enrolled in 10th grade 70.3 68.8 1.5 0.446
Remained in 9th grade 16.4 17.9 -1.5 0.362
Not enrolled in NYC public schoolsa 11.7 11.6 0.1 0.967
Attendance
Attendance rate, Year 1 81.8 81.4 0.4 0.695 0.017
Attendance rate, Year 2 75.3 74.3 1.0 0.441 0.033
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 1 34.0 31.6 2.5 0.226
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 2 28.8 23.7 5.2 *** 0.006
Credits (%)
Attempted 11 or more, Year 1 87.8 83.9 3.9 *** 0.006
Attempted 11 or more, Year 2 80.5 77.9 2.6 0.126
Earned 11 or more, Year 1 49.7 50.0 -0.3 0.886
Earned 11 or more, Year 2 45.2 45.4 -0.2 0.922
Earned 22 or more credits, Years 1 to 2 45.0 44.4 0.6 0.767
Among students enrolled (%)
Attendance rate, Year 1 86.0 85.5 -- --
Attendance rate, Year 2 82.1 81.3 -- --
Earned 22 or more credits, Years 1 to 2 50.7 50.4 -- --
Sample size (total = 1,979) 988 991
9th- to 12th-graders at random assignmentb
Attendance 
Attendance rate, Year 1 81.3 80.8 0.5 0.561 0.021
Attendance rate, Year 2 73.7 72.9 0.8 0.487 0.026
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 1 31.4 28.0 3.4 ** 0.041
Attendance rate is 95% or higher, Year 2 26.0 22.8 3.2 ** 0.048
Credits (%)
Attempted 11 or more, Year 1 84.5 81.6 2.9 ** 0.017
Attempted 11 or more, Year 2 76.2 73.5 2.8 * 0.073
Earned 11 or more, Year 1 49.9 49.4 0.5 0.792
Earned 11 or more, Year 2 45.0 45.7 -0.7 0.703
Earned 22 or more credits, Years 1 to 2 44.7 44.7 0.0 0.999
Sample size (total = 3,077) 1,538 1,539
(continued)
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entering eleventh-graders.19 However, the difference between the program and control groups 
among entering eleventh-graders, at 9.5 percentage points, is notable and just misses statistical 
significance, with a p-value of 0.121.20
 Summary of Effects on School Activities and Outcomes 
 
In sum, considering the effects across all age groups, the program appears to have led to 
small increases in parental engagement among parents of children in elementary and middle 
school. Parents of middle school students were more likely to attend parent-teacher conferences, 
and parents of both groups of children had somewhat more frequent interactions with their 
                                                   
19Entering twelfth-graders have a higher first-year graduation rate than entering eleventh-graders in 
part because of the way in which the sample was chosen for the study. Students were eligible for the 
study if, as of August or September of 2007, they were set to enroll in the next grade. Thus, the study 
sample of twelfth-graders represents a somewhat select group of students who had stayed in school up to 
that point and had plans to enroll for their senior year. 
20The impact analysis does not examine Family Rewards’ effects on dropout rates. Although the DOE 
provided discharge data, students who are not officially discharged during the year as a graduate, a dropout, or 
a transfer (for example, to a private school or another school district) are considered to be still enrolled. If a 
twelfth-grader did not graduate during the year, for example, but was not officially discharged, he or she would 
not show up as a dropout. In fact, the fraction of twelfth-graders in the study who were coded as dropouts 
during Year 1 was less than less 3 percent, despite the fact that only about 70 percent had graduated. Conversa-
tions with DOE staff also indicate that these data are not comparable with published data on dropout rates. 
Table 6.13 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Italic type indicates comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion 
of the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
aNonenrolled students may be attending private schools in New York City or any school outside New 
York City or may have dropped out of school.
bOutcomes for Year 2 and for Years 1 and 2 combined excludes students who entered the study as 
twelfth-graders.
180 
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value
Year 1
Took at least 1 Regents exam (%) 66.5 62.1 4.4 ** 0.028
Took 1 Regents exam (%) 27.8 25.7 2.1 0.303
Took 2 Regents exams (%) 29.0 26.5 2.5 0.205
Took 3 or more Regents exams (%) 9.7 9.9 -0.1 0.915
Passed at least 1 Regents exam (%) 36.9 34.6 2.4 0.193
Passed 1 Regents exam (%) 19.3 16.7 2.6 0.120
Passed 2 Regents exams (%) 13.8 13.9 -0.1 0.974
Passed 3 or more Regents exams (%) 3.7 3.9 -0.2 0.809
Number of Regents exams passed 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.614
Year 2
Took at least 1 Regents exam (%) 72.3 69.2 3.0 0.111
Took 1 Regents exam (%) 12.6 11.5 1.2 0.426
Took 2 Regents exams (%) 18.1 16.1 1.9 0.252
Took 3 or more  Regents exams (%) 41.6 41.7 -0.1 0.980
Passed at least 1 Regents exam (%) 45.8 44.2 1.6 0.417
Passed 1 Regents exam (%) 19.6 17.7 1.9 0.280
Passed 2 Regents exams (%) 14.2 15.1 -1.0 0.529
Passed 3 or more Regents exams (%) 12.5 11.8 0.7 0.604
Number of Regents exams passed 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.532
Years 1 and 2 combined
Took at least 1 Regents exam (%) 79.9 78.0 2.0 0.245
Took 1 Regents exam (%) 9.2 9.4 -0.3 0.846
Took 2 Regents exams (%) 10.1 11.3 -1.2 0.385
Took 3 or more  Regents exams (%) 60.6 57.2 3.4 * 0.097
Passed at least 1 Regents exam (%) 54.7 53.1 1.6 0.401
Passed at least 2 Regents exam (%) 38.2 37.6 0.7 0.719
Passed 1 Regents exam (%) 16.4 15.5 0.9 0.579
Passed 2 Regents exams (%) 10.3 11.3 -1.0 0.472
Passed 3 or more Regents exams (%) 27.9 26.3 1.7 0.327
Number of Regents exams passed 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.427
Sample size (total = 1,979) 988 991
(continued)
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children involving school and homework. For both groups of children, but particularly for 
middle school students, the program led to an increase in extracurricular activities, which in 
many cases were programs to help with school work. However, these small changes in behavior 
did not lead to increases in attendance or test scores, at least through Year 2. See Box 6.2 (page 
185) for a discussion of parents’ efforts to improve their children’s test performance. 
For high school students, the program did not lead to increases in parental engagement 
and had only a small effect on participation in extracurricular activities. However, the program 
did lead to an increase in effort for this group. Students in the program group were more likely 
to have high attendance rates, they attempted more credits during the school year, and they took 
more Regents exams. 
Effects for Key Subgroups 
Family Rewards is unique among incentives programs in that families are offered the 
rewards and are left largely on their own to earn them. For that reason, among others, the effects 
of an intervention like this one may vary across different types of students or different types of 
families. This section examines program effects for selected subgroups of entering ninth-
graders.21
                                                   
21Effects for elementary and middle school students are shown in Appendix F. In general, the effects for 
these students did not vary across subgroups.  
 Variation in impacts was examined across three key dimensions — student’s prior
Table 6.14 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education 
administrative records.
NOTES: The overall outcome measures in this table include the following Regents exams: 
English, Math A, Math B, Geometry, Integrated Algebra, U.S. History, Global History, Biology, 
Chemistry, Physics, and Earth Science.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 
10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to 
account for multiple observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and 
control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control 
groups arose by chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value
Year 1
Took at least 1 Regents exam (%) 70.2 64.9 5.3 *** 0.001
Took 1 Regents exam (%) 23.5 22.1 1.5 0.337
Took 2 Regents exams (%) 27.3 24.1 3.2 ** 0.039
Took 3 or more Regents exams (%) 19.4 18.7 0.7 0.602
Passed at least 1 Regents exam (%) 42.1 38.3 3.7 ** 0.017
Passed 1 Regents exam (%) 20.6 18.0 2.6 * 0.065
Passed 2 Regents exams (%) 15.2 13.3 1.9 0.121
Passed 3 or more Regents exams (%) 6.3 7.0 -0.7 0.426
Number of Regents exams passed 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.148
Sample size (total = 3,077) 1,538 1,539
Year 2
Took at least 1 Regents exam (%) 68.8 66.7 2.1 0.204
Took 1 Regents exam (%) 13.9 12.4 1.5 0.252
Took 2 Regents exams (%) 17.1 15.7 1.4 0.309
Took 3 or more Regents exams (%) 37.8 38.6 -0.8 0.661
Passed at least 1 Regents exam (%) 45.1 43.7 1.3 0.438
Passed 1 Regents exam (%) 20.7 17.3 3.4 ** 0.022
Passed 2 Regents exams (%) 13.2 14.9 -1.8 0.178
Passed 3 or more Regents exams (%) 11.6 11.9 -0.3 0.834
Number of Regents exams passed 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.845
Sample size (total = 2,813) 1,386 1,427
Years 1 and 2 combined
Took at least 1 Regents exam (%) 80.6 78.2 2.4 * 0.092
Took 1 Regents exam (%) 7.5 8.5 -1.0 0.338
Took 2 Regents exams (%) 11.1 11.5 -0.4 0.749
Took 3 or more Regents exams (%) 62.1 58.3 3.7 ** 0.033
Passed at least 1 Regents exam (%) 57.4 55.5 1.9 0.245
Passed at least 2 Regents exam (%) 42.3 40.5 1.8 0.274
Passed 1 Regents exam (%) 15.1 15.0 0.1 0.932
Passed 2 Regents exams (%) 12.9 12.2 0.6 0.610
Passed 3 or more Regents exams (%) 29.4 28.3 1.2 0.454
Number of Regents exams passed 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.448
Sample size (total = 2,813) 1,386 1,427
(continued)
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performance, parent’s education level, and student’s school environment.22
The first subgroup dimension is prior academic performance, measured by whether the 
student achieved proficiency on standardized tests in the year prior to entering the study. 
Because students take standardized tests through the eighth grade, data on last year’s perfor-
mance among high school students are available only for entering ninth-graders. Prior perfor-
mance may affect a student’s ability to respond to the program. In addition, critics of incentives-
based education programs have raised the possibility of “discouragement effects” for lower-
performing students who have little chance of receiving payments.
 As noted in the 
previous chapter, the key focus of subgroup analysis is not necessarily on the impacts for a given 
group, but whether the differences in impacts across the subgroups are statistically significant. 
23
                                                   
22Effects across additional dimensions were also examined as part of a more exploratory analysis. 
These other dimensions include baseline public assistance receipt, public housing status, borough, and 
race/ethnicity. In general, the results showed little variation in effects across these groups. 
 For that reason, it is of 
interest to test for differential effects by prior achievement level.  
23Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (2001). 
Table 6.15 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education 
administrative records.
NOTES: The overall outcome measures in this table include the following Regents exams: 
English, Math A, Math B, Geometry, Integrated Algebra, U.S. History, Global History, Biology, 
Chemistry, Physics, and Earth Science.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 
10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to 
account for multiple observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and 
control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control 
groups arose by chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
Outcomes for Year 2 and for Years 1 and 2 combined exclude students who entered the 
program as twelfth-graders. 
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Table 6.17 (page 186) presents the results, showing that prior achievement is a strong 
predictor of subsequent achievement and, as such, may be viewed as an indicator of preparation 
for high school work. For example, within the control group, students who scored at the profi-
cient level or higher on the prior year’s math test (top panel), representing about one-third of all 
ninth-graders in the study sample, were much more likely to progress to tenth grade, had higher 
attendance rates, earned more credits, and passed more Regents exams than their less proficient 
counterparts. The table shows that the program had substantially larger and more positive effects 
for the more proficient subgroup, with statistically significant impacts for all but one of 
Program Control Difference
Grade Level and Outcome (%) Group  Group (Impact) P-Value
12th-graders at random assignment
Graduated, Year 1 74.1 70.9 3.3 0.503
Graduated, Year 2 12.6 10.6 1.9 0.623
Years 1 and 2 combined 85.9 80.8 5.1 0.190
Sample size (total = 264) 152 112
11th-graders at random assignment
Graduated, Year 2 67.1 57.6 9.5 0.121
Sample size (total = 297) 136 161
Table 6.16
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Impacts on Graduation
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education 
administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; 
** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre- random 
assignment characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account 
for multiple observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and 
control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control 
groups arose by chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
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the 12 measured outcomes.24
                                                   
24Results were similar when the sample was divided according to scores on the previous year’s ELA test.  
 For this more proficient subgroup, the program increased the rate 
of progression into tenth grade (by 5.4 percentage points), increased the fraction of students 
who had earned at least 22 credits through Year 2 (by 8.1 percentage points), increased the 
proportion of students passing at least two Regents exams (by 5.9 percentage points), and
Box 6.2 
Parents’ Involvement in Improving Test Scores and Academic 
Performance for Elementary and Middle School Students 
During the in-depth interviews, parents of elementary and middle school students some-
times reflected on some of the challenges their children faced when it came to taking 
tests. Some talked about their children’s efforts to succeed but finding that they were 
unable to do well on the tests; a few talked about developmental or behavioral challenges 
that made it especially hard for their children to perform well or meet attendance goals. 
Some described their children’s health problems, as did the following parent:   
 
And the 10-year-old, she had a heart problem, that was two years ago, she lost a lot 
of school time. She had to go to doctors every day. She tells me it hurts, I have to 
take her to the hospital. They recently told me that her heart problem was okay… 
But she has missed a lot of school. They’ve been in school for about two or three 
months so she’s missed school about five times. 
 
Other parents were much more focused on their children succeeding more generally in 
school  behaving appropriately in the classroom and getting good grades, for example 
 than they were specifically focused on supporting children regarding standardized 
tests. Although many parents talked about helping their children with homework every 
night, very few mentioned having purchased a test preparation book with the reward 
money they’d earned. Some mentioned that schools or after-school programs themselves 
made a big effort to help their children work on test preparation, and that their own role 
in coaching children was limited to keeping them well fed and rested on the day of the 
test:  
 
Well, I make them go to bed early the night before…. Make sure they have a good 
dinner…. Make sure they, you know, shower and get in the bed early. That morning 
when they get up, I have a nice breakfast for them, you know, and make sure there’s 
no fussing, arguing. You know? Just let everything be nice, you know, peaceful. 
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Sig.
Scored at or above proficiency level 
on annual math test in 8th gradea
Enrolled in 10th grade, Year 2 (%) 90.8 85.5 5.4 ** 0.045  
Remained in 9th grade, Year 2 (%) 3.0 8.8 -5.8 *** 0.003 †
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 54.2 46.7 7.4 * 0.063  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 51.1 36.2 14.9 *** 0.000 †††
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 95.7 91.6 4.1 ** 0.020  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 92.2 89.6 2.6 0.236  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 77.6 68.8 8.9 ** 0.013 †††
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 71.9 62.5 9.3 ** 0.015 †††
Earned at least 22 credits, Years 1 to 2 (%) 72.7 64.5 8.1 ** 0.032 ††
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 1 (%) 74.5 67.1 7.5 ** 0.046  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 2 (%) 78.2 72.4 5.8 * 0.100  
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1 to 2 (%) 77.6 71.7 5.9 * 0.098 †
Number of Regents exams passed, Years 1 to 2 2.9 2.6 0.3 ** 0.026 ††
Sample size (total = 584) 298 286
Scored below proficiency level
on annual math test in 8th gradea
Enrolled in 10th grade, Year 2 (%) 66.7 65.5 1.2 0.674  
Remained in 9th grade, Year 2 (%) 22.1 21.8 0.3 0.916 †
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 29.0 26.8 2.2 0.413  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 21.8 19.3 2.5 0.291 †††
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 90.5 84.9 5.6 *** 0.002  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 80.9 78.7 2.2 0.355  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 43.6 47.1 -3.5 0.234 †††
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 37.6 41.4 -3.8 0.191 †††
Earned at least 22 credits, Years 1 to 2 (%) 38.1 40.1 -2.0 0.492 ††
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 1 (%) 22.4 21.7 0.7 0.759  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 2 (%) 33.9 35.1 -1.2 0.665  
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1 to 2 (%) 22.9 25.2 -2.3 0.343 †
Number of Regents exams passed, Years 1 to 2 0.8 0.9 -0.1 0.341 ††
Sample size (total = 1,143) 565 578
(continued)
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increased the average number of Regents exams passed (from 2.6 for the control group to 2.9 
for the program group).25
Effects on parental engagement and children’s activities were also estimated across the 
subgroups (not shown in table). The only notable difference in effects was on parent attendance 
at parent-teacher conferences. Program impacts were positive and large for parents of more 
proficient students, but not for parents of students in the less proficient subgroup.
 In contrast, the program had little effect on the less proficient sub-
group. With the exception of an increase in those who attempted at least 11 credits in Year 1, 
the effects across the range of measures for that subgroup are small and statistically insignifi-
cant. As noted by the daggers in the rightmost column, the differences between impacts across 
the two subgroups are statistically significant on seven outcome measures, meaning that these 
differences were very unlikely to have arisen by chance. (See Box 6.3 for an illustration from 
the in-depth parent interviews of different responses by students to school and the program.) 
26
Parents’ education level has a strong effect on children’s school performance and may 
also be related to their ability to respond to the program. More educated parents, for example,
  
                                                   
25Effects on progression into tenth grade were driven entirely by differences in grade retention and not in 
transfer rates. 
26Among parents of the participant students, 85.3 percent of the control group reported attending a parent-
teacher conference since random assignment, compared with 95.7 percent of program group parents, for an 
impact of 10.3 percentage points.  
Table 6.17 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for 
multiple observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control 
groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups 
arose by chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
aIn New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed  
"proficient." 
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Box 6.3 
Lower- Versus Higher-Performing High School Students 
The differential findings for higher- and lower-performing teenagers were reflected during in-
depth parent interviews. Parents of high school students were more likely to describe these 
children as engaged with and interested in the program. Not surprisingly, parents described 
their older children as feeling more pressure to have cash for clothing, shoes, and other pur-
chases. They also described them as being more aware of the program, in that they have their 
own, separate bank accounts. One parent described the difference that this separate account 
made for her daughter:  
 
Participant: The more I began to mention the money, I said, “You know, if you do 
this you’re gonna get this amount….” I gave her the Chase card and I said, “This is 
your card . . . .The money that’s on it is yours. Whatever you need it for you can 
use it, but the more you do what you’re supposed to do, the benefits go on this 
card,” and she was like, “Wow.” 
Interviewer: So…that was a huge thing for her.  
Participant: Oh yeah. Bribery. (Laughter) 
However, not every teenager was able to take advantage of these rewards. As suggested by 
the relatively lower school attendance for this group relative to elementary school children, 
some parents said that their children had not made a successful transition from middle school 
to high school. As one said, “He goes to high school, he doesn’t  he’s like out of it. He 
doesn’t want to do anything. The teachers are calling me. He was failing classes. It doesn’t 
matter how much you would tell him, he . . . doesn’t want to go to school. It was a problem.”  
 
Parents described these children as unable to succeed in school, even with the promise of cash 
rewards. In contrast, those who had generally better histories in school were sometimes de-
scribed as being both interested in the rewards and better able to take advantage of them; 
other parents said that their children appreciated the rewards but were likely to succeed with-
out them, based on their assessment of their past performance. One parent talked about her 
daughter’s strong motivation:  
 
She’s taking the English, the math [Regents]. And I just want her to do her best, 
that’s all I expect from her. And she’s doing really great in school; my daughter 
does good in school. She wants to become a pilot. And she’s very pretty and she 
likes to keep a pencil in her hair and a book in her hand. So she does great. She just 
got her report card. She[has an] 80 percent [average]…. I went to the parent-
teacher conference and they wish they had more students like her. She’s very quiet. 
She’s reserved. She’s in karate. My baby does  she’s doing her thing. 
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may be in a better position to offer help with homework or to seek out resources in the commu-
nity for their children. The results are shown in Table 6.18 (page 190).27
Finally, school environment, as measured by test scores of earlier cohorts in a student’s 
school, may also be related to a student’s response to the rewards. Students in low-performing 
schools with low-performing peers may be less able or less willing to attend school more 
frequently or to improve their academic performance. School environment is defined by ranking 
students’ schools according to their average pass rates of the English and math Regents exams 
in the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 school years. The schools are then divided into thirds based on 
this ranking. The results are shown in Table 6.19 (page 192). The table shows that school 
environment is strongly associated with student outcomes. For example, among students in the 
control group, those attending schools with lower pass rates had much lower attendance rates 
than those attending schools with higher pass rates, and they were much less likely to progress 
to tenth grade by Year 2. Despite these dramatic differences in outcomes, the effects of Family 
Rewards did not vary significantly by school environment. 
 As the control group 
patterns illustrate, children of more educated parents (top panel) tended to perform better over 
the year than children of less educated parents, although the differences are not as large as for 
students’ prior academic performance. The impacts of Family Rewards did not differ for the 
two groups. For example, although there is a statistically significant increase in Year 2 atten-
dance for children of more educated parents (of 6 percentage points), it is statistically indistin-
guishable from the 4 percentage point increase for children of less educated parents. 
Conclusion  
Through two years, Family Rewards has had mixed success in improving children’s 
school outcomes. The program had few effects on younger students, but did lead to notable 
gains for a group of more academically prepared high school students. The effects for the more 
proficient high school students are encouraging. Even though this group may be the least 
disadvantaged academically among low-income students, they still face many obstacles to 
success. As an example, only about 65 percent of these students had accumulated enough 
credits by the end of their second year of high school for an on-time graduation. The program 
increased this rate by 8 percentage points. Longer-term follow up will be needed to assess 
whether the program can help these students stay on track and whether their control group 
counterparts fall further behind. 
                                                   
27In order to maintain a consistent sample for the subgroup analysis, effects by parent’s education and 
school environment are also presented for entering ninth-graders only. The results were similar when examined 
for all entering high school students. 
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Parent earned at least a high school diploma/GED certificate 
Enrolled in 10th grade, Year 2 (%) 73.1 70.3 2.8 0.263  
Remained in 9th grade, Year 2 (%) 16.3 16.5 -0.2 0.913  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 38.6 35.0 3.6 0.194  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 32.9 26.9 6.0 ** 0.021  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 88.7 86.2 2.5 0.143  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 83.3 80.1 3.2 0.132  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 53.3 54.2 -1.0 0.723  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 49.6 49.2 0.4 0.879  
Earned at least 22 credits, Years 1 to 2 (%) 50.0 48.6 1.3 0.624  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 1 (%) 41.5 40.0 1.5 0.552  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 2 (%) 50.9 47.9 3.0 0.253  
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1 to 2 (%) 43.2 43.1 0.1 0.967  
Number of Regents exams passed, Years 1 to 2 1.6 1.5 0.1 0.521
Sample size (total = 1,159) 558 601
Parent did not earn at least a high school diploma/GED certificate 
Enrolled in 10th grade, Year 2 (%) 66.3 66.8 -0.6 0.873  
Remained in 9th grade, Year 2 (%) 16.7 20.0 -3.3 0.239  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 27.4 27.0 0.3 0.918  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 23.5 19.5 4.0 0.168  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 85.6 81.7 3.9 0.105  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 75.9 75.9 0.0 0.993  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 44.9 45.0 -0.1 0.982  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 37.6 40.4 -2.9 0.403  
Earned at least 22 credits, Years 1 to 2 (%) 37.5 38.8 -1.4 0.693  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 1 (%) 30.6 26.0 4.7 * 0.091  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 2 (%) 37.4 39.5 -2.1 0.509  
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1 to 2 (%) 30.6 29.9 0.7 0.806  
Number of Regents exams passed, Years 1 to 2 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.924  
Sample size (total = 750) 393 357
(continued)
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Given that families were largely left on their own to find ways to earn the incentives 
in Family Rewards, it makes sense that the achievement gains would be larger for the more 
proficient subgroup. These students were staying afloat academically and probably had the 
personal and other resources necessary to take advantage of the incentives that were offered. 
In contrast, the less proficient students may have faced too many barriers, both academic and 
otherwise, to respond in a similar way. The lack of effects through Year 2 for this group is 
discouraging, although it is still too early to conclude that the program does not work for 
them. The more disadvantaged students and families in the study may have taken longer to 
engage with the program, and staff increased their efforts to work with less engaged parents 
beginning in Year 2.  
Regarding the absence of effects for the younger students, it is worth noting that, with 
the exception of whole school reforms or the implementation of certain types of accountability 
systems, educational interventions typically have not increased test scores for such students.28
The lack of effects on attendance among younger students is somewhat surprising. At-
tendance rates were already quite high for the younger students, but there was some room for 
improvement, particularly among the approximately 30 percent of students who were absent 
more than 10 percent of the time. It may be the case that students who are already chronically 
absent in elementary and middle school need more than incentives to reengage with school. In
 
Perhaps the modest changes in parental engagement and student activities generated by Family 
Rewards were not enough to affect achievement, or perhaps it is still too early to expect 
achievement impacts.  
                                                   
28Kane (2004); Jacob and Ludwig (2009). 
Table 6.18 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from New York City Department of Education administrative records.
NOTES: In most cases, the subgroup for parent's education level is based on the mother's education level. The 
father's education level is used in male-only households.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
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Program Control Difference
School Ranking and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Students in lower-ranking schools
Enrolled in 10th grade, Year 2 (%) 63.0 60.7 2.3 0.510  
Remained in 9th grade, Year 2 (%) 21.6 25.6 -4.1 0.194  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 21.0 23.4 -2.4 0.436  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 19.1 18.1 1.0 0.726  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 89.1 83.7 5.4 ** 0.023  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 79.4 75.8 3.5 0.247  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 42.0 41.1 0.9 0.800  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 36.6 37.7 -1.1 0.762  
Earned at least 22 credits, Years 1 to 2 (%) 37.0 35.8 1.2 0.731  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 1 (%) 24.8 26.6 -1.7 0.542 †
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 2 (%) 35.8 34.4 1.3 0.682  
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1 to 2 (%) 24.7 26.2 -1.5 0.604  
Number of Regents exams passed, Years 1 to 2 0.9 1.0 -0.1 0.536  
Sample size (total = 745) 342 403
Students in medium-ranking schools
Enrolled in 10th grade, Year 2 (%) 73.5 71.3 2.2 0.556  
Remained in 9th grade, Year 2 (%) 14.3 15.7 -1.4 0.658  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 40.5 34.7 5.8 0.157  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 31.9 22.9 9.0 ** 0.016  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 90.7 90.5 0.2 0.942  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 84.2 80.3 3.9 0.222  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 54.5 57.0 -2.5 0.542  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 44.6 46.7 -2.1 0.611  
Earned at least 22 credits, Years 1 to 2 (%) 47.6 47.9 -0.3 0.937  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 1 (%) 42.0 33.8 8.2 ** 0.024 †
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 2 (%) 50.1 44.8 5.3 0.184  
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1 to 2 (%) 41.1 37.4 3.7 0.309  
Number of Regents exams passed, Years 1 to 2 1.5 1.4 0.1 0.216  
Sample size (total = 555) 287 268
(continued)
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any case, it will be important to track effects for these younger children through key transition 
periods during which many students falter. During the third year of the program, entering fourth-
graders will move into middle school and entering seventh-graders will move into high school. 
Some school-based reforms have been found to be successful at keeping high school 
students on track and in school, although many have been much more intensive than Family 
Program Control Difference
School Ranking and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Students in higher-ranking schools
Enrolled in 10th grade, Year 2 (%) 80.7 78.1 2.6 0.451  
Remained in 9th grade, Year 2 (%) 10.1 11.4 -1.3 0.669  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 46.6 42.5 4.1 0.357  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 42.3 32.9 9.4 ** 0.024  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 91.2 90.8 0.4 0.877  
Attempted at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 87.2 85.6 1.7 0.569  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 1 (%) 62.4 61.4 1.0 0.805  
Earned at least 11 credits, Year 2 (%) 62.3 60.6 1.7 0.688  
Earned at least 22 credits, Years 1 to 2 (%) 59.6 58.1 1.5 0.723  
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 1 (%) 55.2 57.8 -2.6 0.495 †
Passed at least 1 Regents exam, Year 2 (%) 62.7 63.8 -1.0 0.796  
Passed at least 2 Regents exams, Years 1 to 2 (%) 58.4 61.2 -2.7 0.477  
Number of Regents exams passed, Years 1 to 2 2.2 2.2 0.0 0.876  
Sample size (total = 457) 239 218
Table 6.19 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: School environment is measured as the average percentage of students in the school who passed the 
Regents English and math exams in the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 school years. Higher-ranking schools have a 
pass rate of 84 percent or higher; medium-ranking schools have a pass rate of 73 percent to 83 percent; and 
lower-ranking schools have a pass rate of 72 percent or lower.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple observations 
per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
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Rewards. Both the Talent Development Model and First Things First led to effects on attendance 
and progression that are similar in size to Family Rewards’ effects for higher-performing ninth-
graders.29
Other studies of interventions involving financial rewards for students show evidence of 
incentive strategies’ potential effects. For example, one program offering high school students 
direct incentives for taking and passing Advanced Placement exams was found to have a range 
of positive effects on educational outcomes.
 However, both of those programs were whole-school reforms that attempted to 
fundamentally change the school environment. What is impressive about Family Rewards is that 
it achieved its effects without any changes in school policies or teachers’ instructional practices.  
30 Another program that offered incentives for taking 
and passing a series of high school exams that were necessary to earn a matriculation certificate, 
which is required for postsecondary schooling, produced large increases in certification rates for 
girls.31
Another way to think about the size of effects for the higher-performing ninth-graders is 
to consider the achievement gap between higher- and lower-income students. DOE data for 
New York City’s more than 370 high schools were used for this exercise. First, the schools 
were ranked based on the number of low-income students they serve.
 The effects were concentrated on relatively higher-performing girls, which, except for the 
gender distinction, is consistent with the pattern of effects found for Family Rewards.  
32
 
 Among schools in 
which low-income students made up more than 80 percent of enrollment, about 74 percent of 
first-year students earned 10 or more credits during the year. In contrast, among schools in 
which less than a third of their students were low-income, this rate was 85 percent, for an 11 
percentage point differential. For the subgroup of more proficient ninth-graders, Family Re-
wards increased the number of students who earned 11 or more credits during Year 1 by 8.9 
percentage points. Thus, at least in terms of credits earned, the program appears to have led to 
sizable and policy-relevant gains in school progress during its first two years of operation, akin 
to narrowing the achievement gap between New York City schools with predominantly lower-
income versus relatively higher-income student bodies.  
                                                   
29The Talent Development Model seeks to transform low-performing high schools through organizational 
and curricular changes, such as the implementation of learning communities, research-based curricula, and 
teacher professional development (Kemple, Herlihy, and Smith, 2005). First Things First called for similarly 
major changes, including learning communities, instructional improvement, and a family advocate system 
(Quint et al., 2005).  
30Jackson (2010). 
31Angrist and Lavy (2009). 
32This ranking was conducted using the percentage of students who were eligible for Title I funds. 
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Chapter 7 
Health Care Rewards and Health Impacts 
Making safety net benefits for low-income families conditional on certain preventive 
health care practices is a core feature of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs worldwide. 
These programs typically require families to obtain regular checkups at health clinics and, in 
some cases, to participate in health and nutrition education sessions that are designed to promote 
active attention to health care in order to receive cash benefits.1
Family Rewards builds on the basic principle of linking financial payments to preven-
tive health care that has been used outside this country, adapted for the very different health care 
and safety net context found in the United States. It offers low-income families incentives to 
maintain public or private health insurance and to obtain age-appropriate preventive medical 
and dental checkups.
 As noted in Chapter 1, a number 
of studies found that some of these programs have important positive effects on the receipt of 
health care services as well as certain health outcomes among poor families.  
2
This chapter describes the health impacts of Family Rewards. Specifically, it examines 
the extent to which adults and children in the program earned rewards for health-related activities 
during the first two years of the program’s operation. It then presents findings on the short-term 
effects of the program on participants’ health insurance coverage, use of health care services, and 
health outcomes. The findings show that within about 18 months, Family Rewards produced a 
number of small, positive effects on outcomes in the health domain. It increased the continuity of 
health insurance coverage and increased the receipt of regular preventive care, particularly dental 
care. It also increased families’ reliance on regular health care providers over emergency room-
based care, and it produced some beneficial effects on health outcomes for both adults and 
children. The positive benefits in health care coverage and utilization (though not health status) 
are concentrated among the better-educated subsample. Although most of the short-term health 
effects of Family Rewards are small, they are observed on outcomes that are generally consi-
dered difficult to influence through social interventions, especially within a relatively brief 
follow-up period.
  
3
                                                   
1Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008). 
  
2See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the logic model and the pathways through which Family Rewards is 
expected to influence health.  
3The literature on the effectiveness — or the relative value  of  preventive clinical interventions (that is, 
interventions designed to change health care behavior) is vast and inconsistent. (In general, the response to 
preventive clinical interventions is weak.) In a systematic review and analysis of recent interventions, Macio-
sek et al. (2006) find insufficient evidence to support the effectiveness of a variety of counseling and preventive 
(continued) 
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The families in the Family Rewards sample had higher-than-expected insurance cover-
age and patterns of preventive care when they entered the study. These characteristics may 
reflect efforts in recent years in New York City and New York State to improve access to health 
care coverage and to improve the health delivery system for low-income and moderate-income 
families. For example, State and City officials have worked with a range of stakeholders to 
implement measures to reduce administrative barriers to enrollment in and maintenance of 
public health insurance programs in order to provide coverage to more individuals.4 Moreover, 
New York City has been at the forefront of creating public-private partnerships to identify and 
enroll eligible uninsured residents. This enrollment push has been aided by a combination of 
State funding support, City agency partnerships, and use of community-based enrollment staff.5 
The City and State have also enacted a series of reforms to increase the retention of public 
insurance among participating families and individuals.6
All these reforms are an important backdrop for understanding the health-related im-
pacts of Family Rewards. They are likely to account for the already high health care coverage 
and preventive health care practices reported by control group parents at the time they entered 
the study and in follow-up interviews. Consequently, on some measures, Family Rewards has 
limited room to improve health outcomes further.  
 For instance, they have reduced 
documentation requirements for Medicaid renewal and streamlined the renewal process.  
Measuring the Health-Related Impacts of Family Rewards 
The analysis of health-related outcomes and impacts is based on a variety of data 
sources. First, Seedco’s Family Rewards payment system provides data on the receipt of health 
rewards during the first two years of the program. As described in Chapter 4, this system 
records the number and types of health reward payments earned, as well as the total amount 
earned by adults and children. Second, the analysis of public health insurance coverage (that is, 
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, or CHIP) is based on administrative 
                                                   
care practices (for example, counseling the general population of adults and children about physical activity 
and diet; counseling children and adults about preventive dental care practices; or counseling older children, 
adolescents, and adults on safety practices). Furthermore, while some evidence suggests that health insurance 
alone has beneficial effects on life expectancy, the impacts are small (Muennig, Franks, and Gold, 2005). On 
the other hand, the effects of social interventions, such as improved early childhood education, have demon-
strated effective ways of improving later health outcomes (Belfield, 2007). The gains are large, ranging from 
four to nine years in increased life expectancy for those who earn a high school diploma, or up to an 11.5 
percent increase (Muennig, 2000). These interventions, however, require many years to demonstrate effects. 
4Even when they meet income requirements, undocumented immigrants are not eligible for public health 
insurance because their immigration status disqualifies them for the programs. 
5New York City Mayor’s Office of Health Insurance Access (2004). 
6See United Hospital Fund (2009). 
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records obtained from New York City’s Human Resources Administration (HRA).7 These data 
are used to calculate public health insurance receipt for adults and children, and are available for 
two to three quarters prior to random assignment, and for six to seven quarters afterward.8 
Third, the Family Rewards 18-month parent survey, fielded for a random subset of the full 
study sample, provides extensive information on health care practices and outcomes that cannot 
be captured from the administrative records databases.9
All the survey-based measures involving health and health care are reported by the par-
ents in the study sample. One potentially problematic aspect of measurement from survey-based 
assessment is the extent to which respondents tend to give “socially desirable” answers to 
questions about their health care behavior rather than reporting on their actual behavior. This 
report is mindful of the potential problems of social desirability, as well as the accuracy of 
respondent recall, another potential problem in survey data, and, wherever possible, uses other 
sources (for instance, Seedco’s earnings data or national and local studies) to try to put the 
Family Rewards survey findings in context.  
 For the most part, these survey inter-
views were conducted between December 2008 and July 2009, which is part way through the 
second year of the program. The survey is the only source of data for analyzing the program’s 
effects on parents’ and children’s health care utilization and health outcomes. It also provides 
information on access to private health insurance, which, unlike information on public health 
insurance, is not available from administrative records. Where possible, the chapter presents 
survey estimates for adults and for three groups of focal children, based on the grade they were 
in when they entered the study: elementary school (kindergarten through fifth grade), middle 
school (sixth through eighth grades), and high school (ninth through twelfth grades).  
Finally, the impact analysis examines a large number of outcomes related to health care. 
As mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6, as the number of outcomes used for impact estimates 
increases, the probability of finding “false positives,” or differences that are statistically signifi-
cant simply by chance, also increases. Although no attempt is made to formally account for 
“multiple hypothesis testing,” caution must be used when interpreting impacts that do not 
appear to be part of a larger pattern of impacts within a given set of measures.  
                                                   
7As noted in Chapter 1, Medicaid is available to pregnant women and children under 6 years of age whose 
family income is at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty level, for children ages 6 to 19 with family 
income up to 100 percent of the federal poverty level, and for families receiving government income support 
through the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program or New York State’s Safety Net 
Assistance program. 
8Because of issues with coverage dates included in the data, Medicaid receipt in a given quarter is meas-
ured using the recipient’s status on the first day of a quarter. As a result, the measure reported here captures 
coverage status at the start of each quarter. 
9For a description of the survey and an analysis of response patterns, see Appendix D. Most survey res-
pondents (92 percent) were interviewed between 15 and 20 months after random assignment.  
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The Health Care Rewards 
Table 7.1 summarizes the Family Rewards health incentives.10
To promote these visits, participants are expected to present doctors with an age-
appropriate “preventive care checklist form” that identifies a set of common health conditions 
that doctors should explore or screen for in any thorough annual physical examination. (Separate 
forms were created for parents and children.) The form is also a way to specify exactly what kind 
of visit to the doctor is to be rewarded, and it communicates to the doctor and the patient that the 
reward is given to participants for preventive behavior only — not for going to the doctor when 
they feel sick or have a particular medical problem. Specifying the activities that are supposed to 
take place during the visit is one way of distinguishing this type of doctor visit from other types 
of doctor visits. Figure 7.1 presents the “Child Non-Emergency Medical Checkup Form” for 
children that is used in the Family Rewards program. Parents are required to have the doctor sign 
this form, which is tailored to the needs of infants and toddlers (ages 0 to 5 years), younger 
children (ages 6 to 12 years), and teenagers (ages 13 to 19 years). As shown, for infants and 
toddlers, the form includes a standard set of questions to encourage the doctor to screen for 
developmental problems and to make an appropriate referral for a fuller early intervention 
evaluation when warranted.  
 The first two panels fo-
cus on rewards for preventive medical and dental examinations. Each program year, families 
can earn $200 per family member for completing an annual nonemergency medical checkup. 
Families with infants and toddlers can get one early childhood intervention screening, in 
addition to a regular checkup, if it is recommended by a physician. Increasing preventive health 
care is expected to ensure that family members get regular medical attention, which can lead to 
early diagnosis and treatment of health problems that can become more serious if left untreated. 
In addition, the program’s designers hoped that by encouraging regular care, they could increase 
the likelihood that participants would establish a “medical home” — in other words, a relation-
ship with a doctor (or health care institution) who knows their medical history and can provide a 
place for them to turn when problems arise, rather than resorting to hospital emergency rooms 
as a first response.  
To encourage adherence to physician-advised follow-up care, the program also offered 
an incentive payment for one follow-up visit per family member per year over the first two 
years of the program. For families with very young children, it also included a reward for 
completing a comprehensive early intervention assessment (which is free of charge to all 
qualifying residents of New York City) in cases where a physician identifies potential develop-
mental problems.  
                                                   
10See Chapter 1 for further detail. 
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Family Rewards also offers an incentive for preventive dental care. It rewards two visits 
per year for cleanings and checkups for all enrolled family members 6 years of age and older, 
and one per year for children between the ages of 1 and 5 years. 
The bottom panel of Table 7.1 focuses on rewards for health insurance coverage. Many 
families who enrolled in the study are eligible for means-tested public health insurance through 
Medicaid, CHIP,11 or Family Health Plus.12
                                                   
11CHIP targets uninsured children and pregnant women in families with incomes too high to qualify for 
Medicaid, but often too low for them to afford private coverage.  
 The incentive payments are intended to encourage 
families to keep their coverage in effect. Substantial evidence exists regarding the potentially 
harmful impacts of the loss of Medicaid insurance. Studies have linked loss of coverage with
12Family Health Plus is also a public health insurance program for adults who are age 19 to 64 who have 
income or resources too high to qualify for Medicaid. Health care is provided through participating managed 
care plans in the area. 
Activity Payment
Complete annual nonemergency medical checkup $200 per family member; once a year
Complete physician-advised follow-up $100 per family member; once a year
Complete pediatrician-advised early-intervention referral and 
evaluation for child under 30 months 
$200 per child; once a year                                                      
Complete 2 dental visits per year for family members 6 and older
$100 per family member; twice a year
Complete 1 dental visit per year for family members ages 1-5 $100 per child; once a year
Health insurance coveragea
Get or maintain public health insurance coverage, including 
Medicaid, Family Health Plus, and/or Child Health Plus
$40 every 2 months; per adult and for all 
children combined
Get or maintain private health insurance $100 every 2 months; per adult and for all 
children combined 
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 7.1
Health Rewards
Preventive health care
Preventive dental care
NOTE: aNo matter how many children a family has, they receive only $40 or $100 per period for this reward; it 
is not paid per child. The health insurance rewards were discontinued at the start of Year 3 of the program, but 
were in effect for most of the period covered by this report.
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Figure 7.1 
Family Rewards Bilingual Nonemergency Medical Checkup Form for Children 
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discontinuity of care, reduced ambulatory care use, increased emergency room use, higher 
health care costs, and worse patient outcomes.13
Because recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Safety 
Net Assistance (SNA) are routinely enrolled in Medicaid and are not required to reestablish 
their eligibility as long as they remain on TANF or SNA cash welfare,
 Furthermore, children of adults who lose 
Medicaid may themselves be affected through “spillover effects” and are more likely to be 
uninsured despite their eligibility for coverage.  
14 they were ineligible for 
this incentive while receiving those benefits.15
The health insurance rewards were discontinued at the start of Year 3. As noted in 
Chapter 1, this decision was made partially because data from the early stages of the evaluation 
suggested that insurance coverage rates were very high for participants in the study and there 
was not very much room for Family Rewards to improve them. This change does not affect the 
results discussed in this chapter, which cover the first and, in some cases, a portion of the 
second program year only.  
 A slightly higher payment was offered to families 
when the parent had coverage from private, employer-sponsored health insurance, to offset the 
higher costs of obtaining coverage.  
Receipt of Health Care Rewards 
This section briefly reviews the extent to which program members earned health care 
rewards during the first two years of Family Rewards. As discussed in Chapter 4, almost 90 
percent of the participating families earned at least one health care reward in Year 1 of the 
program. Data for Year 2 suggest that an equally high proportion of families continued to earn 
health rewards into the second year of the program. Further, most families were fairly well 
informed and knowledgeable about the health-related activities that the program rewarded. 
While there was some confusion about activities that the program did not reward, almost all 
survey respondents knew that they could earn rewards for getting and maintaining health 
insurance coverage (93 percent) and for making regular doctor or dentist visits for preventive 
care (83 and 97 percent, respectively). This section takes a closer look at Seedco’s payment data 
to help clarify the extent to which study participants earned the various health care rewards that 
the program offered.  
                                                   
13See Saunders and Alexander (2009); Fairbrother et al. (2004); Cassedy, Fairbrother, and Newacheck 
(2008); Duderstadt, Hughes, Soobader, and Newacheck (2006).  
14Safety Net Assistance provides benefits to eligible individuals and families who do not qualify for 
TANF or other federal cash assistance programs.  
15However, as discussed in the next section, complexities in administering this portion of the Family Re-
wards program meant that during the first and second years of operations, many of these families did, in fact, 
receive the rewards.  
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Table 7.2 summarizes the rewards that adults and children in the program earned for 
preventive medical and dental visits. Data are shown for each of the first two years of the 
program separately and for the two years combined. The first year of the program covers 
September 2007 through August 2008, and the second year covers September 2008 through 
August 2009. Over the two-year period, 72.6 percent of participating adults earned rewards for 
health and dental care visits. The reward rates were higher for preventive health care checkups 
(64.2 percent for an annual physical) than for regular dental care visits (56.7 percent). Less than 
half the participants earned a reward for a doctor-recommended follow-up visit. As expected, the 
proportion of adults receiving rewards for health-related activities increased slightly over time.  
Years 1 and 2 
Outcome (%) Year 1 Year 2 Combined
Parent
Earned at least one reward for medical or dental visit 60.3 62.2 72.6
Annual physical 49.7 51.1 64.2
Dental care visit 42.1 45.8 56.7
One dental visit 26.4 27.4 NA
Two dental visits 15.7 18.4 NA
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit 27.9 31.4 43.9
Sample size 2,515
Children
Earned at least one reward for medical or dental visit 71.9 68.7 80.0
Annual physical 63.0 58.3 75.0
Dental care visita 54.6 52.9 67.0
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit 30.4 29.9 44.0
Sample size 5,680
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 7.2
Rewards Earned for Parents' and Children's Doctor and Dentist Visits
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008, and the second year 
covers September 2008 through August 2009. "Sample size" refers to the number of individuals.
aFamilies can earn rewards for preventive dental visits up to twice a year for each child ages 6 
and up and once a year for children under age 6.
NA = Not applicable.
203 
 
The table also presents the medical and dental care rewards that all children in the study 
received (bottom panel). About 80 percent of the children earned health or dental care rewards 
over the two-year period. Similar to the pattern that was observed for adults, the reward rates for 
health care checkups were higher than the reward rates for dental visits (75 percent compared 
with 67 percent). While these data point to generally strong participation for children in health-
related activities, Year 2 data show a small drop in the proportion of children who received 
rewards for regular preventive medical and dental care. Interview data discussed in Chapter 4 
suggest that, for some families, connection to the program fluctuated with life events, which 
might explain part of the pattern observed for children.  
Table 7.3 shows the preventive health and dental care rewards for children by age and 
school level. There are few differences by child’s age or school level, and high school students 
were not more likely to earn rewards than were elementary or middle school students.16
Table 7.4 presents rewards earned for getting or maintaining health insurance coverage 
by TANF or SNA status at the time of random assignment. The top panel presents findings for 
adults and families who were not receiving TANF or SNA at random assignment. It shows that 
69.2 percent of the parents in these families had earned at least one reward for getting or 
maintaining public health insurance. Another 29.8 percent had earned at least one reward for 
getting or maintaining private insurance.  
 Over 
the two-year period, the most common reward earned for health care activities was for getting 
an annual health checkup, with 77.8 percent and 76.7 percent of elementary and middle school 
students (respectively) and 71.9 percent of high school students earning at least one reward of 
this type over the reported period. Rewards for doctor-recommended follow-up visits were also 
earned, but reward rates for this activity were much lower than the preventive health and dental 
care rewards earned by school level. Reward rates for early intervention evaluation visits, which 
were offered for children who were younger than 30 months of age, remained low, or about 9.8 
percent over the two-year period.  
The bottom panel of Table 7.4 presents the findings for families who were receiving this 
assistance at the time of random assignment. As noted above, recipients of TANF and SNA are 
automatically enrolled in Medicaid and are not required to reestablish their Medicaid eligibility 
as long as they remain on TANF or SNA. Thus, by design, Family Rewards participants are not 
to be considered eligible for the program’s health insurance incentive while they are receiving 
TANF or SNA (although they could become eligible for the rewards after exiting those programs 
if they still qualified for public insurance). Despite this restriction, 89.4 percent of parents in
                                                   
16As discussed in Chapter 1, some education payments were made to high school students directly, but all 
other payments, including all health payments, were made to the parents.  
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Outcome (%) Year 1 Year 2
Years 1 and 
2 Combined
All children
Child earned at least one reward for medical or dental visit 71.9 68.7 80.0
Annual physical 63.0 58.3 75.0
Dental care visita 54.6 52.9 67.0
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit 30.4 29.9 44.0
Sample size 5,680
Children under 30 months of age
Child earned at least one reward for medical or dental visit 76.4 72.8 83.9
Annual physical 70.1 66.5 82.3
Early intervention evaluation 8.3 1.6 9.8
Dental care visita 27.6 42.9 49.2
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit 34.7 32.3 49.2
Sample size 254
Children 30 months to 5 years of age
Child earned at least one reward for medical or dental visit 73.5 73.9 81.9
Annual physical 67.1 63.4 79.5
Dental care visita 54.8 59.4 71.3
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit 33.6 34.6 49.5
Sample size 547
Elementary school students
Child earned at least one reward for medical or dental visit 74.3 73.6 82.5
Annual physical 65.9 62.8 77.8
Dental care visita 59.6 59.8 72.0
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit 31.2 33.3 46.2
Sample size 1,889
Middle school students
Child earned at least one reward for medical or dental visit 72.4 70.6 81.3
Annual physical 63.5 59.7 76.7
Dental care visita 56.1 53.8 67.3
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit 31.5 30.1 44.9
Sample size 1,264
(continued)
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Table 7.3
Rewards Earned for Children's Doctor and Dentist Visits, 
by Child's Age or School Level
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families receiving TANF or SNA at random assignment received at least one reward for main-
taining public health insurance — a rate higher than that for the subgroup that was not receiving 
TANF or SNA. This pattern can be accounted for by certain difficulties that Seedco encountered 
in implementing this feature of the program. In particular, the administrative records data to 
which it had access for determining families’ health insurance status turned out to be incomplete 
or not current enough. It also faced difficulty obtaining timely information on families’ TANF or 
SNA status, which often changed. Recognizing these administrative complexities, the program 
designers made a policy decision to continue to pay public health insurance rewards to partici-
pants who were receiving TANF or SNA in the second year of the program.  
Overall, a large proportion of program participants earned the health care rewards that 
the program offered. However, as subsequent sections show, the proportion of program group 
members who report on the 18-month survey (as well as on the Background Information Form 
at the time of enrollment in the study) that they have had preventive medical and dental visits is 
higher than the proportion of participants who, according to Seedco’s payment data, earned 
rewards from the program for the same types of activities. The estimates from these different 
data sources could vary because they cover somewhat different reporting periods, or because 
the survey respondent’s recollection of when a particular activity actually took place may be 
based on a longer time horizon than specified in a survey question. Survey respondents may 
also overstate their preventive health care practices in order to give more socially desirable 
responses to the interviewer. Also relevant is the fact that Seedco’s data reflect rewards earned 
for verified activities, and, of course, its counts do not include cases where a participant com-
pleted the relevant health activities but did not submit the paperwork necessary to claim a 
payment. It is not possible to determine how important this factor is relative to others that might 
Outcome (%) Year 1 Year 2
Years 1 and 
2 Combined
High school students
Child earned at least one reward for medical or dental visit 71.3 63.8 78.5
Annual physical 61.0 52.3 71.9
Dental care visita 54.9 48.4 66.1
Doctor-recommended follow-up visit 28.5 26.5 41.2
Sample size 1,538
Table 7.3 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008, and the second year covers 
September 2008 through August 2009. "Sample size" refers to the number of children.
aFamilies can earn rewards for preventive dental visits up to twice a year for each child ages 6 and up 
and once a year for children under age 6.
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Years 1 and 2 
Outcome (%) Year 1 Year 2 Combined
Families not receiving TANF/SNA at random assignment
Parents 
Earned at least one reward for
Parent's public heath insurance 61.4 63.4 69.2
Parent's private health insurance 25.8 25.1 29.8
Parent's public or private health insurance 82.4 84.1 90.3
Sample size 1,848
Families 
Earned at least one reward for
Children's public health insurance 68.9 69.0 74.9
Children's private health insurance 20.0 17.8 22.9
Children's public or private health insurance 83.2 82.3 89.3
Sample size 1,724
Families receiving TANF/SNA at random assignment
Parents 
Earned at least one reward for 
Parent's public heath insurance 81.3 82.5 89.4
Parent's private health insurance 3.1 3.8 4.8
Parent's public or private health insurance 82.5 85.1 90.9
Sample size 583
Families 
Earned at least one reward for
Children's public health insurance 75.4 77.0 82.6
Children's private health insurance 2.3 2.1 3.0
Children's public or private health insurance 76.3 78.7 83.7
Sample size 569
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 7.4
Health Insurance Rewards Earned for Maintaining Coverage, by Temporary
 Status at the Time of Random Assignment
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or Safety Net Assistance (SNA)
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cause the disparity, but the evaluation’s in-depth interviews with a small number of program 
participants suggest that it is a relevant factor. Those interviews reveal that some health care 
providers took weeks to complete the paperwork after the visit. Once it was ready, participants 
had to return to the provider to pick it up. For these reasons, at least 13 participants who took 
part in the in-depth qualitative interviews missed deadlines for coupon submission but had in 
fact completed the activity. Only one participant submitted the coupon after the deadline. 
Another participant explained the challenges she faced in completing the activity: 
Yes, the kid’s dentist. I was not able to send it because I missed the date and, 
you know, you get an appointment and their doctor wasn’t accepting the in-
surance that I had, and when I called and made an appointment the date was 
past. And also, I missed two, the one to the dentist and the one for the physi-
cal, which is every six months. Because I took it to fill it out and it took them 
a month and a half to fill it out. 
In addition, some participants encountered resistance from health care providers who 
were unfamiliar with the program. As one participant explained, “In my case, I rarely send it. A 
Years 1 and 2 
Outcome (%) Year 1 Year 2 Combined
 All families 
Parents 
Earned at least one reward for
Parent's public heath insurance 66.5 68.3 74.3
Parent's private health insurance 20.1 19.7 23.6
Parent's public or private health insurance 82.3 84.3 90.3
Sample size 2,515
Families 
Earned at least one reward for
Children's public health insurance 70.8 71.2 77.1
Children's private health insurance 15.4 13.6 17.7
Children's public or private health insurance 81.5 81.4 87.9
Sample size 2,377
Table 7.4 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTE: The first program year covers September 2007 through August 2008, and the second year 
covers September 2008 through August 2009. 
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lot of times, my doctor, a lady, says, ‘No, but I don’t have time. I don’t have knowledge of this. 
I have to know more about this.’” 
These types of experiences may explain why participants reported more preventive 
health care visits than are evident in the program data.  
Impacts on Health Insurance Coverage and Health Care  
This section examines the impact of Family Rewards on health insurance coverage and 
health care for adults and children who are enrolled in the program.17
Health Insurance Coverage Overall 
 As discussed in previous 
sections, overall health insurance coverage was already extremely high for this sample. None-
theless, Family Rewards helped raise it even higher.  
The analysis of health insurance coverage draws on both the 18-month survey and ad-
ministrative records data. The survey provides a more comprehensive snapshot of health 
insurance coverage by including a series of questions on whether participants — and members 
of their families — were covered by public or private health insurance in the month prior to the 
survey interview. The administrative records data, on the other hand, capture receipt of public 
insurance only, but offer multiple data points, pre- and post-random assignment, allowing the 
study to trace impacts on Medicaid receipt over time. Therefore, these two data sources offer 
slightly different lenses for assessing the program’s effects on health insurance coverage.  
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 present these findings. Starting with the survey-based results (see the 
first panel of Table 7.5), it is evident that at about 18 months after random assignment (the 
average length of the survey follow-up period), few sample members were without health 
insurance coverage. About 95.6 percent of the program group members reported having some 
form of public or private health insurance, compared with 93.7 percent of the control group 
members, a statistically significant though small difference of 1.9 percentage points. The 
program group reported slightly higher levels of both public and private insurance, producing 
the overall difference in coverage between the two groups.  
The control group coverage rates are higher than the designers of Family Rewards an-
ticipated, especially for people living in the very high-poverty neighborhoods from which the 
sample was selected. Consistent with these expectations, a national health study found that
                                                   
17The health insurance reward was dropped for the third year of the program. This change does not affect 
the results presented in this section.  
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Health insurance in previous month
Respondent had health insurance 95.6 93.7 1.9 ** 0.020
Publicly funded 73.3 72.4 0.9 0.451
Privately, but not publicly, fundeda 22.2 21.4 0.8 0.475
All dependent children had health insuranceb 94.8 93.5 1.3 0.133
All children covered by public health insurance onlyc 75.4 74.3 1.1 0.446
All children covered by private health insurance onlyc 15.2 15.9 -0.7 0.542
Health insurance coverage since random assignment
Respondent had a period with no coverage 16.1 19.4 -3.3 ** 0.016
Some or all of respondent's children had a 
period with no coverage 14.6 17.9 -3.3 ** 0.014
Respondent's health care utilization
Has a usual source of health care 94.9 91.4 3.5 *** 0.000
Clinic or health center 61.0 51.6 9.5 *** 0.000
Doctor's office 21.2 23.4 -2.2 0.126
Hospital emergency room 3.3 5.3 -2.0 *** 0.006
Hospital outpatient department 9.4 11.1 -1.8 0.109
Other 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.980
Has a personal doctor or health care provider 94.4 93.4 1.0 0.244
Saw a personal doctor in the past 12 months 86.1 82.3 3.8 *** 0.004
Had a health checkup since random assignment 93.2 91.7 1.5 0.128
Dental visits since random assignment
Had at least 1 dental visit 86.0 83.0 3.0 ** 0.024
Had at least 2 dental visits 67.4 57.9 9.5 *** 0.000
Stayed in hospital overnight since random assignmentd 16.7 18.5 -1.7 0.464
Unmet health needs
Did not get needed medical care because of cost in
past 12 monthse 6.5 10.4 -3.9 *** 0.000
Did not fill prescription because of cost in past 12 months 13.6 15.8 -2.1 * 0.096
Received help finding a dentist or health care provider 
from any NPO 9.5 10.7 -1.1 0.297
Respondent's health care satisfaction
Average patient satisfaction scoref (1 = low; 5 = high) 3.7 3.7 0.0 * 0.094 0.075
General satisfactiong 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.357 0.041
Communicationh 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.546 0.027
(continued)
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Impacts on Families' Health Insurance Coverage and Parents' Receipt of 
Table 7.5
Health Care Services
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Technical qualityi 4.0 3.8 0.1 *** 0.001 0.153
Time spent with doctorj 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.317 0.045
Accessibility and conveniencek 3.5 3.5 0.0 0.766 0.013
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
        
Table 7.5 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values.  
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between the program and control groups arose by chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of the 
standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
aRespondents with public coverage were not asked whether they have private coverage; therefore, it is not possible 
to estimate if they also have private coverage. Seedco's program data indicate that 5 percent of families in the program 
group earned rewards for having both private and public coverage. Even more families may have had both public and 
private coverage but did not actively submit coupons for private coverage and, therefore, are not captured in the 
program data.
bChild-related health insurance measures were calculated for sample members with at least one child at the time of 
the survey.
cThe percentages of all children covered by public and all children covered by private health insurance do not add  
up to the percentage of all children covered by any insurance because some families reported having children covered 
by both types of insurance. 
dThe items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 1,022) of the survey 
respondents.
eThis excludes prescriptions.
fThe items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,043) of the survey 
respondents. The five patient satisfaction subscales are based on ten items from the RAND Patient Satisfaction 
Questionnaire (PSQ-18). Higher values (maximum = 5) reflect more satisfaction with medical care, and lower values 
(minimum = 1) reflect more dissatisfaction  (www.rand.org/health surveys_tools/psq/index.html). The average patient 
satisfaction score is the average of the five subscale scores.
gThe "general satisfaction" subscale is an average of the responses to two questions about agreement with the 
following statements: "The medical care I have been receiving is just about perfect" and "I am dissatisfied with some 
things about the medical care I receive." 
hThe "communication" subscale is based on agreement with the following statement: "Doctors I go to are good 
about explaining the reasons for medical tests."
iThe "technical quality" subscale is based on agreement with the following statement: "When I go for medical care, 
they are careful to check everything when treating and examining me."
jThe "time spent with doctor" subscale is an average of the responses to two questions about agreement with the 
following statements: "Doctors usually spend enough time time talking with me about my medical condition or 
treatment" and "Those who provide my medical care sometime hurry too much when they treat me." 
kThe "accessibility and convenience" subscale is an average of the responses to four questions about agreement 
with the following statements: "Where I get medical care, I have to wait too long for emergency treatment," "I find it 
hard to get an appointment for medical care right away," "I have easy access to the medical specialist(s) I need," and "I 
am able to get medical care when I need it." 
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only 81 percent of food stamp recipients had some form of health insurance.18 A number of 
factors may be contributing to the higher rates found in the Family Rewards sample. First, the 
study sample does not include undocumented immigrants, who tend to have much lower 
coverage rates than legal immigrant and nonimmigrant low-income families. Second, as 
discussed previously, New York City and New York State have expanded public health 
insurance coverage for low-income families (Medicaid program, Family Health Plus, and 
CHIP, also known as Child Health Plus) and have intensified their efforts to market that 
coverage to those families in recent years. Along with the efforts to expand coverage, the City 
and State have also made significant investments in strengthening the primary and preventive 
health care delivery system.19 Moreover, many states “churn” Medicaid recipients at a higher 
rate, requiring them to renew coverage every six months, compared with every year in New 
York. In an attempt to reduce the number of adults and children churning on and off Medicaid 
and CHIP, New York has implemented several steps to streamline and simplify Medicaid 
renewal processes.20
Public Health Insurance Coverage 
  
On the 18-month parent survey, program and control groups report fairly comparable 
levels of public health insurance coverage: 73.3 percent of the program group and 72.4 percent 
of the control group reported having such insurance at the time of the interview, a difference of 
0.9 that is not statistically significant (see Table 7.5). The public health insurance levels reported 
at the point of the survey interview are fairly comparable with the levels reported upon entry 
into the study.  
Findings on public insurance coverage are also available from administrative records 
data and are presented in Table 7.6. The table presents Medicaid receipt for adults grouped by 
their TANF or SNA status at the time of random assignment.21
                                                   
18The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) is the primary data source for moni-
toring the nation’s nutrition and health status. This report by Cole and Fox (2004) describes the nutrition and 
health characteristics of participants and nonparticipants in the Food Stamp program using data from the third 
NHANES survey, which was completed between 1988 and 1994 for a large, nationally representative sample.  
 The top panel shows the impacts 
for program and control group members who were not receiving TANF or SNA at the point of 
random assignment. As shown, the program increased this group’s Medicaid receipt rates 
starting in Quarter 5 of random assignment, producing small but positive effects that persisted 
through the end of the follow-up period for this report. The effects were largest in Quarter 5:  
19Coalition of New York State Public Health Plans (2009). 
20United Hospital Fund (2009). 
21Because reliable data on start and end dates were not available, Medicaid receipt in a given quarter is 
measured using the recipient’s status on the first day of that quarter. As a result, the measure reported here 
captures coverage status at the start of each quarter. 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Medicaid coverage among parents not receiving 
TANF/SNA at random assignment 
Quarter of random assignment (%) 56.3 55.9 0.4 0.680
Quarter 2 58.5 58.6 -0.1 0.909
Quarter 3 58.8 57.8 1.0 0.405
Quarter 4 59.2 57.4 1.8 0.154
Quarter 5 60.8 56.5 4.4 *** 0.001
Quarter 6 60.4 56.5 3.9 *** 0.003
Quarter 7 59.2 56.3 2.8 ** 0.035
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 44.7 41.0 3.7 *** 0.007
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 3.6 3.4 0.1 ** 0.022
Sample size (total = 3,696) 1,837 1,859
Medicaid coverage among parents receiving 
TANF/SNA at random assignment 
Quarter of random assignment (%) 88.8 89.5 -0.8 0.604
Quarter 2 88.2 87.8 0.4 0.824
Quarter 3 85.4 85.2 0.2 0.939
Quarter 4 86.0 82.7 3.3 0.123
Quarter 5 83.8 80.4 3.5 0.120
Quarter 6 80.1 79.6 0.5 0.816
Quarter 7 80.9 80.9 -0.1 0.982
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 62.4 62.8 -0.4 0.887
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 5.0 5.0 0.1 0.396
Sample size (total = 1,121) 579 542
Medicaid coverage among parents
Quarter of random assignment (%) 64.1 64.1 0.0 0.986
Quarter 2 65.6 65.9 -0.4 0.714
Quarter 3 65.1 64.5 0.6 0.583
Quarter 4 65.5 63.8 1.7 0.123
Quarter 5 66.0 62.6 3.4 *** 0.002
Quarter 6 65.1 62.6 2.5 ** 0.030
Quarter 7 64.2 62.7 1.5 0.207
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 49.0 46.4 2.6 ** 0.036
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 3.9 3.8 0.1 * 0.070
Sample size (total = 4,966) 2,498 2,468
(continued)
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 Impacts on Parents' Medicaid Receipt, by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) or Safety Net Assistance (SNA) Status at the Time of Random Assignment
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56.5 percent of the control group participants who were not receiving TANF or SNA at baseline 
were receiving Medicaid, compared with 60.8 percent of the program group, a statistically 
significant difference of 4.4 percentage points.  
The next panel shows the same types of outcomes for the group that was receiving 
TANF or SNA at random assignment. Recall that these individuals were not supposed to be 
eligible for the program’s public health incentives while receiving TANF or SNA. About one-
third of the enrolled sample (N = 1,121) was in this subgroup, and, as expected, Medicaid 
receipt rates for this group were higher for both the program and control groups, and Family 
Rewards did not increase the receipt rate for the program group.  
The final panel shows results for the full sample of parents enrolled in the program. By 
Quarter 5 after random assignment, which coincides with the early part of Year 2 of the pro-
gram, Family Rewards had increased Medicaid coverage for parents in the program group by 
3.4 percentage points. However, that impact on the full sample fades by Quarter 7. 
Continuous Health Insurance Coverage 
Low-income families experience a high rate of interruptions — or churning — in public 
health coverage. It is estimated that approximately one-third of New York’s public health 
enrollees fail to complete the recertification process each year and lose coverage.22
                                                   
22Lake Research Partners and Perry (2009). 
 Even though 
they remain eligible, families are prone to lose coverage at the time of recertification because 
they fail to successfully complete the process. Furthermore, gaps in coverage also occur with 
private insurance programs. This section draws on both administrative records and survey data 
to examine the effects of Family Rewards on continuity of health insurance coverage.  
Table 7.6 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using administrative records data from the New York State Human Resources 
Administration.
NOTES: Because reliable data on start and end dates are not available, Medicaid receipt in a given quarter is 
measured using the recipient's status on the first day of that quarter.
The sample excludes 30 members randomly assigned between January and March 2008.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
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Table 7.6 shows the data on the continuity of Medicaid coverage for parents. The top 
panel shows that Family Rewards increased the continuity of that coverage for parents who 
were not receiving TANF or SNA at the time of random assignment. Among that group, 44.7 
percent of parents in the program group received Medicaid for all seven quarters of the available 
follow-up period, which is 3.7 percentage points higher than the 41.0 percent rate among the 
control group parents in that subgroup. However, it produced no effects on the continuity of 
Medicaid coverage for the subgroup that was receiving TANF or SNA (second panel of Table 
7.6), for which continuity of coverage was already higher, as illustrated by the fact that 62.8 
percent of the control group members had continuous coverage. The positive impacts for the 
full sample, shown in the bottom panel of Table 7.6, largely reflect the impacts for the subgroup 
that was not receiving TANF or SNA, which accounts for three-fourths of the full sample.  
The 18-month survey findings provide another lens on this issue. The survey respon-
dents were asked to report whether they or their children had not been covered by public or 
private health insurance since random assignment. Table 7.5 shows that Family Rewards 
decreased gaps in health insurance for both adults and children. Among adults, roughly 16.1 
percent of program group respondents and 19.4 percent of control group respondents were 
without coverage at some point following random assignment (shown in the second panel of 
Table 7.5), a statistically significant reduction of 3.3 percentage points. Similarly, 14.6 percent 
of program group respondents and 17.9 percent of control group respondents indicated that 
some or all of their children had been without coverage at some point since random assignment, 
also a statistically significant reduction of 3.3 percentage points. Thus, the analyses of Medicaid 
records and the parent survey results show that Family Rewards reduced lapses in health 
insurance coverage for adults and children.  
Source of Health Care  
The 18-month survey included a question asking respondents whether they had a regu-
lar source of care — a place where they usually go when they are sick or in need of advice 
about their health, or when they need routine health care, like a checkup. Those with a positive 
response to the question were asked whether they go to a clinic or health center, a doctor’s 
office or HMO, a hospital emergency room, a hospital outpatient department, or some other 
place for care.23
                                                   
23National estimates for this type of measure suggest that 16 percent of adults 18 years of age and over 
were without a usual place of health care. Of those with a usual place of care, 77 percent considered a doctor’s 
office or HMO to be their usual place of health care, 20 percent considered a clinic or health center to be their 
usual place of health care, and 3 percent considered a hospital emergency room or outpatient department to be 
their usual place of health care (Pleis, Lucas, and Ward, 2009).  
 This question does not attempt to measure actual emergency room or hospital 
outpatient department use; rather, it attempts to assess whether families have a “usual” place of 
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care to which they turn when needed for routine health care purposes. By encouraging partici-
pants to have a regular health care provider, the program is promoting the “medical home” 
concept, a model of health care delivery that, as explained earlier, includes an ongoing relation-
ship between provider and patient, and a comprehensive approach to care and coordination of 
care through providers and community services.24
At 18 months, Family Rewards produced a small but noticeable impact on the like-
lihood that program participants had a usual source of care and on the places from which that 
care was sought (see Table 7.5, third panel). Almost 95 percent of the program group reported 
that they had a usual source of care, compared with 91.4 percent of the control group, a statisti-
cally significant increase of 3.5 percentage points.
 Such a model of health care delivery is 
expected to reduce reliance on hospital emergency rooms for routine care.  
25
Additionally, in the short run, the program reduced reported reliance on hospitals as a 
family’s primary source of care. About 3.3 percent of the program group reported going to an 
emergency room for regular care, compared with 5.3 percent of the control group, a statistically 
significant reduction of 2 percentage points. Emergency room costs per visit are generally much 
higher than the costs of delivering comparable care in an outpatient clinic or doctor’s office, so 
even this small reduction on this measure may yield important cost savings.  
 Program group members were more likely 
to report a clinic or health center as a usual source of care (61 percent compared with 51.6 
percent), a statistically significant 9.5 percentage point impact over the control group.  
Receipt of Health Care Services 
As discussed previously, Family Rewards incentives are also intended to promote regu-
lar preventive medical and dental care for all family members. Adopting good preventive health 
care practices is linked to healthier lives by reducing unmet health needs. National data from 
one study show that 77 percent of adults 18 years of age and over had contacted a doctor or 
                                                   
24The concept of the medical home has evolved since its introduction by the American Academy of Pedia-
trics in 1967. Research suggests that individuals who have continuity with a regular practitioner are more likely 
to adhere to prescribed medications and to receive preventive care and well-coordinated, resource-efficient, and 
family-centered care, and are less likely to visit the emergency department and be hospitalized; in addition, 
their practitioner is more likely to recognize their problems and track their information (Christakis et al., 2001, 
2002, 2003; Starfield and Shi, 2004). 
25According to national estimates released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
(CDC) National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) updates based on data from the January-June 2009 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), the percentage of persons who had a usual place to go for 
medical care was 85.4 percent, which was lower than, but not significantly different from, the 2008 
estimate of 86.4 percent. These estimates are based on household interviews of a sample of the civilian 
noninstitutionalized population.  
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other health professional within the previous 12 months (excluding overnight hospital stays).26
The 18-month survey attempts to capture receipt of preventive health care services by 
asking respondents whether they had gone to a doctor, hospital, or clinic for a routine physical 
checkup (when they were not sick) since random assignment. A separate question asked 
whether they had seen their personal doctor or health care provider for a checkup or any 
medical care in the prior 12 months. Similarly, since the program encourages participants to 
have two dental checkups a year, survey respondents were asked how many times they had seen 
a dentist for a routine checkup or to have their teeth cleaned.  
 
While it is unclear whether these visits were for regular checkups, these rates are lower than the 
rates of preventive health care visits reported by the low-income Family Rewards sample. The 
program’s designers expected that the opposite would be the case.  
These findings are shown under the third panel of Table 7.5. First, 86.1 percent of the 
program group and 82.3 percent of the control group reported that they had seen their personal 
doctor or health care provider in the past 12 months — a 3.8 percentage point difference that is 
statistically significant. Family Rewards encouraged participants to adhere to physician-advised 
follow-up care, which might have contributed to this impact.  
An even higher proportion of program and control group participants (93 percent and 
92 percent, respectively) reported having had an annual health checkup in the period since 
random assignment, which could have ranged between 16 and 24 months for survey respon-
dents. These rates appear to be exceptionally high, even for a sample that is reasonably well 
insured and includes no undocumented immigrants. However, they are high for both the 
program and control groups and there is no evidence that Family Rewards affected this 
particular measure.  
In contrast, the program had some positive effects on preventive dental care. As Table 
7.5 shows, 86 percent of the program group reported having a dental checkup since random 
assignment, compared with 83 percent of the control group, a statistically significant difference 
of 3 percentage points. Family Rewards offered incentives for program participants to have two 
dental checkups in a program year, as recommended by the American Dental Association, and 
the data suggest that the program resulted in a statistically significant 9.5 percentage point 
increase on this outcome.27
                                                   
26Another study, using a 19-month window, finds that 90 percent of all Americans, 74 percent of African-
Americans, and 70 percent of children age 5-15 received preventive exams in that period (see Cherry, 
Woodwell, and Rechtsteiner, 2007).  
 Approximately 67.4 percent of the program group reported having 
two or more dental visits (which could include checkups/teeth cleaning) since random assign-
27Nationally, among adults 18-64 years of age, the prevalence rate for seeing a dentist is about 63 percent 
(NCHS, 2008).  
217 
ment, compared with 57.9 percent of the control group. Those who had not seen a dentist since 
random assignment offered a variety of reasons, including being scared of the dentist, not having 
the time, or lacking insurance or money. Less than 5 percent of those who did not see a dentist 
said they did not have a regular dentist (not shown in table). 
Some participants in in-depth interviews credited the program for helping them make 
changes to their health care efforts. One participant said that, prior to enrollment in the program, 
she took her children to the dentist only when there was a problem. Because of Family Re-
wards, she said, she took her children for a checkup, including her four-year-old, who had never 
seen a dentist. Reflecting on her daughter’s reaction to seeing a dentist, another participant said:  
She’s always been afraid of the dentist, so — I mean I had to take it. It was 
like a month before her . . . six-month checkup, so I said, “We have to go into 
the dentist today.” She said, “Mommy, I don’t want to go. . . . They hurt me.” 
I say, “No they don’t.” I said, “But you’re gonna get money for it.” She said, 
“For real?” I say, “Yeah.” She said, “Okay,” and she went to that dentist and 
she sat down and opened her mouth. She doesn’t have cavities or anything, 
but they cleaned her teeth and stuff. 
Another participant reported that her family had been neglecting doctor visits prior to 
enrolling in Family Rewards because they lacked money for the copayments and medication 
recommended by doctors. With Family Rewards, they were able to go. “So that’s a plus right 
there,” said the mother. Some participants had neglected their own medical checkups, and were 
able to have a regular health checkup after enrolling in the program. Some were simply moti-
vated by the rewards. One participant said,  
Well, even though we were doing the thing all along, we know that, you 
know, sometimes you slack off. It motivates you! Okay, you know that if 
you take the kids to the dentist and say, “Okay, maybe next time,” but you 
know that during this period you will get $100, instead of waiting for some 
other time, you do it. 
Unmet Health Needs 
Family Rewards produced a small reduction in the extent to which families experienced 
medical-related hardships because of costs. In order to determine the program’s effects on 
reducing unmet health needs, the 18-month survey included questions that asked respondents 
whether they needed to see a doctor or fill a prescription for medicine in the prior year but had 
not done so because of the cost. As shown in Table 7.5 (fourth panel, “Unmet health needs”), 
fewer program group members reported not being able to get medical care because they could 
not afford it (6.5 percent versus 10.4 percent, a statistically significant difference of 3.9 percen-
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tage points).28
Finally, patient satisfaction has emerged as a critical outcome of medical care. It has 
been associated with patient adherence to medical recommendations, “doctor shopping,” and 
disenrollment from prepaid health plans. Survey participants were administered items from the 
RAND Patient Satisfaction Questionnaire, a multidimensional scale assessing five domains of 
patient satisfaction.
 Similarly, 13.6 percent of the program group and 15.8 percent of the control 
group reported that they had not been able to fill a prescription because of cost, a statistically 
significant reduction of 2.1 percentage points.  
29
Health Outcomes 
 Respondents report relatively high levels of satisfaction with the quality of 
health care received, among both groups and across all five domains of patient satisfaction (see 
Table 7.5, last panel). However, there is a small but statistically significant difference in respon-
dents’ rating of the technical quality of health care (that is, the patient’s satisfaction with the 
treatment at the time of medical care), with program group members reporting higher levels of 
satisfaction. Along with having a regular source of care, which might contribute to higher patient 
satisfaction, it is possible that the Family Rewards patient checklist form that was designed for 
doctor visits increased participants’ awareness of the care they receive and what they are sup-
posed to receive, and improved their interactions with their health care providers in terms of 
treatment. As discussed in Chapter 1, participants are expected to present doctors with “preven-
tive care checklist forms” that doctors are expected to use for annual physical examinations.  
If Family Rewards encourages continuous health care coverage and the use of preven-
tive health care visits, a logical question is whether this behavior translates into improved 
health outcomes for both adults and children. In the short run, Family Rewards is expected to 
improve health status through more diagnosis and management of chronic health conditions. 
Through its focus on health, the program might also have potential “spillover” effects on 
other health risk-taking behavior, such as smoking and lifestyle habits that lead to obesity, 
both of which are linked to mortality and a wide range of health problems and costs.30
                                                   
28By comparison, for the period January through June 2009, 7.2 percent of the national population 
failed to obtain needed medical care because of cost at some time during the preceding 12 months 
(Blumberg and Luke, 2009).  
 By 
29The Patient Satisfaction Questionnaire (PSQ), consisting of 80 items, was originally developed by Ware 
and his colleagues (Ware, Snyder, and Wright, 1976a, 1976b). The items used for the Family Rewards survey 
are drawn from the PSQ-18, a short-form version of the original that retains many characteristics of its full-
length counterpart (Marshall and Hays, 1994). 
30Obesity has been linked to an increased risk of numerous comorbidities, including high blood pres-
sure, high blood cholesterol, type 2 diabetes mellitus, coronary heart disease, osteoarthritis, asthma, and 
gallbladder disease (Must et al., 1999; Mokdad et al., 2003). Moreover, obesity has been found to signifi-
cantly lower life expectancy, particularly among young adults (Fontaine et al., 2003). With the rise in 
(continued) 
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conditioning reward payments on preventive health care activities, and by providing partici-
pants with the health care checklist to guide the rewarded interactions with doctors, it is 
possible that the program can generate secondary benefits, such as reductions in the types of 
behavior that have documented health risks.  
Health Status 
Table 7.7 presents several measures for assessing the program’s effects on health out-
comes. The first item is a widely used and validated global self-assessment of health status. 
Perceived health status is assessed based on an item drawn from the “Short Form 12 Health 
Survey” (SF12), a widely used scale in national health surveys that provides a generic, multi-
dimensional measure of physical and mental health. The Family Rewards 18-month survey 
respondents were asked, “Would you say your health in general was excellent, very good, good, 
fair, or poor?” When the same question was posed to a national sample, 13 percent of U.S. 
adults 18 years of age and over assessed themselves as being in fair or poor health. Adults in 
near-poor and poor families were two to three times more likely to have fair or poor health 
compared with adults in families who were not poor.31  
As shown in Table 7.7, Family Rewards produced a small but statistically significant 
shift in the perceived health status of the program group relative to the control group. For 
example, it increased the proportion of program group members who rated their health as 
“excellent” by 2.3 percentage points and reduced the proportion who rated their health as 
“poor” by 1.9 percentage points.  
Health Conditions and Risks 
Survey respondents were also asked whether they had a medical or health problem, 
such as high blood pressure, high cholesterol, asthma, cancer, diabetes, or another health 
problem. They were asked to indicate whether the conditions that they mentioned were being 
treated. Overall, the program had no impact on the likelihood of reporting a medical condition.32 
However, program group members were slightly more likely than their control group counter-
parts to be receiving medical attention for health conditions. Just over 47 percent of the program
                                                   
obesity, poor diet and physical inactivity have now become the number two preventable causes of death in 
the United States, behind only tobacco in the number of lives claimed each year (Mokdad, Marks, Stroup, 
and Gerberding, 2004).  
31This is consistent with the NHANES finding that Food Stamp program (FSP) participants have a more 
negative perception of their health status than do higher-income nonparticipants. About a third of the FSP 
participants rated their health status as very good or excellent, and a third rated their health status as fair or 
poor. The NHANES also finds that physician assessments of general health status are consistently more 
positive than are self-assessments.  
32The table shows only the four most common health conditions. 
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Health status
Average self-rated health (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.2 3.1 0.1 ** 0.011 0.081
Excellent (%) 15.8 13.5 2.3 * 0.064
Very good (%) 22.6 22.2 0.3 0.824
Good (%) 33.4 33.7 -0.3 0.857
Fair (%) 21.9 22.3 -0.4 0.753
Poor (%) 6.3 8.2 -1.9 ** 0.033
Health conditions and risks
Has any medical conditiona (%) 53.4 51.7 1.8 0.286
Asthma 17.0 15.7 1.3 0.315
High blood pressure/hypertension 23.9 23.4 0.5 0.737
High cholesterol/high LDL 10.5 10.1 0.4 0.691
Diabetes 9.1 7.9 1.2 0.212
Currently being treated for any medical conditiona (%) 47.2 44.4 2.8 * 0.092
Asthma 14.6 13.6 1.0 0.411
High blood pressure/hypertension 22.4 21.2 1.2 0.406
High cholesterol/high LDL 8.9 8.7 0.2 0.831
Diabetes 9.5 8.8 0.6 0.532
Average Body Mass Index (BMI) 30.3 30.4 -0.1 0.732 -0.013
Underweightb (%) 1.0 1.1 -0.1 0.787
Normal weight (%) 22.0 20.4 1.6 0.284
Overweight (%) 32.2 33.5 -1.4 0.436
Obese (%) 44.8 45.0 -0.2 0.928
Number of cigarettes smoked per day (%)
0 77.5 76.2 1.3 0.379
1-5 11.4 10.7 0.6 0.573
6-10 8.3 9.9 -1.6 0.121
More than 10 2.8 3.2 -0.3 0.597
Psychosocial well-being
Psychological Distress Scale (K10)c (10 = low; 50 = high) 18.9 19.4 -0.5 0.135 -0.064
Experienced serious psychological distress 
in the past monthc (%) 12.8 12.9 -0.2 0.913
Average score on "state of hope" scaled (6 = low; 24 = high) 17.5 17.3 0.2 0.108 0.070
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
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group reported getting treatment for a chronic condition, compared with 44.4 percent of the 
control group, a statistically significant increase of 2.8 percentage points. These findings 
suggest that while the prevalence of selected chronic conditions is comparable across the two 
groups, Family Rewards, perhaps through increasing access to and continuity with health care 
insurance, enabled participants to seek more regular care and identify health problems that 
would otherwise have gone undetected. This “treatment effect” could also result from having a 
regular source of care, which is also one of the short-term effects of Family Rewards. 
Beyond the program’s effects on health care coverage and utilization, the table presents 
findings for selected behaviors that are known to have serious health implications: smoking and 
lifestyle habits that lead to being overweight. To explore the potential impacts of the program, 
this section presents the estimated effects of Family Rewards on smoking and obesity.  
Nationally, the prevalence rate for smoking by individuals who are 18 years of age or 
older in 2008 was estimated to be 21 percent.33
                                                   
33The data suggest that adults with low educational attainment had the highest prevalence of smoking — 
that is, 41.3 percent among persons with a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, compared 
 The Family Rewards sample reports similar 
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SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose 
by chance. 
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a 
proportion of the standard deviation of the outcomes for both groups combined. 
aThe four most commonly reported conditions are listed.
bWeight categories are from the National Institutes of Health. Underweight is defined as having a 
BMI of less than 18.5. Normal weight is defined as having a BMI between 18.5 and 24.9. Overweight is 
defined as having a BMI between 25.0 and 29.9. Obesity is defined as having a BMI at least 30.0. Five 
percent of the sample are excluded from this analysis because of missing data.
cThis item measures the score on Kessler’s Psychological Distress Scale (K10), a 10-item 
questionnaire intended to yield a global measure of distress based on questions about anxiety and 
depressive symptoms that a person has experienced in the most recent four-week period. See Kessler et 
al. (2002).  A randomly selected subsample of survey respondents (N = 2,043) was asked these questions.
dThe "state of hope scale" measures the level of ongoing goal-directed thinking. The response codes 
(1 to 4) of the six items for each person are summed, with lower values representing less goal-directed 
thinking and higher values representing more. The scale is taken from Snyder et al. (1996). A randomly 
selected subsample of survey respondents (N = 2,043) was asked these questions. 
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rates. Survey respondents were asked whether they were currently smoking and the number of 
cigarettes smoked a day. There were no statistically significant differences between the two 
groups on this outcome.  
Obesity is another pressing health concern, with many experts claiming that the country 
is suffering from an obesity epidemic. The concerns about the increasing prevalence of obesity 
are founded in the association between obesity and adverse health outcomes, including excess 
mortality, and increased health expenditures.34
The measure most often used to assess this condition is referred to as the Body Mass 
Index, or BMI. It is calculated from the sample members’ responses to survey questions 
regarding height and weight.
 
35
The final set of measures that is shown in the table captures two dimensions of psycho-
logical well-being: psychological distress and the belief in one’s ability to initiate and sustain 
action.
 As shown in Table 7.7, there are no statistically significant 
differences in the BMI scores for the Family Rewards program and control groups. However, 
close to 45 percent of the sample members in each group were classified in the obese category.  
36 Consistent with prior research, it is possible that changes in health and economic well-
being brought about by such programs could improve mental health and emotional well-being. 
At this stage of the evaluation, there is limited support for this hypothesis. As shown in Table 
7.7, there are no impacts on global measures of distress and feelings of goal orientation. In the 
short run, while Family Rewards reduced poverty, financial strain, and food insecurity, it may 
be that overall distress and beliefs about one’s control over life events are more deeply rooted, 
more characteristic of personal dispositions, and take longer to change.37
 Health Impacts for Children  
  
This section turns to the program’s health effects for children under age 6 and for the 
three groups of focal children. As discussed earlier in this report, the survey targeted “focal” 
                                                   
with 5.7 among those with a graduate degree. The prevalence of current smoking is also higher among adults 
living below the federal poverty level (31.5 percent). See Dube, Asman, Malarcher, and Carabollo (2009).  
34Schmeiser (2008); Flegal, Graubard, Williamson, and Gail (2005).  
35“Underweight” is defined as a BMI of less than 18.5; “normal weight” as greater than or equal to 18.5 
and less than 25.0; “overweight” as greater than or equal to 25.0 and less than 30.0; and “obese” as greater than 
or equal to 30.0. Using self-reported measures of height and weight on the 18-month survey, BMI scores were 
calculated for the program and control group members in the Family Rewards sample. 
36Distress is measured using the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale, known as the “K-10 scale” (Kessler 
et al., 2002), which is a 10-item questionnaire intended to yield a global measure of distress based on questions 
about anxiety and depressive symptoms that a person has experienced in the most recent four-week period. The 
ability to initiate and sustain action is assessed using the State of Hope scale, which measures goal-directed 
thinking (Snyder et al., 1996).  
37Bos et al. (1999).  
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children in three age categories based on the grade at which they entered the study: elementary 
school (grade 4), middle school (grade 7), and high school (grade 9).  
In the 18-month survey, parents were asked to report on a broad set of questions related 
to the health care practices and health outcomes of their focal child. These measures, many of 
which were introduced in the parent-focused tables, are presented in Table 7.8, by child’s age or 
grade at the time of random assignment. Most notable from this table is the sizable and statisti-
cally significant program impact on dental visits. Family Rewards offers incentive payments for 
two dental visits per year for cleanings and checkups for all enrolled children who are 6 years of 
age and older, and for one visit per year for children between the ages 1 and 5 years. The 
program increased the likelihood of a dental visit for children who are younger than age 6 by 
7.2 percentage points. It increased the likelihood of two dental visits per year by 10.4 percentage 
points among middle school students, and by 13.1 percentage points among high school 
students. Overall, these findings are consistent with observations from the in-depth field 
research, which provides several accounts of participants who credited Family Rewards for 
encouraging families to have regular dental checkups.  
Consistent with the findings for adults, Family Rewards also reduced reliance on hos-
pital emergency rooms for routine care for high school children. There is some evidence of a 
similar pattern for middle and elementary school children, but these differences are not statisti-
cally significant. There was no pattern of positive impacts on parent-reported child health status 
outcomes, and most of the program and control group parents rated their child’s health as good, 
very good, or excellent; there were few reports of fair or poor health. 
Table 7.9 presents the impacts on public health insurance coverage for children.38 Many 
families who enrolled in Family Rewards were eligible for public health insurance through 
Medicaid and CHIP, and the program’s incentive payments are intended to encourage families 
to keep coverage for children in effect. The top panel in Table 7.9 presents impacts for Med- 
icaid and CHIP coverage combined, and the two subsequent panels show the same information 
for the two public health insurance programs separately.39
                                                   
38Appendix Table G.1 presents the impacts on children’s public health insurance receipt by TANF/SNA 
classification at the time of random assignment (similar to the subgroup analysis presented in Table 7.5). 
 Overall, program and control group 
children were equally likely to receive some form of public health insurance in the six quarters 
for which both Medicaid and CHIP data are available. While there is evidence of a small impact 
in Quarter 6, longer-term data are needed to assess the stability of this impact, which appears to 
be driven by the program’s effects on increasing Medicaid coverage for children (see second
39Medicaid receipt information was available for seven quarters, and CHIP receipt data were available for 
six quarters. Medicaid receipt in a given quarter is measured using the recipient’s status on the first day of a 
quarter. As a result, the measure reported here captures coverage status at the start of each quarter.  
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Children under age 6 (%)
Had routine health checkup in past yeara 98.0 97.4 0.6 0.566
Had dental checkup in past yeara, b 72.0 64.8 7.2 * 0.062
Any children screened for Early Intervention Programc 31.0 26.1 4.9 0.172
Sample size (total = 701) 371 330
Elementary school students
Health care utilization (%)
Child has usual source of routine care 95.2 92.3 2.9 * 0.074
Child has personal pediatrician 94.1 93.5 0.6 0.730
Child had health checkup or got shots in past 12 months 97.4 95.7 1.7 0.160
Child has usual source of care when sick 95.7 92.6 3.1 * 0.053
Hospital emergency room 12.1 12.4 -0.3 0.882
Other place 83.6 80.2 3.4 0.190
Dental visits in past 12 months
Child had at least 1 dental visit 94.0 93.3 0.7 0.676
Child had at least 2 dental visits 67.6 63.4 4.2 0.189
Health status
Child's health (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.775 0.019
Excellent (%) 39.1 37.1 2.1 0.524
Very good (%) 23.4 26.6 -3.2 0.264
Good (%) 29.3 26.3 3.0 0.309
Fair (%) 6.8 9.5 -2.7 0.131
Poor (%) 1.4 0.6 0.8 0.196
Child has any health conditiond (%) 30.8 32.9 -2.1 0.474
Asthma 12.4 11.4 1.0 0.632
Learning disability 9.0 8.6 0.4 0.822
Attention deficit disorder 3.9 5.4 -1.5 0.270
Sample size (total = 911) 468 443
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Middle school students
Health care utilization (%)
Child has usual source of routine care 94.9 94.6 0.3 0.863
Child has personal pediatrician 92.9 91.6 1.3 0.459
Child had health checkup or got shots in past 12 months 99.0 96.0 3.0 *** 0.004
Child has usual source of care when sick 96.1 93.4 2.7 * 0.067
Hospital emergency room 11.7 14.2 -2.5 0.272
Other place 84.4 79.2 5.2 ** 0.043
Dental visits in past 12 months
Child had at least 1 dental visit 92.8 91.8 1.0 0.587
Child had at least 2 dental visits 70.0 59.6 10.4 *** 0.001
Health status
Child's health (1=poor; 5=excellent) 4.0 3.9 0.0 0.477 0.046
Excellent (%) 39.8 38.6 1.3 0.700
Very good (%) 27.5 24.3 3.2 0.275
Good (%) 24.1 28.8 -4.7 0.107
Fair (%) 6.8 7.3 -0.5 0.752
Poor (%) 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.326
Child has any health conditiond (%) 28.1 26.3 1.9 0.493
Asthma 10.1 12.3 -2.2 0.291
Learning disability 6.9 4.5 2.4 0.105
Attention deficit disorder 3.5 5.5 -2.0 0.142
Sample size (total = 911) 485 426
High school students
Health care utilization (%)
Child has usual source of routine care 94.3 96.1 -1.8 0.223
Child has personal pediatrician 92.0 93.6 -1.6 0.367
Child had health checkup or got shots in past 12 months 96.1 95.8 0.3 0.813
Child has usual source of care when sick 96.1 96.0 0.1 0.920
Hospital emergency room 9.8 15.9 -6.1 *** 0.007
Other place 86.3 80.1 6.2 ** 0.014
Dental visits in past 12 months
Child had at least 1 dental visit 92.7 89.6 3.1 0.115
Child had at least 2 dental visits 70.3 57.2 13.1 *** 0.000
(continued)
Table 7.8 (continued)
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panel in Table 7.9). However, there is no program effect on continuous Medicaid receipt, at 
least in the seven quarters observed here. Just over 50 percent of the program group children 
and 49.2 percent of the control group children were covered by Medicaid in all seven quarters 
following random assignment.40
                                                   
40Since CHIP data are missing for every third calendar quarter, it was not possible to estimate “con-
tinuous” coverage for Medicaid and CHIP combined (top panel of Table 7.9) or for CHIP alone (third panel of 
Table 7.9), which covers only a small proportion of the children in the study. However, continuous coverage is 
reported for Medicaid. 
  
Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Health status
Child's health (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.9 3.8 0.1 0.325 0.065
Excellent (%) 36.6 32.4 4.3 0.193
Very good (%) 26.4 28.8 -2.4 0.436
Good (%) 26.3 28.0 -1.7 0.575
Fair (%) 9.1 8.7 0.4 0.822
Poor (%) 1.6 2.2 -0.6 0.529
Child has any health conditiond (%) 24.0 29.1 -5.1 * 0.071
Asthma 8.5 12.8 -4.3 ** 0.039
Learning disability 6.7 5.2 1.5 0.303
Attention deficit disorder 2.9 3.2 -0.3 0.794
Sample size (total = 870) 469 401
Table 7.8 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table presents outcomes for the randomly selected focal child only, who must have been living in 
the household at the time of interview. 
Sample sizes vary because of missing values.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of familiy or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between outcomes for the program and control 
groups arose by chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of 
the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined. 
aThis measure pertains only to a child in the household under age 6 who was randomly selected for the 
respondent to discuss.
bIf the randomly selected child is less than 1 year old, then the child is excluded from this measure.
cThis includes any of the respondent's children under age 6.
dThis includes physical, medical, learning, emotional, or mental health conditions. The three most 
commonly reported conditions are listed. Sample members may list multiple conditions.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Public health insurance (Medicaid or CHIP) 
coverage among all childrena 
Quarter of random assignment (%) 71.3 72.1 -0.8 0.631
Quarter 2 71.3 71.7 -0.4 0.690
Quarter 3 70.9 70.8 0.1 0.912
Quarter 4 70.5 69.0 1.5 0.262
Quarter 5 72.6 69.9 2.7 0.186
Quarter 6 69.4 67.2 2.2 * 0.054
Sample size (total = 11,331) 5,680 5,651
Medicaid coverage among all childrenb
Quarter of random assignment (%) 67.6 66.9 0.7 0.436
Quarter 2 68.1 68.4 -0.3 0.776
Quarter 3 68.1 67.4 0.7 0.518
Quarter 4 68.0 66.2 1.8 * 0.094
Quarter 5 67.7 65.1 2.6 ** 0.022
Quarter 6 66.5 64.2 2.4 ** 0.038
Quarter 7 65.7 64.8 0.9 0.452
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 50.1 49.2 0.9 0.498
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 4 4 0.1 0.107
Sample size (total = 11,264) 5,640 5,624
CHIP coverage among all children
Quarter of random assignment (%) 3.6 4.2 -0.5 0.563
Quarter 2 3.4 3.4 -0.1 0.919
Quarter 3 2.8 3.4 -0.6 0.163
Quarter 4 3.3 3.6 -0.3 0.598
Quarter 5 2.5 2.8 -0.3 0.644
Quarter 6 3.0 3.1 -0.1 0.838
Sample size (total = 11,331) 5,680 5,651
(continued)
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Table 7.9
 Impacts on Children's Receipt of Public Health Insurance
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Finally, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 7.9, a very small proportion of the pro-
gram and control group children received health insurance coverage through CHIP, which 
targets uninsured children in families with incomes that are too high to qualify them for Medi-
caid, but are often too low for them to afford private coverage. About 3 percent of the program 
and control group children were covered by this form of public health insurance.  
Effects for Key Subgroups 
Because average effects for the full group can mask program effects for some groups of 
study participants, the health impacts of Family Rewards are analyzed for two subgroups 
defined by baseline measures of education and employment. These two subgroups were pre-
selected, based on the extensive literature demonstrating inequalities in health care access and 
health outcomes by socioeconomic characteristics.41 While numerous variables can capture the 
social and economic status of individuals, education, income, and employment or occupational 
status are most often used to examine variations in the distribution of disease and health.42
                                                   
41In addition to education and employment, variation in impacts was examined across a range of dimen-
sions including race/ethnicity, assisted housing status, and poverty status at random assignment. Overall, the 
impacts are pretty similar across these subgroups, with a few exceptions. For example, effects on having an 
annual physical were larger for Hispanics and for families with a household income below 50 percent of the 
federal poverty level. These findings will be explored further in future reports. 
 
42Kreiger, Williams, and Moss (1997). 
Table 7.9 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using administrative records data from the New York State Human Resources 
Administration. 
NOTES: Because reliable data on start and end dates are not available, Medicaid receipt in a given quarter is 
measured using the recipient's status on the first day of that quarter.
aDue to missing data, the sample sizes range from 3,373 to 11,331 children.
bThe sample excludes 30 members randomly assigned between January and March 2008.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple observations 
per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
CHIP = Children's Health Insurance Program.
Since CHIP data are missing for every third calendar quarter, it is not possible to estimate "continuous" 
coverage for Medicaid and CHIP combined (top panel) or for CHIP alone, which covers only a small proportion 
of children in the study.
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Recent reviews reveal that these measures remain persistent and pervasive predictors of varia-
tions in health.  
In general, impacts are expected to vary to some extent across subgroups, simply as a 
result of natural variation around the average impact for the full sample. This section focuses on 
whether that variation in impacts across subgroups is statistically significant, or whether it goes 
beyond what would be expected to occur naturally. For this reason, the focus is not on whether 
a given impact for the less educated subgroup is statistically significant, for example, but 
whether the difference between that impact and the impact for the more educated subgroup is 
statistically significant (as indicated by daggers in the rightmost column of the tables). If the 
difference between these two impacts is not statistically significant, the results suggest that the 
effects observed for the full sample generally hold across more and less educated individuals.  
Impacts by Educational Status at Baseline 
In general, studies find that more educated adults report better health than those who 
are less educated. They are less likely to be hypertensive, to suffer from diabetes, to report 
that they are in poor health, and to report anxiety or depression.43
The Family Rewards health impacts were analyzed separately for parents who had less 
than a high school diploma or GED certificate at the time of random assignment and for those 
with at least a high school diploma or GED certificate. As Table 7.10 shows, the program’s 
impacts on a variety of health measures are statistically significant for the subgroup with a high 
school diploma or a GED certificate. However, only the two impact estimates showing a 
reduction in unmet health needs because of costs are statistically significantly different from the 
impact estimates on the same variables for the subgroup with less education.  
 There are multiple reasons 
for these associations, although it is likely that these health differences are in part the result of 
differences in behavior across education groups. Overall, research suggests very strong 
gradients where the better educated have more healthful behaviors along virtually every 
margin: those with more years of schooling are less likely to smoke, drink heavily, be over-
weight or obese, or use illegal drugs.  
The two panels of Table 7.11 report impacts on adult Medicaid receipt by the parent’s 
educational status at random assignment. The first panel shows that Family Rewards increased 
continuity of Medicaid coverage in the seven quarters of follow-up among people who had 
obtained at least a high school degree or a GED certificate. For example, 43.7 percent of the 
program group was covered during all seven quarters, compared with 38.4 percent of the 
control group, a 5.3 percentage point increase in continuous coverage. The program had no
                                                   
43Muennig, Schweinhart, Montie, and Neidell (2009); Muennig (2007); Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006).  
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Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
High school diploma/GED certificate
Health insurance coverage in previous month
Respondent had health coverage 95.9 93.2 2.7 ** 0.012  
All dependent children had health coveragea 94.8 92.8 2.0 * 0.084  
Health insurance coverage since random assignment
Respondent had a period with no coverage 16.0 19.4 -3.4 * 0.059  
Some or all of respondent's children had a period
with no coveragea 15.5 18.4 -2.9 0.109  
Health care utilization
Had a health checkup since random assignment 94.0 92.2 1.8 0.141  
Dental visits since random assignment
Had at least 1 dental visit 86.4 82.0 4.4 ** 0.012  
Had at least 2 dental visits 68.4 56.9 11.5 *** 0.000  
Unmet health needs
Did not get needed medical care because of cost in
past 12 monthsb 7.2 12.6 -5.4 *** 0.000 ††
Did not fill prescription because of cost in past 12 months 14.0 18.3 -4.4 ** 0.012 ††
Sample size (total = 1,820) 922 898
No high school diploma/GED certificate
Health insurance coverage in previous month
Respondent had health coverage 95.2 94.5 0.7 0.596  
All dependent children had health coveragea 94.7 94.4 0.2 0.860  
Health insurance coverage since random assignment
Respondent had a period with no coverage 16.6 19.0 -2.4 0.283  
Some or all of respondent's children had a period 
with no coveragea 13.6 17.1 -3.6 0.101  
(continued)
by Respondent's Education Level
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Impacts on Family Health Insurance Coverage and Parents' Receipt of Health Care, 
Table 7.10
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effect on this measure for the less educated subgroup, and the difference in impacts across the 
two subgroups is statistically significant.  
Appendix Table G.2 reports impacts on adults’ health status by respondent’s education-
al level at the time of random assignment. While Family Rewards appears to have improved 
perceived health status on the whole, the impacts on health status were not significantly differ-
ent across subgroups defined by baseline educational status.  
Impacts by Employment Status at Baseline  
Several studies have documented the relationship between health and employment.44 
Among studies of welfare recipients and low-income mothers, health problems (of parents and 
children) are a barrier to regular employment and to entry into the labor force.45
                                                   
44Rogot, Sorlie, and Johnson (1992); Ross and Mirowsky (1995). 
 These studies 
also show that employed women have been consistently found to report better health than 
unemployed women. However, the causal chain underlying the relationship between employ- 
45Zwedlewski (1999). 
Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Health care utilization
Had a health checkup since random assignment 91.8 91.3 0.5 0.757  
Dental visits since random assignment
Had at least 1 dental visit 85.6 84.6 1.0 0.651  
Had at least 2 dental visits 66.3 58.9 7.4 *** 0.009  
Unmet health needs
Did not get needed medical care because of cost in
past 12 monthsb 5.5 7.0 -1.5 0.292 ††
Did not fill prescription because of cost in past 12 months 13.2 12.1 1.1 0.580 ††
Sample size (total = 1,186) 610 576
Table 7.10 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values.  
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences in impacts across subgroups were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
aChild-related health insurance measures were calculated for sample members with at least one child at the
time of the survey interview.
bThis excludes prescriptions.
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ment and health is still open to debate. Longitudinal evidence seems to suggest that employment 
affects health, but reciprocal effects are also possible.46
Table 7.12 shows that, for the Family Rewards sample, there were few differences in 
health coverage and health care utilization among members of the control group according to
 This section extends the subgroup 
analysis and examines the program’s impacts on health by respondents’ self-reported employ-
ment status at the time of random assignment.  
                                                   
46See Polit, London, and Martinez (2001). 
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
High school diploma or GED certificate at time
of random assignment
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 43.7 38.4 5.3 *** 0.001 ††
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 3.5 3.3 0.2 ** 0.023  
Sample size (total = 2,852) 1,400 1,452
No high school diploma or GED certificate at time
of random assignment
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 55.9 56.8 -0.9 0.666 ††
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 4.5 4.5 0.1 0.490  
Sample size (total = 1,946) 1,012 934
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 7.11
 Impacts on Parents' Medicaid Receipt,
by Respondent's Education Level at the Time of Random Assignment
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using administrative records data from the New York State Human Resources 
Administration. 
NOTES: Because reliable data on start and end dates are not available, Medicaid receipt in a given quarter is 
measured using the recipient's status on the first day of that quarter.
The sample excludes 30 members randomly assigned between January and March 2008.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Employed
Average self-rated health (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.4 3.3 0.1 * 0.058 0.089  
Excellent (%) 18.5 15.8 2.7 0.161  
Very good (%) 26.6 26.7 -0.1 0.952  
Good (%) 35.6 35.7 -0.1 0.973  
Fair (%) 17.2 17.9 -0.7 0.697  
Poor (%) 2.1 3.8 -1.7 ** 0.038  
Has any medical condition (%) 45.8 41.3 4.5 * 0.059  
Currently being treated for any medical condition (%) 39.0 33.6 5.5 ** 0.019  
Experienced serious psychological distress 
in the past montha (%) 7.6 9.7 -2.1 0.225 †
Sample size (total = 1,599) 823 776
Not employed
Average self-rated health (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.0 2.9 0.1 ** 0.042 0.095  
Excellent (%) 13.2 10.8 2.4 0.158  
Very good (%) 18.5 16.9 1.7 0.399  
Good (%) 30.8 31.6 -0.8 0.738  
Fair (%) 26.5 28.1 -1.6 0.471  
Poor (%) 11.1 12.7 -1.6 0.336  
Has any medical condition (%) 61.7 62.7 -1.0 0.669  
Currently being treated for any medical condition (%) 56.1 56.0 0.1 0.973  
Experienced serious psychological distress 
in the past montha (%) 18.6 15.7 2.9 0.231 †
Sample size (total = 1,440) 725 715
Impacts on Health Status, by Respondent's Employment Status
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 7.12
at the Time of Random Assignment
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Differences in impacts across subgroups were tested for statistical significance. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
aThis item measures the score on Kessler’s Psychological Distress Scale (K10), a 10-item 
questionnaire intended to yield a global measure of distress based on questions about anxiety and 
depressive symptoms that a person has experienced in the most recent four-week period. See Kessler et al. 
(2002).  A randomly selected subsample of survey respondents (N = 2,043) was asked these questions.
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their baseline employment status. Moreover, there is no evidence that the program’s impacts 
varied across the two subgroups. Extending this comparative analysis across additional meas-
ures of health coverage and health outcomes produces similar results: in the short run, there are 
no notable differences in the program’s health impacts by baseline employment status (see 
Appendix Table G.3).  
Conclusion 
Family Rewards health incentives were designed to encourage low-income families to 
adopt better preventive health care practices. It turned out that higher proportions of families 
than the program’s designers had expected were already receiving health insurance coverage 
and practicing preventive health care, which limits the program’s ability to improve some health 
practices and health care behavior further for this sample.  
Nonetheless, the evidence so far suggests that Family Rewards produced a number of 
impacts on some important health indicators, even if only by a small amount. For example, it 
increased the maintenance of health insurance coverage for participants who were not receiving 
TANF or SNA, increased the use of preventive dental care, reduced emergency room-based 
health care, reduced the reported number of health care needs that were not met because of 
prohibitive costs, and produced a significant shift in the perceived health status of the program 
group relative to the control group. This general pattern of positive findings was evident for 
both adults and children.  
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Chapter 8 
Work-Related Rewards and Impacts  
Offering incentives for work and training is not a new idea, and there is evidence from 
earlier programs that these incentives can increase work and, in some cases, training.1
This chapter presents the effects of Family Rewards on parents’ employment and 
earnings. As with the findings in other areas, the results presented here, covering the first 
year to year-and-a-half, are not the final story. In addition to the time it took to fully imple-
ment the program, staff began to market the program’s workforce rewards more heavily 
during the second year. Finally, the state of the economy was rapidly changing during the 
later part of the evaluation period, as unemployment rates began to increase. Although it is 
not obvious how the economic downturn will affect participants’ responses to the program, 
it will be important to track the effects for several more years. 
 What is 
new, however, and what makes Family Rewards unique, is that these incentives are part of a 
larger package of rewards. A family with two children in the program, for example, could earn 
up to $3,000 from the children’s education rewards, more than $2,000 from the family health 
rewards, and more than $2,000 from the parents’ work and training rewards. This structure, in 
which families can earn rewards through a range of activities, has two potential implications for 
effects on work. First, the large menu of options may encourage individuals to focus on some 
activities to the exclusion of others. As noted in earlier chapters, parents tended to view Family 
Rewards largely as an education program, particularly during the first year. Second, the addi-
tional money that families receive from the other rewards may reduce the need to work and off-
set any work incentive created by the work rewards. 
The findings suggest that the program led to a small increase in employment in jobs 
that are not covered by the unemployment insurance (UI) system and to a small decrease in 
employment in UI-covered jobs. Some workers are not covered by the UI system by law, 
such as self-employed individuals, federal government employees, and domestic workers. 
But the UI system also misses informal (casual or irregular) jobs (for instance, babysitting) 
that are never reported to state agencies. It is not clear why the effects of the program would 
vary across types of employment. For some parents, non-UI-covered jobs may have been 
easier to get in a flailing economy, particularly those that offered the full-time hours that are 
necessary to qualify for the work rewards. For other parents, the additional income they ob-
tained from the other rewards may have allowed them to move out of UI-covered jobs and 
                                                   
1Riccio et al. (2008); Martinson and Hendra (2006); Michalopoulos et al. (2002).  
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into non-UI-covered jobs. The latter jobs may have been more attractive options if they 
were more conveniently located, easier to obtain, or offered more flexible schedules.  
The Work and Training Rewards Offer 
The schedule of workforce rewards is presented in Table 8.1. In order to receive the 
employment reward, participants had to work at least 30 hours per week for six out of every 
eight weeks during each two-month rewards payment cycle. Parents who work the minimum 
amount receive $300 every two months, or up to $1,800 per year. By increasing the payoff to 
work, the reward creates an incentive for parents to get a job or, if already working part time, to 
move into full-time work. A parent working 40 hours per week at $8 per hour, for example, 
stands to increase her net wage by 11 percent, to about $8.90 per hour, if she earns the pro-
gram’s employment reward.  
Recognizing that work by itself is not always a route to advancement, the program’s de-
signers incorporated payments into Family Rewards for completing skill-building activities that 
can increase parents’ job skills and help them move into higher-level, better-paying jobs. In or-
der to qualify for these rewards during the first two years of the program, parents had to partici-
pate in job-related education and training activities while working at least 10 hours per week. 
This minimum work-hours requirement was set in order to discourage participants from remain-
ing unemployed or from dropping out of the labor force in order to undertake training.2
Data and Samples 
 
The two data sources used in this chapter are earnings records from the New York State 
unemployment insurance (UI) system and the Family Rewards 18-month parent survey. The UI 
data provide quarterly employment and earnings information, as reported by employers, for the 
majority of workers in the state. These data are available for the entire Family Rewards study 
sample of nearly 5,000 parents for several quarters prior to their date of random assignment and 
for one year afterward, and, unlike survey data, they do not depend on respondent recall. At the 
same time, although these records cover most employment in a given state, they do not capture 
certain types of jobs, including self-employment, federal government employment, military per-
sonnel, informal jobs, and out-of-state jobs. Another drawback of the UI records is that they do 
not provide information on hours worked during a quarter or week or on the characteristics of 
jobs held, such as hourly wage rates, benefits, and schedule. 
                                                   
2The minimum work-hours requirement was dropped for the third year of the program, in part because so 
few parents took up the training rewards (shown later in this chapter).  
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The 18-month survey complements the UI data by capturing all types of jobs held and 
providing data on their characteristics. Respondents provided information on whether these jobs 
were full time or part time, their wage rates, and any benefits offered by the employer. These 
data are available for a randomly chosen subset of the full study sample, or just over 3,000 indi-
viduals. As discussed in detail in Appendix D, although the survey sample is generally repre-
sentative of the full evaluation sample, some caution must be used when interpreting findings 
from the survey. There were some differences in characteristics between program and control 
group respondents; in particular, the program group had higher UI-covered earnings in the year 
prior to entering the study compared with the control group.3
Receipt of Work and Training Rewards 
 
In contrast to the relatively high receipt rate of the education and health rewards, less 
than half of families in the Family Rewards group received at least one workforce reward (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). Table 8.2 presents the receipt of the work and training rewards in more 
detail, focusing on parents rather than families as the unit of analysis. The first panel shows that 
almost all the workforce rewards that were earned were for full-time work. Very few parents in 
the sample earned rewards for taking up education and training. In addition, receipt of the full-
time work rewards was somewhat regular. Only about 1 in 10 parents who received a reward 
did so in only one activity period. (An activity period is two months in duration.) Patterns were 
very similar for Years 1 and 2. 
                                                   
3This difference is accounted for in the impact analysis. The impact regression model includes UI-reported 
employment and earnings and a range of demographic characteristics.  
Activity Payment
30 or more hours per week for 6 or more weeks each 2-month 
period
$300 every two months
Must work at least 10 hours per week while completing an 
approved  coursea
$300 to $600, depending on length of course; 
maximum of $3,000 per adult
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 8.1
Work and Training Rewards
Work
Education and training
NOTE: aTraining may also include basic education activities, such as English as a Second Language (ESL), 
basic skills, and GED preparatory.
238 
 
Although only about 40 percent of parents received a full-time work reward in either 
year, this reward is undoubtedly more difficult to earn than many of the rewards in the educa-
tion and health areas. In this case, it may be unrealistic to expect that similarly high proportions 
of families would earn workforce rewards. In two recent work incentives programs that also 
provided bonuses for full-time work, receipt rates ranged from 30 percent to 40 percent.4
                                                   
4Riccio et al. (2008); Martinson and Hendra (2006).  
  
Years 1 and 2 
Year 1 Year 2 Combined
Parent earned at least one workforce reward 41.6 40.6 47.7
Full-time employmenta 41.1 40.4 47.2
Education and training while employedb 1.8 1.5 2.5
Parent earned a workforce reward inc 
1 activity period only 12.9 11.2
2 or 3 activity periods only 21.6 20.7
4 or 5 activity periods only 27.8 30.6
6 activity periods 37.7 37.6
Sample size 2,515
Full-Timea Part-Time Not Working 
Parent earned at least one full-time employment reward
Year 1 73.2 40.8 12.9
Year 2 68.6 42.2 15.1
Years 1 and 2 combined 78.8 50.5 18.6
Sample sized 967 206 1,148
Employment Status at Random Assignment 
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 8.2
Workforce Rewards Earned by Parents
Outcome (%)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Reward program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers activities that occurred September 2007 through August 
2008, and the second program year covers activities that occured September 2008 through August 
2009.
aFull-time employment is at least 30 hours per week for six weeks or more in each two-month 
activity period, or approximately 75 percent of the time.
bA parent must work at least 10 hours per week while attending a course of at least 35 hours.
cThis is calculated only for adults with any workforce rewards.
dA total of 8 percent of the sample are missing employment status information at the time of 
random assignment.
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Receipt rates by employment status at baseline may provide a better indication of indi-
viduals’ ability or willingness to earn these rewards (bottom panel of Table 8.2). Not surprising-
ly, receipt rates are much higher for parents who reported being employed full time (or for at 
least 30 hours per week) at the time of entering the study, a group most likely to be eligible for 
the rewards. About 73 percent of parents in this group received at least one reward during the 
first program year. Receipt rates among likely eligible participants in the two incentives pro-
grams mentioned above ranged from 55 percent to 76 percent. In that context, the rate of 73 
percent for the Family Rewards subgroup of full-time workers is fairly high. However, a natural 
question is why the remaining 27 percent of likely eligible parents did not earn a reward for sus-
tained employment. Some of them may have lost their jobs after entering the study, others may 
have been unable to or otherwise neglected to provide adequate documentation to the program 
in order to earn the rewards, and still others may not have tried to maintain the required level of 
employment, focusing instead on rewards in the health and education areas. The bottom panel 
of Table 8.2 also shows that the likelihood of receiving at least one full-time employment re-
ward was lower among parents who were working part time when they entered the study (for 
example, 41 percent in Year 1), and even lower among parents who were not employed at study 
entry (for example, 13 percent in Year 1). 
Impacts on Parents’ Education and Training 
This section presents the program’s impacts on parents’ participation in education and 
training activities and on certificate and degree receipt. Despite the low receipt of the training 
rewards, it is possible that the program might increase participation in educational activities by 
increasing family resources. Alternatively, the program might reduce such participation if it en-
courages more individuals to work full time.  
As shown in Table 8.3, about 40 percent of control group respondents reported partici-
pating in some education and training activity since random assignment, with the most common 
activities being vocational training and college courses. The program did not affect participation 
in education and training, with the exception of a small negative effect on English as a Second 
Language (ESL) classes. There is no obvious reason the program should have reduced partici-
pation in ESL classes, although the effect is very small and very few individuals participated in 
this activity. On average, individuals who participated in training did so for about 18 to 20 
weeks during the year. Participation was typically the longest in college courses, at about 27 to 
28 weeks, and the shortest in vocational training, at about 8 to 11 weeks.  
The bottom row of Table 8.3 shows a small, positive impact on the percentage of par-
ents who reported being both employed and engaged in training while working, from 13.8 per-
cent for the control group to 16.4 percent for the program group. This effect is likely driven by 
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the fact that, according to the survey, the program group was also somewhat more likely to 
work during the period, as shown later.  
Table 8.4 presents data on the receipt of education credentials. The table shows the 
percentage of individuals holding a given credential as of the time of the survey interview, 
and not the percentage who obtained these degrees since study entry. The program led to
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Ever participated in an education, training, 
or employment activitya (%) 37.3 39.6 -2.3 0.282
ABE, GED, or high school classes 7.4 7.8 -0.4 0.751
ESL classes 4.4 6.8 -2.4 ** 0.013
College courses for credit 11.3 11.7 -0.4 0.763
Vocational training 14.2 15.6 -1.4 0.364
Other educational, training, or employment program activities 10.3 9.0 1.3 0.324
Number of weeks respondent participated in the following
since random assignment b
Any education, training, or employment activity 17.8 19.6 -- --
ABE, GED, or high school classes 14.5 16.5 -- --
ESL classes 11.7 17.0 -- --
College courses for credit 28.1 26.8 -- --
Vocational training 8.3 11.1 -- --
Other educational, training, or employment program activities 9.1 7.7 -- --
Received help finding or enrolling in training (%) 7.8 8.4 -0.7 0.585
Worked and participated in an education or training activity (%) 16.4 13.8 2.6 * 0.091
Sample size (total = 2,061) 1,051 1,010
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 8.3
Impacts on Participation in Employment and Education Activities
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subset (N = 2,061) of survey 
respondents.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Italic type indicates comparisions that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
aPercentages may sum to more than the number participating in any activity because sample members could 
list more than one response.
bThese measures are calculated among sample members who participated in the relevant activity or activities.
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small increases in the number of parents with a trade license or certificate and in the number 
of parents who held an associate’s degree. The training rewards are unlikely to have led to 
these effects, since so few participants received them. They may instead be driven by the ex-
tra income that was provided to families through the program, which may have functioned as 
a form of financial aid.  
Impacts on Employment and Earnings 
This section presents the effects of Family Rewards on employment and earnings dur-
ing the first 12 to 18 months after the start of the program. Effects for the full sample of parents 
in the evaluation are estimated using UI records data. These records cover one year after the 
sample members’ dates of random assignment. Because the data are reported quarterly, the first 
follow-up year for most sample members (who entered the study during July through Septem-
ber of 2007) covers October 2007 through September 2008. Effects for the subsample of par-
ents who responded to the 18-month survey are examined using both UI and survey data. As 
Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Has any degree, license, or certificate 81.0 81.1 -0.1 0.935
Has any trade license or training certification 54.2 51.2 3.0 * 0.088
Has any degree or diploma 64.2 64.7 -0.5 0.677
Highest degree or diploma
GED certificate 17.5 19.5 -2.0 0.144
High school diploma 28.1 29.2 -1.1 0.472
Associate's degree 10.2 7.7 2.5 ** 0.014
Bachelor's degree or higher 8.4 8.3 0.1 0.906
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 8.4
Impacts on Educational Attainment
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
This table reports on degrees, licenses, and diplomas received, regardless of whether they were received 
before or after random assignment.
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discussed below, the survey data typically capture more employment than do the UI records, 
since the latter data source only includes employment reported to the UI system.  
Results for the Full Sample 
Table 8.5 presents UI-reported employment and earnings during Year 1. About 59 per-
cent of the control group worked at some point during Year 1 in UI-covered jobs. On average, 
they earned just over $12,000 during the year, although this average includes zeroes for those 
who did not work. Among those who did work, average earnings were about $21,000 (not 
shown). The program group was slightly less likely to have worked during the year than the 
control group, with a negative impact of 2.3 percentage points. Data on quarterly employment 
(not shown) indicate that the reduction in employment rates was statistically significant only for 
the last quarter of the year.5
Although the program did not lead to a statistically significant reduction in average an-
nual earnings, it did reduce the fraction of individuals who were earning very low amounts (less 
than $5,000 annually), perhaps reducing work among individuals who would have worked only 
one or two quarters during the year. Coupled with the negative employment effects later in the 
year, the program seems to have discouraged some individuals who would have eventually en-
tered UI-covered employment from going to work.  
  
Why would a program with work incentives reduce employment rates? As noted earli-
er, Family Rewards differs from other work incentives programs in that participants can, and 
did, earn substantial rewards for a variety of nonwork activities. These additional resources of-
fer families more flexibility in terms of work choices. (See Box 8.1 for an illustration from the 
in-depth interviews with parents.) Some parents might use the extra money to cut back on work 
hours and spend more time with their children. Others might take longer to find a new job, 
while others might take a job closer to home, even though it may offer fewer hours or lower 
pay. Economists refer to the reduction in work in response to increased income as the “income 
effect.” Consistent with this hypothesis, this reduction in work occurred in later follow-up quar-
ters, after families began to accumulate income from the other reward payments.6
                                                   
5Effects on UI-covered employment in the first quarter of Year 2, available for a subset of the sample, 
were similarly negative, suggesting that this effect in the last quarter of the year is not a chance finding.  
 The pattern of 
effects on total earnings shown in Table 8.5, in which much of the reduction in work during the 
year appears to have occurred among those who would have had very low earnings, is also con-
sistent with an income effect drawing individuals who are only marginally attached to the labor 
force out of work.  
6It is also possible that the magnitude of the reduction in UI-covered employment would have been greater 
had Family Rewards not included a reward tied to employment.  
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Results for the Survey Sample 
The survey data are an important part of the evaluation, since they capture jobs that are 
not covered by the UI data. Although some employers may fail to report earnings for all their 
workers to the UI system, the records, by law, do not cover several types of employment, in-
cluding informal jobs, self-employment, federal government jobs, and out-of-state jobs. Thus,
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Ever employed (%) 56.2 58.5 -2.3 ** 0.011
Average quarterly employment (%) 49.0 50.3 -1.3 * 0.091
Total earnings ($) 12,114 12,354 -240 0.284
Total earnings (%)
$1 - $4,999 9.0 10.6 -1.5 * 0.059
$5,000 - $9,999 6.7 7.5 -0.8 0.256
$10,000 - $19,999 14.6 14.6 0.0 0.986
$20,000 - $29,999 11.1 10.2 0.9 0.300
Over $30,000 14.9 15.7 -0.8 0.255
Sample size (total = 4,994) 2,513 2,481                  
First-Year Impacts on UI-Covered Employment and Earnings
Table 8.5
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York State unemployment insurance (UI) wage 
records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics for families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for 
multiple observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcimes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose 
by chance.
Dollar averages include zero values for sample members who were not employed.
This table includes only employment and earnings in jobs covered by the New York State 
unemployment insurance (UI) program. It does not include employment outside New York or in jobs not 
covered by the UI system (for example, "off the book" jobs and federal government jobs).  
Year 1 covers October 2007 through September 2008 for sample members randomly assigned before 
October 2007. For sample members randomly assigned on or after October 1, 2007, Year 1 covers January 
through December 2008.
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non-UI employment is not necessarily synonymous with informal, off-the-books jobs. Howev-
er, for low-income populations, informal work and self-employment are typically more preva-
lent and probably do reflect a significant fraction of the jobs that are not accounted for in the UI 
records.7
Table 8.6 presents employment and earnings data for the survey sample. The table 
presents employment captured by the survey and by the UI records data. The first panel presents 
respondents’ reports of work since random assignment, or roughly over the past 18 months, and 
at the time of the survey. According to the survey data, the program increased the percentage of 
parents who worked at some point during the year by 3 percentage points. Parents in the pro-
gram group worked, on average, half of a month more than those in the control group, and, con-
sistent with the rewards conditions, all of this additional work was full time. The program led to 
 Box 8.2 shows that the non-UI-covered jobs for the parents in the study are “lower 
quality” than UI jobs in that they pay somewhat lower wages and are less likely to come with 
key benefits. In what follows, work that is reported on the survey but not in the UI records is 
sometimes referred to as “informal” work. 
                                                   
7Other research suggests that the UI data may miss relatively more employment for low-income popula-
tions than for higher-income groups. For example, the discrepancy between the survey findings and the UI 
records is larger for less educated workers (Abraham, Haltiwanger, Sandusky, and Spletzer, 2009). In addition, 
smaller employers and employers with high turnover, who tend to employ relatively high numbers of less 
skilled workers, tend to underreport earnings to the UI system more often than do other types of employers 
(Burgess, Blakemore, and Low, 1998). 
Box 8.1 
Income from Family Rewards and Work Decisions 
During the in-depth interviews, participants did not generally report that rewards for full-time 
work changed the way they looked for jobs or influenced the outcomes of their efforts. Many 
cited child-raising, health problems, training needs, or a poor economy as more important 
factors in their job-seeking behavior. In some rare instances, participants acknowledged that 
the income from Family Rewards relieved some of the pressure to get a job, when family 
commitments would otherwise push them to stay at home. As one woman who was already 
working full time said about the effect of extra income: 
I was gonna get [an additional] part-time job, but then this came up. I’m like, 
“Okay, I’ll wait two years then.” ’Cause then I have the five-year-old back, then 
. . . I was gonna have an issue with the school and picking him up and dropping 
him off. This . . . program really helped me in that sense. 
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Box 8.2 
UI-Covered and Non-UI-Covered Jobs 
Although UI records typically cover about 90 percent of all employment, they exclude informal 
jobs (for which employers do not report employee earnings to the state), self-employment, federal 
government and military jobs, and out-of-state jobs (since the data are reported only to the state in 
which the employee works). To provide a more detailed look at what type of jobs the UI records 
miss for the Family Rewards sample, the table below presents selected characteristics of jobs re-
ported by respondents to the 18-month survey.  
 
The first column presents job characteristics for respondents who reported being employed at the 
survey interview but who were not identified as employed in that same calendar quarter according 
to the UI data. The second column presents job characteristics for respondents for whom both data 
sources indicated employment. Although non-UI-covered jobs are just as likely to be full time, 
they tend to pay lower wages, more of them have irregular schedules, and they are less likely to 
come with employer-provided benefits. Finally, more than one-fourth of the non-UI-covered work 
for this Family Rewards sample is self-employment. 
 
Job Characteristics at Time of Survey Interview 
 
Variable 
Survey Data Only 
(Non-UI) 
UI and Survey 
Data 
Hourly wage ($) 12.8 13.2 
    
Hourly earnings (%) 24.9 9.1 
 Less than $7 11.5 18.1 
 $7 to 8.99 46.9 63.5 
 More than $9 16.7 9.3 
 Not reported    
    
Working full time (%)   
(30+ hours per week) 81.3 80.7 
    
Schedule (%)   
 Regular daytime 72.1 76.6 
 Regular night 9.7 11.3 
 Rotating/split 8.5 7.8 
 Irregular 8.7 2.9 
    
Employer-provided benefits (%)   
 Paid sick days 46.4 64.3 
 Paid vacation 49.5 70.6 
 Paid holidays 51.9 70.4 
 Dental plan 38.1 53.5 
 Retirement play  41.9 54.6 
 Health insurance 42.5 59.1 
    
Self-employed (%) 28.9 3.9 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employment status, survey 
Ever worked since random assignment (%) 74.6 71.6 3.0 ** 0.025
Number of months worked since random assignment date 7.0 6.5 0.5 *** 0.000
Full time 5.7 5.0 0.6 *** 0.000
Currently working (%) 59.9 54.3 5.6 *** 0.000
Employment status, UI records
Ever employed, Year 1 (%) 57.2 58.6 -1.4 0.220
Total earnings ($) 12,332 12,089 243 0.396
Less than $5,000 9.0 10.6 -1.5 * 0.059
$5,000 - $9,999 6.7 7.5 -0.8 0.256
$10,000 - $19,999 14.6 14.6 0.0 0.986
$20,000 - $29,999 11.1 10.2 0.9 0.300
$30,000 or more 14.9 15.7 -0.8 0.255
Working in quarter of survey interviewa (%) 48.9 49.6 -0.6 0.686
Employment status, survey and UI recordsb (%)
Currently working, according to survey but not UI records 16.2 10.8 5.4 *** 0.000
Currently working, according to both survey and UI records 44.8 43.4 1.5 0.354
4.1 6.2 -2.1 ** 0.023
34.9 39.7 -4.8 *** 0.003
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
Currently working, according to UI records only
Not working, according to survey and UI records
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 8.6
Comparison of Employment and Earnings Impacts Based on Administrative Records
and Similar Impacts Based on Survey Data,
 Among Respondents to the 18-Month Survey
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey and unemployment 
insurance (UI) administrative records from the State of New York.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controllling for pre-random assignment 
charactertistics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
Dollar averages include zero values for sample members who were not employed.
aUI data are not available for the quarter of survey interview for sample members interviewed toward the end 
of the survey fielding period (approximately one-quarter of all survey respondents). 
bThese outcomes are not measured for respondents interviewed toward the end of the survey fielding period.
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an even larger effect on the percentage of parents who reported working at the time of the sur-
vey, an increase of 5.6 percentage points.  
The difference between these positive effects on work versus the slightly negative ef-
fects shown in Table 8.5 could be related to several factors. First, the survey sample may simply 
be different from the full evaluation sample. In that case, effects on UI-covered employment 
should also be positive for the survey sample. The second panel of Table 8.6 (“Employment 
status, UI records”) indicates that this is not the case. Impacts on UI-covered work are slightly 
negative, as they are for the full sample, although not statistically significant. In addition, as 
shown for the full sample, the reduction in work seems to have come largely from individuals 
who would have earned very little during the year. Second, the program may have increased 
work in the types of jobs that are not covered by the UI system. The bottom panel of the table 
attempts to address that issue.  
The correspondence between the two data sources was examined using a subset of the 
survey sample for which UI data were available for the same calendar quarter in which individ-
uals were interviewed for the survey. The data show that the UI records miss a substantial 
amount of employment, as is typically the case. About 11 percent of the control group reported 
working at the time of the survey interview but were not registered as working in the UI 
records. In contrast, 16 percent of parents in the program group worked in these types of jobs. 
This impact on non-covered work explains why the survey shows positive employment effects 
while the UI data do not.  
The Family Rewards program offered incentives for all types of full-time jobs, so it is 
not clear why the program would only increase non-UI-covered employment, particularly since 
individuals had to present adequate documentation in order to earn rewards (see Box 8.3).  
Nonetheless, these jobs, particularly those that were full time, may have been easier to 
obtain than formal jobs during this period. Despite the fact that non-UI-covered jobs typically 
offer fewer benefits, they may have also been more attractive if they offered more flexible hours 
or were in more convenient locations.8
                                                   
8Some support for this idea comes from the evaluation of the Chicago Employment Retention and Ad-
vancement program. Staff in that program found that many of the individuals they served were working in 
informal jobs (for example, babysitting and house cleaning) that were often close to home and offered flexible 
hours. They were often reluctant to move into more formal jobs that also typically involved commuting into 
downtown Chicago (Bloom, Hendra, and Page, 2006). 
 The in-depth interviews with families indicated that 
many adults did work in what would appear to be non-UI-covered jobs, such as washing hair 
and tutoring.  
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Another possible reason for the increase in employment based on survey reports is that 
program group respondents may have been more willing than control group respondents to re-
port employment to the survey interviewer, given that they had gone through the process of 
“formalizing” their employment by providing all the necessary documentation to earn rewards. 
In this case, the impact on employment according to the survey would not represent a real in-
crease in work, but an increase in the reporting of work. Some evidence that is consistent with 
differential reporting is the reduction in UI-only work, or work that is indicated on the UI 
records but that the respondent did not report to the survey interviewer, shown in the final panel 
of Table 8.6. Although a small effect (-2.1 percentage points), it does suggest the possibility that 
program group respondents were more likely to report work on the survey.9
                                                   
9Abraham, Haltiwanger, Sandusky, and Spletzer (2009) suggest that individuals who work in UI-covered 
jobs but do not report employment on surveys are marginal workers, working part time or part of the year, who 
may not consider themselves formal workers. The Family Rewards survey data are consistent with this notion. 
Median quarterly earnings for the UI-only workers were less than half the earnings of those who were em-
ployed according to both sources.  
 However, it is not 
possible to determine with any certainty whether and to what degree differential reporting may 
have contributed to the employment impacts. 
Box 8.3 
Documenting Work 
To earn a reward for full-time work, participants were required to submit, along with the 
mail-in coupon, either a pay stub indicating weekly hours worked during the given activity 
period or, if weekly hours are not indicated on pay stubs, a letter on official letterhead from 
their employer providing this information. (However, it was not always possible to deter-
mine from this information whether the employer paid taxes on that particular individual.) 
Self-employed participants were required to submit other forms, depending on their type of 
work.  Participants who provided child care within their home, for example, were required 
to list hours and weeks of care provided per child, with supporting letters from parents and 
quarterly estimated tax payments (Form 1040-ES). Participants who were working as nan-
nies outside the home also had to document hours and weeks worked, along with their em-
ployer’s ID number (indicating that the employer withholds and pays taxes for the em-
ployee). Other self-employed workers were required to indicate the number of hours worked 
during the activity period and to submit invoices to clients, records of earnings and ex-
penses, and quarterly estimated tax payments. 
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Table 8.7 provides more information about how the program may have affected the 
types of jobs that participants held at the time of the survey — that is, the types of jobs that in-
dividuals took up in response to the program. The top row repeats the impact on employment at 
the time of the survey that is shown in Table 8.6, an increase of 5.6 percentage points. The sub-
sequent rows help to describe this new employment. For example, the impact on working at 
least 30 hours per week (at 5.6 percentage points) is essentially equal to the impact on work, 
suggesting that all of the new employment generated by the program was full-time work. This 
finding is expected given that full-time work was a requirement to earn the rewards. Data on 
wage rates show that the new employment was distributed across the wage categories, although 
most of it was in jobs that paid $9 or more per hour.  
The impact of 2.2 percentage points on the rate of self-employment suggests that about 
one-third of the increase in survey-reported employment was self-employment (2.2 percentage 
points divided by 5.6 percentage points). Similarly, while most of the new employment offered 
paid sick days as a benefit (an impact of 3.8 percentage points divided by 5.6 percentage points), 
only about half of the jobs offered health insurance (an impact of 2.8 percentage points divided 
by 5.6 percentage points). Nonetheless, the data on employer-provided benefits suggest that a 
significant fraction of employment that the UI records miss is legitimate employment, but it is 
work that is either not covered by the UI system or not reported to the UI system by employers.  
Effects for Key Subgroups 
Previous studies of work incentives programs have typically found that the effects vary 
across types of individuals. The effects of Family Rewards were examined for a range of sub-
groups. This section presents findings for subgroups defined by individuals’ work history and 
education level when they entered the study.  
Work history is defined by employment status at the time of random assignment, as 
self-reported on the Background Information Form. A recent study of a post-employment pro-
gram for welfare recipients that similarly included a financial incentive for full-time work found 
that it had larger effects for individuals who had some recent employment history at the time 
they entered the program.10
The first two panels of Table 8.8 present the results for Family Rewards. The program 
had no effect on UI-covered employment for those who were working at the time of random 
assignment, but it did lead to a small increase in employment according to survey reports, 
from 82.4 percent for the control group to 86.3 percent for the program group. Additional
 Such individuals might be better able to take up the offer of rewards 
for full-time work. 
                                                   
10Martinson and Hendra (2006). 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employment status (%)
Currently employed at the time of the survey 59.9 54.3 5.6 *** 0.000
Characteristics of current joba
Average hourly wage ($) 13.07 12.85 -- --
Less than $7.00 (%) 8.1 6.3 1.8 ** 0.047
$7.00 - $8.99 (%) 9.6 7.9 1.8 * 0.078
$9.00 or more (%) 36.2 31.8 4.3 *** 0.003
Not reported (%) 6.0 8.3 -2.3 ** 0.014
1-19 4.2 3.0 1.3 * 0.058
20-29 6.6 7.6 -1.0 0.297
30-34 8.9 6.1 2.8 *** 0.003
35 or more 39.4 36.2 3.1 ** 0.034
Not reported 0.8 1.4 -0.5 0.152
Worked at least 30 hours per week (%) 48.6 43.0 5.6 *** 0.000
Average weekly earnings ($) 446 440 -- --
Usual work schedule (%)
Regular daytime shift 44.1 40.8 3.3 ** 0.034
Regular evening/night shift 7.0 6.9 0.1 0.902
Rotating or split shift 4.9 4.3 0.6 0.430
Irregular shift 2.9 1.5 1.4 *** 0.009
Other 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.289
Self-employed (%) 7.0 4.9 2.2 *** 0.009
Employer-provided benefitsb (%)
Paid sick days 35.1 31.3 3.8 *** 0.005
Paid vacation days 37.7 34.8 2.9 ** 0.033
Paid holidays, including Christmas and New Year's Day 37.7 35.2 2.6 * 0.066
Dental benefits 28.0 27.2 0.8 0.535
A retirement plan 28.5 26.5 2.0 0.136
A health or medical insurance plan 31.8 29.0 2.8 ** 0.039
Enrolled in a work-related health or medical
insurance plan 23.9 22.4 1.5 0.225
(continued)
Hours worked per week (%)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 8.7
Impacts on Job Characteristics
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analyses (not shown) indicate that this effect, as for the full sample, represents an increase in 
non-UI-covered work, or work that is reported on the survey but not in the UI records. In con-
trast, among individuals who were not working at the time of random assignment, the pro-
gram led to a reduction in UI-covered employment and an increase in work reported on the 
survey, suggesting some substitution out of UI-covered work into non-UI-covered work (see 
Table 8.8, second panel).11
                                                   
11This substitution is not observed directly for the survey sample, since (unlike for the full sample of par-
ents who were not working at study entry), there were no negative effects on UI-covered employment. None-
theless, results for the full sample suggest substitution out of formal work. The lack of negative effects for the 
survey sample suggests that some caution be used for this subgroup when generalizing the survey findings to 
the full sample.  
 
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employment search (%)
Looked for work in previous 4 weeks 26.7 26.4 0.3 0.842
Received help finding a job (%) 15.0 13.4 1.6 0.190
From a program or agencyc 9.8 8.5 1.3 0.223
Unemployment agency 0.8 1.0 -0.1 0.681
Job center 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.398
Temp agency 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.293
Work Force One Center or One-Stop Center 1.6 1.4 0.2 0.624
Community organization 0.6 0.1 0.5 ** 0.031
Other 5.8 4.9 0.9 0.297
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
Table 8.7 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Italic type indicates comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
aIf a respondent currently works multiple jobs, then only the primary job is reported. (The job at which the 
respondent works the most hours is considered primary.)  
bThis includes benefits that are or eventually will be offered, regardless of whether the respondent receives 
them.
cPercentages for finding help through specific programs or agencies do not add up to the percentage who 
found help "from a program or agency" because several sample members did not know or refused to identify the 
exact source of help.
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employed
Full sample (UI records)
Ever employed, year 1 (%) 83.0 84.0 -1.0 0.275
Average quarterly employment (%) 77.0 77.7 -0.7 0.439
Total earnings ($) 20,449 20,806 -357 0.314
Sample size (total = 2,634) 1,325 1,309
Survey sample
Ever worked since random assignment (%) 95.8 95.0 0.8 0.443  
Currently working at the time of the survey (%) 86.3 82.4 3.9 ** 0.029  
Sample size (total = 1,599) 823 776
Not employed
Full sample (UI records)
Ever employed, year 1 (%) 25.7 29.8 -4.1 ** 0.015
Average quarterly employment (%) 17.1 19.6 -2.5 ** 0.047
Total earnings ($) 2,677 2,846 -170 0.519
Sample size (total = 2,282) 1,146 1,136
Survey sample
Ever worked since random assignment (%) 50.4 46.2 4.2 * 0.093  
Currently working at the time of the survey (%) 30.1 23.8 6.3 *** 0.005  
Sample size (total = 1,440) 725 715
(continued)
Impacts on Work and Earnings, by Respondent's Employment Status and
Education Level at the Time of Random Assignment
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Table 8.8
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
High school diploma/GED certificate or higher
Full sample (UI records)
Ever employed, year 1 (%) 65.2 66.4 -1.2 0.314
Average quarterly employment (%) 57.7 58.5 -0.9 0.383
Total earnings ($) 15,662 16,064 -403 0.218
Sample size (total = 2,864) 1,404 1,460
Survey sample
Ever worked since random assignment (%) 80.3 76.4 4.0 ** 0.012  
Currently working at the time of the survey (%) 68.8 60.2 8.6 *** 0.000 ††
Sample size (total = 1,820) 922 898
No high school diploma/GED certificate
Full sample (UI records)
Ever employed (%) 44.2 48.3 -4.1 *** 0.008
Average quarterly employment (%) 37.0 39.4 -2.4 * 0.052
Total earnings ($) 7,002 7,223 -221 0.447
Sample size (total = 1,960) 1,021 939
Survey sample
Ever worked since random assignment (%) 65.9 64.8 1.1 0.657  
Currently working at the time of the survey (%) 46.6 45.5 1.1 0.647 ††
Sample size (total = 1,186) 610 576
Table 8.8 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey and New York State 
unemployment insurance (UI) wage records. 
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels are 
indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families and sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
Dollar averages include zero values for sample members who were not employed.
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A comparison of the two panels shows that non-UI-covered employment is much more 
prevalent among parents who were not working at the time of random assignment. As an exam-
ple, only about 30 percent of the control group members who were unemployed at the time of 
random assignment worked during Year 1 according to UI records, while 46 percent reported 
on the survey that they had worked since random assignment. Although the two data sources 
cover somewhat different time periods, these data indicate that one-third of employment for this 
group is in non-UI work. 
Results by education level are shown in the last two panels of Table 8.8. For parents 
who entered the study with at least a high school diploma or a GED certificate, the program led 
to a sizable increase in work according to the survey — for example, an increase of 8.6 percen-
tage points in the percent of individuals who were working at the time of the survey. In this 
case, further analysis (not shown) indicates that this increase represents a small increase in UI-
covered work (in the quarter of survey interview) and a larger increase in non-UI-covered em-
ployment. For the less educated group, the program led to a reduction in UI-covered employ-
ment of 4.1 percentage points and had no effects on employment according to the survey. In this 
case, the program did lead to an increase in informal work (or work reported on the survey but 
not in the UI records), but one that was entirely offset by a reduction in UI-covered work. Thus, 
survey respondents in the program group were no more likely to report being employed than 
were those in the control group. 
In sum, the program appears to have had somewhat different effects for individuals de-
pending on their preparedness for work (based on education and work status at study entry). 
Although it led to an increase in non-UI employment for all groups, this increase was offset in 
part or entirely by a reduction in UI-covered work among the less “work-ready” group. For that 
group, in other words, the program increased informal employment among those who would 
have otherwise worked in formal jobs. If finding or maintaining a UI-covered job is more chal-
lenging for this group, it makes sense that these individuals might either be more likely to take 
up informal jobs to earn rewards or, feeling more secure with the extra income provided by the 
program’s cash transfers, to take on informal work instead of formal work, perhaps for matters 
of convenience.12
                                                   
12Effects across additional dimensions were also examined as part of a more exploratory analysis. These 
other dimensions include baseline public assistance receipt, public housing status, borough, and race/ethnicity. 
The results showed little variation in impacts, although there were a few exceptions. For example, effects on 
survey-reported employment were larger for parents who were living in public or subsidized housing at the 
time of random assignment, compared with other parents. Effects on survey-reported employment were also 
larger for parents in two-parent families, compared with their single-parent counterparts, and for parents whose 
incomes were below 50 percent of the poverty level at the time of random assignment, compared with parents 
above 50 percent of the poverty level.  
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Conclusion 
Family Rewards’ effects on work are mixed. For the sample as a whole, the program 
appears to have led to a small increase in employment, largely in non-UI-covered jobs. Howev-
er, the program also led to a small reduction in UI-covered employment, particularly for more 
disadvantaged subgroups of the sample. It is difficult to know whether this pattern of effects is a 
result of the tough economy, where UI-covered jobs may be difficult to obtain, or a result of the 
other income families obtained from the program — income that may have allowed them to 
leave UI-covered jobs or not move into them as quickly as they would have otherwise. Both 
factors may have played a role.  
It is also not clear why the program, in contrast to previous work incentives programs, 
did not lead to larger increases in all types of employment, UI-covered and not.13
                                                   
13For example, effects on UI-covered employment rates in the fourth quarter of follow-up across several 
“make work pay” programs ranged from 7 percentage points to 14 percentage points (Michalopoulos, 2005). 
Effects on survey-reported employment were similarly positive.  
 Perhaps fami-
lies were not focused on the work rewards during the first year of the program, either because 
they were among many rewards being offered or because these families could and did earn in-
come from the nonwork rewards. Longer-term follow up will be needed to assess how the in-
creased marketing of the workforce rewards in Year 2 by Seedco and the Neighborhood Partner 
Organizations, coupled with the worsening of the economy at that time, affect these results.  
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Chapter 9  
Conclusion 
How do the early results of Family Rewards compare with those of other countries’ 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs? Direct comparisons must be made cautiously 
because of vast differences in the nature of poverty and in broader social and economic condi-
tions in which the programs operate, and because of variations in the programs’ designs and 
target populations. Key among the design differences is the fact that other countries’ CCT 
programs do not generally include rewards for educational achievement or workforce activities. 
Their incentives schedules are much simpler and not nearly as comprehensive, and the pro-
grams are not time-limited. Furthermore, CCT programs in some other countries function as the 
country’s core safety net system, or as a critical part of it, not as an “add-on” program like 
Family Rewards. With these differences in mind, a number of comparisons can be drawn. 
Evaluations of other CCT programs have convincingly shown that such programs can 
reduce poverty and improve the amount and quality of consumption of goods and services (for 
example, increased food purchases) among very poor families — their most important objec-
tive.1
CCT programs in other countries have had more mixed results in terms of their effects 
on human capital development outcomes. Studies have fairly consistently found positive effects 
on school enrollment rates, with impacts in the range of 3 to 13 percentage points above control 
group averages (and sometimes higher), depending on the country. However, these effects may 
vary by grade level. For example, one study of Mexico’s Oportunidades program shows statisti-
cally significant increases in students entering sixth grade, the transition point to secondary 
school when many students typically leave school, but little effect on students in primary school.  
 The initial results from Family Rewards are generally consistent with those findings. 
Family Rewards reduced current income poverty among its participants, and the families used 
some of that extra income to increase their food consumption, meet other daily living expenses, 
and even increase their savings.  
Family Rewards has not produced impacts on school enrollment rates, but at each target 
grade sample (that is, the fourth-, seventh-, and ninth-grade cohorts), the control group enroll-
ment rate was already very high. It remains to be seen whether the control group enrollment 
rates begin to fall over time, with more students dropping out, particularly among students in the 
                                                   
1This chapter uses information on other countries’ CCT programs from studies summarized in Fiszbein 
and Schady (2009) and Levy (2006). 
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high school cohort, and, if so, whether Family Rewards lessens that rate for the program group 
and eventually increases the likelihood of graduation.  
Some studies in Mexico suggest that Oportunidades has reduced dropout rates and 
rates of repeating a grade. However, studies there and elsewhere have not yet found effects on 
educational achievement as measured by standardized tests. In this regard, the early positive 
impacts of Family Rewards on the likelihood that “better-prepared” ninth-grade students 
would pass Regents exams, along with its impacts on their accumulated high school credits 
and grade promotion, is an unusual and promising finding. It suggests the potential of a CCT 
program to increase learning, at least for some students, in the absence of any reforms in 
teacher or school practices. 
CCT programs have generally increased the likelihood of health checkups. A number of 
studies have shown impacts on health visits, ranging from 6 percentage points to 33 percentage 
points relative to control group rates, particularly for very young children who were typically 
the main focus of health care incentives (for example, to encourage parents to take them for 
checkups to monitor their nutrition, growth, and development). The observed effects of Family 
Rewards on the use of medical services are smaller, but they are set against a much higher 
initial use of medical services among the control group than is found in other studies of CCT 
programs. However, the substantial impacts of Family Rewards on preventive dental care, for 
which the normal rates among the control group members are much lower than for medical 
visits, are especially noteworthy. This finding, along with the small, program-induced shifts 
away from the reliance on hospital emergency rooms and the small increase in parents’ likeli-
hood of seeing a medical doctor and of getting treated for a medical condition, provides further 
evidence that the CCT program can positively influence health care behavior. 
The effects of other countries’ CCT programs on health status are more mixed. Some 
evaluations have found positive effects on some health outcomes (such as increased height 
among very young children and reductions of certain illnesses or risk factors among adults), 
while other evaluations have found no effects on these outcomes. However, most of the studies 
have follow-up periods of only one or two years, so the longer-term effects of the programs on 
health status are uncertain.  
CCT programs in other countries have generally not included workforce components 
and so they have not been expected to boost participation in the labor force in the short term. In 
fact, some experts feared that adults may have reduced their work effort in the face of cash 
transfers that were not conditioned on work. However, evaluations have found little reduction in 
work effort. In the Family Rewards study, the data on employment in jobs covered by the 
unemployment insurance (UI) system suggest a similar story — at most, there was a small 
reduction in work effort, with no statistically significant reduction in earnings from those jobs. 
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At the same time, the findings that are based on survey data seem to indicate that the program 
generated an increase in full-time employment and earnings (in non-UI-covered jobs), suggest-
ing a positive response to the program’s work incentives. The survey data also reveal a small 
increase in parents’ acquisition of training credentials or associate’s degrees from two-year 
colleges. Perhaps the extra money they received through Family Rewards helped them pay 
some of the costs that are associated with the education or training they were close to finishing, 
or eased their financial strain in a way that helped them complete their courses.  
Overall, the initial results from the New York City project lend support to the growing 
list of studies showing that a CCT approach can both reduce immediate poverty and hardship 
and promote at least some improvements in families’ own human capital investment. The early 
findings also demonstrate that the CCT concept can be successfully adapted and implemented 
in the context of a large city in a highly developed country.  
The results also have broader relevance when viewed in the context of studies that are 
testing less ambitious incentives programs that focus on only one domain and do not include the 
goal of immediate poverty reduction — for example, programs that offer small incentives tied 
only to education conditions or only to health-related or work-related activities. An increasing 
number of such studies are showing that, although not all such programs have achieved positive 
effects, carefully structured rewards have the potential to influence people’s efforts and 
achievements in the areas of education, health care practices, and employment.2
Still, it is important not to exaggerate the program’s early impacts. So far, it has pro-
duced no effects on some important educational outcomes (such as educational achievement for 
elementary and middle school students and for “less-prepared” high school students) and only 
small or modest effects in the health and workforce domains. This may raise questions about 
how big a difference an “incentives-only” strategy might be able to achieve for certain kinds of 
outcomes, or whether certain modifications in the program’s design and operations could boost 
its effectiveness. For example, reducing the complexity of the program, improving families’ 
understanding of the incentives offer early on, reducing the lag time between meeting condi-
tions and receiving reward payments, and providing more proactive guidance, personal assis-
tance, and extra services from frontline staff might be worth considering were new versions of 
 Family Re-
wards adds to that list, showing that incentives, while not always effective, do have the potential 
to influence a variety of behaviors. 
                                                   
2See Chapter 1 for references to a number of important studies. The results from the evaluation of the 
Spark program, one of three demonstration projects that are part of Opportunity NYC and that offered school-
based education incentives to fourth- and seventh-grade students, were not available at the time that this report 
was written.  
 
260 
the CCT approach to be tested. Of course, the findings that are available so far on Family 
Rewards cover its start-up phase and extend only until the program had just begun to mature. 
Thus, most of the story of Family Rewards remains to be written. 
The program is continuing for a third and final year (which will end in August 2010). 
As mentioned previously, a number of changes have been introduced to streamline the incen-
tives offer, simplify program marketing and administration, and reduce the program’s costs. 
Although the discontinuation of some rewards (see Chapter 1) reduces the maximum amount of 
money that families can earn, the modifications in the incentives offer, with stronger marketing, 
may help families focus on higher-priority rewards that have a better chance of increasing their 
human capital. It remains to be seen whether these operational improvements, plus the addition-
al time that the third year allows families to learn about and respond to the incentives offer, 
increase the magnitude of the program’s impacts.  
Future evaluation reports will present longer-term findings on the program’s operations, 
families’ reactions and experiences, the program’s impacts, and its economic costs and benefits. 
One report, expected to be completed by fall 2010, will provide an in-depth qualitative look at 
how parents and children communicate about the incentives and the behaviors with which they 
are linked, and the implications of the incentives for the dynamics of family life. A subsequent 
report, scheduled for late 2011, will present findings on the program’s impacts within three 
years after random assignment, around the time that the program itself is ending. The final 
evaluation report, due in 2013, will cover a five-year follow-up period, including two years after 
the program ends. The post-program follow-up period will allow the evaluation to determine 
whether any effects that the program achieves while it was operating persist or grow, or perhaps 
even turn negative for some outcomes, after the incentives are no longer offered. Thus, final 
judgments about the potential for Family Rewards to achieve its goals and its relevance for 
government policy for reducing poverty in the United States must be reserved until the longer-
term findings are available.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
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Program Control
Characteristic Group  Group Total
One-parent familiesa (%) 80.5 81.4 80.9
Two-parent family with both parents 
enrolled in Family Rewardsb (%) 6.2 5.1 5.7
Average number of children in household 2.5 2.5 2.5
Number of children in household (%)
1 child 23.0 22.6 22.8
2 children 33.3 35.2 34.3
3 children 26.6 23.7 25.1
4 children or more 17.1 18.5 17.8
Primary language spoken at home is English (%) 76.9 76.9 76.9
Housing status (%)
Own home or apartment 6.9 4.8 5.9
Rent apartment or home 86.3 87.9 87.1
Other housing arrangement 6.8 7.3 7.1
Living in public housing (%) 30.4 30.3 30.4
Receiving Section 8 rental assistance (%) 21.7 24.3 23.0
Receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistancec (%) 24.8 23.2 24.0
Receiving food stamps (%) 60.8 58.0 59.4
At least one adult covered 
by public health insurance (%) 70.9 70.9 70.9
Earnings above 130% of federal poverty leveld (%) 15.4 14.3 14.9
Sample size (total = 4,750) 2,377 2,373
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table A.1
Characteristics of Families at the Time of Random Assignment, 
by Research Group
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms. 
NOTES: In order to assess differences in characteristics across research groups, chi-square tests 
were used for categorical variables, and t-tests were used for continuous variables. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums. 
Public health insurance measures in this table exclude child information. 
aThis measure includes families with parents who reported their marital status as single, single 
but living with a boyfriend or girlfriend, separated, divorced, or widowed. 
bThis refers to sample members who enrolled in Family Rewards with their spouse or legal 
domestic partner.
cThis measure includes families with child-only cases.
dIncome information is not available.
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Program Control
Characteristic Group Group Total
Female (%) 94.7 93.9 94.3
Age (%)
18-24 years 0.3 0.3 0.3
25-34 years 28.9 28.8 28.9
35-44 years 44.6 45.7 45.1
45-59 years 23.1 22.5 22.8
60 years or more 3.1 2.7 2.9
Average age (years) 40 40 40
U.S. citizena (%) 83.1 83.1 83.1
By birth 68.0 66.8 67.4
By naturalization 15.1 16.4 15.7
Legal permanent resident (%) 16.9 16.9 16.9
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 47.2 46.3 46.7
White, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.6 0.8 0.7
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 51.0 51.3 51.2
Other 1.1 1.4 1.4
Education (highest degree or diploma earned) (%)
GED certificate 9.8 12.3 11.1
High school diploma 20.1 22.6 21.3
Associate's degree/2-year college 9.2 8.5 8.9
4-year college or beyond 8.9 8.4 8.7
None of the above 52.0 48.2 50.1
Marital status (%)
Single 61.3 63.6 62.4
Cohabitating 2.6 2.1 2.3
Separated, widowed, or divorced 16.6 15.7 16.1
Married or in a legal domestic partnership 19.5 18.6 19.1
Has an account at bank or credit union (%) 46.0 48.0 47.0
Employment measures
Currently working (%) 52.9 53.2 53.1
Working full timeb (%) 37.6 36.7 37.1
Average weekly earnings, among those currently working ($) 394 393 393
During past year, average number of months worked (%) 10 10 10
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Characteristics of Parents at the Time of Random Assignment, by Research Group 
Appendix Table A.2
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Program Control
Characteristic Group Group Total
Health measures (%)
Health insurance coverage 
Public health insurance 70.5 70.4 70.5
Employer health insurance 20.9 20.2 20.6
Other health insurance 3.0 3.0 3.0
Not covered 5.5 6.4 6.0
Had annual medical checkup when not sick
Within the past year 82.0 82.3 82.1
1-2 years ago 14.3 14.2 14.3
More than 2 years ago 3.5 3.3 3.4
Never 0.2 0.3 0.2
Last medical checkup was at own (regular) doctor's 
office or clinic (%) 93.1 93.9 93.5
Had preventive dental checkup 
Within the past year 64.9 65.0 64.9
1-2 years ago 23.9 23.1 23.5
More than 2 years ago 10.6 11.3 10.9
Never 0.7 0.6 0.7
Self-rated health
Excellent or very good 42.8 43.1 43.0
Good 37.0 36.8 36.9
Fair or poor 20.2 20.1 20.1
Over the past 2 weeks, had little or no interest
in doing things 22.9 21.9 22.4
Over the past 2 weeks, had been feeling down, 
depressed, or hopeless 22.4 21.5 21.9
Sample size (total = 4,750) 2,377 2,373
Appendix Table A.2 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: In order to assess differences in characteristics across research groups, chi-square tests were used for 
categorical variables, and t-tests were used for continuous variables.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums.
This table excludes information for enrolled second parents in two-parent households (N = 247).
aThis measure refers to U.S. citizens both by birth and by naturalization.
bThis measure refers to 30 hours a week or more. 
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by Research Group
Program Control
Characteristic Group  Group Total
Gender (%)
Female 49.8 50.2 50.0
Male 50.2 49.8 50.0
Age (%)
0-5 years 14.3 13.1 13.7
6-10 years 31.0 30.2 30.6
11-13 years 25.5 26.9 26.2
14 years or older 29.2 29.8 29.5
Average age (years) 11 11 11
Born in the U.S. (%) 94.0 93.1 93.5
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 47.0 47.0 47.0
White, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.4 0.5 0.4
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 50.7 50.0 50.4
Other 2.0 2.5 2.2
Type of school child attended in the past year (%)
Public or charter school 97.7 97.3 97.5
Private or parochial school 2.3 2.7 2.5
Gradea (%)
Not yet in pre-K or kindergarten 7.2 7.1 7.1
Pre-K 2.4 2.4 2.4
Kindergarten 3.0 2.5 2.8
1st grade 3.5 3.6 3.5
2nd grade 4.5 3.9 4.2
3rd grade 4.2 3.4 3.8
4th grade 16.6 16.8 16.7
5th grade 4.0 3.8 3.9
6th grade 4.2 4.5 4.3
7th grade 15.7 16.4 16.1
8th grade 3.7 4.0 3.9
9th grade 18.5 18.7 18.6
10th grade 3.7 4.4 4.1
11th grade 3.5 3.6 3.6
12th grade 3.0 2.9 3.0
Collegeb 1.2 1.3 1.2
Not enrolledc 1.1 0.7 0.9
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table A.3
Characteristics of All Children at the Time of Random Assignment, 
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Program Control
Characteristic Group  Group Total
Education measures (%)
Child's parent attended parent-teacher conference 
during past year
Never 4.7 5.3 5.0
1-2 times 36.1 34.5 35.3
3-4 times 34.5 35.5 35.0
5-6 times 11.6 12.0 11.8
More than 6 times 13.1 12.7 12.9
Child's parent spoke with teacher about 
grades, tests, or homework during past year
Not at all 2.8 3.0 2.9
A little 8.1 8.3 8.2
Some 19.9 20.1 20.0
A lot 34.4 34.5 34.5
A great deal 34.9 34.0 34.5
Enrolled in special education in the past school year 15.1 14.7 14.9
Enrolled as an English Language Learner (ELL)
in the past school year 12.5 13.2 12.9
Child health outcomes (%)
Health insurance coverage
Public health insurance 81.1 81.0 81.1
Employer health insurance 15.0 14.0 14.5
Other health insurance 1.3 2.1 1.7
Not covered 2.6 2.9 2.7
Parent's rating of child's health
Excellent 44.4 42.7 43.5
Very good 31.3 30.9 31.1
Good 21.1 22.6 21.8
Fair 2.9 3.4 3.1
Poor 0.4 0.4 0.4
Had annual medical checkup when not sick
Within the past year 90.5 91.0 90.7
1-2 years ago 8.5 8.2 8.4
More than 2 years ago 0.8 0.7 0.8
Never 0.2 0.1 0.2
Last annual checkup was at own (regular) doctor's office or clinic 97.8 97.6 97.7
Had preventive dental checkup: 
Within the past year 73.9 75.4 74.6
1-2 years ago 18.1 16.2 17.2
More than 2 years ago 2.9 3.2 3.1
Never 5.1 5.2 5.1
(continued)
Appendix Table A.3 (continued)
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Program Control
Characteristic Group  Group Total
Has physical problem that limits activities 9.3 9.7 9.5
Has an emotional or mental health problem 
that limits activities 6.1 6.5 6.3
Sample size (total = 11,331) 5,680 5,651
Appendix Table A.3 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: In order to assess differences in characteristics across research groups, chi-square tests were 
used for categorical variables, and t-test were used for continuous variables.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums.
aGrades 4, 7, and 9 are "target grades" for the Family Rewards program. Therefore all enrolled 
families had to have a child in grade 4, 7, or 9.
bCollege students who were under the age of 18 were enrolled in Family Rewards. They were not 
eligible for any reward payments.
cThe "not enrolled" category includes school-age children who are no longer attending or have 
graduated before the age of 18.
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Characteristic CD 5 CD 6 CD 5 CD 16 CD 10 CD 11
One-parent family (%)a 83.2 81.1 79.0 79.1 81.3 82.1
Two-parent family with both parents enrolled  in Family Rewardsb (%) 5.0 8.5 5.6 5.0 4.3 5.1
Average number of children in household 3 3 3 2 2 2
Number of children in household (%)
1 child 21.3 17.3 22.7 24.4 29.4 24.0
2 children 33.8 33.7 34.9 33.1 33.2 36.1
3 children 28.7 29.5 22.7 23.1 21.2 24.6
4 children 16.2 19.5 19.8 19.4 16.2 15.3
5 children or more 
Primary language spoken at home is English (%) 54.2 63.7 82.8 93.1 89.0 81.3
Housing status (%)
Own home or apartment 3.0 3.3 8.1 3.9 5.7 10.0
Rent apartment or home 86.7 90.8 86.8 92.2 86.1 80.6
Other housing arrangement 10.3 5.8 5.1 3.9 8.1 9.4
Living in public housing (%) 17.6 12.0 24.7 40.4 37.1 50.9
Receiving Section 8 rental assistance (%) 25.1 40.7 19.5 16.8 19.7 15.6
Receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistancec (%) 36.3 18.7 24.6 19.6 21.8 23.1
Receiving food stamps (%) 75.0 61.4 55.1 56.2 51.7 56.4
At least one adult covered by public health insurance (%)
Earnings above 130% of federal poverty leveld (%) 5.7 14.0 22.1 22.1 10.3 8.7
Sample size (total = 4,750) 755 843 918 743 555 936
(continued)
Characteristics of Families at the Time of Random Assignment, by Community District (CD)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan
Appendix Table A.4
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Appendix Table A.4 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: Sample sizes may vary because of  missing values. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepencies in calculating sums. 
Public health insurance measures in this table exclude child information. 
This table excludes information for enrolled second parents in two-parent households (N = 247).
aThis measure includes families with parents who reported their marital status as single, single but living with a boyfriend or girlfriend, separated, 
divorced, or widowed. 
bThis  measure refers to sample members who enrolled in Family Rewards with their spouse or legal domestic partner.
cThis measure includes families with child-only cases.
dIncome information is not available.
  
Characteristic CD 5 CD 6 CD 5 CD 16 CD 10 CD 11
Female (%) 94.2 96.0 94.2 96.1 93.5 92.2
Age (%)
18-24 years 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.3
25-34 years 30.5 30.2 31.8 30.1 23.1 25.9
35-44 years 46.0 46.6 43.7 45.0 46.8 43.7
45-59 years 22.6 20.8 21.4 22.1 24.9 25.6
60 years or more 0.8 2.1 2.5 2.7 5.2 4.5
Average age (years) 39 39 39 40 41 41
U.S. citizena (%) 72.1 80.1 84.3 83.6 89.4 89.4
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 71.3 68.2 35.9 15.1 20.7 59.0
White, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.1 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.7 1.1
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 27.3 29.0 62.0 83.8 76.9 38.2
Other 1.2 1.3 1.6 0.9 1.6 1.7
Education (highest degree or diploma earned) (%)
GED certificate 7.9 10.3 9.4 11.1 12.9 14.9
High school diploma 16.0 25.0 19.0 28.1 22.0 18.5
Associate's degree/2-year college 6.3 8.6 12.5 7.8 9.3 8.2
4-year college or beyond 6.7 8.9 8.5 9.1 12.9 7.6
None of the above 63.1 47.2 50.6 43.9 42.9 50.8
Marital status (%)
Single 62.8 61.7 58.5 62.2 64.5 65.7
Cohabitating 1.9 3.2 2.7 0.9 2.5 2.6
Separated, widowed, or divorced 18.5 16.3 17.8 16.0 14.2 13.8
Married or in a legal domestic partnership 16.8 18.9 21.0 20.9 18.7 17.9
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Characteristic CD 5 CD 6 CD 5 CD 16 CD 10 CD 11
Has an account at bank or credit union (%) 30.8 44.4 57.0 48.9 56.5 45.3
Employment measures
Currently working (%) 49.3 53.3 54.0 55.3 56.8 50.9
Working full timeb (%) 28.1 41.8 43.1 42.9 36.6 30.1
Average weekly earnings, among those currently working 300 350 434 440 404 407
During past year, average number of months worked 10 10 10 11 10 10
Health measures (%)
Health insurance coverage 
Public health insurance 85.8 75.4 65.4 67.9 59.5 67.0
Employer health insurance 7.0 15.6 25.8 24.2 30.6 22.3
Other health insurance 2.5 2.2 2.5 1.9 5.1 4.1
Not covered 4.7 6.8 6.3 6.0 4.8 6.6
Had annual medical checkup when not sick
Within the past year 88.9 83.4 82.0 79.8 79.6 78.8
1-2 years ago 9.0 14.8 15.0 16.7 14.3 15.3
More than 2 years ago 1.8 1.8 2.7 3.5 5.9 5.3
Never 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.7
Last medical checkup was at own (regular) doctor's 
office or clinic 92.9 95.1 95.0 97.2 93.1 87.9
Had preventive dental checkup 
Within the past year 73.3 65.6 61.2 59.8 68.4 63.2
1-2 years ago 18.0 24.6 26.3 27.7 21.0 22.2
More than 2 years ago 7.6 9.7 11.8 12.0 10.1 13.6
Never 1.1 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.0
(continued)
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Characteristic CD 5 CD 6 CD 5 CD 16 CD 10 CD 11
Self-rated health
Excellent or very good 40.8 40.5 38.6 52.8 46.2 41.4
Good 38.9 41.9 41.1 30.9 31.9 34.4
Fair or poor 20.3 17.6 20.3 16.3 21.9 24.2
Over the past 2 weeks, had little or no interest
in doing things 29.4 21.4 19.0 14.7 23.3 27.0
Over the past 2 weeks, had been feeling down, 
depressed, or hopeless 28.3 21.7 20.1 16.3 21.4 23.9
Sample size (total = 4,750) 755 843 918 743 555 936
Appendix Table A.5 (continued)
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Baseline Information Forms.
NOTES: This table excludes information for second parents in two-parent families (N = 247).
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepencies in calculating sums. 
aThis measure includes U.S. citizens both by birth and by naturalization.
bThis refers to 30 hours a week or more. 
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As a first step in creating the verification system for Family Rewards, Seedco devel-
oped a detailed list of payment rules that centered on the broader list of activities that the pro-
gram designers had established. There were initially 22 different conditions for claiming re-
wards, and each one required programmatic decisions to address both normal and “atypical” 
circumstances. These rules specified the types of documents that are sufficient to record atten-
dance at charter or parochial schools, and to excuse absences for health reasons; they also de-
scribed what is needed to document full-time, informal work, such as child care, or work that is 
irregular, as is often the case for home health aides. As a result of these efforts to define work, 
Seedco created both a “coupon” and a “form.” The type of activity is noted on the coupon, and 
the form is used to document the activity that is presented on the coupon. Participants are re-
quired to submit the coupons and forms for the activities they have completed during a particu-
lar two-month “activity period” by the end of that period. 
Seedco’s next task was to establish a system for verifying the information on the cou-
pons. The volume of coupons that are received for every payment cycle also suggests the exten-
siveness of this task — on average, about 6,200 coupons are received every two months during 
a three-week window. For example, for a September 15 coupon deadline, the payment file, with 
all decisions about these coupons, needs to be released by October 7 to ensure payment on Oc-
tober 15. Given the number and variety of coupons, forms, and associated documentation re-
ceived, the verification system is highly complex and involves many steps. First, participants 
mail in coupons and forms in pre-addressed, postage-paid envelopes. The mail is picked up 
from a post office box, and when it reaches Seedco’s back office, which is staffed by approx-
imately 20 workers across different shifts, the contents and date are logged into an Excel 
spreadsheet. Folders are then prepared for coupons, supporting forms, and other documentation 
— one folder for each condition that is documented. The folders are verified to make sure that 
the documentation is correct and complete, with staff marking on a “control sheet” whether it is 
approved, rejected, or requires further review. After review (if needed), another worker does a 
quality assurance check before payments can be logged. This system evolved over time. During 
the first cycle, the review was done manually by temporary staff and numerous permanent staff 
members, up to the vice president of Seedco. Over time, however, the system became much 
more efficient, with information technology playing a greater role. The lag between submission 
of documentation and approval between Year 1 and Year 2 was cut approximately in half, from 
13.4 days to 6.8 days on average.  
One important aspect of the verification system is that Seedco, cognizant of some of the 
administrative demands on participants, attempted to conduct what they sometimes called “veri-
fication with a heart.” That is, while Seedco was strict about authorizing payments only if con-
ditions were met, it searched actively for ways to verify those conditions and make the asso-
ciated payments. For example, workers were observed searching for pay stubs that had been 
submitted during a previous payment cycle and had been rejected because they had covered the 
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wrong cycle, but now could be applied to the current one. Staff also sometimes called a school 
to verify the hours and dates of a training program when a transcript was not clear, and they 
spent many hours telephoning physicians who did not provide their license number on annual 
medical visits. As one Seedco worker said of these outreach attempts, “We do realize the pro-
gram is very complex….Let’s say [most] of the participants here are single-parent households, 
right?…The person is working, goes home, cooks for the children, looks after the children, and 
then you expect them to complete this kind of documentation? It is difficult.” 
In addition to coupons, Seedco processed automatically verified rewards, by establish-
ing a sophisticated data exchange system with public agencies. Although this system resulted in 
the ability to pay participants for attendance, test scores, and public health insurance (before the 
reward was discontinued), creating the system presented its own challenges and represented 
another obstacle that Seedco had to overcome to make the program operational. For example, 
electronic test score files from the NYC Department of Education took months to arrive and 
then still had to be checked — well after the parents and children had learned about the scores. 
Attendance data sometimes also needed to be cleaned, with the result that some students who 
were owed payments were not recognized as such during the payment cycle in question. Med-
icaid information was also sometimes difficult to process, with files transferred to Seedco on a 
semi-annual basis, even though payment schedules were semi-monthly. For many of these au-
tomatically verified payments, Seedco reported that electronic files required extensive data 
cleaning and follow-up in order to pay participants successfully for meeting reward conditions.  
Combining manually verified and auto-verified information, Opportunity NYC soft-
ware has records of accepted and rejected reward claims, account information, and payment 
status. After verification, this information permits Seedco’s information technology department 
to send a final file with automatically verified and coupon-based activities to GrantsPlus, a 
payment management service that is part of the Research Division of the City University of 
New York, which processes the payment. After payment funds are transferred, GrantsPlus 
sends Seedco an acceptance or rejection report; the acceptance report is the “payment report,” 
and indicates all payments that were made successfully, while the rejection report indicates any 
payments that bounced back because of incorrect or insufficient bank account information, or as 
a result of technical problems with the transfer.  
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Appendix Table C.1
Summary of Rewards Earned by Families in Program Years 1 and 2 Combined, by Community District (CD)
Outcome CD5 CD6 CD5 CD16 CD10 CD11
Family earned any reward (%) 99.5 99.5 99.4 99.7 100.0 99.6
Automatically verified rewards only (%) 15.6 11.1 8.4 12.4 9.8 12.8
Any automatically verified rewards (%) 99.2 99.1 98.9 99.5 98.9 98.7
Coupon book rewards only (%) 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.9
Any coupon book rewards (%) 83.9 88.4 90.9 87.3 90.2 86.8
Automatically verified and coupon book rewards (%) 83.6 87.9 90.5 87.0 89.1 85.9
Family earned at least one (%):
Education reward 96.0 97.2 98.9 97.6 96.7 98.1
Health reward 97.9 97.6 97.6 98.4 97.5 97.0
Workforce reward 41.5 52.5 54.6 49.5 45.1 45.0
Average reward amount earneda ($) $5,768 $6,516 $7,027 $6,077 $6,085 $5,662
Average number of activity periods during which rewards were earned 10.9 11.0 11.1 11.0 10.9 11.0
Continuity in earnings over time (%)
Earned rewards every activity period 65.2 64.9 69.3 64.0 63.6 64.0
Earned rewards in 6 or more activity periods 97.3 96.9 97.6 96.5 94.9 97.2
Earned rewards in Year 1 but not Year 2 1.1 2.9 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.3
Earned rewards in Year 2 but not Year 1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
Earned rewards in Year 1 and Year 2 98.7 97.2 98.5 98.4 98.6 98.7
Sample size (total = 2,377) 378 423 462 370 275 469
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers activities that occurred from September 2007 though August 2008, and the second program year covers 
activities that occurred from September 2008 through August 2009.
The following NPOs opporated the Family Rewards program in each of the community districts: Groundwork, Inc., in Brooklyn CD5, 
Brownsville Multi-Service Center in Brooklyn CD16, BronxWorks in Bronx CD5, Urban Health Plan in Bronx CD6, Catholic Charities 
Community Services in Manhattan CD10, and Union Settlement Association in Manhattan CD11.
aReward amounts are calculated only for families who earned any rewards.
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Years 1 and 2 
Year 1 Year 2 Combined
Family earned (%)
Health, education, and workforce rewards 41.3 39.4 47.8
Health rewards only 2.7 5.3 1.9
Education rewards only 3.7 3.3 1.6
Workforce rewards only 0.0 0.0 0.0
Health and education rewards 50.8 48.2 47.8
Health and workforce rewards 0.3 1.2 0.2
Education and workforce rewards 0.6 0.6 0.3
Sample size 2,377
Difference between amount paid and amount earneda,b (%)
$500 or higher overpayment 1.4 0.6 1.3
$300 to $499 overpayment 1.6 0.5 1.1
$100 to $299 overpayment 13.6 1.7 5.9
$1 to $99 overpayment 26.6 1.1 8.4
Amount earned = amount paid 48.8 50.3 66.7
$1 to $99 earned but not paid 1.4 22.8 2.3
$100 to $299 earned but not paid 1.4 10.3 2.8
$300 to $499 earned but not paid 1.1 2.8 1.7
$500 or higher earned but not paid 3.5 9.8 9.9
Sample size 2,367
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Appendix Table C.2
Supplementary Information on Patterns of Reward Receipt
Outcome
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using Seedco's Family Rewards program data.
NOTES: The first program year covers activities that occurred from September 2007 through August 2008, 
and the second program year covers activities that occurred from September 2008 through August 2009. 
Payment data updated through June 15, 2009, for both program years are included in these tables. "Sample 
size" refers to the number of families with rewards earnings.
aBecause of the way the raw payment data are structured, the earnings measures that are used to match 
family earnings to family payments are calculated using validation date ranges, which reflect when a 
reward was approved as "earned" by Seedco rather than when an activity eligible for a reward was 
completed. "Year 1 earnings" for these measures includes rewards that were approved for payments as of 
November 6, 2008. "Year 2 earnings" includes all rewards approved after November 6, 2008. As a result, 
some rewards that were earned toward the end of Year 1 may appear as Year 2 earnings in this analysis. 
These yearly earnings totals differ slightly from the other yearly earnings totals presented in the report, 
which better reflect the time a required activity was completed.
bThe primary reason that families were not paid for rewards they earned was because of problems with 
their bank accounts. Opportunity NYC makes backpayments to families when accurate account information 
is provided. 
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The Family Rewards 18-Month Survey provides information about Family Rewards 
sample members on topics such as participation in employment and education activities, health 
care, employment and job characteristics, household composition, and child outcomes. As the 
survey was administered to a subset of the Family Rewards sample, it is necessary to assess the 
reliability of impact results for the survey sample along two dimensions. First, the results for the 
survey sample may or may not generalize to (or be representative of) the full sample because (1) 
only a subset of the full Family Rewards sample was selected to be interviewed; and (2) indi-
viduals who responded to the survey may be different from those who were chosen for the sur-
vey but did not respond. Second, the failure of some families to respond to the survey may 
compromise the validity of the impact estimates, particularly if response rates differ by research 
group. This appendix presents a description of the survey fielding effort and assesses the survey 
in terms of its generalizability to the full sample and its validity for estimating program impacts. 
Overall, the results suggest that the survey sample provides valid estimates of the program’s 
effects that can be generalized to the full research sample.  
Sample Selection and Survey Administration 
The research sample includes 4,750 families, 3,750 of whom were selected to be inter-
viewed for the survey, or to be in the fielded sample.1 (See Appendix Box D.1 for definitions 
of the four sample types: research, fielded, respondent, and nonrespondent.) The selection 
process occurred in two steps. First, only families who entered the study by October 31, 2007, 
were eligible to be in the survey sample. Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table D.1 show base-
line characteristics for the research sample (4,750 families) and the subsample of this group 
that was eligible for survey selection (4,093 families). (Tables for this Appendix begin on page 
292.) Overall, the group that was randomly assigned by October 31 is very similar to the full 
sample. However, there are small differences, of a few percentage points, on three related char-
acteristics: Hispanic origin, community district, and English as the primary language spoken at 
home. Separate analyses (not shown) indicate that the early cohort differed significantly from 
the later cohort on these three measures. Among the early cohort, for example, 79 percent of 
families spoke English as their primary language, compared with only 65 percent of families in 
the late cohort, for a significant difference of 14 percentage points. Differences by community 
district and Hispanic origin are similarly large. These differences reflect the strong effort later 
in the intake period to enroll families from the two community districts in the Bronx, both 
largely Hispanic areas.  
                                                   
1The unit of selection for the fielded sample was families, and the interview was administered to one adult 
family member. As shown in Chapter 2, only 5.7 percent of the research sample families had two adult partici-
pants. In those cases, the adult family member who completed the Baseline Information Form first, usually the 
female, was contacted for the survey interview.  
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From the sample that was randomly assigned by October 31, 2007, a subsample of 
3,750 families, as noted above, was selected for interviewing (the fielded sample). In order 
to ensure adequate representation of families with children in each of the three target grades 
(the fourth, seventh, and ninth grades), families were chosen to be in the survey sample 
such that one-third of the sample had a child in each target grade. That is, 1,250 of the 
fielded sample members were selected from among families with a child in the fourth 
grade; 1,250 were selected from among those with a child in the seventh grade; and 1,250 
were selected from among those with a child in the ninth grade.2
                                                   
2Selection of the fielded sample was optimized by selected background characteristics. Repeated samples 
of the target fielded sample size were drawn. The samples were evaluated based on how similar the research 
groups were on a set of baseline characteristics. The sample that resulted in the smallest difference on these 
characteristics was chosen. Specifically, a distance measure was created that summarized the standardized dis-
tance between the program and control groups on a set of background characteristics. The sample that mini-
mized this distance measure was chosen as the fielded sample. 
 As shown in the first two 
columns (under “Research Sample”) of Table D.1, however, the research sample and the 
sample that was randomly assigned by October 31, 2007, are both weighted somewhat more 
heavily toward families with ninth-graders (representing 36 percent of the sample). Thus, 
the sampling strategy for the survey involved somewhat undersampling families with ninth-
graders and oversampling families with younger children. An additional selection criterion 
Appendix Box D.1 
Sample Definitions 
Research Sample: The research sample includes all 4,750 families who were ran-
domly assigned during the sample intake period, which extended from July 2007 
through January 2008. 
Fielded Sample: Among the 4,093 families who were randomly assigned by October 
31, 2007, 3,750 families were chosen for the survey. Families were divided into three 
groups, based on the grade of the target child, and then selected at random for the sur-
vey.  
Respondent Sample: The respondent sample was made up of the fielded sample 
members who completed the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey. 
Nonrespondent Sample: The nonrespondent sample contained fielded sample 
members who did not complete the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey for various 
reasons — for example, because they were not located or because they refused to be 
interviewed. 
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was that the participating adult in the family either spoke English well or very well, or 
spoke primarily English or Spanish in the home.  
A comparison of the last two columns of the table shows that the fielded sample differs 
from the nonfielded sample in a few ways, some of which were expected. For example, there 
are differences between the two samples in the grades of the target children, with the fielded 
sample split evenly among the three grades. An unexpected difference, however, is for English 
as the primary language — 79.8 percent of families in the fielded sample spoke English as their 
primary language, compared with 67.9 percent of families in the sample that was not fielded. 
This difference, in turn, appears to be related to differences by race and citizenship status. The 
reason for these differences is not clear. However, because the nonfielded sample is a small per-
centage of the eligible sample, the fielded sample (third column) looks, on average, very similar 
to the eligible sample (second column) and to the full research sample (first column). 
The survey instrument consisted of 13 modules, some of which were designated as core 
and were administered to the entire fielded sample, and others that were designated as non-core 
and were administered to a randomly chosen subset of the fielded sample. This design strategy 
was chosen to preserve the breadth of the survey topics, while also being sensitive to the time 
burden placed on participants. Fielded sampled members were randomly distributed into three 
mutually exclusive groups, each of which completed a predefined set of the non-core survey 
modules. Some of the non-core modules were administered to more than one subsample. In ad-
dition, a survey module concerning program experiences and perceptions was administered to a 
subsample of program group respondents. 
Fielding of the survey began in December 2008. Members of the fielded sample were 
initially contacted by a letter that introduced the survey and solicited their participation. Individ-
uals were offered $30 for completing the survey, which was administered over the telephone to 
those who agreed to participate. As fielding progressed, it became evident that individuals in the 
program group were responding at a higher rate than those in the control group and that re-
sponse rates varied by community district. At that point, survey outreach efforts began to be 
targeted to address these imbalances. Survey interviews concluded in July 2009. Respondents 
were interviewed anywhere from 16 to 24 months after they were randomly assigned. Because 
of the initial imbalance in response rates by research group, control group members were inter-
viewed, on average, nearly one month later (relative to random assignment) than were program 
group members, at 18.3 months versus 17.5 months.  
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Characteristics of Respondents and Nonrespondents within the 
Fielded Sample 
Among the 3,750 families who were chosen to be surveyed, 3,082 completed a survey 
interview, for a response rate of 82.2 percent. The response rate was 84 percent for the program 
group and 80.4 percent for the control group.3
Appendix Table D.2 presents selected baseline characteristics for survey respondents 
and nonrespondents. Some differences are to be expected, given that individuals who respond to 
surveys tend to be different, usually less disadvantaged, from those who do not. The table il-
lustrates these types of differences. A higher fraction of the respondent sample, for example, 
speaks English as the primary language at home. Similarly, U.S. citizens by birth were more 
likely to have responded to the survey than were naturalized citizens and noncitizens. 
  
These differences were also tested in a regression model, in which the probability of re-
sponse was regressed on a range of baseline covariates. The results are shown in Appendix Ta-
ble D.3. Many of the statistically significant differences shown in Table D.2 remain statistically 
significant. In addition, the full model is statistically significant. The differences between the 
two groups suggest that some caution is warranted when generalizing the survey findings to the 
research sample. However, because the response rates were fairly high (nonrespondents 
represent less than 20 percent of the fielded sample), the respondent sample still looks similar to 
the fielded sample. As an example, 95.1 percent of respondents and 94.5 percent of the fielded 
sample are female (Table D.2). 
Finally, the top row of Table D.2 shows that individuals in the program group were 
more likely to respond to the survey than were those in the control group, given that program 
group members are underrepresented among nonrespondents, making up only 45 percent of the 
sample. Although it is possible that program group respondents are different from control group 
respondents, even with similar response rates between the two groups, this issue becomes more 
of a concern with differential response rates. Differences in characteristics between the program 
and control groups, in turn, lead to the possibility that impact estimates may be biased, or 
invalid. Although the difference shown in Table D.2 is not large (51.1 percent versus 45.1 per-
cent), this difference remains statistically significant in the regression model (Table D.3). 
                                                   
3Response rates for the three subsamples that were chosen to receive the various non-core modules were 
83.3 percent, 81.4 percent, and 81.9 percent. 
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Comparison Between the Research Groups in the Survey  
Respondent Sample 
Selected baseline characteristics for program and control group survey respondents are 
shown in Appendix Table D.4. Although the two groups are similar across most dimensions, 
there are a few exceptions. For example, a higher fraction of program group respondents are in 
two-parent families, compared with control group respondents. The program group is also less 
likely to receive Section 8 rental assistance. In addition, children in program group families 
scored somewhat higher on the prior year’s English language arts test than did control group 
children. Although most of these differences are small, a notable difference between the two 
groups is for earnings in the prior year, based on unemployment insurance (UI) records. Pro-
gram group respondents earned about $1,590 more than did control group respondents in the 
year prior to random assignment. 
These differences are also estimated in a regression framework, in which the likelihood 
of being in the program group is regressed on a range of baseline characteristics (Appendix Ta-
ble D.5). Although most of the differences found in Table D.4 remain statistically significant in 
the full model, the model as a whole is not statistically significant. While these differences do 
suggest caution when interpreting survey impacts, all of the characteristics for which there are 
differences between the research groups are included in the impact regression models. 
Consistency of Impacts 
The previous sections suggested some caution in interpreting the results from the survey 
for two reasons. First, the results for the survey sample may not be generalizable to the full re-
search sample, given the difference between the late cohort (not eligible for survey fielding) and 
the early cohort on English language use and related characteristics, and given the differences 
on these same characteristics between individuals who responded to the survey and those who 
did not. Second, although accounted for in the impact regression model, there were a few differ-
ences in characteristics between program and control group respondents.  
This section helps to put the survey results in context, by comparing impacts estimated 
from administrative data for the research, fielded, and respondent samples. Impacts for the re-
search sample represent the best estimate of the program’s effects, given that they use the full 
program group and control group, and not a potentially nonrandom subset of survey respon-
dents. Thus, finding similar impacts for the survey sample and the larger research sample would 
give more credibility to the survey analysis. Appendix Tables D.6 and D.7 present the results, 
showing impacts for employment outcomes, using UI records data, and education outcomes, 
using data from NYC Department of Education records.  
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Data for employment outcomes (Table D.6) show a roughly similar story for the three 
samples, although the impacts tend to be a bit more negative for the research sample than for the 
survey sample.4
Table D.7 presents impacts on education outcomes for the research, fielded, and survey 
respondent samples. The first two panels, for fourth- and seventh-graders, show that the results 
are similar for the various samples, showing small and statistically insignificant differences 
across a range of outcomes. The final panel presents impacts for ninth-graders. In general, im-
pacts are somewhat larger for the survey respondent sample than for the research and fielded 
samples, although the overall story is the same across all samples.  
 For example, the effect on “ever employed” for the research sample is −2.3 
percentage points and statistically significant, compared with −1.4 percentage points and not 
statistically significant for the survey sample. Recall that program group survey respondents had 
higher UI-based earnings in the year prior to random assignment than did control group respon-
dents, although this difference is controlled for in the impact regression model. Nonetheless, the 
data in Table D.6 suggest that findings for the survey sample are generally representative of the 
larger sample, although perhaps a bit less negative. 
Sensitivity Test: Weighting 
The impacts for the respondent sample using administrative records data are similar to 
impacts for the full sample. Nonetheless, given the differences between the respondent and oth-
er samples on factors such as race, citizenship status, and English language use, the sensitivity 
of the survey results was assessed by reweighting the survey sample to better match the full re-
search sample. In particular, the probability of survey response for the research sample was re-
gressed on a range of characteristics, including age, sex, race/ethnicity, education level, com-
munity district, citizenship status, and English language use. Survey weights were constructed 
as the inverse of the predicted probability of response.  
Weighted impacts for selected tables from the report are shown in Appendix Tables D.8 
through D.12. Overall, the impact estimates across the range of outcomes are not highly sensi-
tive to weighting. For example, the weighted results, compared with those presented in the main 
report, show similar effects on financial well-being and food security (Table D.8), similar ef-
fects on parental engagement in children’s schooling (Table D.9), and similar effects on em-
ployment at the time of the survey interview (Table D.12). A few of the health status impacts do 
appear to be somewhat sensitive to weighting (Table D.11), suggesting differential effects of the 
program for groups that may have been underrepresented in the survey. Nonetheless, given the 
                                                   
4The research sample includes all participating adults in the research families, while the fielded and re-
spondent samples include only the primary adult. 
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similarity of results across the wide range of outcomes that are presented in this report, weight-
ing the data does not alter the general conclusions about the program’s effects. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the variety of tests that were conducted and the results that are presented sug-
gest that the survey sample provides valid estimates of the program’s effects and these effects 
are representative of those that would have been obtained for the full research sample. Although 
the survey sample differed from the full sample in terms of English language use and other re-
lated variables, the administrative records impacts for the survey sample are similar to those for 
the full research sample. In addition, reweighting the survey data to represent the research sam-
ple does not change the overall story.  
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All Sample Those Assigned by Selected for Not Selected for
Characteristic Members  October 31, 2007 Fielded Sample Fielded Sample
Family baseline measures
Two-parent familya (%) 19.1 18.9 18.9 19.5
Two parents enrolled in Family Rewardsb (%) 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.4
Number of children in household (%)
1 22.8 22.9 22.7 25.1
2 34.3 34.0 34.1 32.5
3 or more 42.9 43.2 43.2 42.4
Primary language spoken at home is English (%) 76.9 78.8 79.8 67.9  ***
Family living in public housing (%) 30.4 31.2 31.4 29.0
Family receiving Section 8 rental assistance (%) 23.0 23.2 23.1 24.8
Family receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistancec (%) 24.0 23.7 23.7 23.7
Family receiving food stamps (%) 59.4 58.9 58.9 57.9
Earnings above 130% of federal poverty leveld (%) 14.9 15.0 15.0 15.6
Community District (%)
Bronx 5 15.9 13.7 13.6 14.9
Bronx 6 17.7 16.1 16.0 17.5
Brooklyn 5 19.3 20.7 20.8 19.5
Brooklyn 16 15.6 16.6 16.8 14.6
Manhattan 10 11.7 11.3 11.6 8.5
Manhattan 11 19.7 21.5 21.2 25.1
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table D.1
Characteristics of the Fielded Survey Sample at the Time of Random Assignment,
Compared with Those Not Selected for the Survey
Research Sample
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All Sample Those Assigned by Selected for Not Selected for
Characteristic Members  October 31, 2007 Fielded Sample Fielded Sample
Parents' baseline measures
Female (%) 94.3 94.2 94.5 90.9  ***
Age (%)
18-34 29.1 29.4 29.6 27.1
34-44 45.1 44.9 44.9 44.6
45-54 20.5 20.4 20.1 22.7
55 or older 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.5
Citizenship (%)
U.S. citizen by birth 67.4 68.7 69.4 61.2  ***
Naturalized U.S. citizen 15.7 15.1 14.8 18.7
Legal Permanent Resident 16.9 16.1 15.8 20.1
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 46.7 44.4 44.0 48.2  **
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 51.2 53.5 54.1 47.9
Other, non-Hispanic/Latino 2.1 2.1 1.9 3.8
Education (highest degree or diploma earned) (%)
Less than high school diploma/GED certificate 40.2 40.0 40.0 40.1
High school diploma or GED certificate 26.0 26.0 25.7 29.2
More than high school diploma/GED certificate 33.8 34.0 34.3 30.7
Currently working (%) 53.1 52.6 52.9 50.0
Working full timee (%) 37.1 37.6 37.7 36.7
Covered by public health insurance (%) 70.5 70.2 70.0 72.0
Self-rated health is good, very good, or excellent (%) 79.9 79.9 79.7 81.5
Has a physical or mental condition that limits work (%) 23.3 23.7 23.8 22.3
Over the past 2 weeks,
Had little or no interest in doing things and/or
had been feeling down, depressed, or hopeless (%) 30.9 31.2 31.3 29.8
(continued)
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Research Sample
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All Sample Those Assigned by Selected for Not Selected for
Characteristic Members  October 31, 2007 Fielded Sample Fielded Sample
Target children's baseline measures
Born in the United States (%) 92.8 93.1 93.4 89.7  **
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 47.0 44.8 44.6 46.2  ***
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 50.5 52.7 53.1 48.8
Other, non-Hispanic/Latino 2.4 2.5 2.3 5.0
Attended public school in past year (%) 98.5 98.4 98.4 99.1
Gradef (%) 
4th grade 32.8 32.6 33.3 24.8  ***
7th grade 31.4 31.7 33.3 13.7
9th grade 35.8 35.7 33.3 61.5
Covered by public health insurance (%) 79.1 78.7 78.5 81.3
Has a physical or mental condition that limits work (%) 14.1 14.3 14.6 11.3  *
Parent's rating of child's health is good, very good,
or excellent (%) 96.6 96.7 96.7 96.5
Administrative data measures
UI earnings in the year prior to random assignment ($) 10,810 10,832 10,893 10,157
TANF payments in the year prior to random assignment ($) 2,332 2,322 2,330 2,233
Food stamp payments in the year prior to random 
assignment ($) 2,323 2,308 2,319 2,193
Medicaid coverage in the 3 quarters prior to random
assignment (%) 66.2 65.3 65.1 67.0
Percentage of target children proficient on ELA test, 2007 38.5 38.4 38.5 36.7
Percentage of target children proficient on math test, 2007 55.4 55.3 56.2 44.9  ***
Sample size 4,750 4,093 3,750 343
(continued)
Research Sample
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Appendix Table D.1 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using Family Rewards Baseline Information Forms and administrative records from New York State. 
NOTES: In order to assess differences in characteristics between the fielded and nonfielded samples, chi-square tests were used for categorical 
variables, and t-tests were used for continuous variables. Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; 
* = 10 percent. 
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums.
aFamilies with parents who reported their marital status as single, single but living with a boyfriend or girlfriend, separated, divorced, or 
widowed are considered single-parent families; those with parents who reported their marital status as married or legal domestic partnership are 
considered two-parent families.
bThis refers to sample members who enrolled in Family Rewards with their spouse or legal domestic partner.
cThis includes families with child-only cases.
dIncome information is not available.
eThis refers to 30 hours or more per week. 
fGrades 4, 7, and 9 are "target grades" for the Family Rewards program, and so all families have a child in grade 4, 7, or 9.
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Survey Non- Fielded
Characteristic Respondents Respondents Sample
Assigned to program group (%) 51.1 45.1 50.0  ***
Family baseline measures
Two-parent familya (%) 18.4 21.0 18.9
Two parents enrolled in Family Rewardsb (%) 5.7 6.1 5.8
Number of children in household (%)
1 23.4 19.2 22.7  *
2 33.7 35.8 34.1
3 or more 42.9 45.0 43.2
Primary language spoken at home is English (%) 80.6 76.3 79.8  **
Family living in public housing (%) 32.6 26.1 31.4  ***
Family receiving Section 8 rental assistance (%) 24.0 19.0 23.1  ***
Family receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistancec (%) 23.1 26.2 23.7  *
Family receiving food stamps (%) 59.3 57.1 58.9
Earnings above 130% of federal poverty leveld (%) 15.0 14.8 15.0
Community District (%)
Bronx 5 13.5 14.1 13.6
Bronx 6 15.4 18.7 16.0
Brooklyn 5 20.8 20.8 20.8  **
Brooklyn 16 16.6 17.5 16.8
Manhattan 10 12.4 7.9 11.6
Manhattan 11 21.3 21.0 21.2
Parents' baseline measures
Female (%) 95.1 91.6 94.5  ***
Age (%)
18-34 28.7 33.7 29.6  *
35-44 45.3 42.8 44.9
45-54 20.6 18.0 20.1
55 or older 5.4 5.5 5.4
Citizenship (%)
U.S. citizen by birth 70.7 63.3 69.4  ***
Naturalized U.S. citizen 14.4 16.8 14.8
Legal Permanent Resident 14.9 19.9 15.8
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 43.6 46.0 44.0  **
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 54.8 50.8 54.1
Other, non-Hispanic/Latino 1.7 3.2 1.9
Education (%)
Less than high school diploma/GED certificate 39.5 42.5 40.0
High school diploma or GED certificate 25.8 25.0 25.7
More than high school diploma/GED certificate 34.7 32.5 34.3
(continued)
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Survey Non- Fielded
Characteristic Respondents Respondents Sample
Currently working (%) 52.6 54.1 52.9
Working full timee (%) 37.3 39.2 37.7
Covered by public health insurance (%) 70.6 67.3 70.0
Self-rated health is good, very good, or excellent (%) 79.8 79.6 79.7
Has a physical or mental condition that limits work (%) 24.4 21.1 23.8  *
Over the past 2 weeks,
Had little or no interest in doing things and/or
had been feeling down, depressed, or hopeless (%) 31.4 31.1 31.3
Target children's baseline measures
Born in the United States (%) 93.8 91.6 93.4  **
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 44.1 47.3 44.6  *
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 53.8 49.5 53.1
Other, non-Hispanic/Latino 2.1 3.2 2.3
Attended public school in past year (%) 98.6 97.4 98.4  **
Gradef (%) 
4th grade 33.0 34.9 33.3
7th grade 33.6 31.8 33.3
9th grade 33.4 33.3 33.3
Covered by public health insurance (%) 78.6 77.9 78.5
Has a physical or mental condition that limits work (%) 14.7 14.2 14.6
Parent's rating of child's health is good, very good,
or excellent (%) 96.6 97.3 96.7
Administrative data measures
UI earnings in the year prior to random assignment ($) 10,912 10,806 10,893
TANF payments in the year prior to random assignment ($) 2,255 2,679 2,330 **
Food stamp payments in the year prior to random 
assignment ($) 2,315 2,336 2,319
Medicaid coverage in the 3 quarters prior to random
 assignment (%) 65.6 62.9 65.1
Percentage of target children proficient on ELA test, 2007 38.3 39.7 38.5
Percentage of target children proficient on math test, 2007 55.9 57.8 56.2
Sample size 3,082 668 3,750
(continued)
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Appendix Table D.2 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using Family Rewards Baseline Information Forms and administrative 
records from New York State. 
NOTES: In order to assess differences in characteristics between respondents and nonrespondents, chi-
square tests were used for categorical variables, and t-tests were used for continuous variables. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums.
aFamilies with parents who reported their marital status as single, single but living with a boyfriend or 
girlfriend, separated, divorced, or widowed are considered single-parent families; those with parents who 
reported their marital status as married or legal domestic partnership are considered two-parent families.
bThis refers to sample members who enrolled in Family Rewards with their spouse or legal domestic 
partner.
cThis includes families with child-only cases.
dIncome information is not available.
eThis refers to 30 hours or more per week. 
fGrades 4, 7, and 9 are "target grades" for the Family Rewards program, and so all families have a 
child in grade 4, 7, or 9.
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Parameter
Variable Estimate P-Value
Family baseline measures
Assigned to program group 0.248 0.005
Target children proficient on ELA test, 2007 -0.056 0.595
Target children proficient on math test, 2007 -0.039 0.710
Community District Bronx 5 0.162 0.338
Community District Bronx 6 -0.123 0.432
Community District Brooklyn 5 0.124 0.386
Community District Manhattan 10 0.545 0.003
Community District Manhattan 11 0.072 0.640
Number of children in household -0.056 0.103
Primary language spoken at home is English 0.096 0.505
Two-parent family 0.004 0.970
High school diploma, GED certificate, or above 0.133 0.164
Currently working -0.006 0.951
Randomly assigned after September 2008 -0.085 0.447
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.583 0.034
Hispanic/Latino 0.615 0.027
U.S. citizen by birth 0.217 0.055
Age 0.009 0.090
Family living in public housing or receiving Section 8 0.447 <0.0001
Family receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistance -0.269 0.017
Covered by public health insurance 0.237 0.030
Likelihood ratio 110.8 <0.0001
Wald statistic 106.5 <0.0001
Sample size 3,750
Fielded Sample
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table D.3
Estimated Regression Coefficients for the Probability of Being a Respondent
to the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using Family Rewards Baseline Information Forms and New 
York City Department of Education administrative records.
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Program Control
Group Group All
Characteristic Respondents Respondents Respondents
Family baseline measures
Two-parent familya (%) 19.8 16.9 18.4  **
Two parents enrolled in Family Rewardsb (%) 6.8 4.5 5.7  ***
Number of children in household (%)
1 23.8 23.0 23.4
2 32.8 34.7 33.7
3 or more 43.3 42.4 42.9
Primary language spoken at home is English (%) 80.2 81.0 80.6
Family living in public housing (%) 32.7 32.4 32.6
Family receiving Section 8 rental assistance (%) 21.8 26.3 24.0  ***
Family receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistancec (%) 23.3 22.9 23.1
Family receiving food stamps (%) 59.6 59.1 59.3
Earnings above 130% of federal poverty leveld (%) 15.7 14.4 15.0
Community District (%)
Bronx 5 13.1 13.9 13.5
Bronx 6 15.1 15.8 15.4
Brooklyn 5 20.6 21.0 20.8
Brooklyn 16 16.6 16.6 16.6
Manhattan 10 12.4 12.3 12.4
Manhattan 11 22.2 20.4 21.3
Parents' baseline measures
Female (%) 95.2 95.0 95.1
Age (%)
18-34 27.3 30.2 28.7  **
35-44 44.2 46.5 45.3
45-54 22.4 18.7 20.6
55 or older 6.0 4.6 5.4
Citizenship (%)
U.S. citizen by birth 70.4 71.1 70.7
Naturalized U.S. citizen 14.6 14.1 14.4
Legal Permanent Resident 15.0 14.8 14.9
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 44.4 42.7 43.6
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 54.2 55.3 54.8
Other, non-Hispanic/Latino 1.3 2.0 1.7
Education (%)
Less than high School diploma/GED certificate 39.8 39.1 39.5
High school diploma or GED certificate 24.2 27.5 25.8
More than high school diploma/GED certificate 36.0 33.4 34.7
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Characteristics of the Survey Respondents at the Time of Random Assignment,
by Research Group
Appendix Table D.4
 301 
Program Control
Group Group Survey
Characteristic Respondents Respondents Respondents
Currently working (%) 53.2 52.0 52.6
Working full timee (%) 38.2 36.5 37.3
Covered by public health insurance (%) 70.0 71.1 70.6
Self-rated health is good, very good, or excellent (%) 79.3 80.2 79.8
Has a physical or mental condition that limits work (%) 25.0 23.8 24.4
Over the past 2 weeks,
Had little or no interest in doing things and/or
had been feeling down, depressed or hopeless (%) 30.8 32.0 31.4
Target children's baseline measures
Born in the United States (%) 94.1 93.5 93.8
Race/ethnicity (%)
Hispanic/Latino 44.8 43.3 44.1
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 53.2 54.4 53.8
Other, non-Hispanic/Latino 2.0 2.3 2.1
Attended public school in past year (%) 98.7 98.5 98.6
Gradef (%) 
4th grade 32.5 33.6 33.0
7th grade 34.2 33.1 33.6
9th grade 33.4 33.4 33.4
Covered by public health insurance (%) 78.5 78.8 78.6
Has a physical or mental condition that limits work (%) 13.3 16.1 14.7  **
Parent's rating of child's health is good, very good,
or excellent (%) 97.3 95.9 96.6  **
Administrative data measures
UI earnings in the year prior to random assignment ($) 11,691 10,101 10,912 ***
TANF payments in the year prior to random assignment ($) 2,272 2,236 2,255
Food stamp payments in the year prior to random 
assignment ($) 2,282 2,350 2,315
Medicaid coverage in the 3 quarters prior to random
assignment (%) 64.4 67.0 65.6
Percentage of target children proficient on ELA test, 2007 39.8 36.6 38.3  *
Percentage of target children proficient on math test, 2007 57.3 54.4 55.9
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
(continued)
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Appendix Table D.4 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using Family Rewards Baseline Information Forms and administrative records 
from New York State. 
NOTES: In order to assess differences in characteristics across research groups, chi-square tests were used for 
categorical variables, and t-tests were used for continuous variables. Statistical significance levels are indicated 
as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums.
aFamilies with parents who reported their marital status as single, single but living with a boyfriend or 
girlfriend, separated, divorced, or widowed are considered single-parent families; those with parents who 
reported their marital status as married or legal domestic partnership are considered two-parent families.
bThis refers to sample members who enrolled in Family Rewards with their spouse or legal domestic partner.
cThis includes families with child-only cases.
dIncome information is not available.
eThis refers to 30 hours per week or more. 
fGrades 4, 7, and 9 are "target grades" for the Family Rewards program, and so all families have a child in 
grade 4, 7, or 9.
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Parameter
Variable Estimate P-Value
Family baseline measures
Target children proficient on ELA test, 2007 0.100 0.248
Target children proficient on math test, 2007 0.096 0.256
Community District Bronx 5 -0.113 0.427
Community District Bronx 6 -0.062 0.648
Community District Brooklyn 5 -0.059 0.625
Community District Manhattan 10 -0.027 0.848
Community District Manhattan 11 0.065 0.612
Number of children in household -0.009 0.763
Primary language spoken at home is English 0.001 0.993
Two-parent family 0.179 0.071
High school diploma, GED certificate, or above -0.068 0.394
Currently working 0.077 0.356
Randomly assigned after September 2008 -0.013 0.891
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.433 0.141
Hispanic/Latino 0.504 0.089
U.S. citizen by birth 0.058 0.557
Age 0.010 0.022
Family living in public housing or receiving Section 8 -0.169 0.031
Family receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistance 0.100 0.297
Covered by public health insurance 0.009 0.920
Likelihood ratio 30.4 0.444
Wald statistic 29.8 0.473
Sample size 3,082
Respondent Sample
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table D.5
Estimated Regression Coefficients for the Probability of Being
a Program Group Respondent to the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using Family Rewards Baseline Information Forms and New York 
City Department of Education administrative records.
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Appendix Table D.6
Year 1 Impacts on UI-Covered Employment and Earnings
Difference
Outcome Average Total Average Total (Impact) P-Value
Ever employed (%)
Research sample 56.2 2,513 58.5 2,481 -2.3 ** 0.011
Fielded sample 57.1 1,873 59.2 1,875 -2.1 * 0.051
Respondent sample 57.2 1,572 58.6 1,508 -1.4 0.222
Average quarterly employment (%)
Research sample 49.0 2,513 50.3 2,481 -1.3 * 0.091
Fielded sample 49.5 1,873 50.3 1,875 -0.8 0.377
Respondent sample 50.0 1,572 50.0 1,508 0.0 0.982
Employed 4 consecutive quarters (%) 
Research sample 40.8 2,513 41.8 2,481 -1.0 0.252
Fielded sample 41.2 1,873 41.7 1,875 -0.5 0.648
Respondent sample 41.9 1,572 42.1 1,508 -0.2 0.888
Total earnings ($)
Research sample 12,114 2,513 12,354 2,481 -240 0.284
Fielded sample 12,170 1,873 12,105 1,875 65 0.801
Respondent sample 12,332 1,572 12,089 1,508 243 0.399
Program Group Control Group
for the Research, Fielded, and Respondent Samples
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York State unemployment insurance (UI) wage records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics for families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
Dollar averages include zero values for sample members who were not employed.
This table includes only employment and earnings in jobs covered by the New York State 
unemployment insurance (UI) program. It does not inlcude employment outside New York or in jobs not 
covered by UI (for example, "off the book" jobs and federal government jobs).  
Year 1 covers October 2007 through September 2008 for sample members randomly assigned before 
October 2007. For sample members randomly assigned on or after October 1, 2007, Year 1 covers January 
2008 through December 2008.
The research sample includes both adults in two-parent families. The fielded and respondent samples 
include only the adult who was fielded.  
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Appendix Table D.7
Impacts on Attendance, Test Scores, and Credits
Difference
Outcome Average Total Average Total (Impact) P-Value
4th-graders at random assignment
Attendance is 95% or higher, Year 1
Research sample 43.2 862 43.3 864 -0.1 0.973
Fielded sample 41.6 698 43.6 703 -2.1 0.430
Respondent sample 43.2 577 44.4 564 -1.2 0.682
Attendance is 95% or higher, Year 2
Research sample 44.5 862 41.6 864 2.9 0.225
Fielded sample 42.3 698 40.7 703 1.6 0.540
Respondent sample 44.4 577 40.6 564 3.9 0.189
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2
Research sample 67.6 793 68.1 803 -0.4 0.828
Fielded sample 68.0 641 68.0 654 0.0 0.998
Respondent sample 67.3 542 68.0 533 -0.8 0.765
Percentage proficient on Math test, Year 2
Research sample 80.3 790 78.6 804 1.7 0.345
Fielded sample 80.2 638 77.2 656 3.1 0.126
Respondent sample 79.7 538 77.4 536 2.3 0.306
7th-graders at random assignment
Attendance is 95% or higher, Year 1
Research sample 43.5 823 43.1 848 0.4 0.876
Fielded sample 43.0 692 43.1 687 -0.1 0.972
Respondent sample 44.6 592 44.3 540 0.3 0.927
Attendance is 95% or higher, Year 2
Research sample 36.6 823 34.9 848 1.6 0.472
Fielded sample 36.4 692 34.9 687 1.5 0.551
Respondent sample 37.8 592 37.1 540 0.8 0.786
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2
Research sample 46.5 765 46.0 802 0.5 0.824
Fielded sample 47.0 639 45.5 652 1.6 0.484
Respondent sample 47.8 557 45.9 522 1.9 0.452
Percentage proficient on Math test, Year 2
Research sample 61.9 763 63.5 793 -1.6 0.414
Fielded sample 61.2 637 62.4 646 -1.2 0.599
Respondent sample 61.7 555 61.0 518 0.7 0.769
(continued)
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Difference
Outcome Average Total Average Total (Impact) P-Value
9th-graders at random assignment
Attendance is 95% or higher, Year 1
Research sample 34.0 988 31.6 991 2.5 0.226
Fielded sample 33.9 745 31.4 743 2.5 0.290
Respondent sample 34.7 620 30.9 599 3.8 0.145
Attendance is 95% or higher, Year 2
Research sample 28.8 988 23.7 991 5.2 *** 0.006
Fielded sample 28.8 745 23.6 743 5.2 ** 0.018
Respondent sample 29.3 620 23.3 599 6.0 ** 0.013
Attempted 11 or more credits, Year 1
Research sample 87.8 988 83.9 991 3.9 *** 0.006
Fielded sample 88.3 745 82.6 743 5.7 *** 0.000
Respondent sample 90.1 620 83.8 599 6.3 *** 0.000
Attempted 11 or more credits, Year 2
Research sample 80.5 988 77.9 991 2.6 0.126
Fielded sample 80.2 745 77.7 743 2.5 0.205
Respondent sample 83.2 620 77.4 599 5.8 *** 0.007
Appendix Table D.7 (continued)
Program Group Control Group
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of family or sample members. 
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control group arose by 
chance. 
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion 
of the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
In  New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed  
"proficient." 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Any housing/utilities material hardship in the 
past 12 months (%) 49.9 58.4 -8.4 *** 0.000
Did not pay full rent or mortgage 39.0 41.5 -2.5 0.233
Evicted from home for not paying rent or mortgage 2.7 4.5 -1.9 ** 0.015
Did not pay full utility billa 23.3 29.6 -6.3 *** 0.002
Utility was turned offa 0.8 9.4 -8.6 *** 0.000
Phone service was disconnectedb 15.0 26.2 -11.2 *** 0.000
Financial well-beingc (4 = low; 16 = high) 9.3 8.7 0.6 *** 0.000
Strongly or somewhat agree with the following (%)
Financial situation is better than last year 66.3 43.9 22.4 *** 0.000
Don't worry about having enough money in future 14.1 20.7 -6.6 *** 0.000
Can generally afford to buy needed things 73.3 63.2 10.1 *** 0.000
Sometimes have enough money to buy something or go 
somewhere just for fun 33.6 26.1 7.5 *** 0.000
Family finances usually work out to have the following at end  
of month (%)
Some money left over 6.7 12.7 -6.1 *** 0.000
Just enough to make ends meet 58.5 45.4 13.1 *** 0.000
Not enough to make ends meet 34.9 41.9 -7.0 *** 0.001
Food securityd (1 = low; 4 = high) 3.4 3.2 0.2 *** 0.000
Insufficient foode (%) 14.9 22.3 -7.4 *** 0.000
Did not get needed medical care because of cost in
past 12 monthsf (%) 6.5 10.4 -3.9 *** 0.000
Did not fill prescription because of cost in past 12 months (%) 13.6 15.8 -2.1 * 0.096
Sample size (total = 2,060) 1,051 1,009
(continued)
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Appendix Table D.8 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: The items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,060) of the 
survey respondents.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differnces.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
aUtilities include gas, oil, and electricity.
bThis includes cellular or land service.
cComponents of the financial well-being scale have been coded such that a lower score implies being 
worse-off and a higher score implies being better-off. The scale is calculated by summing responses to the 
four component questions. Thus, the financial well-being scale presented here ranges from 4 to 16 points.
dThe food security question describes food eaten by the family in the prior month: 1 = Often not enough 
to eat; 2 = Sometimes not enough to eat; 3 = Enough to eat but not always the kinds of food desired; 4 = 
Enough to eat of the kinds of food desired.
eInsufficient food is defined as "sometimes" or "often times" not having enough food to eat.
fThis excludes prescriptions.
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Parent-teacher interactions since
random assignment (%)
Respondent attended parent-teacher conference 98.0 97.3 0.8 0.436
Respondent talked with teacher about grades, tests, or 
homeworka 95.1 93.8 1.3 0.389
School contacted respondent because of a problem 37.6 39.4 -1.8 0.575
Parent-child interactions in past month (%)
Respondent has done the following
 (1 = never; 4 = several times per week)
Talked with child about school 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.242 0.048
Helped child with homework 3.6 3.6 0.1 0.240 0.046
Checked to see child's homework was complete 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.156 0.060
Helped child prepare for test 3.3 3.1 0.2 *** 0.006 0.092
Allowance payments
Child receives an allowance (%) 64.6 58.5 6.1 * 0.051
Child does something to earn the allowance (%) 50.4 46.2 4.2 0.201
Average weekly allowance amount ($) 6.39 5.85 0.54 0.306
Among those who received allowance,
average weekly amount ($) 10.09 10.07 -- --
Sample size (total = 911) 468 443
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
and on Allowance Payments: Elementary School Students
Weighted Impacts on Parents’ Engagement in Focal Child’s Schooling
Appendix Table D.9
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: This table presents outcomes only for focal children who were living in the household and were in 
elementary school at the time of the interview and at random assignment. Nearly all were in the fourth-grade 
target group.
Italic type indicates comparisions that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Sample sizes vary because of missing values.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and diffences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion 
of the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
aThis excludes discussions at formal parent-teacher conferences.
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Health insurance in previous month (%)
Respondent had health insurance 95.8 92.2 3.6 *** 0.003
Publicly funded 74.2 70.4 3.8 ** 0.013
Privately, but not publicly, fundeda 21.5 21.9 -0.4 0.705
All dependent children had health insuranceb 94.5 93.7 0.8 0.367
All children covered by public health insurance onlyc 78.7 75.4 3.3 * 0.063
All children covered by private health insurance onlyc 11.2 16.8 -5.6 *** 0.000
Health insurance coverage since random assignment (%)
Respondent had a period with no coverage 16.4 20.8 -4.4 *** 0.006
Some or all of respondent's children had a 
period with no coverage 14.7 18.2 -3.5 *** 0.009
Respondent's health care utilization (%)
Has a usual source of health care 94.8 91.5 3.3 *** 0.000
Clinic or health center 62.0 53.1 8.9 *** 0.000
Doctor's office 19.2 22.2 -3.0 * 0.077
Hospital emergency room 3.8 5.1 -1.3 * 0.064
Hospital outpatient department 9.8 11.0 -1.2 0.259
Other 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.954
Has a personal doctor or health care provider 94.3 93.5 0.8 0.302
Saw a personal doctor in the past 12 months 85.2 82.3 2.9 ** 0.023
Had a health checkup since random assignment 92.8 90.3 2.5 * 0.063
Had a dental checkup since random assignment 85.0 84.5 0.5 0.748
At least 2 checkups 61.3 58.6 2.7 0.142
Stayed in hospital overnight since random assignmentd 16.8 18.3 -1.5 0.523
Unmet health needs
Did not get needed medical care because of cost in
past 12 monthse 1.3 12.9 -11.7 *** 0.000
Did not fill prescription because of cost in last 12 months 8.1 16.7 -8.6 *** 0.000
Received help finding a dentist or health care provider 5.0 9.8 -4.8 *** 0.001
from any NPO
Respondent's health care satisfaction
Average patient satisfaction scoref (1 = low; 5 = high) 3.7 3.7 0.0 * 0.088 0.014
General satisfactiong 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.419 0.018
Communicationh 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.301 0.003
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Weighted Impacts on Families’ Health Insurance Coverage and Parents’ Receipt 
Appendix Table D.10
of Health Care Services
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Technical qualityi 4.0 3.8 0.1 *** 0.001 0.017
Time spent with doctorj 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.349 0.021
Accessibility and conveniencek 3.5 3.5 0.0 0.905 0.001
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
Appendix Table D.10 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values.  
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of 
the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
aRespondents with public coverage were not asked whether they have private coverage; therefore, it is not 
possible to estimate whether they also had private coverage. Seedco's program data indicate that 5 percent of 
families in the program group earned rewards for having both private and public insurance. Even more families 
may have had both public and private insurance but did not actively submit coupons for private coverage and, 
therefore, are not captured in the program data.
bChild health-related health insurance measures were calculated for sample members with at least one child at 
the time of the survey.
cThe percentages of all children covered by public insurance and all covered by private insurance does not 
add up to the percentage of all children covered by any insurance because some families reported having children 
covered by both types of insurance. 
dThe items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 1,022) of the survey 
respondents.
eThis excludes prescriptions.
fThe items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,043) of the survey 
respondents. The five RAND Patient Satisfaction subscales are based on 10 items from the PSQ-18. Higher values 
(maximum = 5) reflect more satisfaction with medical care, whereas lower values (minimum = 1) reflect more 
dissatisfaction (http://www.rand.org/health/surveys_tools/psq/index.html). The average patient satisfaction score 
is the average of the five subscale scores.
gThe "general satisfaction" subscale is an average of the responses to two questions about agreement with the 
following statements: "The medical care I have been receiving is just about perfect" and "I am dissatisfied with 
some things about the medical care I receive." 
hThe "communication" subscale is based on agreement with the following statement: "Doctors I go to are 
good about explaining the reasons for medical tests."
iThe "technical quality" subscale is based on agreement with the following statement: "When I go for medical 
care, they are careful to check everything when treating and examining me."
jThe "time spent with doctor" subscale is an average of the responses to two questions about agreement with 
the following statements: "Doctors usually spend enough time time talking with me about my medical condition 
or treatment" and "Those who provide my medical care sometime hurry too much when they treat me." 
kThe "accessibility and convenience" subscale is an average of the responses to four questions about 
agreement with the following statements: "Where I get medical care, I have to wait too long for emergency 
treatment," "I find it hard to get an appointment for medical care right away," "I have easy access to the medical 
specialist(s) I need," and "I am able to get medical care when I need it." 
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Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
Health status
Average self-rated health (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.1 3.1 0.0 0.694 -0.001
Excellent (%) 10.4 14.5 -4.1 *** 0.002
Very good (%) 26.8 21.7 5.1 *** 0.001
Good (%) 33.3 33.7 -0.4 0.790
Fair (%) 22.6 22.0 0.5 0.698
Poor (%) 7.0 8.1 -1.1 0.216
Health conditions and risks
Has any medical conditiona (%) 49.2 52.9 -3.7 ** 0.028
Asthma 12.2 16.8 -4.6 *** 0.001
High blood pressure/hypertension 19.0 24.5 -5.5 *** 0.000
High cholesterol/high LDL 5.2 12.6 -7.3 *** 0.000
Diabetes 6.0 7.8 -1.8 0.189
Currently being treated for any medical conditiona (%) 43.1 43.9 -0.8 0.674
Asthma 9.8 14.5 -4.7 *** 0.000
High blood pressure/hypertension 18.0 20.5 -2.5 0.117
High cholesterol/high LDL 4.2 9.5 -5.4 *** 0.000
Diabetes 5.5 6.9 -1.5 0.286
Average Body Mass Index  (BMI) 30.6 30.3 0.2 0.333 0.009
Underweightb (%) 1.0 1.1 -0.1 0.746
Normal weight (%) 21.9 20.5 1.3 0.364
Overweight (%) 31.3 35.1 -3.9 ** 0.044
Obese (%) 45.9 43.2 2.7 0.186
Number of cigarettes smoked per day (%)
0 76.2 76.1 0.1 0.970
1-5 12.1 10.8 1.4 0.235
6-10 8.6 10.0 -1.5 0.158
More than 10 3.2 3.1 0.1 0.934
Psychosocial well-being
Psychological Distress Scale (K10)c (10 = low; 50 = high) 18.9 19.4 -0.5 0.154 -0.007
Experienced serious psychological distress 
in the past monthc (%) 12.7 13.2 -0.4 0.765
Average score on "state of hope" scale (6 = low; 24 = high)d 17.5 17.3 0.2 0.179 0.009
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
(continued)
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Appendix Table D.11 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose 
by chance. 
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a 
proportion of the standard deviation of the outcomes for both groups combined. 
aThe four most commonly reported conditions are listed.
bWeight categories are from the National Institute of Health. Underweight is defined as having a BMI 
of less than 18.5. Normal weight is defined as having a BMI between 18.5 and 24.9. Overweight is 
defined as having a BMI between 25.0 and 25.9. Obesity is defined as having a BMI at least 30.0. Five 
percent of the sample are excluded from this analysis because of missing data.
cThis item measures the score on Kessler's Psychological Distress Scale (K10), a 10-item 
questionnaire intended to yield a global measure of distress based on questions about anxiety and 
depressive symptoms that a person has experienced in the most recent four-week period. See Kessler et al. 
(2002). A randomly selected subsample (N = 2,043) was asked these questions.
dThe "state of hope" scale measures the level of ongoing goal-directed thinking. The response codes 
(1 to 4) of the six items for each person are summed, with lower values representing less goal-directed 
thinking and higher values representing more. The scale is taken from Snyder et al. (1996). A randomly 
selected subsample of survey respondents (N = 2,043) was asked these questions. 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employment status (%)
Currently employed at time of survey 60.7 55.6 5.1 *** 0.003
Characteristics of current joba
Average hourly wage ($) 13.09 12.82 -- --
Less than $7.00 (%) 7.9 7.8 0.1 0.955
$7.00 - $8.99 (%) 9.9 7.8 2.1 ** 0.029
$9.00 or more (%) 37.5 31.5 6.0 *** 0.000
Not reported (%) 5.4 8.5 -3.1 *** 0.001
1-19 4.4 3.0 1.4 ** 0.030
20-29 7.5 7.4 0.0 0.964
30-34 8.9 6.3 2.7 *** 0.003
35 or more 39.0 37.6 1.4 0.394
Not reported 0.9 1.3 -0.5 0.181
Worked at least 30 hours per week (%) 48.2 44.5 3.7 ** 0.030
Average weekly earnings ($) 445 440 -- --
Usual work schedule (%)
Regular daytime shift 44.6 42.3 2.2 0.202
Regular evening/night shift 7.1 6.8 0.4 0.670
Rotating or split shift 5.2 4.2 1.0 0.179
Irregular shift 2.8 1.6 1.3 ** 0.015
Other 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.413
Self-employed (%) 6.5 6.7 -0.3 0.837
Employer-provided benefitsb (%)
Paid sick days 34.9 31.3 3.7 *** 0.005
Paid vacation days 37.9 34.7 3.2 ** 0.015
Paid holidays, including Christmas and New Year's Day 37.8 34.9 2.9 ** 0.030
Dental benefits 27.8 27.1 0.7 0.610
A retirement plan 29.2 26.4 2.8 ** 0.039
A health or medical insurance plan 31.3 29.0 2.2 * 0.089
Enrolled in a work-related health or medical
insurance plan 23.3 22.4 0.9 0.450
(continued)
Hours worked per week (%)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table D.12
Weighted Impacts on Job Characteristics
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employment search (%)
Looked for work in previous 4 weeks 26.8 26.9 -0.1 0.948
Received help finding a job from a 10.8 14.2 -3.4 *** 0.009
Program or agencyc 5.3 9.4 -4.1 *** 0.000
Unemployment agency 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.943
Job center 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.356
Temp agency 0.5 0.7 -0.2 0.438
Work Force One Center or One-Stop 1.7 1.3 0.4 0.374
Community organization 0.6 0.1 0.5 ** 0.016
Other 1.0 5.8 -4.8 *** 0.000
Sample size (total = 3,082) 1,574 1,508
Appendix Table D.12 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Italic type indicate comparisons that are nonexperimental. Statistical tests were not performed.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the differences between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
aIf a respondent currently works multiple jobs, then only the primary job is reported. (The job at which the 
respondent works the most hours is considered primary.)  
bThis includes benefits that are or eventually will be offered, regardless of whether the respondent receives 
them.
cPercentages for finding help through specific programs or agencies do not add up to the percentage who 
found help from a program or agency because several sample members did not know the exact source of help or 
refused to answer.
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The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table E.1
Impacts on Income and Material Well-Being, by Employment Status
at the Time of Random Assignment
Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employed at time of random assignment
Income
Average total household income in prior month
excluding Family Rewards paymentsa ($) 1,919 1,883 36 0.635
Average total household income in prior month
including Family Rewards paymentsb,c ($) 2,248 1,884 364 *** 0.000
Percentage of families with household income at or below
the federal poverty levelb,c 46.4 58.3 -11.9 *** 0.000
Total household income in prior year as a percentage of the
federal poverty levela,b (%)
Less than 50% 9.4 21.5 -12.2 *** 0.000
50% - 100% 37.1 36.8 0.3 0.939
101% - 129% 15.5 14.8 0.7 0.759
130% or more 38.1 26.9 11.2 *** 0.000
Family savings and debt ($)
Average savingsd 754 545 209 0.164
Average debte 8,206 7,132 1,075 0.155
Material hardship and financial strain
Any housing/utilities material hardship in past 12 months (%) 54.1 58.6 -4.4 0.141
Did not pay full rent or mortgage 39.7 43.0 -3.3 0.276
Evicted from home for not paying rent or mortgage 2.4 3.5 -1.1 0.282
Did not pay full utility billf 28.3 29.9 -1.5 0.578
Utility was turned offf 5.7 8.8 -3.1 * 0.051
Phone service was disconnectedg 19.5 27.3 -7.8 *** 0.003
Financial well-beingh (4 = low; 16 = high) 9.3 8.8 0.5 *** 0.000
Strongly or somewhat agree with the following (%)
Financial situation is better than last year 63.5 48.1 15.5 *** 0.000
Don't worry about having enough money in future 20.5 20.3 0.1 0.959
Can generally afford to buy needed things 71.6 64.9 6.7 ** 0.018
Sometimes have enough money to buy something or go 
somewhere just for fun 31.5 29.6 1.9 0.508
Family finances usually work out to have the following at end  
of month (%)
Some money left over 14.9 13.7 1.2 0.577
Just enough to make ends meet 54.8 48.4 6.4 ** 0.037
Not enough to make ends meet 30.3 37.9 -7.6 *** 0.008
(continued)
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Appendix Table E.1 (continued)
Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Food securityi (1 = low; 4 = high) 3.4 3.3 0.1 *** 0.009
Insufficient foodj (%) 12.7 19.9 -7.2 *** 0.001
Sample size (total = 1,081) 558 523
Not employed at random assignment
Income
Average total household income in prior month
excluding Family Rewards paymentsa ($) 1,379 1,238 140 ** 0.024
Average total household income in prior month
including Family Rewards paymentsb,c ($) 1,612 1,238 374 *** 0.000
Percentage of families with household income at or below
the federal poverty levelb,c 72.3 82.4 -10.1 *** 0.000
Total household income in prior year as a percentage of the
federal poverty levela,b (%)
Less than 50% 25.0 39.0 -14.0 *** 0.000
50% - 100% 47.3 43.4 3.9 0.270
101% - 129% 13.4 8.7 4.7 ** 0.031
130% or more 14.3 8.9 5.4 ** 0.013
Family savings and debt ($)
Average savingsd 385 160 225 ** 0.020
Average debte 5,869 5,477 392 0.563
Material hardship and financial strain
Any housing/utilities material hardship in past 12 months (%) 55.9 56.1 -0.3 0.932
Did not pay full rent or mortgage 37.6 40.0 -2.4 0.448
Evicted from home for not paying rent or mortgage 2.9 5.5 -2.6 * 0.051
Did not pay full utility billf 30.6 26.0 4.6 0.112
Utility was turned offf 5.6 8.4 -2.9 * 0.081
Phone service was disconnectedg 20.4 23.5 -3.1 0.241
Financial well-beingh (4 = low; 16 = high) 9.0 8.7 0.3 ** 0.023
Strongly or somewhat agree with the following (%)
Financial situation is better than last year 62.4 40.6 21.9 *** 0.000
Don't worry about having enough money in future 17.0 19.8 -2.8 0.272
Can generally afford to buy needed things 67.1 62.8 4.3 0.173
Sometimes have enough money to buy something or go 
somewhere just for fun 25.5 24.5 1.0 0.719
Family finances usually work out to have the following at end  
of month (%)
Some money left over 9.4 10.2 -0.9 0.664
Just enough to make ends meet 52.0 44.0 8.0 ** 0.014
Not enough to make ends meet 38.6 45.7 -7.1 ** 0.024
Food securityi (1 = low; 4 = high) 3.4 3.2 0.2 *** 0.001
Insufficient foodj (%) 16.9 24.2 -7.2 *** 0.005
Sample size (total = 952) 476 476
(continued)
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Appendix Table E.1(continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES:The items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,033) of the 
survey respondents.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences in impacts across subgroups were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
aMonthly household income amounts equal to or greater than $10,000 were excluded from this calculation.
bFamily Rewards payments are based on Seedco's Family Rewards data from program Year 2, which 
include activities completed in September 2008 through August 2009. The monthly Family Rewards payment 
amount is calculated by dividing the annual reward amount by 12. The payment data do not include bonus 
payments that some families received for opening new bank accounts.
cAnnual household income is calculated by multiplying by 12 income in the month prior to the survey 
interview. For program group members, it includes Family Rewards payments received during Year 1.
dA total of 7 percent of the sample are excluded from this analysis due to missing data.
eDebt amounts equal to or greater than $100,000 were excluded from these calculations. The survey 
questions on savings and debt are largely framed around family finances; thus, it is most likely that participants 
are reporting debt accumulated by the family. A total of 9 percent of the sample are excluded from this analysis 
because of missing or out-of-range values.
fUtilities include gas, oil, and electricity.
gThis includes cellular or land service.
hComponents of the financial well-being scale have been coded such that a lower score implies being 
worse-off and a higher score implies being better-off. The scale is calculated by summing responses to the four 
component questions. Thus, the financial well-being scale presented here ranges from 4 to 16 points.
iThe food security question describes food eaten by the family in the prior month: 1 = Often not enough to 
eat; 2 = Sometimes not enough to eat; 3 = Enough to eat but not always the kinds of food desired; 4 = Enough 
to eat of the kinds of food desired.
jInsufficient food is defined as "sometimes" or "often times" not having enough food to eat.
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employed at random assignment
Family composition
Current marital status
Single, never married 42.1 47.1 -5.1 ** 0.020  
Married and living with spouse 21.4 16.8 4.5 *** 0.002  
Separated or living apart from spouse 17.7 20.3 -2.6 0.195  
Divorced 16.7 13.4 3.3 * 0.061  
Widowed 2.2 2.4 -0.2 0.789  
Housing statusa
Currently lives in public or subsidized housing 62.6 66.0 -3.4 0.203  
Moved since time of random assignment 10.1 14.1 -4.0 ** 0.045  
Sample size (total = 1,599) 823 776
Not employed at random assignment
Family composition
Current marital status
Single, never married 49.6 53.6 -4.1 * 0.075  
Married and living with spouse 16.8 14.0 2.8 ** 0.034  
Separated or living apart from spouse 14.9 15.2 -0.3 0.882  
Divorced 13.3 11.1 2.3 0.188  
Widowed 5.4 6.1 -0.7 0.570  
Housing statusa
Currently lives in public or subsidized housing 77.3 79.3 -2.0 0.444  
Moved since time of random assignment 11.4 16.2 -4.8 ** 0.032  
Sample size (total = 1,440) 725 715
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table E.2
Impacts on Household Composition and Housing Status, by Parent’s Employment
Status at the Time of Random Assignment
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent.
Differences in impacts across subgroups were tested for statistical significance. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
aThe items in this section of the survey were administered to a random subsample (N = 2,060) of 
survey respondents.
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employed at random assignment
Quarters 2-5
Ever received TANF/SNA (%) 19.6 19.9 -0.3 0.777  
Amount of TANF/SNA received ($) 1,017 901 116 0.145  
Ever received food stamps (%) 51.0 51.4 -0.5 0.777  
Amount of food stamps received ($) 1,753 1,826 -72 0.344  
Sample size (total = 2,614) 1,313 1,301
Not employed at random assignment
Quarters 2-5
Ever received TANF/SNA (%) 53.8 55.9 -2.2 * 0.085  
Amount of TANF/SNA received ($) 3,441 3,371 71 0.637  
Ever received food stamps (%) 82.0 81.9 0.1 0.938  
Amount of food stamps received ($) 3,179 3,100 80 0.396  
Sample size (total = 2,274) 1,143 1,131
High school diploma or GED certificate
at random assignment
Quarters 2-5
Ever received TANF/SNA (%) 29.1 29.8 -0.8 0.485
Amount of TANF/SNA received ($) 1,637 1,590 47 0.619
Ever received food stamps (%) 58.4 58.1 0.3 0.829
Amount of food stamps received ($) 2,059 2,078 -19 0.802
Sample size (total = 2,852) 1,400 1,452
No high school diploma or GED certificate 
at random assignment
Quarters 2-5
Ever received TANF/SNA (%) 46.6 46.7 -0.1 0.954
Amount of TANF/SNA received ($) 2,962 2,681 281 * 0.057
Ever received food stamps (%) 76.7 77.0 -0.3 0.836
Amount of food stamps received ($) 2,965 2,926 40 0.687
Sample size (total = 1,946) 1,012 934
(continued)
Appendix Table E.3
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
First-Year Impacts on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or 
Safety Net Assistance (SNA) and Food Stamp Receipt and Payment, 
by Parent’s Employment and Education Level at the Time of Random Assignment
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Appendix Table E.3 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using administrative records data from the New York State Human Resources 
Administration.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent, † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that differences between the program and control groups arose by 
chance.
Dollar averages include zero values for sample members who are not receiving TANF or food stamps.
TANF/SNA and food stamp receipt and payment data are available for four quarters of follow-up after the 
quarter of random assignment. Thus, this table presents impacts for the first year of program participation.
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Scored at or above proficiency level 
on annual math test in prior yeara
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 49.2 47.1 2.1 0.412  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 48.8 45.4 3.4 0.180  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 61.4 63.3 -1.9 0.396  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 77.2 76.5 0.7 0.749  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 86.9 86.2 0.7 0.666  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 90.7 87.7 3.0 * 0.057  
Sample size (total = 1,552) 803 749
Scored below proficiency level
on annual math test in prior yeara
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 33.0 34.1 -1.2 0.782  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 36.5 29.3 7.2 * 0.079  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 21.0 17.9 3.1 0.360  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 34.3 38.1 -3.8 0.360  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 29.0 26.2 2.9 0.468  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 39.1 39.2 -0.1 0.977  
Sample size (total = 557) 264 293
Time of Random Assignment, by Performance in Prior Year 
Impacts on School Outcomes for Elementary School Students at the 
Appendix Table F.1
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education 
administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for 
multiple observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control 
groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups 
arose by chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 school year and the 2008-2009 school year, respectively.
aIn New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed  
"proficient." 
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Parent earned at least a high school diploma/GED certificate 
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 47.7 46.4 1.4 0.583  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 45.4 42.3 3.1 0.200  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 55.4 53.0 2.4 0.290 ††
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 68.3 66.0 2.3 0.284  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 76.5 74.4 2.1 0.285  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 82.0 79.2 2.8 0.112  
Sample size (total = 2,065) 1,010 1,055
Parent did not earn at least a high school diploma/GED certificate 
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 37.4 33.7 3.7 0.195  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 38.2 34.8 3.4 0.239  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 40.5 45.4 -4.9 * 0.078 ††
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 55.0 55.8 -0.9 0.755  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 67.9 67.0 1.0 0.701  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 74.4 71.8 2.6 0.269  
Sample size (total = 1,512) 818 694
at the Time of Random Assignment, by Parent’s Education
Impacts on School Outcomes for Elementary School Students
Appendix Table F.2
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: In most cases, the subgroup for parent's education level is based on the mother's education 
level. Father's education level is used in male-only households.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for 
multiple observations per family. 
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control 
groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups 
arose by chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 school year and the 2008-2009 school year, respectively.
Year 1 test scores are for grades 3 through 5, and Year 2 scores are calculated for grades 2 through 5.
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Program Control Difference
School Ranking and Outcome Group Group Impact P-Value Sig.
Students in lower-ranking schools
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 40.4 42.3 -1.9 0.563 †
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 38.9 40.3 -1.4 0.670  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 45.2 43.7 1.5 0.628  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 60.6 58.2 2.4 0.439  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 67.1 64.6 2.5 0.378  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 73.7 69.8 3.9 0.175  
Sample size (total = 927) 465 462
Students in medium-ranking schools
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 40.8 39.7 1.1 0.693 †
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 43.4 38.2 5.2 * 0.070  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 45.9 47.5 -1.5 0.585  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 60.1 60.4 -0.3 0.910  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 71.3 69.5 1.8 0.493  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 78.1 75.4 2.7 0.231  
Sample size (total = 1,382) 699 683
Students in higher-ranking schools
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 48.5 40.2 8.3 ** 0.011 †
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 44.4 38.3 6.1 * 0.055  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 59.1 60.5 -1.4 0.683  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 69.9 69.2 0.7 0.829  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 81.9 84.4 -2.4 0.339  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 86.0 84.6 1.4 0.542  
Sample size (total = 1,082) 556 526
(continued)
Time of Random Assignment, by School Environment
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Appendix Table F.3
Impacts on School Outcomes for Elementary School Students at the 
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Appendix Table F.3 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: School environment is measured as the average ELA and math test scores by grade in the 2005-2006 and 
2006-2007 school years. Higher-ranking schools have a pass rate of 84 percent or higher; medium-ranking schools 
have a pass rate of 73 percent to 83 percent; and lower-ranking schools have a pass rate of 72 percent or lower.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple observations 
per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
Year 1 test scores and proficiency are shown for grades 3 through 5 at random assignment. Year 2 test 
scores are shown for grades 2 through 5 at random assignment.
In New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed "proficient."
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Scored at or above proficiency level 
on annual math test in prior yeara
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 52.0 50.1 1.9 0.490  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 44.0 40.8 3.2 0.246  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 64.4 66.0 -1.5 0.506  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 71.4 69.6 1.8 0.488  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 84.6 84.6 0.0 1.000  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 86.7 88.6 -1.9 0.348  
Sample size (total = 1,293) 659 634
Scored below proficiency level
on annual math test in prior yeara
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 31.8 29.2 2.6 0.343  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 27.9 22.8 5.0 * 0.052  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 22.0 20.4 1.6 0.473  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 26.6 25.0 1.6 0.539  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 29.7 27.5 2.3 0.383  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 38.8 37.8 0.9 0.773  
Sample size (total = 1,194) 565 629
Time of Random Assignment, by Performance in Prior Year
Impacts on School Outcomes for Middle School Students at the 
Appendix Table F.4
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education 
administrative records.
NOTES: Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for 
multiple observations per family. 
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control 
groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups 
arose by chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
Year 1 test scores and proficiency are shown for the grades 6 through 8 at random assignment. 
Year 2 test scores are shown for grades 6 and 7 at random assignment. 
aIn New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed  
"proficient." 
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Program Control Difference
Subgroup and Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Parent earned at least a high school diploma/GED certificate
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 47.1 43.7 3.4 0.207  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 40.9 35.6 5.3 ** 0.045  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 51.0 51.9 -0.9 0.677  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 56.5 56.1 0.3 0.889  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 65.2 61.6 3.6 * 0.094  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 68.7 71.2 -2.5 0.282  
Sample size (total = 1,401) 694 707
Parent did not earn at least a high school diploma/GED certificate
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 36.6 34.2 2.4 0.421  
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 29.5 28.1 1.5 0.602  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 35.7 34.3 1.4 0.565  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 43.1 40.2 2.9 0.290  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 50.4 49.9 0.5 0.843  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 58.6 57.2 1.4 0.608  
Sample size (total = 1,091) 529 562
at the Time of Random Assignment, by Parent’s Education
Impacts on School Outcomes for Middle School Students
Appendix Table F.5
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: In most cases, the subgroup for parent's education level is based on the mother's education level. 
Father's education level is used in male-only households.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for 
multiple observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control 
groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups 
arose by chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
Year 1 test scores and proficiency are shown for grades 6 through 8 at random assignment. Year 2 
test scores are shown for grades 6 and 7 at random assignment.
In New York State, students who score at level 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed 
"proficient."
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Program Control Difference
School Ranking and Outcome Group Group Impact P-Value Sig.
Students in lower-ranking schools
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 32.1 35.0 -3.0 0.384 †
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 28.2 26.9 1.3 0.692  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 35.7 29.7 6.0 ** 0.028 †
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 34.8 35.5 -0.7 0.829  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 45.1 47.6 -2.5 0.413  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 50.8 53.5 -2.7 0.444  
Sample size (total = 821) 392 429
Students in medium-ranking schools
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 37.0 35.6 1.3 0.697 †
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 36.4 29.8 6.6 ** 0.045  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 42.4 41.9 0.5 0.844 †
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 52.4 50.2 2.2 0.505  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 59.3 55.4 3.9 0.171  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 66.5 63.5 2.9 0.362  
Sample size (total = 836) 389 447
Students in higher-ranking schools
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 1 (%) 55.0 46.0 9.0 ** 0.023 †
Attendance rate 95% or higher, Year 2 (%) 42.8 37.6 5.2 0.174  
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 1 59.0 62.3 -3.3 0.315 †
Percentage proficient on ELA test, Year 2 62.9 61.3 1.6 0.628  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 1 73.4 70.4 3.0 0.278  
Percentage proficient on math test, Year 2 76.6 80.0 -3.4 0.221  
Sample size (total = 639) 336 303
(continued)
Time of Random Assignment, by School Environment
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards 
Appendix Table F.6
Impacts on School Outcomes for Middle School Students at the 
            
                  
                
                      
                   
            
               
          
 334 
  
Appendix Table F.6 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from New York City Department of Education administrative 
records.
NOTES: School environment is measured as the average ELA and math test scores by grade in the 2005-2006 
and 2006-2007 school years. Higher-ranking schools have a pass rate of 84 percent or higher; medium-ranking 
schools have a pass rate of 73 percent to 83 percent; and lower-ranking schools have a pass rate of 72 percent or 
lower.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of family or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Sample sizes may vary because of missing values.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
A two-tailed t-test was applied to the differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
Years 1 and 2 cover the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, respectively.
Year 1 test scores and proficiency are shown for grades 6 through 8 at random assignment. Year 2 test 
scores are shown for grades 6 and 7 at random assignment.
In New York State, students who score at a level of 3 or higher on a 4-point scale are deemed "proficient."
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Medicaid coverage among children not
receiving TANF/SNA at random assignment
Quarter of random assignment (%) 59.5 58.9 0.5 0.606
Quarter 2 60.7 61.4 -0.8 0.523
Quarter 3 61.9 60.9 1.0 0.418
Quarter 4 62.0 60.4 1.6 0.207
Quarter 5 62.4 59.7 2.7 ** 0.043
Quarter 6 61.5 59.1 2.4 * 0.077
Quarter 7 60.4 59.7 0.8 0.592
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 45.7 44.9 0.8 0.562
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 3.7 3.6 0.1 0.216
Sample size (total = 8,040) 4,001 4,039
Medicaid coverage among children
receiving TANF/SNA at random assignment
Quarter of random assignment (%) 88.9 87.4 1.5 0.291
Quarter 2 87.9 85.9 2.0 0.281
Quarter 3 85.0 83.9 1.1 0.583
Quarter 4 84.5 81.1 3.4 * 0.088
Quarter 5 82.0 79.1 2.9 0.176
Quarter 6 79.7 76.2 3.5 0.117
Quarter 7 80.1 77.2 2.9 0.187
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 61.5 60.0 1.5 0.585
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 5.0 4.8 0.2 * 0.063
Sample size (total = 2,897) 1,466 1,431
Medicaid coverage among all children
Quarter of random assignment (%) 67.6 66.9 0.6 0.451
Quarter 2 68.2 68.4 -0.2 0.803
Quarter 3 68.1 67.4 0.8 0.482
Quarter 4 68.1 66.2 1.9 * 0.080
Quarter 5 67.6 65.1 2.5 ** 0.025
Quarter 6 66.5 64.1 2.4 ** 0.037
Quarter 7 65.7 64.8 0.9 0.454
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 50.2 49.1 1.1 0.398
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 4.0 4.0 0.1 0.109
Sample size (total = 11,264) 5,640 5,624
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table G.1
 Impacts on Child Medicaid Receipt, by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) or Safety Net Assistance (SNA) Status at the Time of Random Assignment
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Appendix Table G.1 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using administrative records data from the New York State Human Resources 
Administration. 
NOTES: Because reliable data on start and end dates are not available, Medicaid receipt in a given quarter is 
measured using the recipient's status on the first day of that quarter.
The sample excludes 67 members randomly assigned between January and March 2008.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of families or sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups.
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
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The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table G.2
Impacts on Parents’ Health Status, by Respondent’s Education Level
at the Time of Random Assignment
Program Control Difference Effect
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Size
High school diploma/GED certificate
Average self-rated health (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.3 3.2 0.1 * 0.087 0.070  
Has any medical condition (%) 51.2 49.8 1.3 0.547  
Currently being treated for any medical conditiona (%) 44.2 41.8 2.4 0.268  
Experienced serious psychological distress 
in the past montha (%) 9.6 11.5 -1.9 0.279  
Sample size (total = 1,820) 922 898
No high school diploma/GED certificate 
Average self-rated health (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.1 3.0 0.1 * 0.067 0.098  
Has any medical conditiona (%) 56.1 54.2 1.9 0.480  
Currently being treated for any medical conditiona (%) 51.0 48.7 2.3 0.402  
Experienced serious psychological distress 
in the past montha (%) 17.3 15.0 2.2 0.405  
Sample size (total = 1,186) 610 576
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from responses to the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Differences in impacts across subgroups were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
The effect size is the difference between program and control group outcomes expressed as a proportion of 
the standard deviation of the outcome for both groups combined.
aThis item measures the score on Kessler’s Psychological Distress Scale (K10), a 10-item questionnaire 
intended to yield a global measure of distress based on questions about anxiety and depressive symptoms that a 
person has experienced in the most recent four-week period. See Kessler et al. (2002). A randomly selected 
subsample of survey respondents (N = 2,043) were asked these questions.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employed
Health insurance coverage in previous month
Respondent had coveragea 95.4 93.1 2.2 * 0.058  
All dependent children had coverageb,c 94.5 93.0 1.5 0.239  
Health insurance coverage since random assignment
Respondent had a period with no coverage 17.6 20.6 -3.0 0.130  
Some or all of respondent's children had a period
with no coverageb 15.7 19.3 -3.6 * 0.068  
Respondent's health care utilization
Had a health checkup since random assignment 93.7 92.0 1.7 0.178  
Had at least 1 dental visit since random assignment 87.1 84.0 3.1 * 0.089  
Had at least 2 visits 69.3 58.5 10.8 *** 0.000  
Unmet health needs
Did not get needed medical care because of cost in
past 12 monthsd 6.6 10.7 -4.1 *** 0.003  
Did not fill prescription because of cost in past 12 months 14.8 17.9 -3.2 * 0.088  
Sample size (total = 1,599) 823 776
Not employed
Health insurance coverage in previous month
Respondent had coveragea 95.9 94.5 1.3 0.236  
All dependent children had coverageb,c 95.2 94.1 1.1 0.382  
Health insurance coverage since random assignment
Respondent had a period with no coverage 14.6 18.2 -3.6 * 0.066  
Some or all of respondent's children had a period
with no coverageb 12.7 16.2 -3.6 * 0.063  
(continued)
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Impacts on Family’s Health Insurance Coverage and Parents’ Receipt of Health Care,
Appendix Table G.3
by Employment Status at the Time of Random Assignment
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Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Respondent's health care utilization
Had a health checkup since random assignment 92.5 91.6 0.9 0.551  
Had at least 1 dental visit since random assignment 85.3 82.4 3.0 0.134  
Had at least 2 visits 65.4 57.6 7.8 *** 0.003  
Unmet health needs
Did not get needed medical care because of cost in
past 12 monthsd 6.3 10.1 -3.8 *** 0.008  
Did not fill prescription because of cost in past 12 months 12.5 13.9 -1.4 0.434  
Sample size (total = 1,440) 725 715
Appendix Table G.3 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from responses to the Family Rewards 18-Month Survey.
NOTES: Sample sizes vary because of missing values.  
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Differences in impacts across subgroups were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; †† = 5 percent; † = 10 percent.
aThe percentage of sample members who have any type of health insurance coverage may not necessarily 
equal the sum of those with public coverage and private coverage because of missing values. 
bChild-related health insurance measures were calculated for sample members with at least one child at the
time of the survey interview.
cThe percentages of all children covered by public insurance and all covered by private insurance do not add 
up to all covered by any insurance because some families with multiple children may have some covered by public 
and others covered by private insurance.
dThis excludes prescriptions.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employed at enrollment
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 37.0 34.8 2.2 0.159  
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 3.1 3.0 0.1 0.143  
Sample size (total = 2,614) 1,313 1,301
Not employed at enrollment
Covered by Medicaid in all 7 quarters from
time of random assignment (%) 62.9 59.3 3.6 * 0.053  
Average number of quarters covered by Medicaid 4.9 4.8 0.1 0.164  
Sample size (total = 2,274) 1,143 1,131
The Opportunity NYC Demonstration: Family Rewards
Appendix Table G.4
 Impacts on Parents’ Medicaid Receipt,
by Respondent’s Employment Status at the Time of Random Assignment
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using administrative records data from the New York State Human Resources 
Administration.
NOTES: Because reliable data on start and end dates were not available, Medicaid receipt in a given quarter is 
measured using the recipient's status on the first day of that quarter.
The sample excludes 30 members randomly assigned between January and March 2008.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of familes and sample members. Standard errors were adjusted to account for multiple 
observations per family.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differnces.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between outcomes for the program and control groups. 
The p-value indicates the likelihood that the difference between the program and control groups arose by 
chance. 
Differences across subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance. Statistical significance levels 
are indicated as follows: ††† = 1 percent; ††= 5 percent; † = 10 percent. 
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how and why the program’s effects occur. In addition, it tries to place each project’s findings in 
the broader context of related research — in order to build knowledge about what works across 
the social and education policy fields. MDRC’s findings, lessons, and best practices are proac-
tively shared with a broad audience in the policy and practitioner community as well as with the 
general public and the media. 
Over the years, MDRC has brought its unique approach to an ever-growing range of policy 
areas and target populations. Once known primarily for evaluations of state welfare-to-work 
programs, today MDRC is also studying public school reforms, employment programs for ex-
offenders and people with disabilities, and programs to help low-income students succeed in 
college. MDRC’s projects are organized into five areas: 
• Promoting Family Well-Being and Child Development 
• Improving Public Education 
• Promoting Successful Transitions to Adulthood 
• Supporting Low-Wage Workers and Communities 
• Overcoming Barriers to Employment 
Working in almost every state, all of the nation’s largest cities, and Canada and the United 
Kingdom, MDRC conducts its projects in partnership with national, state, and local govern-
ments, public school systems, community organizations, and numerous private philanthropies. 
 

